The large percentage increase in budget activity 7, "Other equipment," amounting to $27 million is primarily caused by a $19 million increase in our deep submergence program, and

As you know, in our day-to-day administration of the R.D.T. & E. program, we utilize the six DOD categories organized in terms of a spectrum of effort spanning the kinds of work from research to fleet support. For reference purposes, table II compares the fiscal years 1967 and 1968 programs distributed among the six DOD categories.

Mr. Chairman, I am aware that this committee is particularly interested in some broad aspects of our R. & D. program. Before discussing the primary programs within each budget activity, I would like to highlight our R. & D. activities in, and contributions to, the following areas:

A. Strategic offensive and defensive warfare.

B. Southeast Asia conflict.

C. Antisubmarine warfare.

D. Oceanography and ocean engineering.

E. Navy laboratories.

Mr. SIKES. I think we will suspend at this point, gentlemen. The committee will resume its hearings at 2 o'clock.

AFTERNOON SESSION

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Sikes will continue to chair the committee. I must say, Mr. Secretary, I find your statement very interesting. We are pleased to have such an ample and comprehensive presentation of your requirements.

Dr. FROSCH. Thank you very much, sir. We have tried to provide as much information as we could.

Mr. SIKES (presiding). Will you proceed with your statement Mr. Secretary?

Dr. FROSCH. I had begun to discuss strategic offensive and defensive warefare as a highlighted item.

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WARFARE

Our largest single program in fiscal year 1968 is again the fleet ballistic missile system. R.D.T. & E. funding for the FBM program

is being requested in two elements for fiscal year 1968 as shown in table III.

TABLE III.—Strategic Forces, R.D.T. & E.
[Dollars in millions]

The figures in parentheses are the percentage of the total Navy R.D.T. & E. program for the years shown. I will address the three projects, POLARIS, POSEIDON, and FBM control, individually. As you know, the remarkable POLARIS system was initially deployed in November 1960. The FBM force has grown considerably in size and capability since that date. Forty of the ballistic missile submarines have been commissioned. The 41st, and last SSBN in the approved program, WILL ROGERS, will be ready for deployment in the late summer of this year. The relative invulnerability of the FBM force and the assured destruction provided by the reliability and accuracy of the POLARIS system form a highly effective and credible deterrent to aggression in international affairs.

Improvement in the FBM system has been as significant as the growth in size of the force. The 1,200-mile POLARIS A-1 missile, the first of the family, has been retired. All SSBN's on deployment now carry the 1,500-mile POLARIS A-2 or 2,500-mile A-3. With the added range capability of the A-3, the operationally useful waters available in the North Atlantic region have been doubled. That area is now on the order of 4 million square miles of available launch space. With the deployment of SSBN's to the Pacific Fleet there are no important world targets out of reach of POLARIS launched from deep

water.

In addition to these range increases, improvements have been realized in other features of the later POLARIS systems. Statistics on operational tests of POLARIS also show greater success rate for the later missiles, and the newer fire control system permits greater flexibility in selection and reprograming of targets. In support of POLARIS, advancements have been made in navigation aids upon which the FBM system depends for delivery accuracy, and improvements have been made in shore-to-ship communications to insure positive command and control of the FBM force.

Despite the fine performance of the POLARIS system in the past, continuing improvements are required.

Although the present FBM system is highly effective, we cannot afford to assume that enemy countermeasures developments will not reduce its future effectiveness. In December of 1965, the Secretary of Defense directed that development of the POSEIDON missile be pursued toward an operational availability date in This year the Congress is being asked to approve production for deployment.

POSEIDON will have a range and greater accuracy than POLARIS. Overall effectiveness of POSEIDON will be enhanced through the availability of . Last year our planning was based on deploying POSEIDON in of the 41 SSBN's. In order to take advantage of its greater operational capabilities and to meet the which POSEIDON will provide, we now plan to equip 31 of the SSBN's with POSEIDON. The remaining 10 boats of the force will carry the A-3. Fiscal year 1968 milestones for POSEIDON development include the first and completion of necessary construction at the Eastern Test Range. POSEIDON development will require in fiscal year 1968.

Developments for command and control of the FBM system have been consolidated into a single comprehensive program under the overall direction of the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Communications). This effort, previously conducted under the POLARIS line item, is aimed at improving the ability of our communications, command, and control network to survive nuclear attack and to while at the same time safeguarding the submarine's location. Our program includes: completion of the

We do not know at this time what strategic systems might follow POLARIS/POSEIDON into the fleet. Studies and investigations are carried on in military sciences and exploratory development which will define future sea-based systems of greater effectiveness than any now in the national arsenal or in development stages. Concepts which we are investigating for comparison with land based alternatives include a

POLARIS has added a new dimension to seapower. POSEIDON will expand our capability. National strategic systems of the future will continue to use the ocean areas for offensive and defensive purposes.

SOUTHEAST ASIA CONFLICT

The conflict in Southeast Asia has presented its own set of problems, challenges, and opportunities to the Navy's research and development effort. In some areas of this conflict, such as tactical air warfare, the Navy was essentially ready to conduct effective operations with equipment already on hand. Development of follow-on equipment planned before the 1965 increase in the intensity of the war has sufficed here to fill the needs of the fleet. Sometimes, of course, we have accelerated planned development or made modifications. For example, the WALLEYE electro-optical TV-guided glide bomb was undergoing exploratory laboratory experimentation as early as

In other areas, especially those in which response to the details of enemy equipment and tactics is important, such as tactical the conflict in Southeast Asia found our forces not fully equipped. In these cases, programs have either been begun, or accelerated on a crash basis. The war presents us with a curious mix of challenges, some of which were anticipated and planned for, and some of which were not. Before beginning a discussion of our equipment problems in Southeast Asia and how we propose to solve them, I would like to comment on a more general issue. We must be constantly on our guard, lest we

be so seduced by the problems of Vietnam that we overlook our responsibilities to develop hardware which can be used in case of need in other types of warfare and in other parts of the world. There can be no question that, for now, we are fighting only one active war, in one corner of the globe. Our first responsibility is to give the men who are fighting this war the tools they need. At the same time, the Navy's responsibilities are worldwide and far reaching, as are those of the people who conduct its research and development. The Navy must be ready to meet these worldwide responsibilities with the finest weapons and weapons systems that its development organization can provide. The interaction of long term Navy research and development and the short term Navy R. & D. that is oriented to the conflict in Southeast Asia is a matter of daily concern to me. Most conflicts between these objectives are reduced somewhat by the fact that the equipment I will describe that is being developed for use in Southeast Asia has wider applications.

For operational purposes, the Navy sees the war as three separate wars. These are: the air war over North and South Vietnam, the war at sea off the coast of Vietnam, and the war in the rivers and canals of the Mekong Delta. I propose in the remainder of this section to treat each of these segments of the war, to show you the challenges, what we have done with the funds you have given us to date, and what we plan to do with the funds that we are now requesting. Finally, I will tell you of specific developments for the Marine Corps, which is fighting on land and in the air over Southeast Asia.

TACTICAL AIR AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE

The Navy's mission in the air war over Vietnam is to destroy targets. To accomplish this, the pilot of an attack aircraft must do several things. First, he must find the target. He needs some sort of command and control system, either in his aircraft or helping him from outside (as in most of our other tactical aircraft) or both. Second, he must get to the target through a maze of deadly defenses: enemy fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, and radar or optically controlled antiaircraft fire. He needs protection, either self-contained or in support. Third, and above all, he wants to drop weapons which will destroy the target. This means good ordnance and good accuracy. Let me deal with these three steps in turn:

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The E2A aircraft was introduced into the combat zone in November 1965. Originally designed as an early warning aircraft for protection of the fleet from air attack, it has proved enormously successful in controlling strikes,

Complementing the small number of E2A's which are deployed are surface command and control systems. The naval tactical data system is operation in the waters off Vietnam. This is the first combat use of this computer-operated, data-linked real-time tactical data system. Ships equipped with it are stationed far north in the Tonkin Gulf to control aircraft and we are profiting heavily from use of these NTDS ships.

PROTECTION OF AIRCRAFT

Our work here consists of a large-scale effort to develop equipment which will and smaller but very important efforts to develop protection devices for aircraft and weapons that will be more effective in countering ground and air-based antiaircraft opposition.

As you know, surface-to-air missiles in North Vietnam are one of the chief obstacles our forces must face in their operations over that territory

The very few MIG encounters we have had in this war have vindicated, by and large, the Navy's view of the air-to-air battle as one in which overall system performance (both aircraft and missile) must be taken into account. Notwithstanding this, and at no expense to the capabilities of the Navy-developed SIDEWINDER and SPARROW missiles, modifications are being made so they can be used more effectively in

STRIKING THE TARGET

All the work of the planners, all the risk taken by the pilot in flying over hostile, heavily defended territory, is lost unless good ordnance is delivered accurately on target. The Navy has several active developments in progress to insure that this continues to happen.

(1) The A-7 aircraft will begin operations in

This will give us improved range, payload and endurance over the current A-4. Its weapon delivery system, too, should prove more effective than that on the A-4.

(2) Efforts underway to improve unguided air-launched weapons, the Fireye bomb, will allow us to replace the aviation gasoline currently used in napalm firebombs with jet fuel

In fiscal year 1966 the Navy started developing a new, generalpurpose 20-millimeter projectile

Thus far, I have spoken of the air war only from the point of view of getting to the target safely, destroying it, and getting back. Naturally, the war is larger than that. I should take this occasion to tell you that the RA-5C reconnaissance aircraft and its associated integrated operations intelligence center (IOIC) have had great success. The IOIC, developed in past years, has performed "as advertised" in the present war.

Each war brings its own unique problems. This war has highlighted the problem of night interdiction of vehicle and personnel traffic moving on road and trails from North to South Vietnam.

WAR IN THE TONKIN GULF

The guns of our destroyers and cruisers stationed off the coast of Vietnam have been enormously effective on targets within their range. Their high rate of fire, pinpoint accuracy, and ability to interdict and harass the enemy are a valuable supplement to our air effort there. We are continuing development of rocket-assisted projectiles to increase the range of existing and future 5-inch guns