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(i) Examples of Contractor Performance Evaluation Reports.

System planning by
supervisory, personnel,
studies checked by
engineers.

Direct charges set and
accounted for on each
work package.

Exceeds original estimate
on change orders 10
percent time and meets
original design costs.

Design parameters estab

lished by system
engineers and held in
design plans.

Provides services as part
of normal design func-
tion without extra
charges.

Exceeds original estimate
on change orders 5
percent time.

Methods to design plans
limited to less than 5
percent as result lack
engineering system
correlation.

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No cost overruns on
original estimates
absorbs service demands
by shipyard.

Never exceeds estimates
of original package or
change orders.

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NOTE: Provide supporting data and/or justification for below average or outstanding item ratings.

[33 F.R. 19905, Dec. 28, 1968]

X .30
.30
X .40

Total item weighed rating

Total weighed rating..
Rated by:-
Signature(s).

X .30 =

§ 3.405-6 Cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract. (a) Description. The cost-plus-afixed-fee contract is a cost reimbursement type of contract which provides for the payment of a fixed fee to the contractor. The fixed fee once negotiated does not vary with actual cost, but may be adjusted as a result of any subsequent changes in the work or services to be performed under the contract. Because the fixed fee does not vary in relation to the contractor's ability to control costs, the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract provides the contractor with only a minimum incentive for effective management control of costs.

The cost-plus-a

(b) Application. fixed-fee contract is suitable for use when:

(1) A cost-reimbursement type of contract is found necessary in accordance with § 3.405-1(b);

(2) The parties agree that the contract should be fee bearing;

(3) The contract is for the performance of research, or preliminary exploration or study, where the level of effort required is unknown; and where measuring achievements in contract performance does not lend itself to the subjective evaluation required in contracts; or

CPAF

(4) The contract is for development and test where the use of a CPIF is not practical.

(c) Limitations. (1) This type of contract normally should not be used in the development of major weapons and equipment, once preliminary exploration and studies have indicated a high degree of probability that the development is feasible and the Government generally has determined its desired performance objectives and schedule of completion (see 3.405-4). The cost-plus-a-fixedfee contract shall not be used for procurements categorized as either Engineering Development or Operational System Development (see § 4.101(a) (6) and (7) of this chapter), which have undergone contract definition, except that where it may be more advantageous to do so, and with the approval of the head of a procuring activity or his designee, it may be used in these categories for individual procurements, ancillary to the development of a major weapon system or equipment, where the purpose of the procurement is clearly to determine or solve specific problems associated with the major weapon system or equipment.

(2) 10 U.S.C. 2306(d) provides that in the case of a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract the fee shall not exceed ten percent (10%) of the estimated cost of the contract, exclusive of the fee, as determined by the Secretary concerned at the time of entering into such contract (except that a fee not in excess of fifteen percent (15%) of such estimated cost is authorized in any such contract for experimental, developmental, or research work and that a fee inclusive of the contractor's cost and not in excess of six percent (6%) of the estimated cost, exclusive of fees, as determined by the Secretary concerned at the time of entering into the contract, of the project to which such fee is applicable is authorized in contracts for architectural or engineering services relating to any public works or utility projects). As to fee limitations on subcontracts, see § 3.807-10 (d).

(d) Completion or term form. The cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract can be drawn in one of two basic forms, completion or term.

(1) The completion form is one which describes the scope of work to be done as a clearly defined task or job with a definite goal or target expressed and with a specific end-product required. This form of contract normally requires the contractor to complete and deliver the specified end-product (in certain instances, a final report of research accomplishing the goal or target) as a condition for payment of the entire fixedfee established for the work and within the estimated cost if possible; however, in the event the work cannot be completed within the estimated cost, the Government can elect to require more work and effort from the contractor without increase in fee provided it increases the estimated cost.

(2) The term form is one which describes the scope of work to be done in general terms and which obligates the contractor to devote a specified level of effort for a stated period of time. Under this form, the fixed-fee is payable at the termination of the agreed period of time on certification of the contractor that he has exerted the level of effort specified in the contract in performing the work called for, and such performance is considered satisfactory by the Government. Renewals for further periods of performance are new procurement and involve new fee and cost arrangements.

(3) The completion form of contract, because of differences in obligation as

sumed by the contractor, is to be preferred over the term form whenever the work itself or specific milestones can be defined with sufficient precision to permit the development of estimates within which prospective contractors can reasonably be expected to complete the work, as is usually the case in advanced development and engineering development. A milestone is a definable point in a program when certain objectives can be said to have been accomplished.

(4) In no event should the term form of contract be used unless the contractor is obligated by the contract to provide a specific level-of-effort within a definite period of time.

[33 F.R. 19907, Dec. 28, 1968] § 3.406

§ 3.406-1

Other types of contracts.

Time and materials contracts.

(a) The time and materials type of contract provides for the procurement of supplies or services on the basis of (1) direct labor hours at specified fixed hourly rates (which rates shall include wages, overhead, general and administrative expense, and profit), and (2) material at cost, and, in addition, where appropriate, material handling costs as a part of material cost. Material handling costs may include all indirect costs, including general and administrative expense, allocated to direct materials in accordance with the contractor's usual accounting practices consistent with Part 15 of this chapter. Such material handling cost should include only costs clearly excluded from the labor hour rate. This type of contract does not afford the contractor any positive profit incentive to control the cost of materials or to manage his labor force effectively.

(b) Application. The time and materials contract is used only where it is not possible at the time of placing the contract to estimate the extent or duration of the work or to anticipate costs with any reasonable degree of confidence. Particular care should be exercised in the use of this type of contract since its nature does not encourage effective management control. Thus it is essential that this type of contract be used only where provision is made for adequate controls, including appropriate surveillance by Government personnel during performance, to give reasonable assurance that inefficient or wasteful methods are not being used. This type of contract may be used in the procurement

of (1) engineering and design services in connection with the production of supplies; (2) the engineering, design and manufacture of dies, jigs, fixtures, gauges, and special machine tools; (3) repair, maintenance or overhaul work; and (4) work to be performed in emergency situations.

(c) Limitation. Because this type of contract does not encourage effective cost control and requires almost constant Government surveillance, it may be used only after determination that no other type of contract will suitably serve. This type of contract shall establish a ceiling price which the contractor exceeds at his own risk. The contracting officer shall document the contract file to show valid reasons for any change in the ceiling and to support the amount of such change.

(d) Optional method of pricing material. When the nature of the work to be performed requires the contractor to furnish material which is regularly sold to the general public in the normal course of business by the contractor, the contract may provide for charging material on a basis other than at cost if:

(1) The total estimated contract price does not exceed $25,000 or the estimated price of material so charged does not exceed twenty percent (20%) of the estimated contract price;

(2) The material to be so charged is identified in the contract;

(3) No element of profit on material so charged is included in the profit in the fixed hourly labor rates; and

(4) The contract provides that the price to be paid for such material shall be on the basis of an established catalog or list price, in effect when material is furnished, less all applicable discounts to the Government: Provided, That in no event shall such price be in excess of the contractor's sales price to his most favored customer for the same item in like quantity, or the current market price, whichever is lower.

[29 F.R. 6917, May 27, 1964, as amended at 33 F.R. 19907, Dec. 28, 1968]

§ 3.406-2 Labor-hour contract.

(a) Description. The labor-hour type of contract is a variant of the time and materials type contract differing only in that materials are not supplied by the contractor.

(b) Application. See § 3.406–1(b). (c) Limitations. See § 3.406–1(c). [29 F.R. 6918, May 27, 1964]

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In addition to the profit incentives to control costs, inherent in many of the contract types, and combinations thereof, described in §§ 3.404 through 3.406, there are other means of providing profit incentives to contractors, which are described below, to obtain extra management attention and effort. Increases in profits or fees resulting from the use of incentive provisions are made only because cost, performance, or other contractual goals or standards have been surpassed.

§ 3.407-2 Contracts with performance incentives.

(a) Description. A contract with a performance incentive is one which incorporates an incentive to the contractor to surpass stated performance targets by providing for increases in the fee or profit to the extent that such targets are surpassed and for decreases to the extent that such targets are not met. Salient features and consideration in the use of this type of contract are as follows:

(1) "Performance", as used in this section, refers not only to the performance of the article being procured, but to the performance of the contractor as well. Performance which is the minimum which the Government will accept shall be mandatory under the terms of the Completion form contract and shall warrant only the minimum profit or fee related thereto. Performance which meets the stated targets will warrant the "target" profit or fee. Performance which surpasses these targets will be rewarded by additional profit or fee. The incentive feature (providing for increases or decreases, as appropriate) is applied to performance targets rather than performance requirements.

(2) The incentive, when applied to the product, should relate to specific performance characteristics, such as range of a missile, speed of an aircraft or ship, thrust of an engine, maneuverability of a vehicle, and fuel economy, However, high overall performance of the end item is the primary objective of such contracts. Accordingly, the incentive feature should reflect a balancing of the various characteristics which together account for overall performance, so that no one characteristic will be exaggerated to the detriment of the end item as a whole. When applied to the

performance of the contractor, the incentive should relate to specific performance areas or milestones, such as delivery or test schedules, quality controls, maintenance requirements, and reliability standards.

(3) Since performance tests generally are essential in order to determine the degree of attainment of performance targets, the contract must be as specific as possible in establishing test criteria, such as conditions of testing, precision of instrumentation, and interpretation of test

data.

(4) It is essential that there be explicit agreement between the Government and the contractor as to the effect on performance of contract changes (e.g., pursuant to the Changes clause).

(5) Care must be exercised, in establishing performance criteria, to give recognition to the fact that the contractor should not be rewarded or penalized for attainments of Government-furnished components.

(6) In establishing incentives in connection with delivery schedules, it is important to determine the Government's primary objectives in a given contract. In some instances, earliest possible delivery is of paramount importance. In others, early quantity production is essential. On the other hand, it may be that maintaining an established delivery schedule is all that is desired, and that a bettering of such schedule may disrupt continuity of production or run counter to funding limitations.

(7) It is important that incentive arrangements relating to delivery schedules specify the application of the reward/ penalty structure in the event of Government-caused delays (e.g., delays in allotting additional funds to a contract) and other delays beyond the control of the contractor or subcontractor, and without the fault or negligence of either.

(b) Application. Contracts with performance incentives are suitable for use in procurements where it is desired to provide the contractor with an incentive in the form of financial reward for surpassing stated performance targets, counterbalanced by a penalty in the form of decreased profit or fee for failure to achieve such targets. Performance incentives are particularly appropriate for inclusion in contracts for major weapons and equipment, both in development when desired performance objectives are known and the fabrication of prototypes for test and evaluation is required, and

in production where there is potential for improved performance that would be highly desirable to the Government. Effort always should be made in these procurement situations to include a performance incentive in the contract. Performance incentives present complex problems in contract administration and should be negotiated and administered by contracting officers with the full cooperation of Government engineering and pricing specialists.

(c) Limitations. (1) Performance incentives, when related to the performance of the product, may result in increased costs and shall always, except under firm fixed-price contracts, be coupled with a balancing of range of fee or profit on the cost and performance aspects, negotiated so as to give appropriate weight to basic procurement objectives. Where incentives relating to the performance of the product are included in a contract, and earliest possible delivery is of considerable importance to the Government, the contract normally should include a performance incentive relating to time of performance or for expedited delivery schedules.

(2) In the case of cost-plus-incentivefee or cost-plus-award-fee type contracts, the maximum fee shall not exceed the limitation stated in § 3.405-6(c) (2). [27 F.R. 4015, Apr. 27, 1962, as amended at 29 F.R. 6918, May 27, 1964; 31 F.R. 7807, June 2, 1966; 33 F.R. 19907, Dec. 28, 1968] § 3.408

Letter contract.

(a) Description. A letter contract is a written preliminary contractual instrument which authorizes immediate commencement of manufacture of supplies, or performance of services, including, but not limited to, reproduction planning, and the procurement of necessary materials.

letter

contract

(b) Application. A may be entered into when (1) the interests of national defense demand that the contractor be given a binding commitment so that work can be commenced immediately, and (2) negotiation of a definitive contract in sufficient time to meet the procurement need is not possible, as, for example, when the nature of the work involved prevents the preparation of definitive requirements, specifications, or cost data.

(c) Limitations. (1) A letter contract shall be used only after a written determination that no other type of contract is suitable.

(2) A letter contract shall not be entered into without competition when competition is practicable. Where a letter contract award is based on price competition, an overall price ceiling shall be included in the letter contract.

(3) A letter contract shall be superseded by a definitive contract at the earliest practicable date. The letter contract shall reflect an agreement between the Government and the contractor as to the date by which definitization is expected to be completed and a definitization schedule, as required by § 7.802-5. This date shall be prior to:

(i) The expiration of 180 days from the date of the letter contract; or

(ii) Forty percent (40%) of the production of the supplies, or the performance of the work, called for under the contract, whichever occurs first.

In extreme cases, an additional period may be authorized.

(4) The maximum liability of the Government stated in the letter contract will be the amount estimated to be necessary to cover the contractor's requirements for funds prior to definitization, but this amount shall not exceed fifty percent (50 percent) of the total estimated cost of the procurement unless advance approval is obtained from the official authorizing the letter contract. (5) The total estimated cost shall not exceed the funds available for obligation and commitment in the appropriate allotment account. Therefore, the letter contract shall not describe, refer to, or otherwise commit the Government to a definitive contract in excess of the funds available for obligation and commitment at the time the letter contract is executed.

(6) Amendments to letter contracts to accomplish new procurement may be used only if the new procurement is inseparable from the procurement covered by the existing letter contract. Such amendments are subject to the same limitations as new letter contracts.

(d) Content. Letter contracts shall be specifically negotiated and, as a minimum, shall include the clauses required by Subpart H, Part 7 of this chapter. Whether executed on Standard Form 26 or Standard Form 30, a definitized contract will be numbered as a modification of the letter contract.

[27 F.R. 4015, Apr. 27, 1962, as amended at 30 F.R. 5971, Apr. 29, 1965; 31 F.R. 9854, July 21, 1966; 33 F.R. 19907, Dec. 28, 1968]

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