Opinion of the Court

8

456 U. S.

As we have previously described, see Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S., at 759-761, the initial bill' passed by the House of Representatives on February 10, 1964, did not contain § 703(h) and neither the bill nor the majority Judiciary Committee Report even mentioned seniority. However, the House Minority Report warned that the bill, if enacted, would destroy seniority. H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 64-65 (1963). Following a 17-day debate over whether the bill should be referred to committee, the Senate voted to reject the motion to refer it to committee and began to formally consider the merits of the bill on March 30, 1964. Meanwhile, a bipartisan group led by Senators Dirksen, Mansfield, Humphrey, and Kuchel worked to reach agreement on amendments to the House bill which would ensure its passage. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B. C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 431, 445 (1966). The Mansfield-Dirksen compromise, which contained §703(h), was introduced on the Senate floor in the form of a substitute bill on May 26, 1964. Prior to the introduction of the Mansfield-Dirksen substitute, supporters of the House bill responded to charges that it would destroy existing seniority rights.10 On April 8, 1964, Senator Clark made a speech in

application." Post, at 83. Nor is there explicit basis for the proposition that § 703(h) applies only to those plans "adopted" prior to the effective date of the Act. It is nevertheless claimed that the legislative history supports reading this distinction into the statute. Post, at 83, n. 8. Had Congress intended so fundamental a distinction, it would have expressed that intent clearly in the statutory language or the legislative history. It did not do so, however, and it is not this Court's function "to sit as a superlegislature," Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 482 (1965), and create statutory distinctions where none were intended.

'H. R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).

"H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).

'110 Cong. Rec. 11926 (1964).

10 For examples of charges that the bill would destroy existing seniority rights see, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 914, supra, at 64-66 (Minority Report); 110 Cong. Rec. 486-489 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Hill); id., at 11471 (remarks of Sen. Javits discussing charges made by Governor Wallace).

which he stated that "it is clear that the bill would not affect seniority at all." 110 Cong. Rec. 7207 (1964). In support of his conclusion, he inserted three documents into the Congressional Record which this Court has characterized as "authoritative indicators" of the purpose of § 703(h)," Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S., at 352, and which the court below relied upon for its conclusion that post-Act seniority systems were not intended to be protected by § 703(h).

2d, at 749-750, n. 5.

See 634 F.

The first document was a Justice Department memorandum which stated, in part, that "Title VII would have no effect on seniority rights existing at the time it takes effect." 12 The second document was an interpretive memorandum which had been prepared by Senator Clark and Senator Case, and it also said Title VII would “have no effect on established seniority rights." 13 Senator Clark also introduced written answers to questions propounded by Senator Dirksen which included the statement, "Seniority rights are in no way affected by the bill."14

On the basis of the statements that Title VII would not affect "existing" and "established" seniority rights, respondents infer that Title VII would affect seniority rights which were not "established” or “existing" when the Act became ef

"Senator Humphrey, one of the drafters of the Mansfield-Dirksen substitute, explained that § 703(h) did not alter the meaning of Title VII but "merely clarifie[d] its present intent and effect." Id., at 12723. Therefore statements made prior to the introduction of § 703(h) by proponents of Title VII are evidence of the meaning of § 703(h).

"Id., at 7207. The full text of the statement with respect to seniority may be found in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 760, n. 16 (1976).

110 Cong. Rec. 7213 (1964). The full text of the statement with respect to seniority may be found in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., supra, at 759, n. 15.

"110 Cong. Rec. 7217 (1964). The questions and answers with respect to seniority may be found in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., supra, at 760-761, n. 16.

fective. Such an inference is unjustified. While the materials which Senator Clark inserted into the Congressional Record did speak in terms of Title VII not affecting "vested," "existing," or "established" seniority rights, they did so because they were responding to a specific charge made by the bill's opponents, namely, that the bill would destroy existing seniority rights. Had Senator Clark intended that the bill not protect post-Act seniority systems, it is highly unlikely he would have stated on the floor of the Senate that "the bill would not affect seniority at all," 15 110 Cong. Rec. 7207 (1964), or introduced a written response to a question posed by Senator Dirksen which said:

"Seniority rights are in no way affected by the bill. If under a 'last hired, first fired' agreement a Negro happens to be the last hired,' he can still be first fired' so long as it is done because of his status as 'last hired' and not because of his race." Id., at 7217.

Respondents' argument also ignores numerous other references to seniority by proponents of Title VII which were couched in terms of "seniority" rather than "existing seniority rights." See, e. g., id., at 5423 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); id., at 6564 (remarks of Sen. Kuchel); id., at 6565– 6566 (memorandum prepared by House Republican sponsors); id., at 11768 (remarks of Sen. McGovern). In addition, the few references to seniority after §703(h) was added to the bill are to the effect that "the Senate substitute bill expressly protects valid seniority systems." Id., at 14329 (letter from Sen. Dirksen to Sen. Williams). See also id., at 14331 (remarks of Sen. Williams).

15 Strictly speaking, Senator Clark's statement that Title VII would not affect seniority is incorrect. Title VII does affect seniority rights, for Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., supra, allows awards of retroactive seniority to victims of unlawful discrimination. However, Senator Clark's technical error does not alter our conclusion that he and other key proponents of the bill intended that it have minimal impact on seniority systems.

Going behind the plain language of a statute in search of a possibly contrary congressional intent is "a step to be taken cautiously" even under the best of circumstances. Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U. S. 1, 26 (1977). “[I]n light of its unusual legislative history and the absence of the usual legislative materials," Franks v. Bowman Construction Co., 424 U. S., at 761, we would in any event hesitate to give dispositive weight to the legislative history of § 703(h). More importantly, however, the history of § 703(h) does not support the far-reaching limitation on the terms of § 703(h) announced by the court below and urged by respondents. The fragments of legislative history cited by respondents, regardless of how liberally they are construed, do not amount to a clearly expressed legislative intent contrary to the plain language of the statute. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S., at 108.

IV

Our prior decisions have emphasized that "seniority systems are afforded special treatment under Title VII itself,” Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63, 81 (1977), and have refused to narrow § 703(h) by reading into it limitations not contained in the statutory language. In Teamsters v. United States, supra, we held that § 703(h) exempts from Title VII the disparate impact of a bona fide seniority system even if the differential treatment is the result of pre-Act racially discriminatory employment practices. Similarly, by holding that "[a] discriminatory act which is not made the basis for a timely charge is the legal equivalent of a discriminatory act which occurred before the statute was passed," United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U. S. 553, 558 (1977), the Court interpreted § 703(h) to immunize seniority systems which perpetuate post-Act discrimination. Thus taken together, Teamsters and Evans stand for the proposition stated in Teamsters that "[s]ection 703(h) on its face immunizes all bona fide seniority systems, and does not distin

guish between the perpetuation of pre- and post-Act" discriminatory impact. Teamsters, 431 U. S., at 348, n. 30 (emphasis added). 16 Section 703(h) makes no distinction between seniority systems adopted before its effective date and those adopted after its effective date. Consistent with our prior decisions, we decline respondents' invitation to read such a distinction into the statute.

Seniority provisions are of "overriding importance" in collective bargaining, Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U. S. 335, 346 (1964), and they "are universally included in these contracts." Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, supra, at 79. See also Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1532, 1534 (1962). The collective-bargaining process "lies at the core of our national labor policy Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, supra, at 79. See, e. g., 29 U. S. C. § 151. Congress was well aware in 1964 that the overall purpose of Title VII, to eliminate discrimination in employment, inevitably would, on occasion, conflict with the policy favoring minimal

16 Nowhere in Teamsters v. United States does the Court indicate when the seniority system at issue there was adopted, and examination of the record illustrates the difficulty of fixing an adoption date. Article V of the National Motor Freight Agreement of 1964 contains a seniority provision subject to modification by area agreements and local union riders. See Brief for Petitioner Teamsters, O. T. 1976, No. 75-636, pp. 24-25. However, National Motor Freight Agreements are of 3-year duration, and the 1970 Agreement was in effect when the complaint was filed. If a seniority system ceases to exist when the collective-bargaining agreement which creates it lapses, then the seniority system in Teamsters was adopted postTitle VII. On the other hand, if in practice the seniority system was continuously in effect from 1964, it can be argued that its adoption predates Title VII. However, Teamsters places no importance on the date the seniority system was adopted, and we follow Teamsters by refusing to distinguish among seniority systems based on date of adoption. Given the difficulty of determining when one seniority system ends and another begins and the lack of legislative guidance, we think it highly unlikely Congress intended for courts to distinguish between pre-Act and post-Act seniority systems.