SENATE.] Executive Patronage. becoming a public defaulter-a piece of official misconduct of which several classes of these officers, such as naval officers, surveyors of the customs, registers of the land offices, and the like, cannot be guilty, because no public money comes to their hands. And what, Mr. President, said Mr.W., is the assigned cause for this great and dangerous change in the law? To destroy the patronage accruing to the Chief Magistrate by the simple rénominations of these officers to the Senate once in the term of four years. Is Congress prepared to adopt such a remedy for such an evil? Will the members of this House consent to create an army of officers for life in this Government, for the single purpose of getting rid of the evil, if it be one, of the patronage conferred upon the executive power in their periodical reappointment? Mr. W. said he could not think so. He viewed the first section of the bill, standing by itself, as a question of policy only; but he must consider it contrary to the doctrines of the republican fathers, contrary to the genius of our free institutions, and contrary to the well-ascertained and well-established opinions of the great mass of the citizens of the United States, to adopt any measure of legislation calculated or intended to perpetuate office in the same hands. The offices of this Government should not be life estates, but public trusts; and to keep them so, they should return frequently to the people, or to such of their agents and representatives as have the power, by the constitution, to confer them. Without this, the salutary principle of rotation in office is gone, and we raise up an official aristocracy as dangerous to liberty as an hereditary one. Mr. W. said he was not an advocate for executive power or official patronage. He would go as far as any one to limit such powers, where that could be done consistently with the constitution, and a safe and salutary administration of the Government; but to get rid of that portion of the executive patronage which consisted in the renomination to offices, the terms of which were now limited by law, and from which, as yet, he had seen no cause to feel alarm or apprehension, he could not agree to remove all limitation, and make the offices permanent. It would, in his judgment, be an attempt to avoid a possible danger by the voluntary adoption of a great and certain evil. Such (Mr. W. said) were his views upon the first section of the bill, and, unless changed by what might be subsequently offered in its favor, he could not give it his support. As to the second section, he had not a remark to make. He fully acquiesced in the principle it contained, that public defaulters should be hurled from office, and that a knowledge of the fact was sufficient ground for instantaneous removal. If any Senators supposed that legislation was necessary to secure the practical | application of this principle, imperatively and promptly, to every officer of the Government, he was not aware that he had any objection to make to this section. His principal difficulty rested upon the third section of the bill. That section was in the following words: "SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, That in all nominations made by the President to the Senate, to fill vacancies occasioned by removal from office, the fact of the removal shall be stated to the Senate at the same time that the nomination is made, with a statement of the reasons for such removal." This provision in a law of Congress he believed to be in derogation of the constitution of the United States, and he could not, therefore, give it his vote. He had before said he was not an advocate for executive power or official patronage, but he was an advocate for the constitution, and for just so much power in every branch of the Government as that instrument had granted, and for no more in any branch, either executive, legislative, or judicial. The section did not, in terms, [FEB. 16, 1835. deny the power in the President to remove from office, but it proposed limitations upon the exercise of the power equivalent to the denial of its existence as a constitutional grant of power. Mr. W. said the question was one of the first importance and magnitude, and he did not propose to argue it at the present time, but was bound to give the grounds of his opinion that the provision was unconstitutional. The constitution has said, "the executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." This he understood to vest in the President all the executive power pertaining to the Government of the United States, and not otherwise granted by the constitution. He understood the power of appointment to office, and the power of removal from office, to be executive powers, and, therefore, to be vested in the President by this general grant, unless some other provisions of the constitution shall be found to take them from him, or to divide them between him and some other department of the Government. What other provisions bear upon the question? The two following: 1st. "He (the President) shall nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointment are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law." 2d. But the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of Departments." If, then, (Mr. W. said,) he was right in supposing that the power of appointment was an executive power, its existence in the President was qualified by the negative of the Senate, conferred by the clause first above quoted, and he could nominate, but could not appoint, but "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." Still nothing in this clause affected the power to remove from office, unless by implication, of which he should have occasion hereafter to speak; and, therefore, that power, notwithstanding this clause, remained in the President, by virtue of the general grant, perfected and unqualified. But the clause second above quoted might be held to qualify this power of removal, and therefore he referred to it to show that it did not affect the bill under consideration, or obviate its unconstitutionality. That clause gives to the Congress the power, by law, “to vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of Departments." It has been, and may further be, contended that this qualification of the executive power of appointment may also qualify the power of removal; and that when "the Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of Departments," they may prescribe the causes for, and restrictions upon, the removals of the officers so to be appointed in conformity, not to the constitution, but to the law. Mr. W. said he did not find it necessary to discuss this point, as the third section of the bill before him reached the removal of all officers, superior and inferior, and alike required from the President the causes of the removal, whether the office was of the one grade or the other. The provision proposed by the committee made no distinction between an ambassador or other public minister, or consul, or a judge of the Supreme Court, the officers enumer ated in the constitution, a superior officer, a member of the cabinet, and an inferior officer, a surveyor of the customs, "established by law." Again: the Congress had not yet, by law, vested the 1 appointment of any of the officers named in the first and second sections of the bill, "in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of Departments;" and until they had done this, the second clause referred to could have no operation to restrict the power of removal conferred upon the President by the constitution; that power, like the power of nomination, remaining in him under the constitutional grant as to all offices "which shall be established by law," until the Congress think proper to vest the appointment of inferior officers in himself alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of Departments, and to affix by law the causes for, and the restrictions upon, the removal of the officers so to be appointed. [SENATE. these great constitutional questions, and he had said thus much to declare his distinct and clear opinions. He held the power of removal from office to be an executive power, in the clear and universally admitted classification of governmental powers. As an executive power, he held it to be vested in the President by the broad grant of that power contained in the constitution, because no qualification found in that instrument, and no action of Congress under it, granting power to regulate the appointment of inferior officers, had taken it from him, as connected with the third section of the bill before the Senate. Could Congress, then, by law, require from the President his reasons for an act performed in pursuance of the power granted to him by the constitution? He could not think it would be pretended. As well might Congress declare, by law, that the President should send, with every nomination he makes to this body, the reasons why he has selected the individual named. As well might Congress declare, by law, that the Senate should make a statement to the President of the reasons for their action upon his nomination. Each acts in the exercise of an independent constitutional power expressly conferred, and neither is responsible to the other for their action, but both are responsible to the people and the States. Neither of these qualifications upon the executive power granted to the President, then, (Mr. W. said,) | seemed to reach the provision contained in the third section of the bill of the committee, and he was left to inquire whether any implication, from the executive power granted to the Senate, authorized the legislation proposed? The grant to the Senate, made in the constitution, was to advise and consent to nominations made by the President, or to refuse that advice and consent; and it had been argued by the honorable Senator from Massachusetts, [Mr. WEBSTER,] that this power necessarily drew after it the advice and consent of the Senate to removals from office. That honorable gentleman So, in making removals from office, the President, if had stated that he had examined the practice of the he has the power at all, possesses it as an express grant Government, and that the only removal was the appoint- of the constitution, and he is responsible to Congress for ment of another to fill the place of the person removed. its exercise in no other way than by impeachment, and His argument was understood to be, that as the appoint- then the causes should be assigned, if assigned at all, to ment of A to fill the office of B, removed, was the only the impeaching, and not to the trying, branch of Conremoval of B, therefore, the appointment of A was the gress. He therefore could not view the section in any removal of B, and the appointment of A requiring the other light than as a direct and palpable violation of the advice and consent of the Senate, this body must also constitutional powers and rights of the Executive; and, be held as advising and consenting to the removal of B. as such, he must oppose its passage. He would not, Mr. W. said he had not examined the practice of the however, consume more of the time of the Senate, at Government in this respect, and therefore he could not this late stage of the session, in fortifying his position. say whether or not it had been customary, in cases of re- He would content himself with the fact that the first movals from office, to issue a supersedeas, the uniform Congress ever convened under the constitution had depractice, as he believed, in his own State; but he would liberately decided these questions of executive power ask the honorable Senator whether it had ever been sup- as he now contended they existed. That Congress conposed, when the President nominated A to an office insisted of a large number, among others, of the framers the place of B, removed, the rejection of the nomination of A by the Senate restored B to the office from which he had thus been removed by the President? Did not the Senate know that, in case of such rejection, the office had always, from the commencement of the Government under the constitution, been held to be vacant, and the President bound to continue to nominate to the Senate until he found a person to whose appointment they would advise and consent? Had he ever heard of an incumbent, thus removed, returning to the duties of his office in consequence of the rejection by the Senate of the nomination of his successor? Mr. W. said he was confident in the assertion that the history of the Government furnished no instance of such a claim to office, or of such an exercise of official powers. How, then, could the gentleman contend that the advice and consent of the Senate to the appointment of a successor had been held to be also an advice and consent to the remo. val of the incumbent? If the Senate did not advise and consent, the removal had ever been held to be perfect, and the office vacant; and therefore that advice and consent, when yielded, could not be held to make the removal. So much, Mr. W. said, for the argument in favor of the implied executive power existing in the Senate, to participate with the President in removals from office. It had not existed in the practice of the Government; it did not exist in the constitution; and he would leave it to those who made out the claim to point out its derivation. He would again say that it was not his object to argue of the constitution-men more competent than any other Mr. W. said he would not remark further upon this point. If gentlemen would show him that the power of removal was not an executive power, it might then be competent for them to charge him and his friends with attempting to claim power in the President by implication from the constitution, and not from express grant. He was the advocate for no implied powers in any department of the Government. He held this to be an executive power, expressly granted in the broad grant of that power to the President. So the Congress of 1789 had decided it to be, and so the practice of the Government, for almost fifty years, under the constitution had uniformly treated it, without debate or question. He had now completed what he had proposed to say. His principal object had been to examine the facts from which the committee had drawn their frightful picture of danger to the country from executive patronage, and to point out what appeared to him their almost unmeasured exaggerations of inference and conclusion from their own premises. This he had considered it a duty he owed to himself, to the Senate, and to the country to do, and he had made the attempt, whether successful or not, the Senate would decide. He would merely add what he had before repeated, that he saw no cause for the great and peculiar alarm expressed in the report; he felt not that alarm himself, nor could he believe, if it had foundation, that we were to discharge ourselves and the country from it by making perpetual terms of office of all the officers who must receive their appointments upon the nomination of the President, and whose terms of office were now limited by law. Such a remedy would increase, but could not quiet his alarm. Mr. WHITE, of Tennessee, then addressed the Senate to the following effect: Mr. President: It was my fortune to be placed on the committee of nine, in the year 1826, whose proceedings have been spoken of in this debate. I am one of that committee who concurred in reporting the bill said to be similar to the one under consideration. I am now as ready to carry out the opinions then entertained as I was at that time, unless it can be shown Congress has no power to make the enactments, or that they would be injurious to society. The number of officers employed in handling public money was necessarily very much increased during the war which terminated in 1814 -'15. Although the President had the power to remove all the officers mentioned in this bill, yet it was believed, in the year 1820, it had not been exercised as frequently as the public interest required; officers who had collected money, which they ought to have paid into the treasury, and officers who drew money out of the treasury, which it was their duty to disburse, according to the requirement of acts of Congress, had, in many instances, failed in the performance of their duty; losses had been sustained, and more were feared, unless additional provisions were made; these circumstances gave rise to the act of 1820. By this statute, at the end of every four years each of these officers is to be out of office, as a matter of course, without the exercise of any executive power whatever; and during four years, the President, if he pleases to do so, has the power of removing all, or any of them, from office. In carrying into effect the provisions of this act, it was expected, when the term of an officer expired, the President would inform himself, through the proper department, whether the officer had discharged his duty with fidelity; and if he was informed he had, that be would then renominate him for the same office for another term. I believe that the benefits expected from this law have been realized by the practice under it. Ever since I have had the honor of a seat on this floor, I affirm that, both under the past and the present administration, I have witnessed the strictest scrutiny into [FEB. 16, 1835. the conduct of these officers, whenever renominated; and I do not remember a single case in which there was a disposition manifested to continue any one of them who had been faithless in his trust. But in 1826, the committee believed, although much good had resulted from this law, yet, in the struggles for place and for power between parties, very great evils, which had not been foreseen, would in all probability be experienced. The whole of these officers, amounting to a vast number, all going out at the end of each four years, and being entirely dependent on the will of the President, whether their commissions should be renewed or not, would induce many of them to look more to their own situation and interest than to the welfare of the country; and, with a view to secure themselves, they would be most likely to conform their opinions to the wishes of the President, whoever he might happen to be. If he was a candidate for re-election himself, they would most likely vote for him; or if one of his friends was a candidate, they would vote for him, although they might conscientiously believe the best interests of the country would be promoted by the election of his opponent. It is no answer to this argument to say it casts reproach upon these officers to suppose they would surrender their opinions to those in power. Mr. President, is it a reproach to say they are men? Is it a stigma upon their character to say, that while they live in this world, that while they have families to provide for,, they must have the means of living? We all know we are too apt to conclude that our neighbors will be pretty well provided for when we are very well provided for ourselves. Experience convinces us that when a man, who is dependent on his own exertions for a living, obtains one of these offices, he and his family manage well if they keep their expenditures within the salary. They become dependent on the quarter's salary for food and clothing. If deprived of the office, the man knows not to what to turn his hand to earn a dollar to subsist upon. To be deprived of the office is to be deprived of the only means of obtaining a living by honest means. Under such circumstances, it is most likely the officer will not give his judgment fair play; he will conform his opinions to the opinion of the man who has his all in his power; or, if he has manliness enough to form an impartial opinion of the merits of the respective candidates, he will too seldom have the fortitude to express it, either in conversation or by his vote. The probability is, that he will soon lose all that manly independence so essential to the preservation of a free Government. But, Mr. President, this evil does not stop with the head of the family; the same tone of servile feeling is communicated to his whole family. It stops not with his wife and his children; it is communicated to his family connexions. They know the situation of the officer; he and they talk it all over in their family circle; they sympathize with him, and all know the feelings of the Executive will be the more kind towards him in proportion to his influence among his friends; and the result will be that, in most cases, they will all settle down in the conviction that it is most wise to think and vote as the President wishes. Very little reflection, I think, must satisfy us of the alarming extent of this influence in our elections. All district attorneys, all custom-house officers, all paymasters, all receivers of public moneys at your land offices, and all surveyors of your public lands, with their clerks and all their family cannexions, placed in a situation to do as the President of the United States may wish; add to this the further consideration, that these men, from their official stations, each has vastly more influence among his acquaintances than he would have if he were a private man. Society, from the very situation of the officer, will suppose him a better judge of the fitness of a man for the presidential chair than he would be if he were a private man; besides this, many will know that the officer will have it in his power to do them good turns in his office if they can secure his good opinion. Now, let us suppose a President in office, possessed of the mass of influence thus collected, wishing to be elected a second term, when it was the interest of society to leave him out, and put some other person in; or let us suppose a President in for the last time, and wishing to designate some individual as his successor, who would not be the choice of a majority, if left free to act according to their unbiased judgment. What, then, would most probably happen? We might some time find that the President would not, in such a case, be contented with all these people simply thinking with him and voting with him; they must do more, on pain of not being renominated; they must each man do his best to influence as many to think, to speak, and to act with them as they can procure. Where could you find a man able to make a stand in opposition to it? Nowhere; and you would seldom find one willing to make the experiment. Every one must believe he could have no chance of success against such fearful odds. These officers and their friends would act in concert from one end of the Union to the other. They will have it in their power to pour out at once, through the whole body politic, a flood that would sweep from the purest man that lives every particle of reputation he had acquired by a long life of virtue and usefulness. In 1826, as one member of the committee, I came to the conclusion it was dangerous to leave such a power in the hands of the Executive, and through our chairman expressed that opinion to the world. I entertain the same opinion now, am prepared to reaffirm, and to act upon it. Then I was in opposition to the administration; now I am a friend to the administration. This can make no change in my course. When we have a pure and virtuous man for our Chief Magistrate, he will thank Congress to take from him every discretionary power which they can take with propriety. It will ease him of a labor and a responsibility most unpleasant to a good man, and he will still have as many discretionary powers as he will know how to exercise for the public good. If ever it should be our misfortune to have one of an opposite character, disposed to use all his powers for the benefit of himself and his friends, and for the purpose of perpetuating power in his and their hands, then Society at large ought to thank us for stripping the Executive of this influence. My opinions upon this subject are not founded upon the petty consideration of who is in power, whether he is a political friend or a political opponent; they rest upon the eternal principles of what I think is right and wrong between those who are in and those who are out of power. They are founded upon principles deep as the foundations of the Government itself-upon principles which, if disregarded, will poison the very fountain from which all the blessings of our free and happy Government flow. The elective franchise-corrupt that, place our citizens in such a situation that they will not freely form opinions for themselves, and fearlessly act upon them, and we will have little left worth preserving. When called on to act my part, it is matter not to be considered by me whether my friends are in or out. In 1826, when called on for an opinon, my friends and myself were at the bottom of the political wheel. I then entertained and expressed an opinion. Now it has turned; my friends and myself are on its top; our opponents are at the bottom; where we may be with the next whirl no man can tell. As wise men, what ought we to do? We ought to act justly to all men, honestly carry out our own old opinions, and secure the people, as far as we can, in the free, uninfluenced exercise of [SENATE. their own opinions at elections. My principles are to limit power if we can, so as to make every man secure in voting for whom he pleases, as he is in matters of religion, in worshipping his Maker, according to the dictates of his conscience. When power is so limited that no man can so use it as to injure his opponents, then, and then only, do I consider myself safe. Some speak of this body as a permanent one; the situation in which we now find ourselves is another proof of the mutability of all temporary concerns. In 1826 I had the honor of being a member of the committee of nine, a majority of whom, at least, must have entertained opinions similar to my own upon this subject. Where are they now? Two only on this floor in a situation to be heard in this debate. You Mr. President, it is true, are present, and I am sorry, in a situation-no, I am not sorry you are in the honorable station you now occupy, but I am truly sorry we are deprived of the aid of your distinguished talents in this debate, if you entertain the same opinions as I do. We are not acting for ourselves alone; we are not acting for the people of our own time only: we are acting for the people at large of our own time, and for the people in all time to come. Let us, then, so act as will transmit, uncontaminated by official influence, to our posterity the free institutions for which our ancestors struggled, and which we received from them as an invaluable inheritance. This bill still will leave in the hands of the President power enough over all these officers. He will still have the power of dismissing any one of them at any moment he pleases. This is, of itself, a tremendous power, given him in trust, to be used for the public good, and for that only; never for mere difference of opinion, honestly entertained, decently expressed, and acted on with moderation. The question recurs, how can Congress secure the citizen in office against an arbitrary exercise of this power, in cases where the public good does not require it? The committee have attempted it, in the third section, by providing that, whenever a nomination is made to the Senate to fill a vacancy occasioned by a removal, the President shall state the reasons for such removal. This, it has been contended, Congress has no power to do, because, say the opponents of this bill, all executive power is vested in the President by the constitution, and removal from office is an exercise of executive power. The arguments upon this point are far from being satisfactory to my mind, and I must crave the indulgence of the Senate while I present, as briefly as possible, my own views upon it. It is true the constitution vests in the President the executive power; but immediately we ask ourselves what executive power? in what is it to consist? and where shall we ascertain its amount, and a specification of it? Is any gentleman, either here or elsewhere, prepared to state it as his opinion that, under our form of Government, executive power is unlimited and undefined? hold no such doctrine, and it would appear to me a most wild and mischievous opinion. The executive power, in our Government, in the President, is that vested in him by express grants in the constitution, or vested in him by acts of Congress passed in pursuance of the constitution, and no more. By the constitution "all legislative power therein (herein)granted is vested in Congress." By the same instrument the executive power is vested in a President. In this latter clause, the words "herein granted," used in the former, are dropped. The reason for dropping them is, to my mind, very obvious. If they had been used as to the President, he would have but a small portion of the powers necessary to be vested in him to carry on the affairs of the Government. The framers of that instrument foresaw that he must have many more powers than they could specify in the constitution, and, there fore, they say the executive power shall be vested in a President, intending that he should have and exercise all the powers they themselves afterwards might vest him with, and, also, al! others which Congress might, from time to time, vest in him by laws passed in pursuance of the constitution. And afterwards they sum up his duties, by saying he shall see that the laws are faithfully executed. Under these several clauses, the executive powers are easily ascertained. We first look into the constitution, and there see what powers are expressly given to him. Next we look to the acts of Congress, and there find what powers Congress has vested him with; and thus we ascertain his whole powers, and then we see that his duties are to see that all these powers are faithfully executed. It is as much his duty to see that a power vested in him by a constitutional law is faithfully executed, as it is to see that a power vested in him by the constitution is faithfully executed. Whatever powers are vested by the constitution Congress has no power to change; whatever powers they vest by statute, they may change and modify at pleasure. Any other notion of executive powers vested in the President, it seems to me, cannot be maintained under our frame of Government. By the constitution two classes of officers are evidently intended. In relation to one of these Congress is bound to create them, and, when created, the tenure of their office is fixed by the constitution, and can never be changed by act of Congress. As it relates to the other class, Congress may create the office, or not, as they please. In creating it, they may fix the tenure as they please for life, for years, or at will; they prescribe what duties they please, and fix the compensation to suit their own pleasure; and they may point out the mode in which the officer is to be removed or displaced. ments." Every officer specified in the bill now under consideration falls within this latter class. They are what is called in the constitution "inferior officers, the appointment of whom Congress may vest in the President alone, in the courts of justice, or in the heads of the DepartCongress, then, has complete power over all these officers; they may create and abolish the office at pleasure; fix and modify the tenure as they choose; and regulate at pleasure the mode of getting clear of the officers. They may either have them appointed, as they now are, by the President, with the advice of the Senate, or by the President alone, or by the courts of justice, or the heads of the Departments. Suppose this bill had provided that district attorneys should be appointed by the courts, to hold their offices during the pleasure of the court; but, when the court removed one and appointed another, they should put down the reason for the removal, would any gentleman say such provision was unconstitutional? I fancy not. Suppose all the other officers to be appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury, and him vested with the power of removal, but a provision inserted that, when he appointed a successor, he should state why he had removed the incumbent; would such a provision be unconstitutional? I think not. If such provision would not, in these cases, be unconstitutional, why will the like provisions be unconstitutional when the President is to appoint, with the advice and consent of the Senate? In each case it is a legislative enactment on a subject where Congress has express power to act as it pleases, without any limitation; the law, therefore, being constitutional, the President would be bound to see it faithfully executed. To me it appears so plain that Congress has the power to do what this bill proposes, that I feel some surprise there should be any variety of opinion among us upon this question. Ours is emphatically a Government of laws. We are [FEB. 16, 1835. a free people because it is so. Whenever the will of the people is expressed, either in the constitution or in a law passed in pursuance thereof, it must be complied with, because, according to the theory of our Government, the people are sovereign. No person doubts, or can doubt, the power of the President to remove in these cases; but the manner in which he acquires this power is a different question. Gentlemen who argue against this section say he has it from the constitution, because it is an executive power. I deny this, and say it is an executive power because it is made so by statute; and he performs a constitutional duty when he removes, because he is as much bound to perform executive du ties pointed out by statute as he is to perform those specified in the constitution. It is an executive power, because it was the will of the people, through Congress, as their agent, to make it so; and the same power, through the same agent, could have made it a judicial duty, if it had been deemed wise so to provide. When our reason has fair play, it appears to me there can be no difficulty on this point. In 1789, as we have seen, Congress, by the casting vote of the Vice President, thought this power of removal was an executive power under the constitution. From that time to this all officers of this class hold their offices during the pleasure of the President, so expressed in the commission itself. Subsequent statutes, and especially that of 1820, speaking of these very officers being removed, and holding during pleasure, indicate removals by the President, and at his sole pleasure. If, then, the enactments of Congress authorize the removal, who can doubt of the power of the President to remove? But suppose, by this very bill, Congress should say these officers should hold their offices during good behaviour; what then becomes of this constitutional executive pow er? It is converted into a judicial power, and you have no way to remove the incumbent but by impeachment, or by an exertion of legislative power, in abolishing the office. If we suppose this power of removal conferred by statute, and not by the constitution, our whole course is consistent in our executive business. We have repeatedly refused to call upon the Executive for his reasons; and why? Because the statutes had vested the power of removal at his pleasure merely, and one branch of Congress alone had no power to require that which both branches had not seen fit to require. Mr. President, these are the principles upon which I was prepared to act in 1826. They are those upon which I wished to bring into power the present Chief Magistrate. I speak only for myself, but I believed they were the principles of the party with which I acted, and that we were to give effect to these principles, so far as we might have the power. For one, I have seen no sufficient reason to change them, and am prepared to act them out. It is in vain to tell me this is a party question. It is a question of fundamental principles, and I am on that side of it in which I have been educated, on which I have heretofore acted as well as my humble abilities have enabled me; it is one I cannot abandon for any earthly consideration, because in its maintenance I believe the prosperity, happiness, and security of the present and succeeding generations have a deep and abiding interest. It is asked by the opponents of this bill, what benefit its friends expect from a statement of the reasons of the removal, when the nomination of a successor is presented to the Senate? I answer for myself, I wish to cut up by the roots the demoralizing tendencies of office-hunting. I wish to make such provisions, by law, as will shield the Chief Magistrate from impositions being practised upon him to induce him to remove men from office. I wish to shield him from being imposed upon as to the character of those who apply for office. As the law now stands, whenever a man |