The following persons, who are diplomatic representatives of the allied countries in Paris, have been appointed as a permanent committee of the economic conference:

Belgium:

M. G. Peltzer, vice president of the Union Economique Belge. France:

M. Denys Cochin, minister of state, president of the committee. M. Gout, minister plenipotentiary, under secretary of the foreign office.

Contre Amiral Amet, vice president of the committee.

Italy:

Prince Ruspoli, minister plenipotentiary, Italian Embassy in Paris. Commandeur del Abbadessa, assistant general director of the cus

toms.

Col. Brancaccio.

Japan:

Tatsuke, counsellor of the Japanese Embassy in Paris.

Great Britain:

Earl Granville, counsellor of the British Embassy in Paris.
Portugal:

M. de Vilhena.

Russia:

Sevastopoulo, counsellor of the Russian Embassy in Paris. Batcheff, commercial attaché at the Russian Embassy in Paris. Servia:

TRADE AGREEMENTS ABROAD

ARTICLES

RELATING TO

THE RESOLUTION (S. 220) “REQUESTING THE PRESIDENT TO
ASCERTAIN CERTAIN INFORMATION RELATING TO A RECENT
COMMERCIAL CONFERENCE HELD IN PARIS, FRANCE BY
CERTAIN EUROPEAN NATIONS," TOGETHER WITH THE RE-
MARKS OF SENATOR WILLIAM J. STONE AND SENATOR
HENRY CABOT LODGE DELIVERED IN THE UNITED STATES
SENATE THEREON AND THE MESSAGE OF THE
PRESIDENT IN RESPONSE THERETO

WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

SUBMITTED BY MR. STONE.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
July 7 (calendar day, July 10), 1916.

Ordered, That certain articles on trade agreements abroad relating to the resolution of the Senate of June 29, 1916, requesting the President to ascertain certain information relating to a recent commercial conference held in Paris, France, by certain European nations, together with the remarks of Senator William J. Stone and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge thereon, and the message of the President of the United States in response thereto, be printed as a Senate document.

Attest:

JAMES M. BAKER, Secretary.

TRADE AGREEMENTS ABROAD.

REMARKS OF SENATOR WILLIAM J. STONE DELIVERED IN THE SENATE JULY 10, 1916.

Mr. STONE. Mr. President, I ask the Senator in charge of the Agricultural appropriation bill to allow me a few moments to present a question I deem to be of grave international import, and to ask that certain documents I have on my desk may be printed as a public document.

I have put in as brief form as I could what I desire to say to the Senate, and I should like to have, if I can, the considerate attention of the Senate. What I am about to say relates to Senate resolution 220, which I presented June 29, and which was agreed to on the following day. The resolution relates to the recent economic conference or convention held in Paris.

Mr. BRANDEGEE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Missouri be kind enough to state the number of the resolution which he is discussing? I did not catch it.

Mr. STONE. I am addressing my remarks to Senate resolution No. 220.

Mr. President, all of us are deeply sensible of the horrors incident to the great war in Europe. It would be useless for me to dwell upon that. I do not know, nor do you, how this mighty struggle will eventuate. No doubt we entertain individual opinions as to that, but such opinions are of necessity speculative and uncertain; moreover, it would not be thought to be the proper thing for any of us in this presence and at this time to express an opinion on that subject. All that we can assert is that sometime in the not distant future this stupendous butchery of men-men representing what is of the best in our Christian civilization-must end. To be sure whatever this great neutral Nation of ours may properly do to hasten that end should be done, and no doubt will be done. But my present purpose does not lead me into that consideration. For the present my eye is upon the end of the conflict, whenever and however that end may come. My eye is fixed upon the possible, may I not say probable, consequences of that end upon the well-being of this country. I am for the present confining my vision to our own horizon. Already the great nations engaged in this struggle have, as we know, reached a point of great embarrassment to all of them-financially, industrially, economically. If the war should go on to a bitter endthat is, to a final arbitrament of armed strength and endurance-the embarrassment alluded to will of necessity be enormously increased. After it is all over what will the party victorious do, or be inclined to do, and in what way may the post-bellum policies of the victorious party affect our country and people? Of late I have been observ

ing various things bearing upon this question. The things I have been observing relate to the possible policies of the victor, whoever that may be, when the doubtful issue of victory has been decided. Whether from the standpoint of the central-Germanicpowers or from the standpoint of the entente allies, it follows inevitably that whatever they have in mind to do is at least, in large measure dependent upon the final outcome of the struggle. The defeated party will likely have little to say; the victorious party will have much to say.

Mr. President, ought not we to be giving serious thought and attention to the outline of policies the tentative, conditional policies of these combatant nations as these outlines come to us? What does Germany have in mind to do in a commercial way if her arms should compel her enemies to yield? And what will the great powers of the entente alliance have in mind to do if victory should rest in the end upon their banners? I am not for the moment concerned about maps, about territorial changes, about successions to thrones, about governmental autonomies. I have in mind the things that may directly and immediately concern the material welfare of this country in particular, and in a larger sense of this hemisphere in general. It is not my present purpose to discuss these questions at length or with particularity of detail; perhaps we have not yet reached the point where that can be done advisedly. I wish merely to call passing and urgent notice to some of the things that have challenged my thought and attracted my attention.

First, let it be supposed that Germany should be the victor. What would the German policy be with respect not only to her enemy belligerent nations, but with respect to the world at large?

Of course I can not answer this question satisfactorily, much less authoritatively. Still some things come to us it is worth while to take note of. Among other things to which my attention has been called is an article written by Gustaf Sioesteen-written in Berlin and printed in a Swedish publication. From that article I wish to make the following significant quotation:

A commencement of this new economical connection is being made by the negotiations entered on by representatives of Austria-Hungary and Germany concerning the proposed formation of a customs union. Since this union would include 120,000,000 individuals, it must be evident what an immense attraction it must exert on the surrounding smaller nations. Switzerland and Holland can scarcely escape this attraction, and the Scandinavian countries, it is said, would probably find it to their advantage, together with a liberated Finland, to form a northern customs union, which later, on an independent basis, could enter in close union with the vast "Zollverein " of central Europe.

This "Zollverein" would then include about 175,000,000 individuals. The adhesion of Italy to the vast union would not be inconceivable, and then the combination of the United States of Europe, founded on a voluntary commercial union, would be approaching its realization.

Such a commercial union, embracing various peoples, could only lead to moderation in foreign politics and would be the best guaranty for the peace of the universe. A brisk interchange of commodities, a fruitful interchange of cultural ideas, would result from such a union, connecting the polar seas with the Mediterranean and the Netherlands with the steppes of southern Russia.

Of course this is not official or in any sense authoritative, but I have some good reason, although I do not feel at liberty to state the grounds of that reason, to believe that it is in some large way expressive of German governmental policy. That is all I care to say at this time on that subject. If true, it is very important.