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provide the agencies with those resources. Of greater importance to consumers, none of these proposals recognize that the federal bank regulators are already overextended and that, as a consequence, they are not fulfilling all of their statutory mandates.

Mildred Brown of ACORN, from her experience of trying to enforce the Community Reinvestment Act, stated:

And from where ACORN members sit, most regulators look and sound just like bankers. It is hard to believe that regulators are paid With these to protect our interests.

Most

experiences behind us, ACORN is worried about the grab by banks for expanded powers. banks have not come close to living up to their current legal responsibilities to serve low and moderate income people.

(emphasis in original)

Because of their concerns that Congress has not fully addressed all of the potential dangers to individual consumers and to the economy as a whole associated with giving banks new securities powers, three of the witnesses requested Congress explicitly to extend the moratorium to enable Congress to fully Specifically, Bankwatch suggested that Congress adopt legislation quickly that would set in motion investigate these concerns. a two year investigation of these issues under the direction of the House and Senate Banking Committees and that the legislation should identify the issues that Congress should investigate.

economy.

9.

Banks Should Not Neglect Their Intermediary Role Financial intermediation is an essential function in our Only a very small percentage of American businesses can qualify for investment-grade ratings on their obligations. While a few of the rest may be able to issue so-called junk bonds, the vast majority need a bank with which they can develop an ongoing, reactive business relationship with sufficient mutual understanding to encourage the extension of credit and the proper handling of the credit relationship when things get rough. This vast majority is essentially a captive audience. When Congress long ago instituted federal deposit insurance, it was clear that not only depositors but the banks The world now knows that the FDIC and the Federal Reserve discount window are firmly behind banking themselves would benefit. The aura of organizations and not just their $100,000 accounts. that government support makes money flow into bank certificates of deposits from all over the world on an unsecured basis at

When Congress conferred this benefit on the banking industry, however, it did not intend for banks to take favorable rates. the money and run in all directions with it. It was banking, the critical job of the financial intermediary that provides credit to companies and citizens that cannot access the capital markets, that was to be backed by federal insurance funds and the federal treasury.

Expansion of banking organizations into additional non-banking activities would not only jeopardize the federal safety net surrounding the insured deposits, but would encourage neglect of the functions that are the raison-d'etre of banks and If banking create a void in our economic structure. organizations, as they claim, can make bigger profits elsewhere, will traditional lending become a poor cousin when banks are given carte blanche to engage in other activities? If Salomon Brothers is driven by balance sheet concerns to eliminate its municipal bond operations, will bank holding companies cut back on their banking operations if their performance is mediocre Bank holding relative to their non-banking subsidiaries?

companies are supposed to tend to their banks; bank holding companies that hold banks and an assortment of other subsidiaries may not, if the drive to maximize the bottom-line If this phenomenon is leads them to neglect their banking role. encouraged, financing for essential sectors of the economy such as the farm and energy areas and small business may become scarce, to the detriment of the nation's financial health.

10.

Securities Industry Is Highly Competitive

The American securities industry has served American
business very well over the past fifty years and has been an
important source of equity capital for new businesses and for
The innovation in
growth and liquidity for existing businesses.
securities instruments and in financing transactions has been
remarkable, particularly in the past ten years.

Statistics on the volume of underwriting tend to indicate that five or six firms account for the majority of underwriting This data has of certain types of debt and equity securities. been cited as evidence of concentration in the securities industry, but concentration should not be confused with lack of Indeed, in his testimony last month before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, price competition. Regulation and Insurance of the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, while discussing competition in the securities industry, stated, "I would emphasize that concentration per se need not lead to higher consumer costs, because the possibility that new firms will enter a market may be sufficient to achieve competitive prices.

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recent years. The securities industry is highly competitive and margins on underwriting and brokerage services have tended to decline in While profit levels have been good over the past layoffs and mergers. few years, the health of the industry has been cyclical, and the present period is one in which there have been a large number of The 1970s witnessed a severe shakeout as under the competitive strains. hundreds of firms failed or merged and thousands lost their jobs

Developments in the securities business in the last six to
eight years have shown the need for increased capital for
securities firms because of the size and risks of transactions.
business and many try.
The industry is wide-open to entrants; anyone except banks can
ingredients.
become involved in any and all aspects of the securities
Capital and expertise are essential
There have been a dozen major acquisitions of
mergers among securities firms.
securities firms by financial and non-financial companies and
Some commercial firms have been
a strong source of capital for the securities industry.

The lead underwriters in major transactions recently have had capital of over $500 million and often over $1 billion. Because of the special nature of the securities business, particularly the large size of many transactions and related large capital requirements, new entrants into the business tend in the larger transactions. to specialize in niches rather than compete for a lead position The potential for mergers or entry into the business by non-financial companies, nevertheless, exercises a moderating influence on pricing in the industry. As Chairman Greenspan indicated, this is the effect of potential future competition, which regulatory agencies and courts take into account in deciding whether a sector is unduly concentrated. Appendix III-B-10 shows that the top five U.S. securities firms ranked by capital over the past eight years has the competitiveness of the industry. changed and has been shared by nine different firms, evidence of The appendix also shows the marked increase in growth in capital of these firms that has been required to compete in their segment of the market. For example, the top ranked firm in 1980 had just under $1 billion ranked in 1980, had over $3 billion in capital. in capital and the top ranked firm in 1986, which was the fourth

It is also important to realize that the securities industry is not composed of only large companies. There are many companies, indeed hundreds, that have only a small number important segment of the business. of employees and a handful of offices and they constitute an 5,000 firms in the securities business. Altogether, there are over

Independent of the question of whether from an abstract competition viewpoint banking organizations, as additional suppliers of services, should be encouraged to enter the

this is appropriate policy. securities business to a greater extent,

is the issue of whether Large banks, in particular those who have severe exposure from loan positions with developing now for their banking activities. nations, do not seem to have much, if any, excess capital right Also, because the risk-reward policy grounds, ratio of handling large transactions is high, it is questionable whether banking organizations should be encouraged, on public to enter the securities business to provide an additional source of competition because organizations affiliated with government-backed deposit insurance funds should shocks to which the securities business is prone. not, on policy grounds, be allowed to become vulnerable to the

A recent study on rapid financial market change and
systemic risk, by the Bank for International Settlements in
risk in the securities business
Basel, Switzerland, emphasizes two factors that contribute to
-- the innovation in financial
instruments and their pricing and the speed and force with which
market strains may be transmitted around the globe with the
international integration of financial markets. The study
emphasizes that the pricing of new instruments is difficult and
systemic risk:
there has been considerable mispricing of such securities and
transactions in large part because of competition that increases

Financial markets are highly competitive.
profit margins.
and there is continuous pressure to narrow
If in this environment,

markets seriously underprice assets, then

dilute the capital base of financial losses will appear, which, if widespread, could

institutions and expose the financial system as

a whole to risk.

SIA believes that the securities industry is highly competitive and that special risk factors of the securities in the false name of increased competition. business mitigate against placing the federal safety net at risk

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IV.

BANK PARTICIPATION IN SECURITIES AND OTHER NON-BANKING ACTIVITIES WILL RESULT IN UNFAIR COMPETITION AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

Bankers are fond of calling for repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act to create a level playing field" permitting head to head competition between banks and securities firms. However, banks enjoy a variety of government-conferred special benefits that enable them to transact business at a significantly lower cost than non-banking competitors. In addition, their role as lenders enables banks to use their The entry of credit facilities to tie-in unrelated services. banks into non-banking activities is therefore likely to c: eate not a level playing field, but a field sharply tilted in the It is not only the integrity of competition that is called into question by the participation of banks in direction of banks. non-banking activities, however, but the integrity of banks themselves, which may lose their objective role as lenders if they simultaneously participate in other transactions with, or in competition with, their credit customers. See per a

A.

Banks Have Substantial Government-Conferred Advantages Any business opportunities the banking industry may have lost in 1933 with respect to securities activities that were placed off limits to banks by the Glass-Steagall Act were more than compensated for by new federal support for basic banking This support includes the following special activities. advantages:

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Ability to take deposits for use in their business

it

Federal insurance of deposits which inspires U.S.
government-created confidence in the banking system:
is assumed that the government will protect and save the
bank; therefore, a company or individual would rather
deal with a bank than with an institution which is not a
bank, all other things being equal

Because banks have their federal safety net, they have
accumulated vast pools of deposits and other funds with
which to extend credit and can use that power to support
their securities activities

• Exclusive direct access to the payments system for
making payments for U.S. government securities and
dollar-denominated international transactions and
foreign exchange (particularly Fedwire and CHIPS)
Continuing tax advantages

Federal funds market availability for low-cost funds

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Regular access to the Federal Reserve discount window

Special accounting rules, especially those which do not require them to mark to market.

Backed by federal deposit insurance, the banking industry
has grown immensely since 1983. Because the biggest banks are
now too big to fail," federal backing, and the confidence it
inspires in banking, often extends to the bank itself, not just
Indeed, in recent years
to the insured accounts (now $100,000).
bank regulators have saved not only banks but entire bank
Consequently, even the supposedly uninsured
creditors of the banks and the holding companies (through
holding companies.
certificates of deposits and otherwise) derive tremendous
comfort from knowing that they are dealing with federally-
That confidence is reflected directly
protected institutions.

in a lower cost of money raised by banks compared to financial
The cost
institutions that do not have federal backing.
advantage conferred upon banks by deposit insurance is enormous,
particularly assuming that the FDIC is in fact insuring the bank
and not just deposits up to $100,000:

[A]ssume a gap of 25 basis points between what
the money center banks now pay for money and
what they would have to pay if the big
borrowings were regarded as uninsured, assume
that two-thirds of the footings at such banks
are supported by such borrowings -- all
reasonable assumptions -- and the value of the
"deposit" insurance protection the FDIC gives
away to the big banks provides roughly
one-third of their profits.

Although interest rate ceilings on bank deposits have been removed, the attraction of federal insurance still enables banks In fact, some to borrow from depositors at favorable rates. legal preclusions on payment of interest to corporate customers on bank demand deposits still survive, yet the federal safety net provides an incentive for such customers to provide banks with no cost funds.

This assortment of benefits was conferred on the banking industry by Congress on the assumption that they would not be major players in non-banking industries, and that the subsidies provided thereby would inure to the health and stability of the Congress did not traditional intermediation function of banks. intend these advantages to carry over into bank participation in financial or commercial enterprises that could stand alone Yet the bills being considered by the Committee do little to isolate those advantages to the without government support.

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banks intermediary functions, and certainly the banks that surrender those advantages. demand a repeal of Glass-Steagall are not volunteering to

B.

The

The list of bank advantages does not stop, however, with
those conferred intentionally by legislation or regulation.
Banks as sources of credit in time can dominate any market.
happens all the time.
availability of credit can be tied explicitly or implicitly to
use of a bank's securities or other non-banking services. It
And it is virtually impossible to police.
Banks Tie-In Credit With Other Services
One example of how banks routinely leverage their credit
enhancement facilities to obtain entry into other financial
services is that of municipal bond underwriting.
IV-B-2 to this statement.
Two studies of
bank tie-ins in this area are attached in Appendix IV-B-1 and
The results could not be more ce
emphatic or more instructive. One of the studies involves
long-term municipal housing revenue bonds with "put" features
that allow the holders to tender the bonds back to the issuer at
periodic intervals prior to maturity. As indicated in the
such a repurchase obligation.
study, only large commercial banks have the liquidity to back up
Before the advent of housing
bonds.
bonds with "put" features requiring such liquidity facilities,
banks had minimal participation in the underwriting of housing
Bank participation in managing underwriting groups
transactions on the credit side.
increased dramatically as soon as they became involved in such
In fact, according to the
study, in 24 of 24 negotiated housing bond offerings involving a
letter of credit by three major banks, the banks also
participated in the managing underwriting group.
none of the banks was involved in underwriting such bonds if
they did not supply the credit facility. According to the
second study, 125 out of 146 banks that participated as lead
supplied the letter of credit.
managers of housing financings during the period 1980-1987 also

The potential for tie-ins exists as well in the
financial instruments or services.
underwriting of mortgage-backed securities, insurance and other
Such tie-ins are impossible
without any prompting by the bank.
to eliminate because they are frequently "voluntary," occurring
For example, when short-term
credit becomes a relatively scarce and valuable commodity,
customers may feel obliged to be "good customers" of their banks
in all respects. A federally-backed organization should not be
consumers and other peoples' businesses.
able to apply such subtle coercion, at least as it affects

The possibility of tie-ins occurring seems all the more
products in which banks engage.
likely when one considers the active "cross marketing" of
Yet none of the bills before

contrary, it is explicitly encouraged. the Committee put any restraints on cross-marketing; to the What is "synergy" for a banking organization is unfair competition for a company that does not ha e such government-conferred benefits.

In sum, banks are inherently unfair competitors outside of
banking if, as is now the case, they can use their banking
markets in their other businesses.
relationships, credit sources, credit support and captive
The situation will be made
dramatically worse if bank non-banking activities are allowed to

grow.

C.

Create Conflicts Of Interest
Bank Participation In Non-Banking Activities Will

Common ownership of banking and non-banking facilities
leads inevitably to conflict of interest situations in which the
competitors.
to the detriment of the bank or the bank affiliates'
bank's status as an objective, dispassionate lender is subverted
Neither existing legislation nor any of the bills
non-banking affiliates.
before the Committee are adequate to prevent improper use of
credit facilities by banks in transactions relating to their
banking organization.
The only way to avoid such conflicts is
to minimize the non-banking activities being conducted within a

The most clearcut conflict situation is where a bank's
resources, supported by the federal safety net, are diverted to
a non-banking affiliate on terms less favorable to the bank than
would be obtained from a third party or in situations where such
resources would not be made available to a third party at all.
are at best mild restraints.
Although Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act attempt
Institution has noted:
to legislate away such conflict of interest opportunities, they
As Robert Litan of the Brookings

At a

As controlled as inter-affiliate transac-
tions may be, however, insured depositories
belonging to diversified financial
organizations can still exploit conflicts of
interest by favoring nonbank affiliates.
minimum, bank holding companies may use various
sub rosa mechanisms to channel resources from
their banks to their nonbank corporations: by
imposing higher service or management fees on
their banks, by increasing their depositories'
tax reimbursements to parent companies, or by
pricing.
making subtle adjustments in inter-affiliate
Each of these techniques may be
difficult to detect and can be used as a device

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An equally disturbing conflict of interest arises with
respect to the willingness of banks to extend credit to
competitors of their affiliates. Securities firms with their
overnight loan requirements are among the bank's biggest
If banks or their affiliates are granted full
customers.
securities powers, will banks continue to make credit available
to their main competitors? The problem will also be acute in
less populated areas, where the banking markets are quite
concentrated. As Litan points out, independent insurance
agencies or real estate brokers may have trouble obtaining bank
financing if all area banks, or their affiliates, are engaged in
insurance and real estate activities.

A third type of conflict of interest is a corollary to the
unfair competition problems created by bank tie-ins.
Banks may
attempt to bolster or expand the customer base of their
non-banking affiliates by making credit more readily available
to potential or existing customers. Such looser credit
standards, or lack of credit standards, would run directly
counter to the quintessential function of banks, which, as the
Supreme Court noted in ICI v. Camp., was intended to be the
sober, objective central supplier of credit to the economy, free

and independent of the entrepreneurial and heavily profitmotivated urges of the rest of the financial world.

A more detailed discussion by the OECD of the confl ct cf interest problems associated with bank participation in non-banking activities is contained in Appendix IV-C to this written statement.

D.

An Internal Firewall Is Weak And Unproven

Advocates of bank entry into securities or other
non-banking activities concede that the breaking down of
Glass-Steagall barriers and Bank Holding Company Act bar :iers
could potentially raise the level of risk to the federal safety
net and the prospects for unfair competition and conflicts of
interest. They assert, however, that something less than a flat
separation of banks from non-banking organizations will suffice
to contain these adverse aspects of bank integration with other
financial or commercial entities.

In particular, the concept of separate non-banking
subsidiaries of a bank holding company accompanied by legal
restrictions on transactions between banks and such non-banking
affiliates, has been touted as an insulation mechanism that will
keep banks isolated while permitting their holding companies to
reap profits in other sectors of the economy. This separate
subsidiary with a "firewall" concept is the cornerstone of
S.1886, the Proxmire-Garn Financial Modernization Act of 1987.
However, the firewall there will not keep out many fires.

Chairman Proxmire has said that he could not support a
repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act if banks were permitted to
engage in securities or other non-banking activities in their
own subsidiaries, because the temptation to rescue an ailing
subsidiary would be too great. Paradoxically, the Chairman's
bill, as discussed in Section V-B of this statement, permits
many securities activities to be conducted directly within a
bank. But that aside, there is little evidence that the
temptation of a banking unit of a bank holding company to rescue
another unit or to otherwise benefit another unit is
significantly affected by the location of that other unit within
the bank holding company structure.

Testifying about his experience in regulating bank holding
companies, former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker has
noted:

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