215 Findings of Fact external reality (delusions, hallucinations, illusions) and they do not present gross disorganization of the personality. Anxiety in psychoneurotic disorders is a danger signal felt and perceived by the conscious portion of the personality (ego). Its origin may be a threat from within the personality-expressed by supercharged repressed emotions, including particularly such aggressive impulses as hostility and resentment-with or without stimulation from external situations, as loss of love or prestige, or threat of injury. The various ways in which the patient may attempt to handle this anxiety will result in the various types of reactions listed below. c. Conversion reaction. This term is synonymous with "conversion hysteria." Instead of being experienced consciously (either diffusely or displaced, as in phobias), the impulse causing the anxiety in conversion reaction is "converted" into functional symptoms in organs or parts of the body, mainly under voluntary control. Often, such reactions meet the immediate needs of the patient and are, therefore, associated with obvious "secondary gain." ** "*** 38. There was, in 1945, in existence a manual prepared in the Surgeon General's Office entitled "Manual for Officers in the Disposition and Retiring Board Branch of the Physical Standards Division of the Surgeon General's Office" which provided in part as follows: 74. Psychoneurosis. Where there is no history of the disease, treatment for a similar condition, or similar symptoms prior to EOD, and the condition is more than mild and has not improved after prolonged treatment or temporary limited service, the officer may be considered incapacitated for active service. Line of duty, Yes. Where the disease existed prior to EOD, and the condition is more than mild but no worse than his previous episodes prior to EOD, the officer may be found incapacitated. Line of duty, No. Where the disease existed only in a mild to moderate degree prior to EOD, and now has become severe with no improvement after prolonged treatment, the condition may be considered permanently aggravated by the military service. (An NP Consultation, SGO, is indicated). Where the disease existed prior to EOD and there has been aggravation by the service but the advancement is considered only situational, and if it is evident that it will be re Syllabus 154 Ct. CL. moved, with reversion of the disorder to its previous degree of severity within a reasonable time, upon return to civilian life, the aggravation is not considered permanent (and the said incapacity will not be the result of an incident of service). CONCLUSION OF LAW Upon the foregoing findings of fact, which are made a part of the judgment herein, the court concludes as a matter of law that the plaintiff is entitled to recover and judgment is entered to that effect with the amount of recovery to be determined in accordance with Rule 38 (c). In accordance with the opinion of the court and on a memorandum report of the commissioner as to the amount due thereunder, it was ordered on February 2, 1962, that judgment for plaintiff be entered for $23,501.37. DON MONTELL FORESTER v. THE [No. 30-60. Decided June 7, 1961] ON PLAINTIFF'S AND DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Military pay; retired pay (nondisability); Reserve officer-service creditable.--In an action by plaintiff, a former Reserve officer, to recover retired pay to which he claims he is entitled under the Army and Air Force Vitalization and Retirement Equalization Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 1087, on the ground that he is past the age of 60 and has completed the required 20 years of service if the period of a few months between his discharge from the United States Army in 1919 and his acceptance of a commission in the Officers' Reserve Corps in 1920 were counted, it is held that during the period in question plaintiff did not hold a commission in the Reserves since his discharge had not only separated him from military service but had also terminated his commission under applicable statutes and General Orders of the Army. Petition dismissed. Military pay; retired pay (nondisability); Reserve officer-service creditable; discharge-termination of commission in World War I.-A Reserve officer called to active duty in 1917, whose Reserve 270 Opinion of the Court commission was converted to a commission in the United States Army and was thereafter discharged, was not only completely separated from military service, but his commission was terminated. Accordingly, the time between his discharge in 1919 and his later appointment in 1920 to a Reserve unit could not be counted in computing creditable service time for eligibility for Reserve officer retired pay under the Army and Air Force Vitalization and Retirement Equalization Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 1087, 10 U.S.C. § 1331. Authority for the termination of the Reserve commission and for conversion of the commission to one in the United States Army are found in paragraph 6 of section 37 of the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916, 39 Stat. 166, 189, 190, and in section 1 of the Act of May 18, 1917, 40 Stat. 76. Armed Services 13.5 (6) Scott P. Crampton for plaintiff. Dwight Taylor was on the brief. Katherine H. Johnson, with whom was Assistant Attorney General William H. Orrick, Jr., for defendant. WHITAKER, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court: This is an action by a former reserve officer for retired pay. Pursuant to the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916, sixth paragraph, section 37, 39 Stat. 166, 189, 190, plaintiff, on April 27, 1917, was appointed a Second Lieutenant, Corps of Engineers, Officers' Reserve Corps, "for a period of five years unless sooner terminated in the discretion of the President." Thereafter, plaintiff was called to active duty and served as an officer in the Corps of Engineers during World War I. While on active duty, plaintiff was promoted to First Lieutenant, and then to Captain, pursuant to the provisions of the Draft Act of May 18, 1917, 40 Stat. 76. On July 9, 1919, plaintiff received a certificate of honorable discharge, issued under the provisions of War Department Circular No. 75, November 20, 1918, and section 9 of the Act of May 18, 1917, supra. About six months later, on January 28, 1920, plaintiff was appointed to the rank of Captain, Engineer Section, Officers' Reserve Corps, and he continued to serve as a reserve officer until his commission expired on May 12, 1937. Opinion of the Court 154 Ct. CI. When plaintiff reached 60 years of age on December 8, 1950, he submitted his application for retirement pay under section 302 (a) of the Army and Air Force Vitalization and Retirement Equalization Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 1087, 10 U.S.C. § 1331. He was advised by the Department of the Army that he had had only 19 years, 5 months, and 28 days of the requisite 20 years of satisfactory Federal service prescribed for retired pay purposes; hence, his application was denied. In computing his length of service the Army did not include the period between the date of his discharge on July 9, 1919, and the date he was commissioned Captain, Engineer Section, Officers' Reserve Corps, which was on January 28, 1920. In his petition, plaintiff claims he is entitled to recover retired pay from December 8, 1950, the date he attained the age of 60 years, to date. It is plaintiff's position that his appointment as a reserve officer under the Act of June 3, 1916, was not terminated by his discharge on July 19, 1919, but that he continued to be a reserve officer throughout the period July 9, 1919, to January 28, 1920, with the result that he had had more than the required 20 years' service. The case is before us on defendant's motion for summary judgment and plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment. The only question which we must decide is whether plaintiff's military status was terminated by his discharge on July 9, 1919. Plaintiff says that the discharge terminated only his temporary appointment to Captain in the National Army under the Act of May 18, 1917, supra, and that he remained a member of the Officers' Reserve Corps for the remainder of the five-year period for which he was appointed. This position seems contrary to the well-nigh all-inclusive language of Circular No. 75, supra, under the terms of which plaintiff was discharged. This circular reads in part: Discharge of Officers 1. The President has determined, under the provisions of section 9, act of Congress approved May 18, 1917, that the public service will be promoted by the discharge, as rapidly as their services can be spared, of officers in the 270 Opinion of the Court United States Army, except those holding commissions of any kind in the Regular Army. 3. *** Such discharges will be a complete separation of the individual from the military service and will terminate all commissions held by him in the Officers' Reserve Corps or otherwise. All officers should be so informed and should also be informed that, while they are given opportunity to express their desires relative to commissions in the Reserve Corps or the Regular Army, the granting of such commissions will be entirely dependent upon their fitness, eligibility, and such vacancies as may be provided by existing or future laws and regulations. 10. In connection with these discharges attention is directed to the following: a. Section 9, act of May 18, 1917. (See page 11, Bulletin No. 32, War Department, 1917.) b. Sixth paragraph, section 37, act of June 3, 1916. (See page 59, Special Regulations No. 43.) The Circular says the President has determined that the public interest would be promoted by the discharge of all "officers of the United States Army," save only those holding commissions in the Regular Army. Prior thereto, on August 7, 1918, General Orders No. 73 had converted all commissions in the Regular Army, the National Guard, the National Army, and the Reserve Corps into commissions in the United States Army. This General Order reads in part: 4. All effective commissions purporting to be, and described therein as, commissions in the Regular Army, National Guard, National Army, or the Reserve Corps shall hereafter be held to be, and regarded as, commissions in the United States Army-permanent, provisional, or temporary, as fixed by the conditions of their issue; and all such commissions are hereby amended accordingly. Hereafter during the period of the existing emergency all commissions of officers shall be in the United States Army ***, and shall, as the law may provide, be permanent, for a term, or for the period of the emergency. ** After this order, plaintiff was no longer an officer in the Reserve Corps; thereafter he held a commission in the United |