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creased to provide war stocks. Great purchases of beds and hospital supplies in May, 1914; embargo on stocks of foreign pneumatic tires in Germany; hasty collection of accounts by German merchants; transfer of bank balances, etc., from beginning of July, etc. (See Le Mensonge du 3 Août, 1914, pp. 9-10.)
5. Recall of reservists from South America, etc., in May and June, 1914.
6. Exceptional grand manœuvres of 1914. Ordered in May, these massed "500,000 men in Cologne, the Grand Duchy of Baden, and Alsace-Lorraine for the month of August." (Le Mensonge du 3 Août, 1914, p. 9.)
7. Preparations for stirring up revolt in the British Empire. (a) In South Africa. Reply of the Kaiser (in 1913) to a communication from the future rebel leader, Colonel Maritz: "I will not only acknowledge the independence of South Africa, but I will even guarantee it, provided the rebellion is started immediately." (Speech of General Botha at Cape Town, July 25, 1915. See Rose, Development of the European Nations, 5th ed., II, p. 379.)
(b) In British India. On July 8, 1915, indictments were brought in the Federal Court at San Francisco against 98 persons, including German consuls, at which time the Federal District Attorney said: "For more than a year prior to the outbreak of the European war certain Hindus in San Francisco and certain Germans were preparing openly for war with England. At the outbreak of the war Hindu leaders, members of the German consulate here, and attachés of the German Government, began to form plans to foment revolution in India for the purpose of freeing India and aiding Germans in their military operations." The leaders of these defendants plead guilty to the charges against them in December, 1917. (See War Cyclopedia, under "German Intrigue Against American Peace.”) "Consideration of all testimony leads to the conviction that the India plot now before the Federal Court here [in Chicago] is but a very small part of the whole conspiracy. . . . The defendants appear to have traveled far and wide in promotion of their alleged work. And always, testimony indicates, German consuls were aware of what was going on and ready to give things a push. Pro-Germanism all over the United States, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Hawali, Manila, China, Indo-China, Siam, Java, and various parts of Africa has been brought into the case. No part, according to the testimony, seems to have been detached. All blended into the whole scheme, which is alleged to have had its inspiration and propulsion in Berlin." (Christian Science Monitor, October 19, 1917.)
8. Coaling arrangements made for German naval vessels (June 14, 1914).
“A German cruiser, the Eber, was in dock at Cape Town a few days before the outbreak of war, and got away just in time. An intercepted letter addressed to the commander contained certain instructions from Berlin, which were dated June 14, 1914. These instructions revealed a complete system for coaling the German navy on the outbreak of war through secret service agents in Cape Town, New York and Chicago.
"The commander of the Eber was given the names of shippers and bankers with whom he could deal confidentially, the essence of the plan being that a collier would leave Table Bay [Cape Colony] ostensibly bound for England, but really to meet a German warship at an agreed rendezvous. Naturally, so far as Cape Town is concerned, the arrangements have been upset owing to the discovery, and this, perhaps, explains why German cruisers have been more in evidence in North Atlantic waters than in the southern ocean." (Cape Town correspondent of London Times, issue of October 6, 1914.)
"There is a whole category of facts to which we do not, temporarily, attach a decisive importance, for the spirit of mathematics can invoke in its favor the benefit of coincidence. . . . It is a question of various measures taken by Germany (the state or individuals) long before the menace of war was appreciable. . . . Certain persons would see in those measures, of which the war has demonstrated the utility, the proof that Germany had, months before, taken the resolve to launch the European war in 1914. When one has seen the German Government at work, this hypothesis is not extravagant." (Le Mensonge du & Août, 1914, p. 9-10.)
"Not as weak-willed blunderers have we undertaken the fearful risk of this war. We wanted it. Because we had to wish it and could wish it. May the Teuton devil throttle those whiners whose pleas for excuses make us ludicrous in these hours of lofty experience! We do not stand, and shall not place ourselves, before the court of Europe. Our power shall create new law in Europe. Germany strikes. If it conquers new realms for its genius, the priesthood of all the gods will sing songs of praise to the good war.... We are waging this war not in order to punish those who have sinned, nor in order to free enslaved peoples and thereafter to comfort ourselves with the unselfish and useless consciousness of our own righteousness. We wage it from the lofty point of view, and with the conviction, that Germany, a result of her achievements, and in proportion to them, is justified in asking, and must obtain, wider room on earth for development and for working out the possibilities that are in her. The Powers from whom she forced her ascendancy, in spite of themselves, still live, and some of them have recovered from the weakening she gave them. . . . Now strikes the hour for Germany's rising power." (Maximilian Harden, editor of Die Zukunft; see New York Times Current History, III, p. 130.)
"It now appears beyond the possibility of doubt that this war was made by Germany pursuing a long and settled purpose. For many years she had been preparing to do exactly what she has done, with a thoroughness, a perfection of plans, and a vastness of provision in men, munitions and supplies never before equaled or approached in human history. She brought the war on when she chose, because she chose, in the belief that she could conquer the earth nation by nation." (Senator Elihu Root, speech in Chicage, September 14, 1917.)
For reading references on Chapter III, see page 39.
IV. THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CONTROVERSY. I. INTRODUCTION: PRIOR RELATIONS OF SERBIA, AUSTRIA, AND RUSSIA.
1. Previous history of Serbia: Its fleeting greatness under Stephen Dushan (died 1355); conquered by Turks, 1458; self-governing principality from 1830; independent of Turkey, 1878; territory greatly increased through war with Turkey, 1912-13. Revival in recent years of "Greater Serbia" movement, directed largely against Austria-Hungary, which held Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, lands which by nationality and speech were Serbian. Compare Piedmont's unification of Italy, against Austrian resistance. (See War Cyclopedia, under "Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.")
1. Serbia's relations with Austria-Hungary.
(a) Political estrangement due to Austria's highhanded annexation of Bosnia in 1908, and the thwarting by Austria and Italy, in 1913, of Serbia's desire for an outlet to the Adriatic. Declaration exacted of Serbia in 1909 (March 31): “Serbia recognizes that the fait accompli regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights. . . . In deference to the advice of the Great Powers, Serbia undertakes to renounce from now onwards the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary, and to live in future on good neighborly terms with the latter." (British Blue Book, No. 4; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 4.)
(b) Tariff disputes over importation of Serbian pigs into Austria-Hungary. A prohibitive tariff was imposed in 1906.
(c) Continued agitation of Serbian revolutionary Societies (especially the Narodna Odbrana) against the dangerous, heartless, grasping, odious and greedy enemy in the north," who "robs millions of Serbian brothers of their liberty and rights, and holds them in bondage and chains." (Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. 19; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 465.)
(d) German plans for Berlin-Bagdad railway required that Serbia should be controlled by Austria. (See above, ch. ii, IV 4.)
3. Russia's interest in Serbia-founded upon kinship in blood, language and religion, and on Russian aid in the past against Turkey (in 1806-12, 1829-30, 1877-8). This interest was well known, and Austria and Germany recognized that their policy toward Serbia might lead to war with Russia. (See War Cyclopedia, under "Pan-Slavism.")
"During the Balkan crisis he [the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs] had made it clear to the Austrian Government that war with Russia must inevitably follow an Austrian attack on Serbia." (Report of British Ambassador to Russia. British Blue Book, No. 139; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 101.)
"We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of Austria-Hungary against Serbia might bring Russia upon the field, and that it might therefore involve us in a war, in accordance with our duty as allies." (German White Book; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 406.)
3. General character of the Note. In effect an ultimatum to which ur onditional acceptance must be given within forty-eight hours. Humiliating character of its demands. (See War Cyclopedia, under "Serbia, Austrian Ultimatum.")
"I had never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character." (Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in British Blue Book, No. 5; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 13.)
"The demands of that [the Austrian] Government are more brutal than any ever made upon any civilized State in the history of the world, and they can be regarded only as intended to provoke war." (German Socialist newspaper Vorwärts, July 25, 1914.)
4. Some specific demands. The numbers attached are those of the Note itself. (See British Blue Book, No. 4; Col lected Diplomatic Documents, pp. 3-12.)
"2. To dissolve immediately the society called Narodna Odbrana [the chief society for Serbian propaganda], to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Serbia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal [Serbian] Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name and form."
"3. To eliminate without delay from public instruetion in Serbia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary."
"5. To accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy."
“6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th June who are on Serbian territory; delegates of theAustro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto." 5. Denial by Germany that she was consulted by Austria before sending the Note.
"We, therefore, permitted Austria a completely free hand in her action towards Serbia, but have not participated in her preparations." (German White Book; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 406.)
This denial was, and is, generally disbelieved. (See Ramsay Muir, Britain's Case Against Germany, p. 8, and the evidence concerning the Potsdam Conference.) Germany's claim that she was ignorant of the Austrian Ultimatum was from the outset preposterous and against all reason. Intimately allied with Austria-Hungary and for a decade the dominating power in the diplomacy of the Central Powers in the Balkans and the Near East, is it possible to believe that she did not examine into and even give direction, in broad outline at least, to the policy of her ally at this critical stage in the development of her Pan-German program? The purpose of the denial, apparently, was to satisfy Italy (Austria's other ally), which certainly was not consulted.
6. Circumstances making a peaceful outcome more difficult: Absence of most of the foreign ambassadors from Vienna for their summer vacations; immediate withdrawal of Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs to a remote mountain resort, etc., etc.
7. Widespread anxiety over the situation, as threatening the peace of Europe. Russia, England, and France make urgent endeavors:
(a) To induce Serbia to go as far as possible in meeting the demands of Austria.
(b) To obtain an extension of the time limit, in order (1) that the Powers might be enabled to study the documentary material promised by Austria embodying the findings of the court at Serajevo; and (2) to permit them to exercise a moderating influence on Serbia. Sharp refusal of Austria to extend the time limit. (For later proposals see ch. v.)
IV. SERBIAN REPLY TO THE AUSTRIAN NOTE (JULY 25, 1914).
(See British Blue Book, No. 39; Collected Diplomatic Correspondence, pp. 31-37.)
1. To the gratification of Europe, Serbia
(a) Accepted eight of the ten Austrian demands. (b) Returned a qualified refusal to the other two.
As to No. 5, the Serbian Government said that they "do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand, . . . but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighborly relations."
As to No. 6, they returned a temperate refusal (founded, according to Austrian claim, upon a deliberate misunderstanding of the nature of the domand): "It goes without saying that the Royal [Serbian] Government consider it their duty to open an enquiry against all such persons as are, or even
tually may be, implicated in the plot, and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal [AustroHungarian] Government, the Royal [Serbian] Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as 4 would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the AustroHungarian agents."
(c) In conclusion, Serbia suggested reference to the Hague Tribunal or to the Great Powers, in case its reply was not considered satisfactory.
2. Austria (to Europe's amazement) found this reply dishonest and evasive. (See Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. 34; Collected Diplomatic Documents, pp. 506514.)
In less than an hour after receiving it the Austrian Minister left Belgrade with all his staff. Grave apprehensions were felt that this break of diplomatic relations would be followed by European war.
The Austrian Foreign Minister declared to the Russian Ambassador (July 28) that his Government could "no longer recede, nor enter into any discussion about the terms of the Austro-Hungarian Note." (British Blue Book, No. 93; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 70.)
AUSTRIA DECLARES WAR ON SERBIA (JULY 28, 1914). 1. In spite of the efforts at mediation of Great Britain, Russia, and France, Austria declared war on Serbia, July 28, 1914.
2. Demand of Germany that the war be “localized "-1. •, that no other Power interfere with Austria's chastisement of Serbia.
3. Belgrade bombarded, July 29-30, and the war begun.
1. Austria and Germany wanted war with Serbia, and their chief fear was lest something might, against their wills, force them to a peaceful settlement; hence the haste and secrecy which attended their measures.
The impression left on my mind is that the Austro-Hungarian Note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable; that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved to have war with Serbia; that they consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake; and that until punishment has been administered to Serbia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of mediation. This country [Austria-Hungary] has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Serbia, and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be a great disappointment." (British Ambassador at Vienna, July 27, 1914. In British Blue Book, No. 41; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 38.)
"He [the German Secretary of State] admitted quite freely that Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give the Serbians a lesson, and that they meant to take military action. He also admitted that Serbian Government could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands. . . . Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the Note left much to be desired as a diplomatic document." (British Chargé at Berlin to Sir Edward Grey, July
25, 1914. British Blue Book, No. 18; Collected July 31. Threatening danger of war" proclaimed in
"In the Viennese note to Serbia, whose brazen arrogance has no precedent in history, each phrase bears witness that Austria-Hungary desired the war. ... Only a war, for which the best minds of the army were thirsting, . . . could cure the fundamental ills of the two halves of the Austrian Empire, and of the monarchy. Only the refusal and not the acceptance of the claims put forward in the note could have profited Vienna.
Aug. 1. Orders for general mobilization in France and in
Aug. 2. Occupation of Luxemburg by Germany. Demand
Aug. 3. Belgium refused the German demand. Germany
Aug. 6. Austria-Hungary declared war on Russia.
II. PROPOSALS FOR PRESERVING PEACE.
1. A conference at London proposed by Sir Edward Grey
"If it is borne in mind how incomparably more difficult problems had been successfully solved by the conference of ambassadors at London during the Balkan crisis, it must be admitted that a settlement between the Austrian demands and the Serbian concessions in July, 1914, was child's play compared with the previous achievements of the London conference." (I Accuse, p. 155.)
The proposal was accepted by Russia, France, and Italy. It was declined by Germany (without consulting Austria) on the ground that she "could not call Austria in her dispute with Serbia before a European tribunal." (German White Book; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 409.) Grey explained that it "would not be an arbitration, but a private and informal discussion; " nevertheless, Austria and Germany continued to decline.
4. The Kaiser (who unexpectedly returned to Berlin on July 26 from a yachting cruise) attemped to act as "mediator" between Russia and Austria; but appar ently he confined himself to the effort to persuade Russia "to remain a spectator in the Austro-Serbian war without drawing Europe into the most terrible war it has ever seen." (Kaiser to Tsar, July 29, in German White Book, exhibit 22; Collected Diplomatie Documents, pp. 431-2.)
"Neither over the signature of the Kaiser nor over
that of his Foreign Minister does the record show a single communication addressed to Vienna in the interests of peace." (J. M. Beck, The Evidence in the Case, p. 112.)
5. The Tsar proposed, in a personal telegram to the Kaiser (July 29), "to give over the Austro-Serbian problem to the Hague Tribunal." (Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 542.) This telegram is omitted from the German White Book! "The acceptance of the Tsar's proposal would doubtless have led to peace, and for this reason it was declined." (I Accuse, p. 187, note.) 6. Proposal by Grey (July 29) that Austria should express herself as satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade and the neighboring Serbian territory as a pledge for a satisfactory settlement of her demands and should allow the other Powers time and opportunity to mediate between Austria and Russia.
King George of England, in a personal telegram (July 30) to the Kaiser's brother, said: "I rely on William applying his great influence in order to induce Austria to accept this proposal. In this way he will prove that Germany and England are working together to prevent what would be an international catastrophe." (Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 539.)
Grey's expressed opinion (July 29) Was that "mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would press the button' in the interests of peace." (British Blue Book, No. 84; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 64.)
7. Proposal of Russian Foreign Minister (July 30): “If Austria, recognizing that the Austro-Serbian question has assumed the character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate the sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia engages to stop her military preparations." (Russian Orange Book, No. 60; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 288.)
Reply of German Foreign Minister that "he considered it impossible for Austria to accept our proposal." (Russian Orange Book, No. 63; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 289.)
8. Second Proposal of Russian Foreign Minister (July 31): "If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Serbian territory; and if, recognizing that the Austro-Serbian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Serbia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia undertakes to maintain her waiting attitude." (Russian Orange Book, No. 67; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 291.)
This proposal remained unanswered.
⚫. Austria declared (August 1) that she was then "ready to discuss the grounds of her grievances against Serbia with the other Powers." (Russian Orange Book, No. 73; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 293.)
Sir Edward Grey comments: "Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are ready to converse." (British Blue Book, No. 131; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 97.) From July 30 onwards "the tension between Russia and Germany was much greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the latter an arrangement seemed almost in sight." (British Ambassador at Vienna, in
British Blue Book, No. 161; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 117.)
But it was then too late, as Germany had already resolved upon war, and was preparing her ultimatums which precipitated the conflict.
III. GERMAN ULTIMATUMS AND DECLARATIONS OF WA AGAINST RUSSIA AND FRANCE.
1. A council of war, held at Potsdam on the evening of July 29, apparently decided definitely to make war OB France and Russia.
"Our innermost conviction is that it was on this evening that the decision of war was reached. The 5th of July, before his departure for a cruise on the coasts of Norway, the Kaiser had given his consent to the launching of the Serbian venture. The 29th of July he decided for war." (Le Mensonge du Août, 1914, p. 38.)
"People who are in a position to know say that those occupying the leading military positions, supported by the Crown Prince and his retainers, threatened the Emperor with their resignation en bloc if war were not resolved on." (I Accuse, p. 189.)
2. General mobilization of Russian army (July 30-31). This was grounded not merely on the measures of Austria, but also on "the measures for mobilization [against Russia] taken secretly, but continuously, by Germany for the last six days." (French Yellow Book, No. 118; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 223.)
The Tsar assured the Kaiser: "It is far from us to want war. As long as the negotiations between Austria and Serbia continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give you my solemn word thereon." (German White Book; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 411.)
For evidence of German mobilization against France beginning as early as July 21, see Nineteenth Century and After, issue for June, 1917. Consult also I Accuse, pp. 194-201; War Cyclopedia, under "Mobilization Controversy."
3. German ultimatum to Russia (July 31, midnight) demanding that the Government "suspend their military measures by midday on August 1" (twelve hours).
Demand addressed to France (July 31, 7.00 p. m.) as to "What the attitude of France would be in case of war between Germany and Russia?" (French Yellow Book, No. 117; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 223.) The French Prime Minister answered (August 1, 1.05 p. m.) that "France would do that which her interests dictated." (German White Book, exhibit 27; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 434.)
4. Declaration of war against Russia at 7.10 p. m. on August 1, following Russia's failure to demobilize. (Russian Orange Book, No. 76; Collected Diplomatio Documents, p. 294.)
Orders for a general mobilization of the French army were signed at 3.40 p. m. the same day.
5. Declaration of war against France on August 3 (French Yellow Book, No. 147; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 240.)
This declaration contained charges that France had already violated German territory (e. g., by dropping bombs from aeroplanes on railway tracks near Nuremburg). These charges are now shown to be falsehoods. (Le Mensonge du 3 Août, 1914, pp. 130230; pamphlet entitled, German Truth and a Matter of Fact, London, 1917.) To avoid possible clashes