CHAPTER I

SYMBOLISM OF FREEMASONRY

Introduction.

HE study of Symbols is so closely interwoven with Language that it is essentially necessary, in a treatise on Symbology, that we should begin with an examination into the Origin of language itself; for it is to be presumed that language, or rather speech, was the very first effort of man to make his wishes known to his fellow-man.

The

habitual use of certain words, applied to the same objects, produced the primitive language.

We shall not attempt to follow those who have supposed that language was derived from certain inorganic sounds predicated upon the "utterances of Animals," called "Bow-Wow" theory by Max Müller and others. Now we must remember that it has been clearly proven by distinguished philologists that "the whole of what we call the human mind is realized in language, and in language only. Our next task would be to try to discover the constituent elements of language, and watch, in their development, the true historical development of the human mind." It becomes requisite in order fully to understand "symbolisms," as applied to the Ancient Mysteries, the Religions of the World, and also to Speculative Masonry, that we should be more particular in tracing the genealogy of language, from its very commencement, so far as it is possible to do so, by consulting the works of those distinguished writers of the present century, and more particularly within the last quarter of the century now about to close; and inasmuch as on this particular subject of language there is intimately associated that of the mind, which means thought" and which, again, means "combination," no better work can possibly be referred to than the Science of Thought, by

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1 Max Müller, "Science of Thought," vol. i., p. 176.

Max Müller in his recent two volumes, which we may constantly quote from wherever in that work we find that his authority will confirm our own ideas.

Müller is strictly a "scientist" in whatever line of thought he enters for examination, and upon this very subject he has shown the manner in which we may attain the truth, viz., by the "Constituent Elements of Thought," "Thought and Language," "Constituent Elements of Language," the "Origin of Concepts and Roots."

In the proper examination of any individual subject-matter the only true method of examination is by analysis; hence Müller does analyze, so as to show each and every element which enters into the composition of language. He says:

"Few words have been used in so many different senses as Thought. I mean by Thought the act of thinking, and by thinking I mean no more than combining. I do not pretend that others have not the right of using Thought in any sense which they prefer, provided only that they will clearly define it. I only wish to explain what is the meaning in which I intend to use the word, and in which I hold it ought to be used. 'I think' means to me the same as the Latin Cogito, namely Co-agito, 'I bring together,' only with the proviso, that bringing together or combining implies separating, for we cannot combine two or many things without at the same time separating them from all the rest. Hobbes expressed the same truth long ago when he said 'that all our thinking consisted in addition and subtraction."

“Humiliating as this may at first sight appear, it is really not more so than that the most subtle and complicated mathematical processes, which to the uninitiated seem beyond all comprehension, can be reduced in the end to addition and subtraction.

"Thinking may not seem so marvellous an achievement as we formerly imagined when we look up with vague admiration to the Mathematical Calculations of Newton, or to the Metaphysical Speculations of Kant; yet if what these thinkers achieved has been achieved by such simple processes as addition and subtraction, combining and separating, their work to the mind becomes in reality far more marvellous than it appeared at first. Much, however, depends on what we combine and separate, and we have therefore to consider what corresponds in thinking to the numbers with which the mathematician operates, what are, in fact, the known quantities

that constitute the material of our thoughts, what are the elements which we bring together or co-agitate."

Müller then proceeds to distinguish in our knowledge four things: "Sensations, Percepts, Concepts, and Names, and, while we can distinguish these, we must not suppose that they ever exist as separate entities; for no words are possible without concepts, nor can there be concepts without percepts, nor percepts without sensations. If we postulate sensations as the causes of percepts, percepts as the causes of concepts, and concepts as the causes of names, it would seem a very natural conclusion that sensations could exist previous to and therefore independent of percepts, percepts of concepts, concepts of words. And yet we have only to try the experiment in order to convince ourselves that, as a matter of fact, thought, in the usual sense of the word, is utterly impossible without the simultaneous working of sensations, percepts, concepts, and names, and that in reality the four are inseparable."

With these fundamental principles thus clearly laid down by Müller, we may discover how, at the earliest period in man's history, he very soon found a name for every fact which was presented to his observation. We shall follow the Author in his most interesting and conclusive arguments to prove the position which he has taken. The service of language is to convey our thoughts to one another.

There are various ways in which men can communicate with one another-by gestures, cries, words; make pictures to represent their ideas, characters or letters. These are signs, and in order to understand in what manner they operate we must commence with such signs as are the most natural and simple. When parties meet who speak different languages they endeavor to make themselves understood by gestures which would most naturally indicate the idea wished to be conveyed:

"This is the gesture-language, as we all know how to use it. But to see what a full and exact means of Communication it may be worked up to, it should be watched in use among the deaf and dumb, who have to depend so much upon it. To give an idea how far gestures can be made to do the work of spoken words, the signs may be described in which a deaf-and-dumb man once told a child's story in presence of the writer. He began by moving his hand, palm down, about a yard from the ground, as we do to show the height of a child-this meant it was a child he was thinking of,

Then he tied an imaginary pair of bonnet-strings under his chin (his usual sign for female) to make it understood that the child was a girl. The child's mother was then brought on the scene in a similar way. She beckons to the child and gives her two-pence, these being indicated by pretending to drop two coins from one hand into the other; if there had been any doubt as to whether they were copper or silver coins this would have been settled by pointing to something brown or even by one's contemptuous way of handling coppers which at once distinguishes them from silver. The mother also gives the child a jar, shown by sketching its shape with the forefingers in the air, and going through the act of handing it over. Then by imitating the unmistakable kind of twist with which one turns a treacle-spoon, it is made known that it is treacle the child is to buy. Next, a wave of the hand shows the child being sent off on her errand, the usual sign of walking being added, which is made by two fingers walking on the table. The turning of an imaginary door-handle now takes us into the shop, where the counter is shown by passing the flat hands as it were over it. Behind this counter a figure is pointed out; he is shown to be a man by the usual sign of putting a hand to one's chin and drawing it down where the beard is or would be; then the sign of tying an apron around the waist adds the information that the man is the shopman. To him the child gives the jar, dropping the money into his hand, and moving her forefinger as if taking up treacle, to show what she wants. Then we see the jar put into an imaginary pair of scales which go up and down; the great treacle-jar is brought from the shelf and the little jar filled with the proper twist to take up the last trickling thread; the grocer puts the two coins in the till, and the girl sets off with the jar; she sees a drop of treacle on the rim, wipes it off with her finger, and puts her finger in her mouth, how she was tempted to take more, how her mother found her out by the spot of treacle on her pinafore, etc."

The student anxious to master the principles of language will find this gesture-talk so instructive that it will be well to explain its workings more closely. "The signs used are of two kinds. In the first kind, things actually present are shown. Thus, if the deaf-mute wants to mention 'hand,' or 'shoe,' he touches his own hand or shoe. Where a speaking man would say 'I,' 'thou,' 'he,' the deaf-mute simply points to himself and the other persons.

To ex