Physicalism Deconstructed: Levels of Reality and the Mind–Body Problem
How should thought and consciousness be understood within a view of the world as being through-and-through physical? Many philosophers have proposed non-reductive, levels-based positions, according to which the physical domain is fundamental, while thought and consciousness are higher-level processes, dependent on and determined by physical processes. In this book, Kevin Morris's careful philosophical and historical critique shows that it is very difficult to make good metaphysical sense of this idea - notions like supervenience, physical realization, and grounding all fail to articulate a viable non-reductive, levels-based physicalism. Challenging assumptions about the mind-body problem and providing new perspectives on the debate over physicalism, this accessible and comprehensive book will interest scholars working in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science.
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argues argument brute supervenience causal Chapter claim conception concerns context counterfactual CR-realization definition of physicalism distinct dualistic eliminativism emergentism entails event example exclusion problem exclusionist Fodor functional predicates functional properties functional realization functionalist Gillett’s given Grounding-based Heil higher-level causes higher-level discourse higher-level items higher-level occurrence higher-level properties higher-level truth Horgan idea identity theory instantiated intertheoretical reduction issues Kim’s levels-based physicalism Melnyk mental causes mental properties metaethics multiple realization Nonetheless nonreductive physicalism nonreductive physicalism’s nonskeptical antirealism one-level physicalism overdetermination philosophy philosophy of mind physical occurrence physical properties physical realizers physicalist metaphysic Polger position predicates primitive Grounding purely physical realized properties reason to think reductionism reductionist reductive physicalism rejected related remarks relation between powers sense special science subset realization subset relation subset view supervene on physical supervenience-based definitions suppose theory of causation thesis things are physically tion truthmaking type identity theory type physicalism virtue Wilson