Deputy Director for Operational Forces with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations.

In August 1959, he was appointed as Assistant Deputy Commander for Weapon Systems Management, Air Research and Development Command, at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. In July 1960, he became Commander of Wright Air Development Division at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. Back to Washington again, in July 1961, he assumed duties at Headquarters U.S. Air Force as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Systems and Logistics, and on May 1, 1964 he became the Director of the Weapon Systems Evaluation Group, Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense.

On September 1, 1966, General Holzapple was reassigned to Headquarters U.S. Air Force as Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development, his present position.

His decorations include the Silver Star, Legion of Merit, Distinguished Flying Cross with one oak leaf cluster, Air Medal with 18 oak leaf clusters, Distinguished Unit Citation with one oak leaf cluster. Foreign governments have bestowed upon General Holzapple the Croix de Guerre with étoile d'argent (France), the Croix de Guerre with Palm (France), and the British Distinguished Flying Cross. He is rated a command pilot.

General HOLZAPPLE. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am most pleased to have this opportunity to appear before you and present the Air Force research, development, test, and evaluation program for fiscal year 1968. The appropriation that I am requesting today represents the money needed to continue essential programs started in prior years, and to initiate new programs to satisfy new requirements. In this context, the fiscal year 1968 R.D.T. & E. program is the next segment in a continuous process of system development cycles and continuing research programs.

As we formulated the 1968 R.D.T. & E. program, I found that references to prior budgets and programs, and their trends, provided a sense of continuity that was most helpful in the development of this year's program. I would like to review with you some of the trends from earlier budgets and programs, and use these as a foundation for the presentation of the 1968 program. I will do this by presenting the size of our total R.D.T. & E. program in recent years, and then by the funds for system development programs in our mission areas. These latter funds are the operational systems development and engineering development categories allocated to strategic offense and defense forces, general purpose forces, and airlift forces. Then, before addressing the fiscal year 1968 program, I will describe some of the results that we have achieved by focusing the breadth of our technological capabilities on a specific area-Southeast Asia. The fiscal year 1968 program can then be viewed in its proper perspective.

R.D.T. & E. TRENDS

Over the past 5 years, and into our requested program for 1968, the size of the Air Force R.D.T. & E. program has varied appreciably from the peak year of 1963. As shown in figure 1, the variations are from a high of $3.8 billion to this year's $3.4 billion-a change that does not take into account the reduced purchasing power of the dollar over these years. The amounts of these funds allocated to system developments in the different mission areas have also varied considerably. These variations are attributable to programs progressing from development to production, the introduction of new programs, and the termination of others. Viewed over a 5-year span, the trend data in

mission areas shows where we have placed our system development emphasis. Because systems take anywhere from 4 to 10 years to develop, the trend data also shows where and when we can expect new systems to become operational in the next 5 years. That is, any new major system that is to become operational before 1973, must be in development now. In this sense, the trend data from 1963-68, measures about a decade of major system developments.

The strategic forces are the deterrent of general nuclear war and the backbone of our national security. In providing these forces with the best possible weapons, we have consistently allocated the largest fraction of our system development money (fig. 2) to improving operational systems and developing more advanced systems. With both the Soviets and the Chinese devoting substantial amounts of their resources to this area, and with the Chinese demonstrating remarkable progress, we have recognized that we can hardly afford complacency.

Taking these world conditions into account, we have progressed from the MINUTEMAN I ballistic missile to the recently deployed MINUTEMAN II, and we are working on the MINUTEMAN III and studying an advanced ICBM. We are also developing new and sophisticated penetration aids for these missiles. We are completing development on the Mach 3 SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft and we have started development on the FB-111A bomber and its companion short range attack missile (SRAM). We are also developing the command and control to integrate these systems into a highly effective strategic force.

Our air defense capabilities are of course closely linked to the strategic threat posed by potential enemies. In recent years, the growing ballistic missile threat has tended to overshadow enemy long-range manned bombers and air-to-surface missiles. As a result, our system development resources in this area (fig. 3) have been concentrated on programs such as over-the-horizon radar for detecting missiles, and additions to our spacetrack system. The risk inherent in low levels of development activity on bomber defenses is that we will not have the time to develop and deploy an effective counter weapon system if we wait for irrefutable evidence of a substantially increased bomber or bomber/air-to-surface missile threat. To reduce this risk we plan to continue the development of the F-12 interceptor.

GENERAL PURPOSE OR TACTICAL FORCES

The area of general purpose or tactical forces has received considerable attention since the Executive decision of 1961 to revitalize these forces. Much of the Air Force activity in this area has been in adopting developments that will minimize leadtimes and take advantage of available technology. The major Air Force operational system development program in this area is the F-111, an aircraft that holds great promise for the tactical strike, attack, and reconnaissance roles. The comparatively small amount of development funds for the Air Force configuration of the A-7 is also included in this category. This aircraft is tailored to the ground support role in areas where air superiority is not in question. However, neither of these aircraft is well suited for close air-to-air combat with Mig's or their successors. With the Soviets continuing to develop successively better fighters, and with their willingness to distribute them worldwide, we are proposing an advanced fighter, the F-X, for the air superiority role. We are also investigating the possibility of developing a low cost attack aircraft, the A-X.

Our allocation of R. & D. resources to airlift has increased in the last 4 years. In terms of hardware, the development funds shown in figure 5 are primarily for the C-5A although some C-141 money is also included. The C-141 and C-5A provide excellent solutions to the long range, intertheater, airlift problems; and the C-130 has been satisfying the need for intermediate range airlift, but we still must develop a better air transport capability for use in forward areas. We expect to start the development process, in the near future, for an intratheater airlift transport-probably a short takeoff and landing (STOL) transport with limited vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) capability to satisfy this requirement.