66 Fourth, that all well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently of the world." (War, Labor, and Peace, p. 38.) 9. The proposals of Great Britain (speech of Lloyd George, January 5, 1918, and of revolutionary Russia (Bolshevik proposals at Brest-Litovsk, December 2, 1917) were in substantial agreement with those of President Wil son. (See comparative synopsis in New York Times Current History for February, 1918, pp. 257-9.) An Inter-Allied Labor Conference, held in London, February 20-23, speaking in the name of practically all the organized working class of Great Britain, France, Belgium, and Italy, specifically indorsed President Wilson's proposals, and declared that “a victory for German imperialism would be the defeat of democracy and liberty in Europe," and that the Socialists whom they represented were inflexibly resolved to fight until victory is achieved." (Full text of declaration in The New Republic for March 23, 1918.) 66 10. Replies of Germany and Austria (January 24): Count Czernin, the Austrian Foreign Minister, replied to President Wilson's address of January 8, in a speech of conciliatory tone, but said that Austria would "defend the pre-war possessions of her allies as she would her own." This attitude ignored the Alsace-Lorraine question, but by implication conceded the giving up of Belgium. (In the first telegraphic despatches, this passage was falsified in the German interest by the Wolff Press Bureau.) 66 Chancellor con Hertling's speech in reply was 'very vague and confusing": "His discussion and acceptance of our general principles lead him to no practical conclusions. He refuses to apply them to the substantive items which must constitute the body of any final settlement. He is jealous of international action and of international counsel. He accepts, he says, the principle of public diplomacy, but he appears to insist that it be confined, at any rate in this case, to generalities; and that the several particular questions of territory and sovereignty, the several questions upon whose settlement must depend the acceptance of peace by the twenty-three States now engaged in the war, must be discussed and settled, not in general council, but severally by the nations most immediately concerned by interest or neighborhood. "He agrees that the seas should be free, but looks askance at any limitation to that freedom by international action in the interest of the common order. He would without reserve be glad to see economic barriers removed between nation and nation, for that could in on way impede the ambitions of the military party with whom he seems constrained to keep on terms. Neither does he raise objection to a limitation of armaments. That matter will be settled of itself, he thinks, by the economic conditions which must follow the war. But the German colonies, he demands, must be returned without debate. He will discuss with no one but the representatives of Russia what disposition shall be made of the peoples and the lands of the Baltic Provinces; with no one but the Government of France the "conditions" under which French territory shall be evacuated; and only with Austria what shall be done with Poland. In the determination of all questions affecting the Balkan States he defers, as I understand him, to Austria and Turkey; and with regard to the agree ments to be entered into concerning the non-Turkish peoples of the present Ottoman Empire, to the Turkish authorities themselves. After a settlement all around, effected in this fashion, by individual barter and concession, he would have no objection, if I correctly interpret his statement, to a league of nations which would undertake to hold the new balance of power steady against external disturbance. "It must be evident to everyone who understands what this war has wrought in the opinion and temper of the world that no general peace, no peace worth the infinite sacrifices of these years of tragical suffering, can possibly be arrived at in any such fashion. The method the German Chancellor proposes is the method of the Congress of Vienna. We cannot and will not return to that. What is at stake now is the peace of the world. What we are striving for is a new international order based upon broad and universal principles of right and justice-no mere peace of shreds and patches." (President Wilson, address of February 11, 1918, in War, Labor, and Peace, pp. 34-5.) 11. Attitude of the Kaiser. "The year 1917 with its great battles has proved that the German people has in the Lord of Creation above an unconditional and avowed ally on whom it can absolutely rely. . . . If the enemy does not want peace, then we must bring peace to the world by battering in with the iron fist and shining sword the doors of those who will not have peace." (Address to German Second Army on the French front, December 22, 1917.) "We desire to live in friendship with neighboring peoples, but the victory of German arms must first be recognized. Our troops under the great Hindenburg will continue to win it. Then peace will come." (On conclusion of peace with Ukrainia, February 11, 1918.) IV. DEALINGS OF THE CENTRAL POWERS WITH RUSSIA AND ROUMANIA. 1. Armistice with Russia for one month agreed to December 15, 1917 (subsequently extended to February 18, 1918). 2. Brest-Litovsk negotiations (December 22 to February 10). (a) Count Czernin presented (December 25) what purported to be the terms of the Central Powers for a general peace, "without forcible annexation of territory" or indemnities. "Almost any scheme of conquest could be perpetrated within the literal interpretation of such a pledge." (Lloyd George, January 5, 1918.) (b) Failure of Russia's allies to appear at BrestLitovsk within ten days led the German representatives to declare Czernin's terms withdrawn. Negotiations with Russia for a separate peace followed. (c) Quarrels between the Russian and German negotiators over (1) the German refusal to guaranty an immediate removal, after the peace, of German troops from occupied Poland, Lithuania, Courland, Livonia, and Esthonia; and (2) over Bolshevik propaganda for revolution in Germany. (3) Reported conflicts between the German Foreign Minister von Kuehlmann and the German military party; victory of the militarists and determination to annex extensive portions of Russian territory. 3. Peace concluded (February 9) between the Central Powers and the anti-Bolshevik party in Ukrainia, which had set up a weak "People's republic." Its purpose to secure grain for the Teutonic allies from the rich “black lands" of Ukrainia, to control its extensive coal and iron deposits, and to rule the Black Sea. Refusal of the Bolsheviki to recognize the new State; civil war in Ukrainia, resulting in conquest by German troops and the occupation of Odessa (March 13). Similar civil war and German occupation in Finland; Aaland Islands seized by Germany. 4. Abrupt withdrawal of the Bolshevik negotiators from Brest-Litovsk and announcement that the war was at an end, without signing a treaty of peace (February 10): and "We could not sign a peace which would bring with it sadness, oppression and suffering to millions of workmen and peasants. But we also cannot, will not, and must not continue a war begun by czars and capitalists in alliance with czars and capitalists. We will not and we must not continue to be at war with the Germans and Austrians-workmen peasants like ourselves. . . . Russia, for its part, declares the present war with Germany and AustriaHungary, Turkey and Bulgaria at an end. Simultaneously, the Russian troops receive an order for complete demobilization on all fronts." (Declaration signed by Lenine and Trotzky, heads of the Bolshevik Government of Russia.) 5. Renewal of German military operations against Russia (February 18) with the object of adding Esthonia and Livonia, the remaining Baltic Provinces, to other lands wrested from Russia. 6. Announcement by Lenine and Trotzky (February 19) that "in the present circumstances" their Government was forced "formally to declare its willingness to sign a peace upon the conditions which had been dictated " by the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk. The Germans nevertheless advanced, with practically no resistance, on a front of 500 miles and to within seventy miles of Petrograd. Great quantities of military supplies captured (over 1,300 cannon, 4,000 to 5,000 motor cars, etc.) 7. Peace between Russia and the Central Powers signed at Brest-Litovsk (March 3, 1918; ratified by the "AllRussian Congress of Soviets," at Moscow, March 14). Its principal terms were: (a) the surrender by Russia of Courland, Poland, Lithuania, Livonia, and Esthonia. (b) Peace to be made with Ukrainia and Finland by which Russia recognizes their independence. (c) Batoum and other districts in Transcaucasia to be surrendered to Turkey. (d) An indemnity which is variously estimated at from $1,500,000,000 to $4,000,000,000. Maxim Gorky calculated that this treaty robbed Russia of 4 per cent. of her total area, 26 per cent. of her population, 27 per cent. of her agricultural land normally cultivated, 37 per cent. of her foodstuffs production, 26 per cent. of her railways, 33 per cent. of her manufacturing industries, 75 per cent. of her coal, and 73 per cent. of her iron. It has also been pointed out that the treaty strengthened Germany's hold on the Mohammedan peoples, and gave her an alternative route to India and the East via Odessa, Batoum, Transcaucasia, and northern Persia. S. Roumania was forced to sign a preliminary treaty with the Central Powers (March 6), ceding the whole of the Dobrudja and granting extensive trading and other rights. Subsequently (March 9) Roumania broke off negotiations owing to excessive demands. Austria then (March 21) added to her claims the surrender of about 3,000 square miles of territory on Roumania's western frontier. Are 1. Conflict vs. mutual aid as factors in evolution. States of necessity rival and conflicting organizations? 2. William James' answer to the militarists' plea for war as a school to develop character and heroism; the existence of a "moral equivalent for war." (See International Conciliation for February, 1910). 3. Amicable means of settling international differences These include negotiation, good offices, mediation, international commissions of inquiry, and international arbitration. (See A. S. Hershey, Essentials of International Law, ch. xxi.). About 600 cases of international arbitration have been listed since 1800. Importance of developing the habit of relying on these amicable means of settling differences. 4. Proposals of the League to Enforce Peace. These include the following articles, to be signed by the nations joining the League: "(1) All justiciable questions arising between the signatory Powers, not settled by negotiation, shall, subject to the limitations of treaties, be submitted to a Judicial Tribunal for hearing and judgment, both upon the merits and upon any issue as to its jurisdiction of the question. "(2) All other questions arising between the signatories, and not settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to a Council of Conciliation for hearing, consideration, and recommendation. "(3) The signatory Powers shall jointly use forthwith both their economic and military forces against any one of their number that goes to war, or commits acts of hostility, against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be submitted as provided in the foregoing. "The following interpretation of Article 3 has been authorized by the Executive Committee: "The signatory Powers shall jointly use, forthwith, their economic forces against any of their number that refuses to submit any question which arises to an international Judicial Tribunal or Council of Conciliation before threatening war. They shall follow this by the joint use of their military forces against that nation if it actually proceeds to make war or invades another's territory without first submitting, or offering to submit, its grievance to the court or Council aforesaid and awaiting its conclusion.' "(4) Conferences between the signatory Powers shall be held from time to time to formulate and codify rules of international law, which, unless some signatory shall signify its dissent within a stated period, shall thereafter govern in the decisions of the Judicial Tribunal mentioned in Article I."-(World Peace Foundation, Pamphlet Series, August, 1916.) 5. Possibility of World Federation. (a) Some historical antecedents-the Holy Alliance (1815); the Quadruple, later the Quintuple, Alliance (1815); the Hague Peace Conferences (1899 and 1907); the Conference at Algericas (1906). (b) Success of partial federations-the United States of America; Dominion of Canada, Commonwealth of Canada, and Union of South Africa; the British Empire; the German Empire; etc. (c) Lack of explicitness in current proposals. "Internationalists hold that nationalism is no longer expressive of the age, but that federation is not as yet feasible; that the present sovereignty of states is detrimental, but that one cannot hope to change the theory suddenly. Hence, they propose internationalism, that is, a sort of confederation, a cooperative union of sovereign states, a true Concert of Powers. The individual schemes vary greatly and are usually not very explicit, chief emphasis being placed on faults of the present system."(Edward Kriehbiel, Nationalism, War, and Society, page 210.) 6. Indispensable elements in an effective World Federation. (a) The triumph of democratic government. “A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith with it or observe its covenants. . . Only free peoples can hold their purpose and their honor steady to a common end and prefer the interesti of mankind to any narrow interest of their own.”(President Wilson, speech of April 2, 1917.) (b) An international legislature. We have already the beginnings of a world legislature in the two Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. (c) An international executive authority and an international army and navy. (d) An international court of justice. The so-called permanent court of arbitration at the Hague (Hague Tribunal) not a real court. 7. The triumph of the United States and the Entente Allies over militarist and despotic Germany, gives the best assurance of the establishment of a League of Pesos and the practical ending of war. For reading references for Chapter X, see page 40. Reading References The references at the close of chapters do not include the publications of the Committee on Public Information (Washington, D. C.), of which the following are most useful for this study: War Cyclopedia, A Handbook for Ready Reference; W. Notestein, Conquest and Kultur; D. C. Munro, German War Practices; C. D. Hazen, The Govern ment of Germany. ANON., I Accuse, by a German, 26-141. ANGELL, N., The Great Illusion, chs. i-viii. BARKER, J. E., Modern Germany, 297-317, 798-829. BERNHARDI, F. VON, Germany and the Next War, 1-166, 226-259. BOURDON, G., The German Enigma. CHERADAME, A., The Pan-German Plot Unmasked. CHITWOOD, O. P., The Immediate Causes of the War. CONQUEST AND KULTUR. (Committee on Public Infor mation.) DAVIS, W. S., The Roots of the War, chs. xvii-xviii. DAWSON, W. H., What is Wrong with Germany, 1-69, 89 191. GERARD, J. W., My Four Years in Germany, chs. iv-v. GIBBONS, H. A., New Map of Europe, 21-57, 119-130. GRUMBACH, S., AND BARKER, J. E., Germany's Annexationist Aims. HAZEN, C. D., Europe Since 1915, 728-736. LE BON, The Psychology of the Great War, ch. iv. ROSE, J. H., Origins of the War, chs. i, fi, v. REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER II. BARKER, J. E., Modern Germany, 1-362. BULLARD, A., Diplomacy of the Great War, 1-160. CHERADAME, A., The United States and Pangermania, chs. i-iii. CHITWOOD, O. 1., The Immediate Causes of the War. DAWSON, W. H., What is Wrong with Germany, 70-112. DILLON, E. J., A Scrap of Paper, Introduction and ch. iii. FIFE, R. H., The German Empire Between Two Wars. FULLERTON, W. M., Problems of Power, 260-315. GERARD, J. W., My Four Years in Germany, chs. i-ii. GIBBONS, H. A., New Map of Europe, 1-367. HART, A. B., The War in Europe, ch. i-vi. HAYES, C. J. H., Political and Social History of Modern Europe, II, 397-426, 490-539, 679-719. HAZEN, C. D., Europe Since 1815, 303, 328, 601-644. The Government of Germany (pamphlet). MUIB, R., Britain's Case Against Germany, ch. iv. OGG, F. A., The Governments of Europe, 202-225, 251281. OXFORD UNIVERSITY FACULTY, Why We Are at War, ch ti-iii. PROTHERO, G. W., German Policy Before the War, ch. 1 ROSE, J. H., Development of the European Nations, II, 1-43. Origins of the War, ch. iii, iv, vi. SCHMITT, B. E., England and Germany, 219-357, 366-377. SCHURMAN, J. G., The Balkan Wars. SEYMOUR, C., Diplomatic Background of the War. TARDIEU, A., France and the Alliances. URQUHART, F. F., The Eastern Question (Oxford Pamphlets, No. 17). VILLARD, O. G., Germany Embattled, 126-156. PERIODICALS: ANON. The Balkan League-History of Its Formation, in Fortnightly Review, 93: 430-439. ANON. The Greater Servia Idea, in World's Work, for September, 1914, 129-131. ANON. Austria-Disturber of the Peace, in Fortnightly Review, 93: 249-264, 598-602. BARKER, J. E., The War in the Balkans, in Fortnightly Review, 92: 813-825. DILLON, E. J., Foreign Affairs, in Contemporary Review, 95: 619-638, 492-510. CHIROL, SIR V., Turkey in the Grip of Germany, in Quarterly Review, 222: 231-251. COLQUHON, The New Balance of Power, in North American Review, 191: 18-28. JOHNSTON, H. H., Africa and the Eastern Railway Schemes, in Nineteenth Century, 72: 558-569. MARRIOTT, J. A. R., Factors in the Problem of the Near East, in Fortnightly Review, 99: 943-953. O'CONNOR, The Bagdad Railway, in Fortnightly Review, 95: 201-216. TREVELYAN, G. M., Serbia and Southeastern Europe, in Atlantic Monthly, 116: 119-127. REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER III. In addition to the references cited in this chapter, see the various indexes to periodical literature on the topics indicated. REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER IV. The diplomatic documents published by the various Governments ("White Book," "Blue Book," "Yellow Book," etc.), may most conveniently be found in the volume entitled Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War (indexed), published in this country by George H. Doran & Co., New York (price, $1.00). The two volumes edited by James Brown Scott, under the title, Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War (Oxford University Press, New York), are of great value. The American Association for International Conciliation, 407 West 117th Street, New York, has published the correspondence in a series of pamphlets which it distributes gratis so long as its supply lasts. Discussions of the correspondence may be found in: J. M. Beck, The Evidence in the Case; A. Bullard, The Diplomacy of the Great War; J. W. Headlam, History of Twelve Days; I Accuse, by a German; and The Crime, by the same author; M. P. Price, Diplomatic History of the War; E. C. Stowell, Diplomatic History of the War; L. H. Holt and A. N. Chilton, History of Europe, 1862-1914, pp. 539-559; W. S. Davis, The Roots of the War (1918), ch. xxiii. REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER V. See I Accuse! and works previously cited by Bullard, Gibbons, Hayes, Headlam, Rose, Schmitt, Seymour, etc. The New York Times Current History contains much valuable material. BECK, J. M., The Evidence in the Case, chs. vi-vii, ix CHITWOOD, O. P., Fundamental Causes of the Great War, chs. v-vii. DAVIS, W. S., The Roots of the War, ch. xxiii. OXFORD UNIVERSITY FACULTY, Why We Are at War, ch. v. PRICE, M. P., The Diplomatic History of the War, pp. 16-84. STOWELL, E. C., The Diplomacy of the War of 1914, chs. iii-vii. PERIODICALS: CHIROL, SIB V., The Origins of the Present War, in Quarterly Review (Oct., 1914). DILLON, E. J., Causes of the European War, in Contemporary Review (Sept., 1914). FERRERO, G., The European Tragedy, in Educational Review (Nov., 1914). HILL, D. J., Germany's Self-Revelation of Guilt, in Century Magazine (July, 1917). "POLITICUS," The Causes of the Great War, in Fortnightly Review (Sept., 1914). TURNER, E. J., Causes of the Great War, in American Political Science Review (Feb., 1915). REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER VI. BECK, J. M., The Evidence in the Case, ch. viii. CHITWOOD, O. P., Immediate Causes of the Great War. DE VISSCHER, C., Belgium's Case, chs. i-vi. DAVIS, M. O., The Great War, chs. viii-ix. DAVIS, W. S., The Roots of the War (1918), ch. xxiv. DILLON, E. J., The Scrap of Paper, chs. ix-xi. GIBBONS, H. A., The New Map of Europe, ch. xxi. MCCLURE, S. S., Obstacles to Peace, ch. xiv. MAETERLINCK, M., The Wrack of the Storm. SAROLEA, C., How Belgium Saved Europe, chs. i-vii. STOWELL, E. C., The Diplomacy of the War of 1914, cha. vili-ix. WAXWEILER, E., Belgium, Neutral and Loyal, chs. i-iv. -, Belgium and the Great Powers. WHY WE ARE AT WAR, by members of the Oxford Historical Faculty, ch. i. REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER VII. BLAND, J. O. P. (Trans.), Germany's Violations of the Laws of War, 1914-15. Compiled under the auspices of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. CHESTERTON, G. K., The Barbarism of Berlin. Chitwood, O. P., Immediate Causes of the Great War, chs. x-xii. CHAMBERY, RENE, The Truth About Louvain (1916). THE CRIMES OF GERMANY. Special supplement issued by the Field newspaper, London. DILLON, E. J., From the Triple to the Quadruple Alliance, Why Italy Went to War. GARDINER, J. B. W., How Germany is Preparing for the Next War. (In World's Work, February, 1918.) MCCLURE, S. S., Obstacles to Peace, ch. viii-xi, xv, xvi, xviii, xx. MOKVOELD, L., The German Fury in Belgium. WAXWEILER, E., Belgium, Neutral and Loyal, ch. v. REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER VIII. AMERICAN YEAR BOOK, 1914, 1915, 1916, 1917 (under International Relations). BECK, J. M., The War and Humanity, chs. ii-vi. CHERADAME, A., The United States and Pangermania. is at War. 64 Cong. Doc., No. 2111. GERARD, J. W., My Four Years in Berlin, chs. xviii-xix. HOW THE WAR CAME TO AMERICA (Committee on Publie Information). OGG, F. A., National Progress, 1907-1917. American Nation Series. OHLINGER, G., Their True Faith and Allegiance. OSBORNE, W. F., America at War. PARTIAL RECORD OF ALIEN ENEMY ACTIVITIES, 19151917. (Pamphlet reprinted from data prepared by the Providence Journal, by the National Americanization Committee, 29 West Thirty-ninth Street, New York.) RATHOм, J. R., Germany's Plots Exposed. Work for February, 1918.) (World's ROBINSON, E. E., and West, V. J., The Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson. ROGERS, L., America's Case Against Germany. FESS, S. D., The Problems of Neutrality When the World is at War (64 Cong. Doc., No. 2111). REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER IX. (For Maps and Map References, see HISTORY TEACHER'S MAGAZINE for April, 1918.) ALLEN, G. H., AND WHITEHEAD, H. C., The Great War. 2 vols. issued. ANON., A German Deserter's War Experience (1917). BELLOC, H., A General Sketch of the European War. vols. issued. BUCHAN, J., Nelson's History of the War. BOYD, W., With the Field Ambulance at Ypres (1916). BRITTAIN, H. E., To Verdun from the Somme, 1916. COBB, I. S., Paths of Glory (1915). DOYLE, A. CONAN, A History of the Great War. 2 vola issued. EYE-WITNESS's NARRATIVE OF THE WAR: From the Marne to Neuve Chapelle (1915). FORTESCUE, G., At the Front with Three Armies (1914). GIBBS, P., The Soul of the War (1915). NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY (serial, monthly.) OLGIN, M. J., The Soul of the Russian Revolution (1918). PALMER, F., My Year of the War. My Second Year of the War. POWELL, E. A., Italy at War (1917). REED, J., The War in Eastern Europe. RUHL, A., Antwerp to Gallipoli (1916). SAROLEA, C., How Belgium Saved Europe, viii-xviii. SIMONDS, F., History of the Great War. VERHAEREN, E., Belgium's Agony. WASHBURN, S., The Russian Advance (1917). WELLS, H. G., Italy, France and Great Britain at War (1917). REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER X. BABSON, R. W., The Future of World Peace. BUXTON, C. R. (Editor), Towards a Lasting Peace (1915). CHERADAME, A., The Disease and Cure. (Reprinted from Atlantic Monthly, November and December, 1917.) "Cosmos," The Basis of a Durable Peace (1917). GRUMBACH, S., AND BARKER, J. E., Germany's Annexationist Aims (abridgment in English of Grumbach's Annexionistische Deutschland). HEADLAM, J. W., The Issue (1917). HERRON, G. D., Woodrow Wilson and the World's Peace (1917). HILL, E. J., The Rebuilding of Europe. MARCOSSON, I. L., The War After the War. WEBB, SIDNEY, When Peace Comes; the Way of Industrial Reconstruction. |