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creased to provide war stocks. Great purchases of beds and hospital supplies in May, 1914; embargo on stocks of foreign pneumatic tires in Germany; hasty collection of accounts by German merchants; transfer of bank balances, etc., from beginning of July, etc. (See
Le Mensonge du 3 Août, 1914, pp. 9-10.) 6. Recall of reservists from South America, etc., in May and
June, 1914. 6. Exceptional grand manœuvres of 1914. Ordered in May,
these massed “ '500,000 men in Cologne, the Grand Duchy of Baden, and Alsace-Lorraine for the month
of August." (Le Mensonge du 3 Août, 1914, p. 9.) 7. Preparations for stirring up revolt in the British Empire.
(a) In South Africa. Reply of the Kaiser (in 1913)
to a communication from the future rebel leader, Colonel Maritz: “I will not only acknowledge tho independence of South Africa, but I will even guarantee it, provided the rebellion is started immediately." (Speech of General Botha at Cape Town, July 25, 1915. See Rose, Development of the European Nations, 5th ed., II, p.
379.) (b) In British India. On July 8, 1915, indictments
were brought in the Federal Court at San Fran. cisco against 98 persons, including German consuls, at which time the Federal District Attorney said: “For more than a year prior to the outbreak of the European war certain Hindus in San Francisco and certain Germans were preparo ing openly for war with England. At the outbreak of the war Hindu leaders, members of the German consulate here, and attachés of the German Government, began to form plans to foment revolution in India for the purpose of freeing India and aiding Germans in their military operations." The leaders of these defendants plead guilty to the charges against them in December, 1917. (See War Cyclopedia, under
"German Intrigue Against American Peace.”) "Consideration of all testimony leads to the conviction that the India plot now before the Federal Court here [in Chicago] is but a very small part of the whole conspiracy. ... The defendants appear to have traveled far and wide in promotion of their alleged work. And always, testimony indicates, German consuls were aware of what was going on and ready to give things a push. Pro-Germanism all over the United States, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Hawaii, Manila, China, Indo-China, Siam, Java, and various parts of Africa has been brought into the case. No part, according to the testimony, seems to have been detached. All blended into the whole scheme, which is alleged to have had its inspiration and propulsion in Berlin." (Christian Science Monitor, October 19,
1917.) 1. Coaling arrangements made for German naval vossels (Juno 14, 1914).
“A German cruiser, the Eber, was in dock at Cape Town a few days before the outbreak of war, and got away just in time. An intercepted letter ad. dressed to the commander contained certain instructions from Berlin, which were dated June 14, 1914. These instructions revealed a complete system for coaling the German navy on the outbreak of war through secret service agents in Cape Town, Now York and Chicago.
“The commander of the Eber was given the name of shippers and bankers with whom he could deal oon. fidentially, the essence of the plan being that a col. lier would leave Table Bay (Cape Colony) ostensibly bound for England, but really to meet a German war. ship at an agreed rendezvous. Naturally, so far as Cape Town is concerned, the arrangements have boon upset owing to the discovery, and this, perhaps, a. plains why German cruisers have been more in sul dence in North Atlantic waters than in the southon ocean.” (Cape Town correspondent of London Timos,
issue of October 6, 1914.) VI. CONCLUSION. Before June 28, 1914, Germany willed, y
not war, at least another trial of diplomatic strength in which the threat of war should enter as a decisive factor.
“There is a whole category of facts to which we do not, temporarily, attach a decisive importanco, for the spirit of mathematics can invoke in its favor the benefit of coincidence. . . . It is a question of various measures taken by Germany (the state or individ. uals) long before the menace of war was approciable. . . . Certain persons would see in those meas. ures, of which the war has demonstrated the utility, the proof that Germany had, months before, taken the resolve to launch the European war in 1914. When one has seen the German Government at work, this hypothesis is not extravagant." (Le Mensonge du s Août, 1914, p. 9-10.)
“Not as weak-willed blunderers have we under taken the fearful risk of this war. We wanted 4. Because we had to wish it and could wish it. May the Teuton devil throttle those whiners whose plous for excuses make us ludicrous in these hours of lofty experience! We do not stand, and shall not place ourselves, before the court of Europe. Our powa shall create new law in Europe. Germany strikos. If it conquers new realms for its genius, the priesthood of all the gods will sing songs of praise to the good war. . . . We are waging this war not in order to punish those who have sinned, nor in order to free enslaved peoples and thereafter to comfort ourselves with the unselfish and useless consciousness of our own righteousness. We wage it from the lofty point of view, and with the conviction, that Germany, a result of her achievements, and in proportion to them, is justified in asking, and must obtain, wider room on earth for development and for working out the possibilities that are in her. The Powers from whom she forced her ascendancy, in spite of thonselves, still live, and some of them have recovered from the weakening she gave them. . . . Now strikas the hour for Germany's rising power." (Maximilian Harden, editor of Die Zukunft; see New York Times Current History, MI, p. 130.)
“ It now appears beyond the possibility of doubt that this war was made by Germany pursuing a long and settled purpose. For many years she had been pro paring to do exactly what she has done, with a thoroughness, a perfection of plans, and a vastnoss of provision in men, munitions and supplies never before equaled or approached in human history. She brought the war on when she chose, because she chose, in the belief that she could conquer the earth nation by nation.” (Senator Elihu Root, speech in Chicage,
September 14, 1917.)
IV. THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CONTROVERSY. I. INTRODUCTION: PRIOB RELATIONS OF SERBIA, AUSTRIA,
AND RUBBIA. 1. Provious history of Serbia: Its fleeting greatness under
Stophen Dushan (died 1355); conquered by Turks, 1458; self-governing principality from 1830; independent of Turkey, 1878; territory greatly increased through war with Turkey, 1912-13. Revival in recent yoars of “Greater Serbia movement, directed largely against Austria-Hungary, which held Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, lands which by nationality and speech were Serbian. Compare Piedmont's unification of Italy, against Austrian resistance. (See War Oyclopedia, under “Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and
Slovenes."). 1. Serbia's relations with Austria-Hungary.
(a) Political estrangement due to Austria's high
handed annexation of Bosnia in 1908, and the thwarting by Austria and Italy, in 1913, of Ser. bia's desire for an outlet to the Adriatic. De
claration exacted of Serbia in 1909 (March 31): “ Serbia recognizes that the fait accompli regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights. . . . In doferonce to the advice of the Great Powers, Serbia undertakes to renounce from now onwards the attitudo of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary, and to live in future on good neighborly terms with the latter." (British Blue Book, No. 4; Collected Diplomatio Documents, p. 4.) (b) Tariff disputes over importation of Serbian pigs
into Austria-Hungary. A prohibitive tariff was
imposed in 1906. (c) Continued agitation of Serbian revolutionary
societies (especially the Narodna Odbrana) against the “dangerous, heartless, grasping, , odious and greedy enemy in the north,” who “robs millions of Serbian brothers of their liberty and rights, and holds them in bondage and chains.” (Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. 19;
Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 465.) (d) German plans for Berlin-Bagdad railway re
quired that Serbia should be controlled by Aus
tria. (See above, ch. ii, IV 4.) 3. Russia's interest in Serbia-founded upon kinship in
blood, language and religion, and on Russian aid in the past against Turkey (in 1806-12, 1829-30, 1877-8). This interest was well known, and Austria and Germany recognized that their policy toward Serbia might lead to war with Russia. (See War Cyclopedia, under “ Pan-Slavism.")
“During the Balkan crisis he [the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs) had made it clear to the Austrian Government that war with Russia must inevitably follow an Austrian attack on Serbia.” (Report of British Ambassador to Russia. British Blue Book, No. 139; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 101.)
“ We were perfectly aware that a possible warliko attitude of Austria-Hungary against Sorbia might bring Russia upon the field, and that it might therefore involve us in a war, in accordance with our duty as allies.” (German White Book; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 406.)
II. THE SERAJEVO ASSASSINATION (JUNE 28, 1914). 1. Assassination of the Austrian Crown Prince Franz Far.
dinand and his wife, while on an official visit to Sortjevo, the capital of the Austrian province of Bosnia Failure of first attempt at assassination by explosion of a bomb; success of second attempt, some hours later, by revolver shots. The assassins were Austrian subjects of Serbian nationality. (See War Cyclopedia,
under “Serajevo.”) 2. Opportuneness of the crime for Austria. (See Ramsay
Muir, Britain's Case Against Germany, p. 152.)
III. AUSTRIAN NOTE TO SERBIA (JULY 23, 1914.) 1. Preliminaries: Secret investigation of the crime by the
Austrian court at Serajevo. (Reports of the alleged results in Collected Diplomatic Documents, pp. 490-4; Austrian Red Book, Appendix 8, and German Whito Book, Appendix; summary, pp. 416-7.) Quieting reports as to its intentions issued by Austrian Government, but preparations made in secret for rigorous measures against Serbia.
“A reckoning with Serbia, a war for the position of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as a Great Power, even for its existence as such, cannot bo permanently avoided.” (Austrian Minister at Belgrado to Aur trian Government, July 21, 1914. In Austrian Red Book, No. 6; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p.
452.) 2. Conference at Potsdam (July 5, 1914), at which the
terms of the Note were practically settled. The hold. ing of such a conference has been denied by German newspapers, but the denial is not convincing. (860 War Cyclopedia, under “ Potsdam Conferenco; ” Now York Times, Current History, September, 1917, pp.
469-471.) 3. General character of the Note. In effect an ultimatup
to which ur onditional acceptance must be given withia forty-eight hours. Humiliating character of its do mands. (See War Cyclopedia, under “Serbia, Austria Ultimatum.”)
“I had never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formid. able a character.” (Sir Edward Grey, British Socra tary for Foreign Affairs, in British Blue Book, Na 6; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 13.)
“The demands of that [t Austrian) Government are more brutal than any ever made upon any dril. ized State in the history of the world, and thoy can be regarded only as intended to provoke war.” (Gar.
man Socialist newspaper Vorwärts, July 25, 1914.) 4. Some specific demands. The numbers attached are those
of the Note itself. (See British Blue Book, No. 4; Ool lected Diplomatic Documents, pp. 3-12.)
“ 2. To dissolve immediately the society called Narodna Odbrana (the chief society for Serbian propaganda), to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other so cieties and their branches in Serbia which engago ha propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal [Serbian] Government shall tako the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolvd from continuing their activity under another nam. and form."
“3. To eliminate without delay from public instrue tion in Serbia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction, overy thing that serves, or might serve, to foment the pro paganda against Austria-Hungary."
“5. To accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy."
“6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th June who are on Serbian tor ritory; delegates of theAustro-Hungarian Government
will take part in the investigation relating thereto." 6. Denial by Germany that she was consulted by Austria before sending the Note.
“We, therefore, permitted Austria a completely free hand in her action towards Serbia, but have not participated in her preparations.” (German White Book; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 406.)
This denial was, and is, generally disbelieved. (Seo Ramsay Muir, Britain's Case Against Germany, p. 8, and the evidence concerning the Potsdam Conference.) Germany's claim that she was ignorant of the Aus. trian Ultimatum was from the outset preposterous and against all reason. Intimately allied with Austria-Hungary and for a decade the dominating power in the diplomacy of the Central Powers in the Balkans and the Near East, is it possible to believe that she did not examine into and even give direction, in broad outline at least, to the policy of her ally at this critical stage in the development of her Pan-German program? The purpose of the denial, apparently, was to satisfy Italy (Austria's other ally), which
certainly was not consulted. 6. Circumstances making a peaceful outcome more difficult:
Absence of most of the foreign ambassadors from Vienna for their summer vacations; immediate withdrawal of Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs to a
romote mountain resort, etc., etc. 7. Widespread anxiety over the situation, as threatening
the peace of Europe. Russia, England, and Franco
meeting the demands of Austria.
der (1) that the Powers might be enabled to study the documentary material promised by Austria embodying the findings of the court at Serajevo; and (2) to permit them to exercise a moderating influence on Serbia. Sharp refusal of Austria to extend the time limit. (For later proposals see ch. v.)
tually may be, implicated in the plot, ... and who
Hague Tribunal or to the Great Powers, in care
its reply was not considered satisfactory. 2. Austria (to Europe's amazement) found this reply dis
honest and evasive. (See Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. 34; Collected Diplomatic Documents, pp. 500514.)
In less than an hour after receiving it the Austrian Minister left Belgrade with all his staff. Grave apprehensions were felt that this break of diplomatic relations would be followed by European war.
The Austrian Foreign Minister declared to the Russian Ambassador (July 28) that his Government could no longer recede, nor enter into any discussion about the terms of the Austro-Hungarian Note." (British Blue Book, No. 93; Collected Diplomatto Documents, p. 70.)
V. AUSTRIA DECLARES WAB ON SERBIA (JULY 28, 1914). 1. In spite of the efforts at mediation of Great Britain,
Russia, and France, Austria declared war on Sorbia,
July 28, 1914, 2. Demand of Germany that the war be " localized "-L l,
that no other Power interfere with Austria's chastiso
ment of Serbia. 3. Belgrade bombarded, July 29-30, and the war begun.
IV. SERBIAN REPLY TO THE AUSTBIAN NOTE (JULY 25,
1914). (Soo British Blue Book, No. 39; Collected Diplomatic
Correspondence, pp. 31-37.) 1. To the gratification of Europe, Serbia,
(a) Accepted eight of the ten Austrian demands.
As to No. 5, the Serbian Government said that they “ do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand, ... but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principlo of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighborly relations."
As to No. 6, they returned a temperate refusal (founded, according to Austrian claim, upon a doliberate misunderstanding of the nature of the domand): “It goes without saying that the Royal [Serbian] Government consider it their duty to open an onquiry against all such persons as are, or oven
VI. CONCLUSIONS. 1. Austria and Germany wanted war with Serbia, and their
chief fear was lest something might, against their wills, force them to a peaceful settlement; hence the basto and secrecy which attended their measures.
“ The impression left on my mind is that the Austro-Hungarian Note was 80 drawn up as to mako war inevitable; that the Austro-Hungarian Govorn. ment are fully resolved to have war with Serbia; that they consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake; and that until punishment has been administered to Serbia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of mediation. This country [Austria-Hungary] has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Serbia, and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be a great disappointment.” (British Ambassador at Vienna, July 27, 1914. In British Blue Book, No. 41; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 38.)
“He [the German Secretary of State) admitted quite freely that Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give the Serbians a lesson, and that thoy meant to take military action. He also admitted that Serbian Government could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands. ... Secretary of Stato confessed privately that he thought the Note left much to be desired as a diplomatic document" (British Charge at Berlin to Sir Edward Grey, Jaly
25, 1914. British Blue Book, No. 18; Collected July 31. “ Threatening danger of war” proclaimed in Diplomatic Documents, p. 22.)
Germany. German sent ultimatums to Russia and to “ In the Viennese note to Serbia, whose brazen France. arrogance has no precedent in history, each phrase Aug. l. Orders for general mobilization in France and b bears witness that Austria-Hungary desired the war. Germany. Declaration of war by Germany against ... Only a war, for which the best minds of the Russia. Italy declared that she would remain neutral army were thirsting, ... could cure the fundamen since " the war undertaken by Austria, and the conso tal ills of the two halves of the Austrian Empire, and quences which might result, bad, in the words of the of the monarchy. Only the refusal and not the ac German ambassador himself, an aggressive object." ceptance of the claims put forward in the note could British Blue Book, No. 152; Collected Diplomatio have profited Vienna.
Documents, p. 107.) The question has been asked: Where was the Aug. 2. Occupation of Luxemburg by Germany. Demand plan of campaign elaborated-in Vienna or Berlin: that Belgium also permit German troops to violate its And some hasten to reply: In Vienna. Why do peo neutrality. ply tolerate the propagation of such dangerous Aug. 3. Be im refused the German demand. Germany fables? Why not say the thing that is (because it declared war on France. must be), namely, that a complete understanding in Aug. 4. Germany invaded Belgium. Great Britain declared all matters existed between Berlin and Vienna." war on Germany. (Maximilian Harden, in Die Zukunft for August 1, Aug. 6. Austria-Hungary declared war on Russia. 1914; quoted in G. Alexinsky, Russia and the Great
II. PROPOSALS FOB PRESERVING PEACE, War, 129-130.)
1. A conference at London proposed by Sir Edward Groy 3. Austria's object was to reduce Serbia to a state of vas
(July 27). To be composed of the German and Italian Balage, as a step to Austrian hegemony in the Balkan
ambassadors to Great Britain, as friends of Austria, Peninsula. Her promises not to destroy Serbia's
and the French ambassador and Grey himself, u sovereignty, or to annex her territory, therefore, failed
friends of Russia. Its purpose, to discover an issue to satisfy Serbia's friends.
which would prevent complications." “ Austria demanded conditions which would havo
“If it is borne in mind how incomparably more placed Serbia under her permanent control.” (Prof.
difficult problems had been successfully solved by the Hans Delbrück, a noted professor and statesman of
conference of ambassadors at London during the Germany, in Atlantic Monthly, for February, 1915,
Balkan crisis, it must be admitted that a settlement
between the Austrian demands and the Serbian cor3. Germany's objects were:
cessions in July, 1914, was child's play compared (a) To recover her prestige, lost in the Agadir affair with the previous achievements of the London con(1911) and over the Balkan wars (1912-13).
ference.” (I Accuse, p. 155.) (b) To strengthen her ally Austria, and so increase
The proposal was accepted by Russia, France, and her own power.
Italy. It was declined by Germany (without con(c) To humiliate Russia and the Triple Entente, and sulting Austria) on the ground that she “could not to disrupt or render harmless the latter.
call Austria in her dispute with Serbia before a Euro(d) To promote the Central European—"Berlin to pean tribunal.” (German White Book; Collected
Bagdad "-project, and open a trade route to Diplomatic Documents, p. 409.) Grey explained that Saloniki, the most favorably situated seaport for it “would not be an arbitration, but a private and the commerce of Central Europe with the East.
informal discussion; ” nevertheless, Austria and Gor. 4. To advance these ends Germany and Austria deliberately many continued to decline.
incurred the grave risk of a general European war. 2. Germany proposed (July 26) that France "exerciso • For reading references on Chapter IV, see page 39.
moderating influence at St. Petersburg." The French
Foreign Minister in reply “pointed out that Germany V. FAILURE OF DIPLOMACY TO AVERT WAR: GER
on her part might well act on similar lines at Vienna, MANY AND AUSTRIA AT WAR WITH RUSSIA
especially in view of the conciliatory spirit displayed
by Serbia. The (German) ambassador replied that AND FRANCE.
such a course was not possible, owing to the decision I. OUTLINE OF EVENTS, JULY 21 to August 6, 1914.
not to intervene in the Austro-Serbian disputa" July 21. Secret orders preliminary to mobilization issued (Russian Orange Book, No. 28; Collected Diplomatio
in Germany. These measures, including the movement Documents, p. 276.) of troops towards the French frontier, continued up to
3. Germany proposed direct negotiations between Russia final mobilization, (See Le Mensonge du 8 Août, 1914, and Austria over the Serbian question (July 27). pp. 14-25; Nineteenth Century and After, issue for Austria declined these direct negotiations, even though June, 1917.)
proposed by her ally. (Was this due to collusion be July 23. Austrian Note sent to Serbia.
tween the two Governments ?) suly 25. Reply of Serbia. Austrian Minister quits Bel. 4. The Kaiser (who unexpectedly returned to Berlin an grade, severing diplomatic relations.
July 26 from a yachting cruise) attemped to act se July 27. Sir Edward Grey proposed a conference at Lon “ mediator” between Russia and Austria; but appar
don on the Serbian question. France, Russia, and Italy ently he confined himself to the effort to persuado accepted; Germany refused.
Russia "to remain a spectator in the Austro-Serbia July 28. Austria declared war on Serbia.
war without drawing Europe into the most terrible July 29. Russian mobilization on the Austro-Hungarian war it has ever seen.” (Kaiser to Tsar, July 29, ha frontier.
German White Book, exhibit 22; Collected Diplomatie July 30. Bombardment of Belgrade. General mobilization Documents, pp. 431-2.) in Russla begun.
"Neither over the signature of the Kaiser nor Ovo
that of his Foreign Minister does the record show a single communication addressed to Vienna in the interests of peace.” (J. M. Beck, The Evidence in the
Case, p. 112.) 5. The Tsar proposed, in a personal telegram to the Kaiser
(July 29), “to give over the Austro-Serbian problem to the Hague Tribunal.” (Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 542.) This telegram is omitted from tho German White Book! “The acceptance of the Tsar's proposal would doubtless have led to peace, and for
this reason it was declined.” (I Accuse, p. 187, noto.) 6. Proposal by Grey (July 29) that Austria should express
herself as satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade and the neighboring Serbian territory as a pledge for a satisfactory settlement of her demands and should allow the other Powers time and opportunity to mediate between Austria and Russia.
King George of England, in a personal telegram (July 30) to the Kaiser's brother, said: “I rely on William applying his great influence in order to induce Austria to accept this proposal. In this way ho will prove that Germany and England are working together to prevent what would be an irternational catastrophe." (Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 539.)
Grey's expressed opinion (July 29) was that “mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Ger. many would 'press the button' in the interests of peace.” (British Blue Book, No. 84; Collected
Diplomatic Documents, p. 64.) 7. Proposal of Russian Foreign Minister (July 30): “I
Austria, recognizing that the Austro-Serbian question bas assumed the character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate the sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia engages to stop her military prepara. tions." (Russian Orange Book, No. 60; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 288.)
Reply of German Foreign Minister that "he considered it impossible for Austria to accept our proposal.” (Russian Orange Book, No. 63; Collected
Diplomatic Documents, p. 289.) 8. Second Proposal of Russian Foreign Minister (July 31):
“If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Serbian territory; and if, recognizing that the Austro-Serbian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Power8 may examine the satisfaction which Serbia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia undertakes to maintain her waiting attitude." (Russian Orange Book, No. 67; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 291.)
This proposal remained unanswered. .. Austria declared (August 1) that she was then “ ready
to discuss the grounds of her grievances against Serbia with the other Powers." (Russian Orange Book, No. 73; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 293.)
Sir Edward Grey comments: “ Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are ready to converse." (British Blue Book, No. 131; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 97.) From July 30 onwards “the tension between Russia and Germany was much greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the latter an arrangement seemed almost in sight.” (British Ambassador at Vienna, in
British Blue Book, No. 161; Collected Diplomatie
But it was then too late, as Germany had already resolved upon war, and was preparing her ultimatums
which precipitated the conflict. DII. GERMAN ULTIMATUMS AND DECLABATIONS or Wu
AGAINST RUSSIA AND FRANCE. 1. A council of war, held at Potsdam on the evening of July
29, apparently decided definitely to make war
“Our innermost conviction is that it was on this evening that the decision of war was reached. The 5th of July, before his departure for a cruise on the coasts of Norway, the Kaiser had given his consent to the launching of the Serbian venture. The 29th of July he decided for war." (Le Mensonge du : Août, 1914, p. 38.)
“ People who are in a position to know say that those occupying the leading military positions, supported by the Crown Prince and his retainers, threatened the Emperor with their resignation en bloo I
war were not resolved on.” (I Accuse, p. 189.) 2. General mobilization of Russian army (July 30-31).
This was grounded not merely on the measures of Austria, but also on “the measures for mobilization [against Russia] taken secretly, but continuously, by Germany for the last six days.” (French Yellow Book, No. 118; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 223.)
The Tsar assured the Kaiser: “ It is far from us to want war. As long as the negotiations between Aur tria and Serbia continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give you my solemn word thereon.” (German White Book; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 411.)
For evidence of German mobilization against France beginning as early as July 21, seo Nineteenth Century and After, issue for June, 1917. Consult also I Accuse, pp. 194-201; War Cyclopedia, under “Mo
bilization Controversy." 3. German ultimatum to Russia (July 31, midnight) do
manding that the Government “ suspend their military measures by midday on August 1” (twelve hours).
Demand addressed to France (July 31, 7.00 p. m.) as to “ What the attitude of France would be in caso of war between Germany and Russia ? (French Yellon Book, No. 117; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 223.) The French Prime Minister answered (August 1, 1.05 p. m.) that “France would do that which her interests dictated.” (German White Book, exhibit 27;
Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 434.) 4. Declaration of war against Russia at 7.10 p. m. on Au.
gust 1, following Russia's failure to demobiliza (Russian Orange Book, No. 76; Collected Diplomatio Documents, p. 294.)
Orders for a general mobilization of the French
army were signed at 3.40 p. m. the same day. 5. Declaration of war against France on August 3 (French
Yellow Book, No. 147; Collected Diplomatic Documents,
This declaration contained charges that France had already violated German territory (e. g., by dropping bombs from aeroplanes on railway tracks near Nuremburg). These charges are now shown to be falsehoods. (Le Mensonge du 3 Août, 1914, pp. 130230; pamphlet entitled, German Truth and a Matter of Fact, London, 1917.) To avoid possible clashes