CHAP. VI.

Those that seemed to be the most strenuous advocates for the immortality of the soul, and a future state, among the ancients, did not pretend to any certainty concerning it. The uncertainty they were under appears from their way of managing their consolatory discourses on the death of their friends. To this also it was owing, that in their exhortations to virtue, they laid little stress on the rewards of a future state. Their not having a certainty concerning a future state, put them upon schemes to supply the want of it. Hence they insisted upon the selfsufficiency of virtue for complete happiness without a future recompense; and asserted, that a short happiness is as good as an eternal one.

ANOTHER important observation with regard to those ancient philosophers, who were esteemed the ablest advocates for the immortality of the soul and a future state, is, that after all the pains they took to prove it, they did not pretend to an absolute certainty, nor indeed do they seem to have fully satisfied themselves about it. The passages to this purpose are well known, and have been often quoted, but cannot be entirely omitted here.

Socrates himself, when he was near death, in discoursing with his friends concerning the immortality of the soul, expresses his hope that he should go to good men after death, "but this (says he) I would not absolutely affirm." He indeed is more positive as to what relates to his going to the gods after death, though this he also qualifies, by saying, that "if he could affirm any thing concerning matters of "such a nature, he would affirm this.-Ereg ri ähλo sãv toistan σε διίσχυρισαίμεν ἂν καὶ τᾶτο.”* And he concludes that long discourse concerning the state of souls after death, with saying, "That these things are so as I have represented them, it does "not become any man of understanding to affirm:" though he adds, "that if it appears that the soul is immortal, it "seems reasonable to think, that either such things, or something like them, are true, with regard to our souls and their "habitations after death: and that it is worth making a trial, "for the trial is noble.+

* See Plato's Phædo, Opera, p. 377. H. edit. Lugd.

† Ibid. p. 401. A.

And in his apology to his judges, he comforts himself with this consideration, that "there is much ground to hope that "death is good for it must necessarily be one of these two: "either the dead man is nothing, and hath not a sense of "any thing; or it is only a change or migration of the soul " hence to another place, according to what we are told, “ xarà và Xeyóμsva. If there is no sense left, and death is like ❝ a profound sleep, and quiet rest without dreams, it is won"derful to think what gain it is to die; but if the things "which are told us are true, that death is a migration to "another place, this still is a much greater good." And soon after, having said that those "who live there, are both in "other respects happier than we, and also in this, that for "the rest of their time they are immortal :" he again repeats what he said before; "If the things which are told us are true,” Εἴπερ τὰ λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ ἔστιν : where he seems to refer to some ancient traditions which were looked upon as divine, and which he hoped were true, but which he was not absolutely sure of.

And he concludes his apology with these remarkable words ; "It is now time to depart hence: I am going to die; you "shall continue in life; but which of us shall be in a better "state, is unknown to all but God."*

What has been observed concerning Socrates, holds equally concerning Plato, who generally speaks his own sentiments, especially in what relates to the immortality of the soul and a future state, by the mouth of Socrates.

None of the ancient philosophers has argued better for the immortality of the soul than Cicero: but at the same time he takes care to let us know, that he followed only that which appeared to him the most probable conjecture, and which was the utmost he could attain to, but did not take upon him to affirm it as certain. This is what he declares in the beginning of his discourse upon that subject: "Ut homunculus "unus à multis probabilia conjecturâ sequens, ultra enim

• See Plato's Phædo, Opera, p. 368. H. 369. A. C. D. edit. Lugd. VOL. II.

Pp

quo progedior, quàm ut verisimilia videam, non habeo."* And after having mentioned a great variety of opinions about the human soul, and particularly whether it dies with the body, or survives it; and if the latter, whether it is to have a perpetual existence, or is only to continue for a time after its departure from the body; he concludes with saying, "Which of these opinions is true, some god must determine. "Which is most probable, is a great question.”—“ Harum "sententiarum quæ vera sit deus aliquis viderit: quæ verisi"millima magna questio est."+

The uncertainty the most excellent Pagan philosophers were under, with regard to a future state, further appears, in that in their disputations and discourses, which were designed to fortify themselves or others against the fear of death, as also in their consolatory discourses on the death of deceased friends, they still proceeded upon alternatives; that death is either a translation to a better state, or is an utter extinction of being, or at least a state of insensibility. It was with this consideration that Socrates comforted himself under the near prospect of death, as appears from the passages already produced. In like manner Cicero's whole disputation in his celebrated book above-mentioned, the professed design of which is to fortify men against the fear of death, turns upon this alternative, with which he concludes his discourse: that "if the day of "our death brings with it not an extinction of our being, "but only a change of our abode, nothing can be more de"sirable; but if it absolutely destroys and puts an end to our "existence, what can be better than, amidst the labours and "troubles of this life, to rest in a profound and eternal sleep?"

"Si supremus ille dies non extinctionem, sed commuta"tionem adfert loci, quid optabilius? Sin autèm perimit ac "delet omnino, quid melius quam in mediis vitæ laboribus "obdormiscere, et ità conniventem somno consopiri sempi"terno." And this is the consideration that he seems to me to rely principally upon.

There are several passages of Seneca to the same purpose,

* Tuscul. Disput. lib. i. cap. 9.

+ Ibid. cap. 11.

Ibid. cap. 49.

some of which are cited above, p. 252. To which I shall add one more from his Consolation to Polybius, who was grieved for the death of his brother. He directs him to argue with himself thus: "If the dead have no sense, my brother "has escaped from all the incommodities of life, and is re"stored to that state he was in before he was born; and be"ing free from all evil, fears nothing, desires nothing, suffers "nothing. If the dead have any sense, the soul of my bro"ther, being let loose as it were from a long confinement, " and entirely his own master, exults and enjoys a clear sight "of the nature of things, and looks down, as from a higher "situation, upon all things human with contempt; and he has

a nearer view of divine things, the reasons of which he has "long sought in vain. Why, therefore, do I languish for "the want of him, who is either happy, or not at all? To "lament one that is happy, is envy and one that has no "existence, is madness."*

Plutarch, as was before observed, has several passages, from which it may be concluded, that he looked upon the immortality of the soul as a probable opinion, yet he sometimes expresses himself in a manner which seems to show that he either did not believe it, or was not certain of it. In his Consolation to Apollonius, he observes that Socrates said that death is either like to a deep sleep, or to a journey afar off and of a long continuance, or to the entire extinction of soul and body. This he quotes with approbation, and sets himself distinctly to show, that in none of these views can death be considered as an evil. And in the treatise which is designed

Senec. Consol. ad Polyb. cap. 27. "Si nullus defunctis sensus sit, evasit "omnia frater meus vitæ incommoda; et in eum restitutus est locum, in quo "fuerat antequàm nasceretur, et expers omnis mali nihil timet, nihil cupit, pa❝titur. Si est aliquis defunctis sensus, nunc animus fratris mei, velut ex diu"tino carcere missus, tandem sui juris et arbitrii, gestit, et rerum naturæ spec. "taculo fruitur, et humana omnia ex superiore loco despicit, divina verò, quo"rum rationem tamdiu frustrà quæsierat, propíùs intuetur. "desiderio maceror, qui aut beatus aut nullus est? "nullum dementia."

Quid itaque ejus Beatum deflere, invidia est,

Plutarch. Opera, tom. II. p. 107. D. Here one part of the alternative is

to prove that no man can live pleasantly according to the tenets of Epicurus, speaking of the hope of immortality, he calls it ἡ περὶ τὸ μυθωδὲς τῆς αἰδιότητος ἔλπις, « the fabulous hope "of immortality." Or, as the learned Mr. Baxter renders it, in his English translation of that tract," the hope conceived "of eternity from the tales and fables of the ancients."* And in his treatise of superstition, he supposes death to be the final period of our existence, and that the fear of any thing after it, is the effect of superstition; "Death (says he) is to "all men the end of life, but to superstition it is not so. She "stretches out her bounds beyond those of life, and makes ❝her fears of a longer duration than our existence." Пégas τη βία πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὁ θάνατος, τῆς δὲ δεισιδαιμονίας οὐδ ̓ οὗτος, ἀλλ ̓ ὑπερβάλλει τοὺς ὄρους ἐπέκεινα τῇ ζῆν, μακρότερον τῇ βία ποιῆσαι τὸν φόβον.†

So great is the inconsistency which frequently appears in the writings of the ancient philosophers on this and other articles of importance. They are so often varying in their doctrine, seeming to affirm in one place what they treat as fabulous and uncertain in another, that some very learned persons have thought it could not be otherwise accounted for, than by supposing a great difference between what is called the exoteric and esoteric doctrine; that is, the doctrine they taught openly to the people, and that which they taught privately to their disciples, whom they let into the secrets of their scheme. I shall not enter into the controversy about the meaning of the distinction between the exoteric and esoteric doctrine of the ancients. I am apt to think that it relates sometimes to their treating on different subjects, and sometimes to their different manner of treating the same subject. For

the utter extinction of being; and he endeavours to show, that, on that supposition, death is not an evil; and yet, ibid. p. 1105. A. in his treatise Non posse suaviter viv. he very justly argues, that the notion of utter dissolution and extinction at death does not take away the fear of death, but rather confirms it; since this very thing is what nature has a strong aversion to.

* Plutarch. Opera, tom. II. p. 1104. C.

† Plutarch. de Superstit. Opera, tom. II. p. 166. F. edit. Xyl.