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(c) The Federal Council (Bundesrat) is a council of ambassadors appointed by the rulers of the separate States, and responsible to them. It oversees the administration and initiates most legislation, and is the most powerful body in the Empire. The States are represented unequally in it. Prussia, which contains two-thirds of the population of Germany, has 17 votes out of a total of 61. (If we include the three votes allotted to Alsace-Lorraine in 1911, which are "instructed " by the Emperor, Prussia has 20 votes in the Bundesrat.) Bavaria has six votes, Saxony and Württemberg four each, and the other States fewer.

(d) The Reichstag is the representative chamber of the legislature. It is composed of 397 members, of whom Prussia elects 236. Representative districts are very unequal in population. “A Berlin deputy represents on the average 125,000 votes; a deputy of East Prussia, home of the far-famed Junkers, an average of 24,000." The members are elected by manhood suffrage for a term of five years; but the Emperor may (with the consent of the Bundesrat) dissolve the Reichstag at any time and order new elections. (e) The administration of the Empire is in the

hands of a ministry, headed by the Imperial Chancellor. Unlike the ministers of true parliamentary governments, the German ministers are responsible to the Emperor, and not to the legislative chamber. They do not need, therefore, to resign their offices when defeated in the Reichstag.


1. The Triple Alliance formed by Germany, Austria, and Italy (1882). Germany's main object was to safeguard herself against an attempt by France to recover Alsace-Lorraine. As France recovered strength Germany plotted new aggressive designs against her.

2. Germany attempted in 1904-05 to form a secret alliance with Russia and France against Great Britain. Failure of the attempt owing to France's unwillingness to give up hope of recovering Alsace-Lorraine. The evidence of this attempt was published in 1917, in a series of letters signed "Willy" and "Nicky" which passed between the Kaiser and the Tsar, and which were discovered in the Tsar's palace after his deposition. (See War Cyclopedia, under "Willy and Nicky Correspondence.")

3. Formation of the Triple Entente.

(a) Dual Alliance of France and Russia formed (1891-94) as a counterpoise to the Triple Alliance.

(b) Settlement of England's disputes with France over certain African questions, etc. (1904), and with Russia over Persia, etc. (1907), established the Triple Entente ("good understanding ") between those powers.

"France and England were face to face like birds in a cockpit, while Europe under German leadership was fastening their spurs and impatient to see them fight to the death. Then suddenly they both raised their heads and moved back to the fence. They bad decided not to fight, and the face of European things was changed." (Fullerton, Problems of Power, p. 57.) III. THREE DIPLOMATIC CRISES: 1905, 1908, 1911.

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(c) Delcassé, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, dismissed on Germany's demand. "We are not concerned with M. Delcassé's person, but his policy is a menace to Germany, and you may rest assured we shall not wait for it to be realized." (German ambassador to France, in published interview.)

(d) France brought to the bar of Europe in an international conference at Algeciras-which, in the main, sanctioned her Moroccan policy.

(e) The purpose of Germany in this crisis, as in those which follow, was to humiliate France and o test the strength of the Triple Entente. These were struggles to increase German prestige.

2. Crisis over Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. See War Cyclopedia, under "BosniaHerzegovina," Congress of Berlin," Pan-Slavism," "Slavs," etc.)

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(a) These provinces freed from direct rule of the Turks by Serbia and Russia, but handed over by the Congress of Berlin to Austria to administer (1878).

(b) Austria seized the occasion offered by the "Young Turk" Revolution of 1908 to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, and refused to refer the question to a European congress for settlement. (c) Russia (as yet unrecovered from the RussoJapanese War) was forced to acquiesce when the Kaiser "took his stand in shining armor by the side of his ally." Humiliating submission imposed on Serbia. (See below, ch. iv, I 2 a.) 8. Second Morocco crisis, in 1911. (See Conquest and Kultur, 120-126; War Cyclopedia, under "Morocco Question.")

(a) Agadir Affair: German cruiser "Panther" sent to Agadir as a protest against alleged French infractions of the Algeciras agreement, and "to show the world that Germany was firmly resolved not to be pushed to one side." (Speech of the German Chancellor to the Reichstag.) (b) Great Britain, in spite of political difficulties at home, warned Germany that in case of war she would help France.

(c) Adjustment of the Moroccan question. Germany accepted compensation from France elsewhere in return for recognition of French protectorate over Morocco. (Treaty of November 4, 1911.) (d) Furious resentment of the German military party at this outcome. "The humiliation of the Empire is so much the greater, since it is the Emperor himself who had engaged the honor of the German people in Morocco." (RheinischWestfälische Zeitung.)

4. Hardening of the German resolve not to accept another diplomatic defeat. "It is not by concessions that we shall secure peace, but by the German sword." (Speech in Reichstag, applauded by the German Crown Prince.)


1. Germany supplants England as the protector of Turkey against Russia. Speech of the Kaiser at Damascus, 1898: "The three hundred million Mohammedans who live scattered over the globe may be assured of this, that the German Emperor will be their friend at all times."

8. The Bagdad Railway. Designed to connect Bagdad with Constantinople and the Central European railways. Germany obtains concession from Turkey for its construction in 1902-03. Political as well as economic motives involved. Threat to British rule in India by proposed extension to the Persian Gulf. (See the President's Flag Day Address with Evidence of Germany's Plans, note 15; Conquest and Kultur, sec. 8; War Cyclopedia, under "Berlin to Bagdad," "Corridor," etc.)

8. The "Middle Europe" Project. This may be defined briefly as a plan for "a loosely federal combination for purposes of offense and defense, military and economic, consisting primarily of the German Empire and the Dual Monarchy [Austria-Hungary], but also including the Balkan States and Turkey, together with all the neutral States-Roumania, Greece, the Scandinavian kingdoms, and Holland-that can be drawn within its embrace." (W. J. Ashley, in Introduction to F. Naumann's Central Europe, translated by Christabel M. Meridith, 1916.)

The plan includes the domination of this group State by Germany through (a) its control of the common financial and economic policy, and (b) its control of the military forces, based on universal military service. (Compare Prussia's control within the German Empire.) (See Conquest and Kultur, sec. 8; War Cyclopedia, under "Mittel-Europa," etc.; The President's Flag Day Address, notes 15-17.)

4. Union of the Middle Europe project and the Bagdad Railway project in a Berlin-to-Bagdad plan.

"Their plan was to throw a broad belt of German military power and political control across the very center of Europe and beyond the Mediterranean into the heart of Asia; and Austria-Hungary was to be as much their tool and pawn as Serbia or Bulgaria or Turkey or the ponderous States of the East. Austria-Hungary, indeed, was to become part of the central German Empire, absorbed and dominated by the same forces and influences that had originally cemented the German States themselves. The dream had its heart at Berlin. It could have had a heart nowhere else! It rejected the idea of solidarity of race entirely. The choice of peoples played no part in it at all. It contemplated binding together racial and political units which could be kept together only by force-Czechs, Magyars, Croats, Serbs, Roumanians, Turks, Armenians-the proud States of Bohemia and Hungary, the stout little commonwealths of the Balkans, the indomitable Turks, the subtile peoples of the East. These peoples did not wish to be united. They ardently desired to direct their own affairs, would be satisfied only by undisputed independence. They could be kept quiet only by the presence or the constant threat of armed men. They would live under a common power only by sheer compulsion and await the day of revolution. But the German military statesmen had reckoned with all that and were ready to deal with it in their own way." (President Wilson, Flag Day Address, June 14, 1917.)

"Across the path of this railway to Bagdad lay Serbia-an independent country whose sovereign alone among those of southeastern Europe had no marriage connection with Berlin, a Serbia that looked toward Russia. That is why Europe was nearly driven into war in 1913; that is why Germany stood so determinedly behind Austria's demands in 1914 and forced war. She must have her 'corridor' to the southeast; she must have political domination all along the route of the great economic empire she planned. She was unwilling to await the process of 'peaceful penetration."" (The President's Flag Day Address, with Evidence of Germany's Plans, note 15.)

V. TRIPOLITAN AND BALKAN WARS, 1911-13. (See War Cyclopedia, under “Balkan Wars," "Constantinople,” "Drang nach Osten," "Young Turks.")

1. War of Italy with Turkey over Tripoli (1911-12). Claims of Italy on Tripoli; weakness of Turkey following Young Turk revolution of 1908; unfavorable attitude of Italy's allies (Germany and Austria) to the war as endangering their relations with Turkey. Treaty of Lausanne (Oct. 15, 1912) transfers Tripoli from Turkish to Italian rule.

2. War of Balkan Allies against Turkey (1912-13).

(a) Secret league of Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro to expel Turkey from Europe and

liberate their fellow Christians from Turkish misrule. War declared Oct. 16, 1912.

(b) Inability of the Great Powers, because of their own divergent aims, to restrain the Balkan allies. (c) Success of the allies. By the Treaty of London

(May 30, 1913) Turkey was to surrender all territories in Europe except Constantinople and a small strip of adjacent territory (Enos-Midia line).

3. War among the Balkan Allies (June 30 to July 21, 1913). (a) Bulgaria (with Austria's support) attacked her allies as a result of disputes over division of conquered territory.

(b) Roumania joined Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro in defeating Bulgaria. Turkey recovered Adrianople.

(c) Treaty of Bucharest (Aug. 10, 1913). Most of the conquered territory was given to Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro, though Serbia was denied (through Austrian, German, and Italian pressure) an outlet to the Adriatic. A smaller share was given Bulgaria. Roumania secured a slice of Bulgarian territory. Albania was made a principality under a German ruler. 4. Some wider features of these conflicts:

(a) A general European war was prevented (though with difficulty) by statesmen of the different countries working through the agency of (1) diplomatic notes, and (2) diplomatic conferences held especially at London. Sir Edward Grey, British Minister of Foreign Affairs, the chief agent in maintaining peace. (See War Cyclopedia, under "Grey, Viscount.")

(b) Austrian and German influence was seriously impaired, for they "had guessed badly and supported the losing side-first Turkey and then Bulgaria." Their Balkan domination and Middle Europe project alike were threatened by the events of 1912-13. Corresponding increase of Russian and Serbian power.

(c) A new assertion of power on the part of Germany and Austria, principally against Russia and Serbia, to recover the ground lost through the Balkan Wars and the Treaty of Bucharest was made practically certain.


I. AUSTRIA PROPOSED AN ATTACK ON SERBIA IN 1913. See War Cyclopedia, under "Austria and Serbia, 1913.")

1. Austria's Proposal to Italy (Aug. 9, 1913-the day before the Peace of Bucharest.)

"Austria has communicated to us and to Germany her intention of taking action against Serbia, and defines such action as defensive, hoping to bring into operation the causus foederis of the Triple Alliance. (Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in dispatch of Aug. 9, 1913. Revealed by ex-Prime Minister Giolitti in speech of Dec. 5, 1914. See Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 401.)

step which she is taking on her own account, since there is no question of defense, inasmuch as no one is thinking of attacking her. It is necessary that a declaration to this effect should be made to Austria in the most formal manner, and we must hope for action on the part of Germany to dissuade from this most perilous adventure." (Reply of Prime Minister Giolitti to above dispatch, Ibid.)


This report came into the possession of the French Minister of War in some unexplained way soon after it was drawn up; it is published in French Yellow Book, No. 2; Collected Diplomatic Documents, pp. 130-133.

The following extracts occur in the part headed Aim and Obligations of Our National Policy, of Our Army, and of the Special Organizations for Army Purposes": 1. Minds of the people must be prepared.

(See Conquest and Kultur, secs. 15-16; War Cyclopedia, under "PanGermanism," ," "Pan-Germans Urge War in 1913," etc.)


"We must allow the idea to sink into the minds of our people that our armaments are an answer to the armaments and policy of the French. We must aocustom them to think that an offensive war on our part is a necessity in order to combat the provocations of our adversaries. . . . We must so manage matters that under the heavy weight of powerful armaments, considerable sacrifices, and strained political relations, an outbreak [of war] should be considered as a relief, because after it would come decades of peace and prosperity, as after 1870. We must prepare for war from the financial point of view; there is much to be done in this direction." (Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 131.)

2. “Stir up trouble in the North of Africa and in Russia.” "We must not be anxious about the fate of our colonies. The final result in Europe will settle their position. On the other hand, we must stir up trouble in the north of Africa and in Russia. It is a means of keeping the forces of the enemy engaged. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that we should open up relations, by means of well-chosen agents, with influential people in Egypt, Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco, in order to prepare the measures which would be necessary in the case of a European war. . . The first attempt which was made some years ago opened up for us the desired relations. Unfortunately these relations were not sufficiently consolidated." (Ibid., p. 132.)

3. Small states to be coerced. (See War Cyclopedia, under "Neutralized State," "Netherlands, German View," etc.)

"In the next European war it will also be necessary that the small States should be forced to follow us or be subdued. In certain conditions their armies and their fortified places can be rapidly conquered or neutralized; this would probably be the case with Belgium and Holland; so as to prevent our enemy in the west from gaining territory which they could use as a base of operations against our flank. In the north we have nothing to fear from Denmark and Scandinavia. . . . In the south, Switzerland forms an extremely solid bulwark, and we can rely on her energetically defending her neutrality against France, and thus protecting our flank.” (Ibid., p. 132.)

2. Italy declined the proposal, as (apparently) did Germany also. The declination of the latter was probably due to the fact that German military preparations were not yet completed. (See below, V 1.)

"If Austria intervenes against Serbia, It is clear that a causus foederis cannot be established. It is a 4. No guarantee to Belgium for security of her neutrality.

(See Conquest and Kultur, sec. 11; War Cyclopedia, under “Belgium, Neutralization of.")

"Our aim must be to take the offensive with a large superiority from the first days. . . . If we could induce these States [on our northwestern frontier] to organize their system of fortification in such a manner as to constitute an effective protection for our flank we could abandon the proposed invasion. . . . If, on the contrary, their defensive organization was established against us, thus giving definite advantage to our adversary in the west, we could in no circumstances offer Belgium a guarantee for the security of her neutrality.” (Ibid., p. 133.)


5. Short-term ultimatum to be issued. (See War Cyclopeunder Serbia, Austrian Ultimatum.") "The arrangements made with this end in view allow us to hope that it will be possible to take the offensive immediately after the complete concentration of the army of the Lower Rhine. An ultimatum with a short time-limit, to be followed immediately by invasion, would allow a sufficient justification for our action in international law." (Ibid., p. 133.) 6. Prizes of the war. (See Conquest and Kultur, sec. 17.)


"We will . . . remember that the provinces of the ancient German Empire, the County of Burgundy [Franche Comté, acquired by Louis XIV] and a large part of Lorraine, are still in the hands of the French; that thousands of brother Germans in the Baltic provinces [of Russia] are groaning under the Slav yoke. It is a national question that Germany's former possessions should be restored to her." (Ibid., p. 133.)


1. Circumstances of the interview; held in the presence of General von Moltke (chief of the German General Staff) and reported to Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador at Berlin, "from an absolutely reliable source." Published in French Yellow Book, No. 6; Collected Diplomatic Documents, pp. 142-3. (See War Cyclopedia, under "Albert I,” “William II," etc.)

2. War with France regarded by the Kaiser as inevitable. (See War Cyclopedia, under "William II, Ambitions.")

"This conversation, it appears, has made a profound impression on King Albert. I [Cambon] am in no way surprised at the impression he gathered, which corresponds with what I have myself felt for some time. Enmity against us is increasing, and the Emperor has ceased to be the friend of peace.

"The person addressed by the Emperor had thought up till then, as did all the world, that William II, whose personal influence had been exerted on many critical occasions in support of peace, was still in the same state of mind. He found him this time completely changed. The German Emperor is no longer in his eyes the champion of peace against the warlike tendencies of certain parties in Germany. William II has come to think that war with France is inevitable, and that it must come sooner or later...

"General von Moltke spoke exactly in the same strain as his sovereign. He, too, declared war to be necessary and inevitable, but he showed himself still more assured of success, 'for,' he said to the King [Albert], 'this time the matter must be settled, and your Majesty can have no conception of the irresisti

ble enthusiasm with which the whole German people will be carried away when that day comes." lected Diplomatic Documents, p. 142.)


3. Cambon's comment on the interview.

"As William II advances in years, family traditions, the reactionary tendencies of the court, and especially the impatience of the soldiers, obtain a greater empire over his mind. Perhaps he feels some slight jealousy of the popularity acquired by his son, who flatters the passions of the Pan-Germans, and who does not regard the position occupied by the Empire in the world as commensurate with its power. Perhaps the reply of France to the last increase of the German Army [German army law of 1913, cited below; France met this by increasing her military service from two years to three years], the object of which was to establish the incontestable supremacy of Germany is, to a certain extent, responsible for his bitterness, for, whatever may be said, it is realized that Germany cannot go much further.

"One may well ponder over the significance of this conversation. The Emperor and his Chief of the General Staff may have wished to impress the King of the Belgians and induce him not to make any opposition in the event of a conflict between us. (Ibid., p. 143.)

IV. GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION AS REPORTED BY FRENCH DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR AGENTS (JULY 30, 1913). (In French Yellow Book, No. 5; Collected Diplomatic Documents, pp. 136-142.)

1. The Moroccan settlement considered a diplomatie defeat. (See Conquest and Kultur, sec. 16.)

66 Here is a synthesis of all these opinions: The Treaty of the 4th November is a diplomatic defeat, a proof of the incapacity of German diplomacy and the carelessness of the Government (so often denounced), a proof that the future of the Empire is not safe without a new Bismarck; it is a national humiliation, a lowering in the eyes of Europe, a blow to German prestige, all the more serious because up to 1911 the military supremacy of Germany was unchallenged, and French anarchy and the powerlessness of the Republic were a sort of German dogma.” (Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 136.)

2. Forces making for peace.

"There are in the country forces making for peace, but they are unorganized and have no popular leaders. They consider that war would be a social misfortune for Germany, and that caste pride, Prussian domination, and the manufacturers of guns and armor plate would get the greatest benefit, but above all that war would profit Great Britain." Those favoring peace included "the bulk of the workmen, artisans, and peasants, who are peace-loving by instinct," etc. But the classes which prefer peace to war are only a sort of make-weight in political matters, with limited influence on public opinion, or they are silent social forces, passive and defenseless against the infection of a wave of warlike feeling." (Ibid., p. 137-138.)



3. Forces making for war. (See War Cyclopedia, under "Arbitration, German Attitude," "Disarmament, German Attitude," German Military Autocracy, Propaganda for War," "Militarism or Disarmament," "PanGermans Urge War in 1913," "War, German View,” etc.)

"There is a war party, with leaders, and followers, a press either convinced or subsidized for the purpose of creating public opinion; it has means both varied and formidable for the intimidation of the Government. It goes to work in the country with clear ideas, burning aspirations, a determination that is at once thrilling and fixed." (Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 139.) It included the following: (a) Those who regard war as inevitable, and hence 66 the sooner the better."

(b) Those influenced by economic reasons—“ overpopulation, over-production, the need for markets and outlets," etc.

(c) Those influenced by "Bismarckism." "They feel themselves humiliated at having to enter into discussions with France, at being obliged to talk in terms of law and right in negotiations and conferences where they have not always found it easy to get right on their side, even when they have a preponderating force.”

(d) Those influenced by "a mystic hatred of revolutionary France," and others who acted from " feeling of rancor."

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(a) The country squires (junkers), who wish to escape the imposition of inheritance taxes ("death duties ") "which are bound to come if peace continues. . . . This aristocracy is military in character, and it is instructive to compare the Army List with the year book of the nobility. War alone can prolong its prestige and support its family interest. . . . This social class, which forms a hierarchy with the King of Prussia as its supreme head, realizes with dread the democratization of Germany and the increasing power of the Socialist party, and considers its own days numbered." (Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 140.)

(b) The capitalist class ("higher bourgeoisie "), including the manufacturers of guns and armor plate, big merchants who demand bigger markets, and all who “regard war as good business." Among these are "doctrinaire manufacturers who declare that the difficulties between themselves and their workmen originate in France, the home of revolutionary ideas of freedom-without France industrial unrest would be unknown." (Ibid., p. 140.)

(c) University professors, etc. "The universities, if we except a few distinguished spirits, develop a warlike philosophy. Economists demonstrate by statistics Germany's need for a colonial and commercial empire commensurate with the industrial output of the Empire. There are sociological fanatics who go even further. . . . Historians, philosophers, political pamphleteers and other apologists of German Kultur wish to impose upon the world a way of thinking and feeling specifically German. They wish to wrest from France that intellectual supremacy which according to the clearest thinkers is still her possession." (Ibid., p. 140-1.) (d) Diplomatists and others "whose support of the war policy is inspired by rancor and resentment.

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German diplomatists are now in very bad odor in public opinion. The most bitter are those who since 1905 have been engaged in the negotiations between France and Germany; they are heaping together and reckoning up their grievances against us, and one day they will present their accounts in the war press. It seems as if they were looking for grievances chiefly in Morocco, though an incident is always possible in any part of the globe where France and Germany are in contact." (Ibid., p. 141.)

5. Must war be considered inevitable?


The opinion is fairly widely spread even in PanGerman circles, that Germany will not declare war in view of the system of defensive alliances and the tendencies of the Emperor. But when the moment comes, she will have to try in every possible way to force France to attack her. Offense will be given if necessary. That is the Prussian tradition.

"Must war then be considered as inevitable? It is hardly likely that Germany will take the risk, if France can make it clear to the world that the Entente Cordiale and the Russian alliance are not mere diplomatic fictions but realities which exist and will make themselves felt. The British fleet inspires a wholesome terror. It is well known, however, that victory on sea will leave everything in suspense. On land alone can a decisive issue be obtained." (Ibid., pp. 141-143.)

V. EXTRAORDINARY MILITARY MEASURES OF GERMANY TAKEN BEFORE JUNE 28, 1914. (See Conquest and Kultur, sec. 16; War Cyclopedia, under "Egypt," 66 German Army Act, 1913," ," "German Intrigue Against American Peace," "Kiel Canal," "Sinn Fein," "South Africa," etc.)

1. Laws of 1911, 1912, and especially 1913, increased the German army in time of peace from 515,000 to 866,000 men. Great increase of machine-gun corps, aviators, etc. Enormous stocks of munitions prepared. Exceptional war tax levied of $225,000,000. Special war fund (for expense of mobilization, etc.) increased from $30,000,000 to $90,000,000.

2. Reconstruction of Kiel canal (connecting Baltic and North Sea) hastened so as to be ready in early summer of 1914. Fortifications of Helgoland, etc., improved.

3. Strategic railways constructed leading to Belgian, French, and Russian frontiers.


Germany had made ready, at heavy outlay, to take the offensive at a moment's notice, and to throw enormous forces across the territories of two unoffending and pacific neighbors [Belgium and Luxemburg] in her fixed resolve to break through the northern defenses of France, and thus to turn the formidable fortifications of the Vosges. She has prepared for the day by bringing fully-equipped and admirably constructed railways up to her neighbors' frontiers, and in some places across them. . . . An immense sum of money has been sunk in these railways, . . and there is not the least prospect of an adequate return on them as commercial ventures. They are purely military and strategical preparations for war with France." (See Fortnightly Review for February, 1910, and February, 1914, and New York Times Ourrent History, I, 1000-1004.)

4. Exportation of chemicals used in making explosives greatly reduced in 1913-14, and importation of horses, foodstuffs, and fats (used in nitroglycerin) greatly in

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