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War Supplement to The History Teacher's Magazine, January, 1918
War Reprint, No. 1
The Study of the Great War
A TOPICAL OUTLINE
with Copious Quotations
PROFESSOR SAMUEL B. HARDING
McKINLEY PUBLISHING COMPANY
Alliance and the Triple Entente; III. Three Diplomatic Crises; IV. Bagdad
Railroad and Mittel-Europa; V. Tripolitan and Balkan Wars.
I. Prior Relations of Serbia, Austria and Russia; II. The Serajevo
Declares War on Serbia; VI. Conclusions.
Preserving Peace; III. German Ultimatums and Declarations of War against
Russia and France; IV. German Responsibility for the War.
1. Other States Enter the War; II. World-wide Character of the War;
lations of International Law; V. Summary and Explanation of German Policy.
III. Summary of Reasons for Entering the War.
Topical Outline of the War
BY SAMUEL B. HARDING, PROFESSOR OF EUROPEAN HISTORY IN INDIANA UNIVERSITY.
PREPARED IN CO-OPERATION WITH THE NATIONAL BOARD FOR HISTORICAL SERVICE AND THE COMMITTEE
ON PUBLIC INFORMATION.*
I. FUNDAMENTAL CAUSES OF THE WAR.
already, to give vent to our surplus energies without I. GENERAL FACTOBS.
losing them and to make the motherland economi
cally independent.” (Manifesto of the Colonial 1. The constitution of the German Empire permits its for
League.) oign policy to be determined by the Emperor alone, who
“We need a fleet strong enough not only to protect is at the same time, by “divine right," King of Prus
the colonies we now have, but to bring about the sosia—the State which possesses an overwhelming terri
quisition of others." (Manifesto of the Navy torial, political, and military predominance in the
“A progressive nation like ours needs territory, “ The Emperor declares war with the consent of
and if this cannot be obtained by peaceful means, it the Bundesrat, the assent of the Reichstag not being must be obtained by war. It is the object of the Dorequired. Not even the Bundesrat need be consulted
fense Association (Wehrverein) to create this sontiif the war is defensive, and as the Hohenzollerns
ment.” (Lieut.-General Wrochem in speech to tho have always claimed to make defensive warfare it is
Wehrverein in March, 1913.) not surprising that
“Without doubt this acquisition of new lands will Bundesrat was officially informed about the present not take place without war. What world power was war three days after the Emperor declared it.”
ever established without bloody struggles ?” (Al(Charles D. Hazen, The Government of Germany;
brecht Wirth, Volkstum und Weltmacht in der Committee on Public Information publication.) (See Geschichte, 1904. Quoted by Andler, Le PangermanWar Cyclopedia, under "Autocracy,” “Kaiserism," isme continentale, 1915, p. 308.) “ William II.”)
“It is only by relying on our good German sword 2. Profit derived from war in the past by Prussia (Ger
that we can hope to conquer that place in the sun many).
which rightly belongs to us, and which no one will (a) Through increase of territory (cf. maps).
yield to us voluntarily. . . . Till the world comes to (b) Through indemnities (e. g., from France, 1871).
an end, the ultimate decision must rest with the (c) Through increased prestige and influence. Hence sword.” (German Crown Prince, in Introduction to
justification of the "blood and iron ” policy of Germany in Arms, 1913.)
4. Biological argument for war.
(a) Darwin's theory of the “struggle for existence” sia's power by successful and deliberately incurred
as a chief factor in the evolution of species. wars. Frederick the Great followed in the footsteps
(b) Development in Germany of the theory that of his glorious ancestor. ... None of the wars which
States are of necessity engaged in such strughe fought had been forced upon him; none of them
gle for existence." did he postpone as long as possible. ... The lessons (c) Hence war is an “ordinance of God for the weedof history thus confirm the view that wars which
ing out of weak and incompetent individuals and have been deliberately provoked by far-seeing states.
States.” Corollary: "Might makes right." men have had the happiest results.” (Bernhardi, (d) Examples of such arguments from Treitschke, Germany and the Next War, 1911.)
Bernhardi, etc. (See Conquest and Kultur, seo. 3. Gormany's demand for “ a place in the sun.”
1, 2, 4; War Cyclopedia, under “ Bernhardi," (a) Meaning of the Kaiser's phrase (“ a place in the
“ Treitschke,” “War, German View;" Vernon sun") not clear. It covers vaguely colonies, com
Kellogg, "Headquarters' Nights," in Atlantic merce, and influence in international affairs in
Monthly for August, 1917.) proportion to Germany's population, industrial
“War is a biological necessity of the first im. importance, and military power.
portance, a regulative element in the life of mankind (b) Obstacles. The German Empire was & late
which cannot be dispensed with, since without it an comer in the family of nations; the best regions unhealthy development will follow, which excludos for colonization and exploitation, especially in every advancement of the race, and thereforo all real the temperate zones, were already occupied by
civilization. .. 'To supplant or be supplanted is other Powers.
the essence of life,' says Goethe, and the strong life (0) Examples of the demand. (See Conquest and gains the upper hand. The law of the stronger holds
Kultur, secs. 6, 10; War Cyclopedia, under good everywhere. Those forms survive which are “ Place in the Sun,” “ Pan-Germanism,” etc.)
able to procure themselves tho most favorablo con"We need colonies, and more colonies, than we have
ditions of life, and to assert themselves in the uni.
versal economy of Nature. The weaker This outline was prepared with the active aid of the Committee on
cumb. . Public Information (Department of Civic and Educational Co-operadon), 10 Jackson Place, Washington, D. 0. Frequent reference 18
“Might gives the right to occupy or to conquer. made herein to the publications of this committee, which with a few axeptions are distributed tree upon application.
Might is at once the supremo right, and the disputo Copyright, 1917, McKinley Publishing Company.
as to what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war." (Bernhardi, Germany and the Nert War, 1911, pp. 18, 23.)
“ They fight, not simply because they are forced to, but because, curiously enough, they believe much of their talk. That is one of the dangers of the Germans to which the world is exposed; they really beliove much of what they say.” (Vernon Kellogg, in
Atlantic Monthly, August, 1917.) Idea of the German mission in the world, and the Gore man demand for world influence and prestige (PanGermanism). (a) Ardent belief in the superiority of the German
race and German Kultur » over all other races
and civilizations. (b) Hence the duty to promote the Germanization
of the world, and to oppose the absorption of
Germans by other nationalities. (c) Examples of these ideas in writings of Treit
schke, Rohrbach, Bernhardi, etc. (Seo Conquest and Kultur, secs. 1, 2; War Cyclopedia, under
Bernhardi,” Hegemony, German Ambition,” Kultur," “Pan - Germanism,” “ Treitschko,” “ William II.” “I hope that it will be granted to our German Fatherland to become in the future as closely united, as powerful, and as authoritative as once the Roman Empire was, and that just as in old times they said Civis Romanus sum, one may in the future need only to say, 'I am a German citizen.''
God has called us to civilize the world; we are the missionaries of human progress.”
"The ocean is indispensable for Germany's greatness, but the ocean also reminds us that neither on it nor across it in the distance can any great decision be again consummated without Germany and the German Emperor.” (Speeches of Emperor William
II. MILITABISM AND ABMAMENTS. 1. Definition of militarism. It is a state of mind; not tho
having of an army, no matter how large, but the as. altation of it to the chief place in the state, the subordination to it of the civil authorities. Joined to this is the reliance upon military force in every disputo. (See War Cyclopedia, under “Militarism," “ Prussian
ism," etc.) 2. Militarism and the military class dominant in Germany.
(a) Historical reasons for this: lack of defensible
frontiers; hostile neighbors, etc. Relation also
to topics under heading I. (b) The Zabern Incident (1913) as a practical ex.
ample of military domination. (See War Cyclo
pedia, under “ Zabern,” “ Luxemburg, Rosa.” (c) Quotations showing German exaltation of war
and army, etc. (See Conquest and Kultur, seca. 4, 5.)
Because only in war all the virtues which militarism regards highly are given a chance to unfold, because only in war the truly heroic comes into play, for the realization of which on earth militarisnı is above all concerned; therefore it seems to us who are filled with the spirit of militarism that war is a holy thing, the holiest thing on earth; and this high ostimate of war in its turn makes an essential ingrediont of the military spirit. There is nothing that tradespeople complain of so much as that we regard it as holy.” (Werner Sombart, Händler und Helden, 1915.)
“War is the noblest and holiest expression of human activity. For us, too, the glad, great hour of battle will strike. Still and deep in the German heart must live the joy of battle and the longing for it. Let us ridicule to the utmost the old women in breeches who fear war and deplore it as cruel and revolting. No; war is beautiful. Its august sublimity elevates the human heart beyond the earthly and the common.” (Jung-Deutschland, official organ of Young Germany, October, 1913.)
"War is for 48 only a means, the state of preparation for war is more than a means, it is an end. If we were not beset with the danger of war, it would be necessary to create it artificially, in ordor to strengthen our softened and weakened Germanism, to make bones and sinews.” (Ernst Hasse, Die Zukunft des deutschen Volkstums, 1908.)
“ It is the soldier and the army, not parliamentary majorities and votes, that have welded the German Empire together. My confidence rests with the army." (Emperor William II.)
Otfried Nippold, a University professor and jurist, was shocked to observe, on his return to Europe from a residence of several years in Japan, the extraordinary growth in Germany of militarism and the “jingo” spirit. At the end of a book which he compiled, made up of statements by prominent Germans in 1912-13 advocating war and conquest, he said: “The evidence submitted in this book amounts to ea irrefutable proof that a systematic stimulation of the war spirit is going on, based on the one hand on the wishes of the Pan-German League and on tho other on the agitation of the Defense Association [Wehrverein). . . . War is represented not merely as a possibility that might arise, but as a necessity that must come about, and the sooner the better. In the opinion of these instigators, the German nation needs & war; a long-continued peace seems regrettable to
“ The German race is called to bind the earth under its control, to exploit the natural resources and physical powers of man, to use the passivo races in subordinate capacity for the development of its Kultur.” (Ludwig Woltmann, Politische Anthropologie, 1913.)
“If people should ask us whether we intend to become a world power that overtops the world powers so greatly that Germany would be the only real World Power, the reply must be that tho will to world power has no limit.” (Adolph Grabowsky, in Das neue Deutschland, Oct. 28, 1914.)
“ By German culture the world shall be healed, and from their experience those who have only heard lics about German culture will perceive, will feel in their own bodies what German means and how a nation must be made up, if it wishes to rule the world." (Benedikt Haag, Deutschland und der Weltkrieg, 1914.)
“With the help of Turkey, India and China may be conquered. Having conquered these Germany should civilize and Germanize the world, and the German language would become the world language.” (Theodor Springman, Deutschland und der Orient, 1915.)
"Our next war will be fought for the highest interests of our country and of mankind. This will invest it with importance in the world's history. 'World power or downfall!' will be our rallying cry.” (Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War, 1911, p. 154.)
them just because it is a peace, no matter whether there is any reason for war or not, and therefore, in case of need, one must simply strive to bring it about. . . The desire of the political visionaries in the Pan-German camp for the conquest of colonies suits the purpose of our warlike generals very well; but to them this is not an end, but only a means. War as such is what really matters to them. For if their theory holds good, Germany, even if she conquered ever so many colonies, would again be in need of war after a few decades, since otherwise the German nation would again be in danger of moral degeneration. The truth is that, to them, war is a quite normal institution of international intercourse, and not in any way a means of settling great international conflicts—not a means to be resorted to only in case of great necessity.” (Der deutsche Chauvinismus, 1913, pp. 113-117; quoted in Conquest and
Kultur, 137-139.) 3. The competition in armaments. Europe an “armed
camp" following 1871, with universal military service, and constantly increasing military forces and expendi. tures. The trained forces at the beginning of the war
estimated approximately as follows: Russia, 4,100,000; Germany, 4,250,000; Austria, 3,600,000; France, 4,000,000; Great Britain (including its “Terri
torials or trained militia), 707,000. 4. Germany, already the first of military powers, planned a
Navy to rival that of England. Her first Naval Bill was introduced in 1898; Great Britain's reverses in the Boer War (1899-1902) greatly stimulated German naval activities.
every possible means of doing harm alike to enemy or neutral ships. At the same time she was anxious to secure to belligerent merchant-ships the right of transforming themselves into warships on the high seas." (Ramsey Muir, Mare Liberum: The Freedom
of the Seas, pp. 8-13.) IV. SOME SPECIAL SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT. 1. French desire to recover Alsace-Lorraine, taken by Ger
many in 1871. (See War Cyclopedia, under “ Alsace
Lorraine,” “ Franco-German Rivalry.”) 2. Desire of Italy to reclaim its unredeemed ” lands held
by Austria. (See Ibid., “ Italia Irredenta.") 3. Colonial and commercial rivalry among the Great Powe
ers over Central and Northern Africa (Morocco especially); Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, and Persia; China and the Far East; South America, etc. (See Ibid., un
der “Morocco Question,” “Franco-German Rivalry.") 4. Increased gravity of questions concerning the Balkan
Peninsula after the Turkish Revolution of 1908. Plans for Austrian and German domination in these regions (Drang nach Osten) conflicted with Russia's desiro to secure Constantinople and an outlet to the Mediterranean, and threatened the security of Great Britain's communications with India. (See Ibid., “ Balkan Prob
lem,” “ Drang nach Osten,” etc.) 5. Grouping of the Great Powers into the Triple Alliance
(1882) and the Triple Entente. Germany's fear of being hemmed in " (alleged policy of “ encircloment"). (See Ibid., “Encirclement, Policy of,"
Triple Alliance," " Triple Entente.”) 6. The Anglo-German Problem. (See Sarolea, The Anglo
German Problem, 1911; Conquest and Kultur,
time supremacy through Germany's rapid indus
trial development since 1870. (b) Colonial and trade rivalry in Africa, Asia Minor,
Mesopotamia, etc. (c) Hostility to Great Britain taught by Treitschko
and others. Doctrine that England was decrepit —“a colossus with feet of clay”—and that her empire would fall at the first hostile touch. Toasts of German officers to “the Day "-when war with Great Britain should come. (Seo War
Cyclopedia, under “ Der Tag,” “ Treitschke," eto.) “ If our Empire has the courage to follow an independent colonial policy with determination, a collision of our interests with those of England is inevitable. It was natural and logical that the new Great Power in Central Europe should be compelled to settle affairs with all Great Powers. We have settled our accounts with Austria-Hungary, with Franco, with Russia. The last settlement, the settlement with England, will probably be the lengthiest and tho most difficult.” (Heinrich von Treitschke.) (d) Attitude of Great Britain on the whole one of
conciliation. (e) Failure of the two Powers to arrive at an agree
ment as to naval armaments and mutual rela. tions. Great Britain proposed (in 1912) to sige
the following declaration : “ The two Powers being naturally desirous of socuring peace and friendship between them, England declares that she will neither make, nor join in, any unprovoked attack upon Germany. Aggressions upon Germany is not the subject, and forms no part, of any treaty, understanding, or combination to whleb
III. FAILURE OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907, AND OF THE NAVAL CONFERENCE OF
LONDON (1908-9). 1. History of the Hague conferences. Agency of Russia
and the United States in calling them. Their positive results in formulating international law and establishing a tribunal at the Hague. (See War Cyclopedia, under Hague Conferences," " Hague Conventions,”
Hague Regulations," " Hague Tribunal.” 2. Plans therein for disarmament and compulsory arbitra
tion defeated by Germany and Austria. 3. General policy of Germany with reference to arbitration.
Refusal to enter into an arbitration treaty with the
tude," “ Peace Treaties.”) 4. British vs. German views of the “freedom of the seas,"
as revealed at the Hague Conferences and the Naval Conference of London. (See War Cyclopedia, under “ Freedom of the Seas," “ Declaration of London," etc.)
“The German view of freedom of the seas in time of war was that a belligerent should have the right to make the seas dangerous to neutrals and enemies alike by the use of indiscriminating mines; and that neutral vessels should be liable to destruction or seizure without appeal to any judicial tribunal if in the opinion of the commander of a belligerent warvessel any part of their cargo consisted of contraband. On the other hand, Germany was ever ready to place the belligerent vessels on the same footing as neutral vessels, and to forbid their seizure or dostruction except when they were carrying contraband or endeavoring to force a blockade. In this way she hoped to deprive the stronger naval power of its principal weapon of offense—the attack upon enemy commerce-while preserving for the weaker power