would immediately jeopardize and imperil our national defense and the defense of those joined with this Nation in resisting aggression; and That, as the head of the United Steel Workers of America, CIO, has publicly announced, such a work stoppage will immediately result if the order appealed from is not stayed and the possession of the steel plants by the United States is terminated. Respectfully submitted, Holmes Baldridge, Assistant Of Counsel: James R. Browning, Edward H. Hickey, Marvin C. Taylor, Samuel D. Slade, Benjamin Forman, Herman Marcuse, T. S. L. Perlman, Attorneys, Department of Justice. [File endorsement omitted.] [fol. 251] [Appellant's Designation of Content of Record on Appeal-Omitted in Printing] [fol. 252] [Order for Clerk to Transmit Original Record to Court of Appeals-Omitted in Printing] [fol. 257] IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT [Title omitted] [fol. 259] ORDER UPON DEFENDANT'S APPLICATION FOR A STAY-Filed April 30, 1952 This cause came on to be heard upon the defendant's motion for a stay pending appeal of the Court's order of April 30th, 1952, granting a temporary injunction as therein stated, and was argued by counsel. Upon consideration. thereof, it is hereby Ordered, adjudged and decreed that the said motion be and the same hereby is denied. David A. Pine, Judge of U. S. District Court for the [File endorsement omitted.] [fol. 94] IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Civil Action No. 1625-'52 No. 11404-13 UNITED STATES STEEL COMPANY, 525 William Penn Place, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Plaintiff, V. CHARLES SAWYER, Department of Commerce, Washington, D. C., Defendant COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Filed April 11, 1952 Plaintiff, United States Steel Company, alleges: 1. This is an action for a declaratory judgment brought pursuant to the provisions of the Act of June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat. 964, as amended by the Act of May 24, 1949, c. 139, sec. 111, 63 Stat. 105 (28 U. S. C. A. §§ 2201 and 2202) and for an injunction. 2. Plaintiff is a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of New Jersey and is a citizen and a resident of said State. It is engaged in integrated operations for the production and sale of a wide variety of steel products, and operates, among other things, steel producing, manufacturing and fabricating plants in various states of the United States. In the operation of said plants and related facilities plaintiff owns and uses extensive real and personal properties, funds, rights, franchises and other valuable assets. It employs over 260,000 persons in its enterprise and has an investment totaling many millions of dollars in plant and related facilities. [fol. 95] Many of plaintiff's customers have pending orders for steel and steel products for use in applications having no relation to the defense effort of the United States. 3. Defendant, Charles Sawyer, is Secretary of Commerce of the United States and is a resident of the District of Columbia. 4. This action involves questions under the Constitution and laws of the United States. The matter in controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum of $3,000. There exists between the parties herein an actual justiciable controversy in respect of which plaintiff requires a declaration of its rights by this Court. 5. On April 9, 1952, plaintiff received from defendant a telegram and on April 10, 1952 an order designated Order No. 1 and dated April 8, 1952, which telegram and order purport to take possession of all properties of plaintiff, except railroads and all coal and metal mines. The telegram and order, which are annexed hereto as Exhibits A and B, respectively, purport to have been issued pursuant to authority vested in defendant by Executive Order No. 10340 issued by the President of the United States on April 8, 1952. Such Executive Order is annexed hereto as Exhibit C. 6. Prior to April 9, 1952, plaintiff had enjoyed peaceful possession and the exclusive operation of the properties referred to in paragraph 2 hereof, and had operated the same in all respects consistent with applicable laws of the United States and of the various States of the United States having jurisdiction thereof. [fol. 96] 7. The United Steelworkers of America (hereinafter called the "Union") represents certain employees of plaintiff at the plants and facilities referred to in paragraph 2 hereof for the purposes of collective bargaining. Since November 27, 1951, plaintiff has been engaged in collective bargaining negotiations with the Union concerning wages and other conditions of employment. On December 22, 1951, the President referred the matter to the Wage Stabilization Board for consideration and recommendation. Plaintiff did not agree to be bound by or to accept any recommendations by the Wage Stabilization Board. December 31, 1951, the labor agreements which had theretofore been in effect between plaintiff and the Union expired. On March 20, 1952, the Wage Stabilization Board made certain recommendations with respect to the employment conditions under negotiation. Plaintiff has not accepted the recommendations of the Wage Stabilization Board. A strike of the employees of plaintiff and of most other producers of steel products was called by the Union for 12:01 a. m., April 9, 1952. On 8. On April 8, 1952, the President issued the aforesaid Executive Order No. 10340, purporting to authorize and direct defendant to take possession of all or such of the plants, facilities and other property, or any part thereof, of listed companies, including plaintiff, as he may deem necessary in the interest of national defense; and to operate or to arrange for the operation thereof and to do all things necessary for, or incidental to, such operation. The Executive Order recites the fact that a strike had been called, and states that the Executive Order is issued to assure the [fol. 97] continued availability of steel and steel products. The Executive Order directs defendant, among other things, to determine and prescribe terms and conditions of employment under which the plants, facilities, and other properties, possession of which is taken pursuant to that Order, shall be operated. 9. Defendant's Order No. 1 provides, among other things, that plaintiff's plants, facilities and other properties are to be operated in accordance with such regulations and orders as are promulgated by defendant and recites that the management, officers and employees of plaintiff's plants are serving the Government of the United States. 10. Sections 206-210 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 136; 29 U. S. C. A. App. § 141) provide specific machinery for dealing with threatened or actual strikes which affect an entire industry or a substantial part thereof and which in the opinion of the President imperil the national health or safety. Congress in the course of its consideration of this Act considered and specifically rejected the device of seizure as a means of dealing with such a strike. In the Act Congress has authorized the President to establish a Board of Inquiry and to petition a district court of the United States to enjoin a threatened or actual strike for a period not exceeding 60 days, during which period it shall be the duty of the parties to the labor dispute to make every effort to adjust and settle their differences. In the event the dispute is not resolved during such period, and after a secret ballot of the employees of each employer involved in the dispute, the Act requires the President to submit to the Congress a full and [fol. 98] comprehensive report of the proceedings together with such recommendations as he may see fit to make for consideration and appropriate action by the Congress. The President has not invoked the provisions of this Act in connection with the labor dispute between plaintiff and the Union. 11. Section 18 of the Universal Military Training and Service Act (62 Stat. 635; 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 468) provides that, upon the President's determination that it is in the interest of the national security to obtain prompt delivery of any articles or materials, the procurement of which has been authorized by the Congress exclusively for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States or the use of the Atomic Energy Commission, the United States is authorized to place orders for such articles or materials. Any person with whom such an order is placed is to be advised that such order is placed pursuant to the provisions of this section. In case the person with whom such an order is placed refuses or fails to fill such order, the President is authorized to take immediate possession of the plant of such person and to operate it for the production of such articles or materials as may be required by the United States. Plaintiff has received no orders placed pursuant to the provisions of this Act. 12. Section 201 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended (64 Stat. 799, 65 Stat. 132; 50 U. S. C. A. App. $2081) authorizes the President, whenever he deems it necessary in the interest of national defense, to acquire any real property including facilities, temporary use thereof, or other interest therein, together with any personal prop[fol. 99] erty located thereon or used therewith, upon the payment of just compensation in accordance with procedures set forth in the Act. The President has made no determination pursuant to this Act with respect to any property of plaintiff nor has he taken any action to acquire any such property in accordance therewith. 13. Executive Order No. 10340 and the actions of defendant taken or to be taken in pursuance thereof are unlawful and without effect in that (a) They are without authority under any statute of the United States, and specifically are outside of and inconsistent with the authority and procedures provided under the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, the Universal Military Training and Service Act, |