writer has well obferved, "whoever confiders how great a "coherence there is between the feveral parts of the law, "and how much the reafon of one cafe opens and depends "upon that of another, will I prefume be far from thinking "any of the old learning ufelefs, which will fo much con"duce to the perfect understanding of the modern." And befides I fhould have done great injuftice to the founders of our legal conftitution, had I led the student to imagine, that the remedial inftruments of our law were originally contrived in fo complicated a form, as we now present them to his view: had I, for instance, entirely paffed over the direct and obvious remedies by affifes and writs of entry, and only laid before him the modern method of profecuting a writ of ejectment.

CHAPTER THE EIGHTEENTH.

OF THE PURSUIT OF REMEDIES BY ACTION; AND FIRST, OF THE ORIGINAL WRIT.

AVING, under the head of redress by fuits in courts, pointed out in the preceding pages, in the first place, the nature and feveral fpecies of courts of juftice, wherein remedies are administered for all forts of private wrongs; and, in the second place, fhewn to which of these courts in particular application must be made for redress, according to the diftinction of injuries, or, in other words, what wrongs are cognizable by one court, and what by another; I proceeded, under the title of injuries cognizable by the courts of common law, to define and explain the specifical remedies by action provided for every poffible degree of wrong or injury; as well fuch remedies as are dormant and out of use, as thofe which are in every day's practice, apprehending that the reafon of the one could never be clearly comprehended, without fome acquaintance with the other: and, I am now, in the laft place, to examine the manner in which these several remedies are pursued and applied, by action in the courts of common law; to which I fhall afterwards fubjoin a brief account of the proceedings in courts of equity.

IN treating of remedies by action at common law, I fhall confine myself to the modern method of practice in our courts of judicature. For, though I thought it neceflary to throw out a few obfervations on the nature of real actions, how

ever at prefent difufed, in order to demonftrate the coherence and uniformity of our legal conftitution, and that there was no injury fo obftinate and inveterate, but which might in the end be eradicated by fome or other of those remedial writs; yet it would be too irksome a task to perplex both my readers and myself with explaining all the rules of proceeding in thefe obfolete actions, which are frequently mere pofitive establishments, the forma et figura judicii, and conduce very little to illuftrate the reafon and fundamental grounds of the law. Wherever I apprehend they may at all conduce to this end, I fhall endeavour to hint at them incidentally.

WHAT therefore the student may expect in this and the fucceeding chapters, is an account of the method of proceeding in and profecuting a fuit upon any of the personal writs we have before spoken of, in the court of common pleas at Westminster; that being the court originally conftituted for the profecution of all civil actions. It is true that the courts of king's bench and exchequer, in order, without intrenching upon antient forms, to extend their remedial influence to the neceffities of modern times, have now obtained a concurrent jurifdiction and cognizance of very many civil fuits but, as caufes are therein conducted by much the fame advocates and attorneys, and the feveral courts and their judges have an entire communication with each other, the methods. and forms of proceeding are in all material refpects the fame in all of them. So that, in giving an abstract or history of the progrefs of a fuit through the court of common pleas, we

a In deducing this history the ftudent must not expect authorities to be conftantly cited; as practical knowledge is not fo much to be learned from any books of law, as from experience and attendance on the courts. The compiler must therefore be frequently obliged to rely upon his own obfervations; which in general he hath been ftudious to avoid where those of any other might be had. To accompany and illuftrate thefe re

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marks, fuch gentlemen as are defigned for the profeffion will find it neceffary to perufe the books of entries, antient and modern; which are tranfcripts of proceedings that have been had in fome parti. cular actions. A book or two of technical learning will alfo be found very convenient; from which a man of a liberal education and tolerable understanding may glean pro re nata as much as is fufficient for his purpose. These books of practice,

fhall at the fame time give a general account of the proceedings of the other two courts; taking notice, however, of any confiderable difference in the local practice of each. And the fame abstract will moreover afford us fome general idea of the conduct of a caufe in the inferior courts of common law, those in cities and boroughs, or in the court-baron, or hundred, or county court: all which conform (as near as may be) to the example of the fuperior tribunals, to which their caufes may probably be, in fome ftage or other, removed.

THE most natural and perfpicuous way of confidering the fubject before us will be (I apprehend) to pursue it in the order and method wherein the proceedings themselves follow each other; rather than to diftract and fubdivide it by any more logical analyfis. The general therefore and orderly parts of a fuit are thefe; 1. The original writ: 2. The procefs: 3. The pleadings: 4. The iflue or demurrer: 5. The trial: 6. The judgment, and it's incidents: 7. The proceedings in nature of appeals: 8. The execution.

FIRST, then, of the original, or original writ; which is the beginning or foundation of the fuit. When a perfon hath received an injury, and thinks it worth his while to demand a fatisfaction for it, he is to confider with himself, or take advice, what redrefs the law has given for that injury; and thereupon is to make application or fuit to the crown, the fountain of all justice, for that particular specific remedy which he is determined or advifed to purfue. As, for money. due on bond, an action of debt; for goods detained without force, an action of detinue or trover; or, if taken with force, an action of trejpafs vi et armis; or to try the title of lands,

as they are called, are all pretty much on a level, in point of compofition and folid instruction; fo that that which bears the latest edition is usually the best. ButGilbert'shifteryandpractice of the court of common pleas is a book of a very different ftamp: and though (like the reft

of bis pofthumous works) it has fuffered moft grofsly by ignorant or carelefs tranferibes, yet it has traced out the reason of many parts of our modern practice, from the feodal inftitutions and the primitive construction of our courts, in a mot clear and ingenious manner.

a writ of entry or action of trefpafs in ejectment; or, for any confequential injury received, a special action on the cafe. To this end he is to fue out, or purchase by paying the stated fees, an original, or original writ, from the court of chancery, which is the officina juftitiae, the fhop or mint of justice, wherein all the king's writs are framed. It is a mandatory letter from the king in parchment, fealed with his great seal ", and directed to the fheriff of the county wherein the injury is committed or fuppofed fo to be, requiring him to command the wrongdoer or party accufed, either to do justice to the complainant, or elfe to appear in court, and answer the accufation against him. Whatever the fheriff does in pursuance of this writ, he must return or certify to the court of common pleas, together with the writ itfelf: which is the foundation of the jurifdiction of that court, being the king's warrant for the judges to proceed to the determination of the caufe. For it was a maxim introduced by the Normans, that there should be no proceedings in common pleas before the king's justices without his original writ; because they held it unfit that thofe juftices, being only the substitutes of the crown, fhould take cognizance of any thing but what was thus exprefsly referred to their judgment. However, in fmall actions, below the value of forty fhillings, which are brought in the court-baron or county court, no royal writ is neceffary; but the foundation of such suits continues to be (as in the times of the Saxons) not by original writ, but by plaint; that is, by a private memorial tendered in open court to the judge, wherein the party injured fets forth his cause of action: and the judge is bound of common right to adminifter juftice therein, without any special mandate from the king. Now indeed even the royal writs are held to be demandable of common right, on paying the ufual fees for any delay in the granting them, or fetting an unufual or exorbitant price upon them, would be a breach of magna carta. c. 29. nulli vendemus, nulli negabimus, aut "differemus juftitiam vel rectum.”