proves that the doctrine may be defended from other sources of evidence, as well as from the proper meaning of the term; but it is giving up the argument from that source. It is allowing that the term everlasting stands for nothing, unless you can prove from the connection, that it must mean endless: whereas by the other mode of reasoning, the word itself, wherever it occurs, establishes the doctrine; unless they can prove from the connection, that the proper sense is inadmissible. But farther: the above is only argumentum ad hominem, which is adapted to silence an opposer, rather than convince him. I do not say it is unfair reasoning with persons who hold the eternity of future rewards: but Universalists, rather than admit of eternal punishment, will call this in question. This is actually done by Mr. Vidler:* and if we concede with your correspondent, that the word awvios itself proves nothing, I acknowledge that I do not perceive how the doctrine of endless punishment, or of endless rewards, is to be maintained from Matt. xxv. 46. We must, as far as I see, relinquish that important post, and fly to some other source of evidence. We may assert, that " the term being applied to the states of the righteous and the wicked, after the day of judgment," requires it to be taken in the sense of endless; but we should be told, this is begging the question; the very point at issue being, whether every thing that takes place after the day of judgment be endless.

Respecting baptism, your correspondent "willingly admits, that I might introduce that topic for no other reason than that it appeared to me an apt illustration of the rule I was endeavouring to establish for the interpretation of scripture; and hopes that I shall as readily give him credit for a proper motive, in entering a protest against such an application of my principle." As to motives, I had no other than a desire to ascertain what is truth; and I give him credit that such is his. But why must not the

* Letters to Mr. Fuller, p. 95.

principle in question be applied to pædobaptism, as well as other things? He does not mean to suggest, I presume, that this subject is exempted from examination by the courtesy of the country. If the principle be false, or misapplied, I hope we shall be able to discover the fallacy, or wherein the misapplication consists.

Mr. Greatheed calls in question two things:-(1) Whether the word ẞaTTigw primarily signifies to immerse-(2) If it do, whether this be the only meaning that ought to be called in to settle the dispute.-With respect to the first, my assertion may, as he observes, be "too comprehensive to be supported by due evidence in your publication."* I was aware of this at the time, and therefore referred to Mr. Booth's "Pædobaptism Examined," vol. i. chap. 2, where no less than eighty two of the most learned pædobaptists acknowledge the native, primary, or proper meaning of the word to be IMMERSION. Your correspondent in answer, refers to Dr. Williams's "Antipædobaptism Examined;" and I in reply, may refer to Mr. Booth's "Defence." The reader who wishes to examine this subject to the bottom, will find, I presume, in these three performances all that is necessary for the purpose.

Your correspondent asks, in the second place, "If the primary meaning of the word Banτiw were to immerse, yet why should that be the only meaning called in to settle the dispute." I answer-(1) Because, as Dr. Williams says, "It is not fair, nor agreeable to the just rules of criticism, to interpret the words of an author allusively, improperly, and metaphorically, except when plain necessity urges." Let it but be proved, that plain necessity urges the proper meaning of Barrigw, when applied to the ordinance of baptism, to be given up in favour of one that is improper, and I consent to call it in.—(2) Because, as Mr. Greatheed himself allows, "the primitive sense of a term, when it can clearly be ascertained, ought not to be accommodated to any of its figurative applications:" and

* Biblical Magazine, 1803.

that it can easily be ascertained in this case, is granted in the supposition. All secondary and figurative meanings therefore, by his own concession, ought to be excluded in the settling of this controversy.

But your correspondent supposes, that though the word BaTTigw should be allowed primarily to mean immersion, yet that a secondary or improper sense of the term, might be that on which the primitive christians acted. "Wherefore is it impossible, he asks, that the first christians should have used the term, with as little idea of immersion, even had that been its primary sense, as the jews had of greenness, when they spoke of the month abib.”Nothing that I have advanced supposes this to be "impossible." But it lies upon my friendly opponent to prove that it must have been so: otherwise, according to Dr. Williams's and his own acknowledgment, it is " unfair, and contrary to the just rules of criticism," to suppose this to have been the case. I can prove that when the term abib is applied to a month, it must needs be taken in a figurative sense; as it would involve an absurdity to translate it as in Job viii. 12, by the abstract term greenness. Let him prove the same necessity for affixing a figurative meaning to BaTTięw, and his point is gained.

Mr. Greatheed goes farther: he affirms, that "when the term BaTTicw is specifically used for the initiatory ordinance of the gospel dispensation, its application must be admitted to be figurative." Indeed! Indeed! But wherefore? If instead of this assertion, which appears to me to be utterly unfounded, he had given evidence of it, it had been to purpose. Let him but prove that the word, when applied to baptism, requires to be understood in a secondary or improper sense, or that to understand it properly would involve an absurdity; and I say again, his point is gained. If he succeed in proving this however, he will disprove what he says he has "long since been led to apprehend-that its primary meaning is not immersion." I suppose he means ablution; for if the primary meaning of ßartigw be ablution, and baptism were originally ad

ministered by immersion, the term, with respect to that ordinance, must have been applied in its literal, and not in a figurative sense.

PROPER AND IMPROPER USE OF TERMS.

In Reply to the Rev. Samuel Greatheed.

YOUR correspondent intimates, that some things in my last tended to "provoke asperity." Nothing was farther from my design: but if by what I considered a stroke or two of pleasantry, I have excited any such feelings, I sincerely beg his pardon, and will endeavour to avoid every thing of the kind in future. It never was my intention to rank pædobaptists with universalists or socinians, in the manner which his note represents; but merely to point out their agreement in one principle of reasoning; and I should think, notwithstanding his assertion, he would be sorry to be put to the proof of it.*

With respect to the principle of interpretation, he thinks "nothing more is necessary, than to bring into one point of view the variations in my manner of stating it." By this it would seem that I have shifted my ground, and in effect conceded the matter in dispute. At first, my statement was thus expressed: 'In arguments from the meaning of scripture terms, it becomes of importance to ascertain the true, primitive, or proper sense, and to measure all secondary and figurative applications by it as a standard.' Afterwards, it seems, I modified this principle,

* In this and the following paragraph, the Editor has omitted a few personalities and other momentary circumstances, as totally unconnected with the subject in debate, and less deserving the attention of the reader.

that it can easily be a in the supposition. A ings therefore, by his cluded in the settling

But your correspon βαπτίζω should be all yet that a secondary be that on which the fore is it impossibl should have used t sion, even had tha had of greenness, w Nothing that I ha possible." But it li that it must have be liams's and his ov contrary to the ju to have been the abib is applied t figurative sense; a late it as in Job Let him prove t meaning to βαπτι Mr. Greathee the term βαπτιζι ordinance of the be admitted to If instead of t utterly unfoun been to purpos applied to bap dary or impro would involv is gained. I disprove wh apprehendI suppose he

οι βαπτίζω 1

every word be taken in its literal, -am per sense, unless there be any thing in the at in the subject, which requires it to be taken And lastly, I am contented with saying, 'If @olan ascertain what was the obvious meaning of a wirt, at the time wien the author wrote, we thereby ascertax to every purpose of just reasoning, what is its primayr per meaning. Whether any "change has oda y adment on this subject, or whether we have only meanderstood each other," he does not determaz bar serms to think, that as to the general principle, we are now nearly agreed.

my

In answer. I must say, there is no alteration in jat: the while therefore must be attributed to modstanding. With respect to the first statement, I never entered my mind that all words are to be understad terally, or properly; but merely that the literal is the standard sense, or that all allusive meanings are to be measured by that to which they allude But the answers of Mr. Greatheed proceed upon the supposition, that I was pleading for the primitive sense of the term *being invariably adhered to." It is only on this suppost in that what was afterwards said, could be considered as "a modification of my principle." The truth is, I held no principle that required modifying. I never för a moment thought of maintaining any other idea than that *every word should be taken in its literal, primary, or proper sense, unless there be any thing in the subject that requires it to be taken otherwise.'‚ In proof of this, I could refer to two pamphlets, of which you know that I approve; and in which this subject is more fully handled nan can be expected in these papers.*

Wh respect to my last "variation," as it is called, it were answer to an exception which he had made to mwing to the difficulty in many cases, of 1 she primitive, and which the figura

sal, site is Scruciar's Review, Letters vii. xi,