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through hot-headedness of her troops and underofficers, France withdrew her troops 10 kilometers (about six miles) within her own frontiers. On the othor hand, German bands repeatedly crossed the French frontier, and even killed a French soldier on French soil before the declaration of war. (French Yellow Book, No. 106.)

Similar falsehoods were inserted in the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia, and in the German declaration of war on Russia. Falsehood and forgery were used with Machiavellian unscrupulousness by Germany in the conduct of her foreign affairs. (Compare Bismarck's changes in the “Ems dispatch” at beginning of Franco-German war and his diabolical pleasure that war with France thus became certain. Bismarck, Autobiography, II, p. 101. See War Cyclopedia, under German Government, Moral Bankruptcy,” etc.)

and long-cherished principles of international action and honor; which chose its own time for the war; delivered its blow fiercely and suddenly; stopped at no barrier either of law or mercy; swept a whole continent within the tide of blood-not the blood of soldiers only, but the blood of innocent women and children also and of the helpless poor; and now stands balked but not defeated, the enemy of fourfifths of the world. This power is not the German people. It is the ruthless master of the German people. It is no business of ours how that great people came under its control or submitted with tomporary zest to the domination of its purpose; but it is our business to see to it that the history of the rest of the world is no longer left to its handling." (President Wilson's reply to the Pope's peaco proposals, August 27, 1917.) For reading references on Chapter V, see page 39.


The testimony is overwhelming not only that Germany planned with Austria an aggressive stroke in 1914, but that in the end it was she who willed the war. (See War Cyclopedia, under “War, Responsibility for.")

“ The constant attitude of Germany who, since the beginning of the conflict, while ceaselessly protesting to each Power her peaceful intentions, has actually, by her dilatory or negative attitude, caused the fail. ure of all attempts at agreement, and has not ceased to encourage through her Ambassador the uncompromising attitude of Vienna; the German military preparations begun since the 25th July and subsequently continued without cessation; the immediate opposition of Germany to the Russian formula [of July 29-31], declared at Berlin inacceptable for Austria before that Power had ever been consulted; in conclusion, all the impressions derived from Berlin bring conviction that Germany has sought to humiliato Russia, to disintegrate the Triple Entente, and if these results could not be obtained, to make war." (Viviani, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 31, in French Yellow Book, No. 114; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 221.)

“Never in the history of the world has a greater crime than this been committed. Never has & crime after its commission been denied with greater offrontery and hypocrisy." (I Accuse, pp. 208-9.)

“ The German Government contrived the jointly in concert with the Austrian Government, and so burdened itself with the greatest responsibility for the immediate outbreak of the war. The German Government brought on the war under cover of deception practised upon the common people and even upon the Reichstag (note the suppression of the ultimatum to Belgium, the promulgation of the German White Book, the elimination of the Tsar's despatch of July 29, 1914, etc.).” (Dr. Karl Liebknecht, German Socialist, in leaflet dated May 3, 1916. See War Cyclopedia, under “ Liebknecht on German War Policy.")

“ The object of this war [on the part of the opponents of Germany) is to deliver the free peoples of the world from the menace and the actual power of a vast military establishment controlled by an irresponsible government which, having secretly planned to dominate the world, proceeded to carry the plan out without regard either to the sacred obligations of treaty or the long-established practices


IN GREAT BRITAIN. I. WHY GREAT BRITAIN WAS EXPECTED TO STAY OUT. 1. Embittered state of party relations growing out of the

Budget struggle of 1909-11, the limitation of the voto of the House of Lords in 1911, violence of the suffragettes (“ the wild women ”), and the passago by the House of Commons of the Irish Home Rulo bill (May

25, 1914). 2. Serious threat of rebellion in northern Ireland (Ulster)

against putting in force Irish Home Rule act. Organi. zation of armed forces under Sir Edward Carson; " gun

running" from Germany. 3. Widespread labor troubles, especially among the railway

workers. 4. Unrest in India, following administrative division of the

province of Bengal; boycott movement; revolutionary

violence attending Nationalist (Hindu) agitations. 5. Unwarlike character of the British people; a "nation of

shopkeepers” supposedly unready for the sacrificos of war. Progress of pacifist opinions (“Norman-Angell

ism"). 6. Lack of an army adequate for use abroad. Composed of

volunteers (“ mercenaries ”) instead of being based on compulsory service, it was regarded (in the Kaisar's phrase) as contemptible.”

II. BRITISH DIPLOMACY AND THE WAB. 1. Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, labored

unremittingly for peace. (See War Cyclopedia, under 'Grey and British Policy, 1914.”)

“Sir Edward Grey deserves more than any other the name of the peacemaker of Europe.' . . . His efforts were in vain, but his merit in having served the cause of peace with indefatigable zeal, with skill and energy will remain inextinguishable in history." (I Accuse, pp. 247-8.)

“No man in the history of the world has ova labored more strenuously or more successfully than my right honorable friend, Sir Edward Grey, for that which is the supreme interest of the modern worlda general and abiding peace. . . . We preserved by every expedient that diplomacy can suggest, straining to almost the breaking point our most cherished friendships and obligations, even to the last making offort upon effort and hoping against hope. Then, and only then, when we were at last compelled to realize that the choice lay between honor and the


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honor, between treachery and good faith, and that we had at last reached the dividing line which makes or mars a nation worthy of the name, it was then, and only then, that we declared for war.” (Prime Minister Asquith, at the Guildhall, London, September 4, 1914.)

“ Shoulder to shoulder with England we labored incessantly and supported every proposal,” etc. (German White Book; in Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 410.)

Similar admissions that Great Britain strove sincerely and energetically for peace are found in other passages in the German White Book. Later the German Chancellor, von Bethmann Hollweg, declared: “The inner responsibility (for the war) lies on the Government of Great Britain. . . . England saw how things were moving, but did nothing to spoke the wheel.” (Speech in Reichstag, December

2, 1914.) This statement, however, is palpably false. 2. British fleet kept together after the summer mancuvres (July 27). Importance of this step.

"I pointed out to the Austrian ambassador) that our fleet was to have dispersed to-day, but we had felt unable to let it disperse. We should not think of calling up reserves at this moment, and there was no menace in what we had done about our fleet; but, owing to the possibility of a European conflagration, it was impossible for us to disperse our forces at this moment. I gave this as an illustration of the anxiety that was felt (over the Serbian question)." (Sir Edward Grey, in British Blue Book, No. 48; Collected

Diplomatic Documents, p. 43.) 3. Her liberty of action reserved; Great Britain was free from engagements (July 29).

"In the present case the dispute between Austria and Serbia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand. Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a ques. tion of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav-a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved and France became involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to consider. .. We were free from engagements, and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do. I thought it necessary to say that, because . we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet, and I was about to warn (the German ambassador] not to count on our standing aside, but that it would not be fair that I should let (the French ambassador) be misled into supposing that this meant that we had decided what to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise.” (Sir Edward Grey to the French Ambassador, in British Blue Book, No. 87;

Collected Diplomatic Documents, pp. 65-66.) 4. Germany's “Infamous Proposal” of July 29 (following

the Potsdam council of that date, at which war apparently was resolved upon). In return for British neu. trality in case of war between Germany and France, tho German Chancellor promised: (a) Not to aim at “territorial acquisitions at the expense of France" in Europe; (b) a similar undertaking with respect to the French colonies was refused; (c) the neutrality of Holland would Le observed as long as it was respected by Germany's adversaries; (d) in case Germany was obliged to violate Belgium’s neutrality, “when the war

was over Belgian integrity would be respected if sho had not sided against Germany."

“He [the German Chancellor] said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Gor many's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of bis continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as ho was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imper. ial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.

“I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a simi. lar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that so long as Gørmany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany." (British Ambassador at Berlin, in British Blue Book, No. 85; Collected

Diplomatic Documents, p. 64.) 5. This proposal was emphatically rejected by Great

Britain. “What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and Franco is beaten, so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies." (Sir Edward Grey, in British Blue Book, No. 101; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 77. Compare Germany's attitudo over Great Britain's proposal for a compact in 1912— see ch. i, IV 6 c.)

The proposals of July 29 may be regarded as “tho first clear sign of a general conflict; for they prosumed the probability of a war with France in which Belgium, and perhaps England, might be involved, while Holland would be left alone.” (J. H. Roso, Development of the European Nations, 5th ed., II, p.

387.) 6. Grey holds out the prospect of a League of Peace (July

30). In his reply to the foregoing proposals, the British Foreign Secretary adds:

“If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavor will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definito proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may mako possible some more definito rapprochement betwoen

the Powers than has been possible hitherto." (Brit as well as of her rights as a neutral state in general ish Blue Book, No. 101; Collected Diplomatic Docu (See Hague Convention of 1907, Articles 2-5; War ments, p. 78.)

Cyclopedia, under Luxemburg,"

“Neutral Duties," Germany made no reply to the above suggestion. “Neutrality,” “Neutralized State.") 1. Would Great Britain keep out if Germany respected 2. Special status of Belgium as a Neutralized State. Based Belgium's neutrality? (August 1.)

upon the Treaty of London (1839), by which Belgium “He [the German Ambassador] asked me [Sir became “

an independent and perpetually neutral state, Edward Grey] whether, if Germany gave a promise ... bound to observe such neutrality towards all not to violate Belgium's neutrality, we would engage other states," and Prussia, France, Great Britain, Aus. to remain neutral.

tria, and Russia became the guarantors

» of her “I replied that I could not say that; our hands neutrality. The German Empire was the successor to were still free, and we were considering what our Prussia in this guarantee. Confirmation of Belgium's attitude should be. All I could say was that our at neutrality in 1870, by treaties between Great Britain titude would be determined largely by public opin. and Prussia and Great Britain and France. (See War ion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would Cyclopedia, under “ Belgium, Neutralization.”) appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not

“Had Belgium been merely a emall neutral nethink that we could give a promise of neutrality on tion, the crime (of her violation) would still have that condition alone.

been one of the worst in the history of the modern “The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could world. The fact that Belgium was an internationalnot formulate conditions on which we would remain

ized State has made the invasion the master tragedy neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of

of the war. For Belgium represented what progress France and her colonies might be guaranteed.

the world had made towards co-operation. If it “I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any

could not survive, then no internationalism was pog. promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I sible. That is why, through these years of horror could only say that we must keep our hands free.” upon horror, the Belgian horror is the fiercest of all. (British Blue Book, No. 123; Collected Diplomatic The burning, the shooting, the starving, and the robDocuments, p. 93.)

bing of small and inoffensive nations is tragic enough.

But the German crime in Belgium is greater than the 8. Great Britain not to come in if Russia and France rejected reasonable peace proposals; otherwise she would

sum of Belgium's misery. It is a crime against the aid France (July 31).

basis of faith on which the world must build or per

ish." “I said to German Ambassador this morning that

(Walter Lippman, in Annals of the American

Academy of Political and Social Science, July, 1917). if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Aus 3. German reassurances to Belgium in 1911 and 1914. tria were striving to preserve European peace, and

Germany will not lose sight of the fact that the that Russia and France would be unreasonable if neutrality of Belgium is guaranteed by international they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg treaty.” (German Minister of War, in the Reichstag, and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia April 29, 1911. See Belgian Grey Book, No. 12; and France would not accept it His Majesty's Gov.

Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 306.) ernment would have nothing more to do with the

“The troops will not cross Belgian territory." consequences; but, otherwise, I told German Am

(German Minister to Belgium, early on August 2, bassador that if France became involved we should be 1914, to Brussels journalists. In H. Davignon, drawn in." (Sir Edward Grey, in British Blue Book,

Belgium and Germany, p. 7.) No. 111; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 86.)

“Up to the present he (the German Minister to 9. Great Britain gives Naval assurance to France (August

Belgium, on August 2] had not been instructed to 2), following the German declaration of war on Russia

make us an official communication, but that we knew (August 1) and the invasion of Luxemburg.

his personal opinion as to the feelings of security

which we had the right to entertain towards our "I am authorized (by the British Cabinet] to give

eastern neighbors.” (Belgian Minister for Foreign an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the

Affairs, in Belgian Grey Book, No. 19; Collected Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the

Diplomatic Documents, p. 309.) British fleet will give all the protection in its power."

4. France officially assured Great Britain and Belgium of (Sir Edward Grey to the French Ambassador, in her resolve to respect Belgium's neutrality (July 31 British Blue Book, No. 148; Collected Diplomatic and August 1), in response to an inquiry addressed by Documents, p. 105.)

Great Britain to both France and Germany. (British This assurance was given as the result of an ar

Blue Book, No. 115 and 125; Belgian Grey Book, No. rangement of several years' standing whereby the

15; Collected Diplomatic Documents, pp. 87, 94, 307.) French fleet was concentrated in the Mediterranean 5. Germany declined to give such an official assurance and the British in the North Sea. “It did not bind (July 31)-apparently on the ground that "any reply us to go to war with Germany unless the German they might give could not but disclose a certain amount fleet took the action indicated.” (Sir Edward Grey of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing." to the British Ambassador at Paris, in British Blue (British Blue Book, No. 122; Collected Diplomatio Book, No. 148; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. Documents, p. 92.) 105. )

8. Germany demanded (August 2 at 7.00 p. m.) permission

to pass through Belgium on the way to France, alleging III. NEUTBALITY OF LUXEMBURG AND OF BELGIUM

(falsely) that France intended to march into Belgium, VIOLATED.

and offering to restore Belgium and to pay an indem1. Luxemburg lovaded by German troops (August 2). nity at the end of the war. Should Belgium oppose the

This was in violation of the Treaty of London (1867), German troops, she would be considered as an enemy,"


and Germany would undertake no obligations of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integtowards her. (Belgian Grey Book, No. 20; Collected rity of Belgium.” (Belgian Grey Book, No. 25; Cole Diplomatic Documents, pp. 309-311.)

lected Diplomatic Documents, p. 313.) 7. Belgium refused such permission (August 3). “The 2. Great Britain's ultimatum to Germany (August 4) ask. Belgian Government, if they were to accept the pro

ing assurance by midnight that “the demand made posals submitted to them, would sacrifice the honor of

upon Belgium will not be proceeded with, and that her the nation and betray their duty towards Europe.” neutrality will be respected by Germany." (British (Belgian Grey Book, No. 22; Collected Diplomatic

Blue Book, No. 153, 159; Collected Diplomatic DocuDocuments, p. 312.)

ments, pp. 107-109.) 8. German armed forces entered Belgium on the morning 3. War declared by Great Britain (about midnight, August of August 4. Belgium thereupon appealed to Great

4). The "scrap of paper utterance. Britain, France, and Russia, as guaranteeing Powers, to

The account of the last interview (about 7.00 come to her assistance in repelling the invasion.

p. m., August 4) of the British Ambassador with the 6. Germany's justification of her action.

German Chancellor is instructive: “I found the (a) Plea of necessity. Gentlemen, we are now in Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law.

began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and per minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's haps have already entered Belgian territory. Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word Gentlemen, this is a breach of international law.

Neutrality,' a word which in war time had so ... We know ... that France stood ready for often been disregardedjust for a scrap of paper an invasion [this statement was false]. France Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred could wait, we could not. The wrong-1 nation who desired nothing better than to be friends speak openly—the wrong we thereby commit we with her. All his efforts in that direction had been will try to make good as soon as our military rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the aims have been attained. He who is menaced as

policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself we are and is fighting for his highest possession since his accession to office had tumbled down like a can only consider how he is to hack his way house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; through.” (Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg,

it was like striking a man from behind while he was in the Reichstag, August 4, 1914. See War

fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Cyclopedia, under “ Bethmann Hollweg,” “Kriegs

Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events Raison," "Notwendigkeit."

that might happen. I protested strongly against that (b) Charge that Belgium had violated her own neu

statement, and said that, in the same way as he and trality by concluding military conventions with

Herr von Jagow (German Foreign Minister] wished England in 1905 and 1912 directed against Ger

me to understand that for strategical reasons it was many. This claim is based on a willful mis

a matter of life and death to Germany to advance interpretation of documents discovered by Ger

through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, many in Brussels after the taking of that city. 80 I would wish him to understand that it was, so to (Collected Diplomatic Documents, pp. 350-367.)

speak, a matter of life and death' for the honor of “That a wrong was done to Belgium was originally Great Britain that she should keep her solemn enopenly confessed by the perpetrator. As an after gagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neuthought, in order to appear whiter, Cain blackened

trality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had Abel. In my opinion it was a spiritual blunder to

to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in rummage for documents in the pockets of the quiver

engagements given by Great Britain in the future? ing victim. ... To calumniate her in addition is

The Chancellor said, But at what price will that really too much.” (Karl Spitteler, a Swiss, quoted

compact have been kept? Has the British Governin I Accuse, p. 234.)

ment thought of that?' I hinted to his Excellency (c) Military expediency was the real reason. This

as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could is shown, among other indications, by an inter

hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn view (August 3, 1914) between the German Min

engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, 80 ister for Foreign Affairs and the Belgian Minister

evidently overcome by the news of our action, and to Germany.

so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from German Minister: “It is a question of life or death

adding fuel to the flame by further argument." for the Empire. If the German armies do not want

(British Blue Book, No. 160; Collected Diplomatio to be caught between the hammer and the anvil they

Documents, p. 111. See War Cyclopedia, under must strike a decisive blow at France, in order then

Scrap of Paper.") to turn back against Russia.”

4. Great Britain's reasons for entering the war. Belgian Minister: “But the frontiers of France are

(a) Her obligations to Belgium under the treaty of sufficiently extended to make it possible to avoid

1839. passing through Belgium."

(b) Her relations to France growing out of the EnForeign Minister: “ They are too strongly forti

tente Cordiale (1904). These ties were strengthified.” (H. Davignon, Belgium and Germany, p. 14.)

ened in subsequent years by consultations of IV. GREAT BRITAIN ENTEBS THE WAR.

British and French naval experts, but no promise 1. Appeal of King Albert of Belgium to King George

of anything more than diplomatic support was (August 3). Remembering the numerous proofs of

given until August 2, 1914. your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor,

“We have agreed that consultation between exand the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the perts is not, and ought not, to be regarded as an enproof of friendship you have just given us again, I gagement that commits either Government to action make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention in any contingency that has not yet arisen and may

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elled and ruled by Prussia. She is to dispose of the liberties of her neighbors and of us all. We say that life on these terms is intolerable. And this also is what France and Italy and Russia say. We are fighting the German idea of the wholesomeness, almost the desirability, of ever recurrent war. Germany's philosophy is that a settled peace spells degeneracy. Such a philosophy, if it is to survive as a practical force, means eternal apprehension and unrest. It

ever-increasing armaments. It means arresting the development of mankind along the lines of culture and humanity...

The Allies can tolerate no peace that leaves tho wrongs of this war unredressed. Peace counsels that are purely abstract and make no attempt to discriminate between the rights and the wrongs of this war are ineffective if not irrelevant.

“... The Prussian authorities have apparently but one idea of peace, an iron peace imposed on other nations by German supremacy. They do not understand that free men and free nations will rather die than submit to that ambition, and that there can be no end to war till it is defeated and renounced." (Sir Edward Grey to correspondent of Chicago Daily News, in June, 1916.) For reading references on Chapter VI, see page 40.

never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to cooperate in war.

"You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

"I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common.” (Sir Edward Grey to the French Ambassador, November 22, 1912; see New York Times Current History, I, p. 283.)

There is but one way in which the Government could make certain at the present moment of keeping outside this war, and that would be that it should immediately issue a proclamation of unconditional neutrality. We cannot do that. We have made the commitment to France (of August 2, 1914) that I have read to the House which prevents us doing that." (Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons, August 3, 1914; New York Times Current History, I, p. 289.) (c) Self-interest—the realization that Germany's

hostility to her was implacable, and that if Great Britain was not to surrender her position as a Great Power in the world, and possibly a goodly portion of her colonial possessions, she must ultimately fight Germany; if so, better in alliance with France and Russia than alone at a

later time. 5. Great Britain's declared war aims.

“We shall never sheathe the sword which we have not lightly drawn until Belgium recovers in full measure all and more than all that she has sacrificed, until France is adequately secured against the menace of aggression, until the rights of the smaller nationalities of Europe are placed upon an unassailable foundation, and until the military domination of Prussia is wholly and finally destroyed.” (Prime Minister Asquith, November 9, 1914.)

“I say nothing of what the actual conditions of peace will be, because those are things which we must discuss with our allies and settle in common with them. But the great object to be attained. . . is that there shall not again be this sort of militarism in Europe, which in time of peace causes the whole of the continent discomfort by its continual menace, and then, when it thinks the moment has come that suits itself, plunges the continent into war.” (Sir Edward Grey, House of Commons, January 26, 1916.)

• What we and our allies are fighting for is a free Europe. We want a Europe free, not only from the domination of one nationality by another, but from hectoring diplomacy and the peril of war, free from the constant rattling of the sword in the scabbard, from perpetual talk of shining armor and war lords. In fact, we feel we are fighting for equal rights; for law, justice, peace; for civilization throughout the world as against brute force, which knows no straint and no mercy.

“What Prussia proposes, as we understand her, is Prusslan supremacy. She proposes a Europe mod


THE WAR I. OTHER STATES ENTER THE WAB. 1. Montenegro declares war (Aug. 7. 1914), as an ally of

Serbia. 2. Japan declares war (Aug. 23), because of (a) Alliance with Great Britain (concluded in 1902;

renewed in 1905 and 1911). (b) Resentment at German ousting of Japan from

Port Arthur in 1895, and German seizure of KlaoChau Bay (China) in 1897. Japanese ultimatum to Germany in 1914 modeled on that of Germany

to Japan in 1895. (c) Japan captures Tsingtau, on Kiao-Chau Bay (Nov.

17, 1914). Thenceforth her part in the military

operations of the war was slight. 3. Unneutral acts of Turkey (sheltering of German war

ships, bombardment of Russian Black Sea ports, Oct. 29, etc.) lead to Allied declarations of war against her (Nov. 3-5, 1914). It is now proved that Turkey was in alliance with Germany from August 4, 1914, (Sco

N. Y. Times Current History, Nov., 1917, p. 334-335.) 4. Italy declares war on Austria, (May 23, 1915; on Ger.

many August 27, 1916.) Due in part to(a) Italy's desire to complete her unification by acquir

ing from Austria the Italian-speaking Trentino

and Trieste (Italia Irredenta). (b) Conflicts of interests with Austria on the Eastern

shore of the Adriatic. (c) Austria-Hungary's violation of the Triple Alliance

agreement by her aggressive policy in the Balkans. 8. Bulgaria, encouraged by Russian and British reversen,

and assured by Germany of the much coveted shore on the Aegean, makes an alliance with Austria and Gormany and attacks Serbia (Oct. 13, 1915). Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy thereupon declared war on Bulgaria (Oct. 16–19.) Refusal of King Constantine of Greece to fulfill his treaty with Serbia.


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