Department of Defense Appropriations for 1979: Budget overviewU.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations, United States. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on Department of Defense U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978 |
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Page 162
... conventional as well as nuclear . We should seek to involve the Soviets constructively in a number of international activities social and economic , including non - strategic trade . We should encourage their cooperation in resolving ...
... conventional as well as nuclear . We should seek to involve the Soviets constructively in a number of international activities social and economic , including non - strategic trade . We should encourage their cooperation in resolving ...
Page 163
... conventional forces necessary to deter , or if necessary frustrate , possible Soviet military actions in areas of the world that are vital to us . Because certain deficiencies threaten to develop in our posture as a result of the recent ...
... conventional forces necessary to deter , or if necessary frustrate , possible Soviet military actions in areas of the world that are vital to us . Because certain deficiencies threaten to develop in our posture as a result of the recent ...
Page 165
... conventional cap- abilities . Strategic parity has not created this problem ; the United States and its allies have been at risk to Soviet nuclear attacks for many years . But nuclear parity has forced all of us to recognize that the ...
... conventional cap- abilities . Strategic parity has not created this problem ; the United States and its allies have been at risk to Soviet nuclear attacks for many years . But nuclear parity has forced all of us to recognize that the ...
Page 166
... conventional as well as for tactical and strategic nuclear forces in the posture of the Alliance . We also agree with our allies that , owing to the strengthening of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe , NATO ( including the United States ) ...
... conventional as well as for tactical and strategic nuclear forces in the posture of the Alliance . We also agree with our allies that , owing to the strengthening of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe , NATO ( including the United States ) ...
Page 168
... conventional forces in being , that alone is not sufficient . We must also maintain a high level of readi- ness in our active forces . Otherwise , we will have the facade rather than the reality of collective security . I consider our ...
... conventional forces in being , that alone is not sufficient . We must also maintain a high level of readi- ness in our active forces . Otherwise , we will have the facade rather than the reality of collective security . I consider our ...
Common terms and phrases
active additional air defense aircraft airlift allies appropriate arms Army attack AWACS ballistic missile billion bomber capability carrier CHAPPELL Chart combat continue conventional cost cruise missile DEFENSE BUDGET Department of Defense deployed deployment deterrence dollars effective efforts equipment estimate Europe fleet funds FY 1979 budget helicopter ICBM improve increase initial launchers maintain major Marine Corps ment military MINUTEMAN MINUTEMAN III MIRVed mission mobility modernization NATO naval Navy nuclear forces nuclear weapons operational outlays percent personnel procurement projected proposed QUESTION radar readiness reduce request reserve SALT II Secretary BROWN Secretary of Defense ships SLBM Soviet Union squadrons strategic forces strategic nuclear submarine tanks targets theater nuclear theater nuclear forces threat tion TRIDENT United unobligated balances USSR V/STOL WACKER war reserve stocks warfare warheads Warsaw Pact weapon systems
Popular passages
Page 372 - All requests to purchase major defense equipment are reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Page 156 - The convention protects our environment by prohibiting all significant hostile uses of environmental modification techniques "having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as a means of destruction, damage or Injury to any other State Party.
Page 373 - I am initiating this policy of restraint in the full understanding that actual reductions in the worldwide traffic in arms will require multilateral cooperation.
Page 371 - The United States will not be the first supplier to introduce into a region newly-developed, advanced weapons systems which would create a new or significantly higher combat capability.
Page 18 - International affairs General science, space and technology Energy Natural resources and environment Agriculture Commerce and housing credit Transportation Community and regional development Education, training, employment, and social services Health Medicare Income security Social security Veterans...
Page 371 - We will continue to utilize arms transfers to promote our security and the security of our close friends. But in the future the burden of persuasion will be on those who favor a particular arms sale, rather than those who oppose it.
Page 131 - US advantages in other characteristics; and —— the US posture is not in fact, and is not seen as, inferior in performance to the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union.
Page 731 - FULL-TIME TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE SELECTED RESERVE Question. The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs conducted a detailed study of the full-time training and administration of the selected reserve, and issued a draft report generally supporting the status of Full-Time Training and Administration of the Selected Reserve despite considerable differences in the systems used by the various Reserve components. Have you approved the final report and when will...
Page 371 - States will not entertain such requests, we can avoid unnecessary bilateral friction caused by later denials. 6. An amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations will be issued, requiring policy level authorization by the Department of State for actions by agents of the United States or private manufacturers which might promote the sale of arms abroad.
Page 203 - In designing our general purpose forces, what must concern us first and foremost is the heavy concentration of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe and the western military districts of the USSR. Those forces represent a direct and growing threat to the security of Western Europe, on both the central front and the flanks. They also define the magnitude of the largest and most serious non-nuclear contingency that could confront us in the foreseeable future. To stress Europe is not to rule out...