SEARCH AND DESTROY The "in-country" war-the search and destroy operation-is directed at destruction of the military threat arising from the VC and NVN presence in South Vietnam. The major R. & D. efforts now underway are attempting to upgrade: (1) target acquisition, especially in night operations, (2) fire support, (3) close air support, and (4) mobility. Many problems are deepened by a lack of detailed knowledge of the environment. Therefore, in addition to our substantial hardware R. & D. programs, we are supporting studies by ARPA of critical environmental factors. The conditions of climate and terrain in SEA, plus the isolated nature of insurgent activities, dictate vastly different operational requirements for reconnaissance from those for which the existing systems were developed. Accordingly, a large portion of our current R. & D. effort is directed toward the early application of such new sensor technology Each service must now take these individual new components and create the necessary operational systems. NATION BUILDING A crucial area for R. & D.-and one in which I'm afraid we still have much more theory than proven practice is referred to as "nation building" or "pacification." The jobs are clear: understanding the people as well as the enemy, working with other U.S. activities to strengthen the SVN Government, and finding means to assist in social and economic development. We have a role here and are supporting projects in both the "hard" and "soft" sciences. ARPA is heavily involved. Significant studies which have been made available to the U.S. mission and to COMUSMACV include the Chieu Hoi program (determining the motives of returnees and potential returnees), Vietcong motivation and morale, and ethnic minorities in the SVN highlands. Planned studies include regional force-popular force motivation; supporting studies for psychological warfare; an evolutionary base defense study; and an air traffic control study. General Westmoreland has repeatedly emphasized the importance and the usefulness of these types of studies to him. R. & D. COORDINATION I want to emphasize what we are doing to coordinate and expedite our varied R. & D. efforts: I established within my staff a new office, the Deputy Director for Southeast Asia Matters, to deal with SEA items directly. We established Provost (Priority Research Objectives, Vietnam Operational Support) to react on an across-the-board basis (O.D.D.R. & E., military departments, JCS) to urgent technicaloperational problems. to I assigned two distinguished defense scientists to act as advisers 78-056-67-pt. 3- 2 (MACV). Dr. W. G. McMillan is in Saigon, and Dr. T. P. Cheatham is in Hawaii at Cincpac Headquarters. The services established "lead" in-house laboratories to coordinate our national technical resources and apply them to SEA problems. The willingness of our able field commanders to accept this help, to innovate, and to press the concept of "combat R.D.T. & E." has been gratifying to me. Some IMMEDIATE GOALS areas which I intend to push next year include: 1. Better radar. 2. Improved accuracy ordnance and bomb delivery systems to reduce the required numbers of sorties. 3. Better standoff and flak-suppression weapon systems to reduce our aircraft attrition. 4. Improvements to our air-to-air missiles and fire control systems, and better IFF equipment for our fighters. 5. Better command and control systems by which to direct our air war against elusive interdiction and infiltration targets. 6. Better capability for search and rescue of downed pilots. 7. Continued development of a more versatile electronic warfare capability. 8. Better real-time and night-time reconnaissance sensors. 9. 10. Better intrusion detection devices, new surveillance systems, and area attack weapons to counter infiltration into SVN and to enhance our defenses around hamlets, villages, and military bases. 11. Better defenses against mortar attacks, better detection of ambushes and land mines, and better means of detecting, neutralizing, and denying tunnels. 12. Better forward air controller aircraft and sensor equipment. 13. Better mine detection and swimmer defense systems for use with the "shallow water Navy." LOCATION OF VIETCONG TUNNELS Mr. MAHON. As you know, there are extensive manmade tunnels in Vietnam. Have you done any research and development in an effort to find better ways of locating and destroying them? If so, what have you done? Dr. FOSTER. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Let me mention one that is not referred to either in my brief statement or the longer backup. Very recently I heard of a very novel scheme to determine the location of tunnels. This is a scheme which uses a (Discussion off the record.) Mr. SIKES. Do objects such as food supplies and weapons stored there make a difference? Dr. FOSTER. No, not unless they tended to fill up the tunnel. Mr. SIKES. What about the effect of human bodies? Dr. FOSTER. People in there could cause some difficulty, depending on the number of them and their location. (Discussion off the record.) Mr. SIKES. What is the range? Dr. FOSTER. Mr. SIKES. You would have to use a great many of them to be effective. Dr. FOSTER. Mr. ANDREWS. tunnel. chances are he could see the opening of the Dr. FOSTER. If the opening were in that vicinity. Mr. ANDREWS. You say he would have to have Dr. FOSTER. Mr. SIKES. The entrance could be well camouflaged. Mr. ANDREWS. When do you expect to have it operational in Vietnam? Dr. FOSTER. The planning will depend on the experiments now being conducted. If they are successful I doubt that we would be able to make available equipment that would be useful for the services before Mr. LIPSCOMB. What you are describing appears to be a project similar to the one being conducted by ARPA. Dr. FOSTER. That is right, it is to be an ARPA project. Is that it? Dr. FOSTER. That is another ARPA project, (Discussion off the record.) -development. Mr. LIPSCOMB. You said what you are working on will not be in the field until Dr. FOSTER. Mr. Lipscomb, what I should have indicated at the outset is that the tunnel problem is considered to be very serious and we are looking at a number of approaches. Mr. LIPSCOMB. The reason I bring this up is because I am interested in duplication of effort. Dr. FOSTER. Certainly. Mr. LIPSCOMB. A question was asked about the tunnel. Yet I recalled that I just had finished reading about that. Dr. FOSTER. Quite so. If we find a system that proves satisfactory and superior to other systems I assure you I will terminate the other effort. Mr. LIPSCOMB. Where is your effort? Under what program and through what department? Dr. FOSTER. I will provide for the record, a description of this activity. I do not recall the name of the investigator and his location. (Classified information was submitted to the committee.) Mr. LIPSCOMB. I was impressed with ARPA's recognition of the problem because they seem to be doing a lot. Dr. FOSTER. ARPA has under contract several efforts. Frankly, if we find another one that had a good chance of working I would initiate it. Mr. LIPSCOMB. There evidently is a study about ready to be completed, too. Dr. FOSTER. That is correct. We also had a rather intensive effort underway to There is a whole host of ideas being followed up. I mentioned the because it is the most recent to come to my attention. Mr. MAHON. Do the Vietcong have hundreds of tunnels? Dr. FOSTER. There are miles of tunnels. These have been dug for decades, and they have been found to be an extremely valuable means of coping with invasion. Mr. RHODES. How long will a tunnel remain usable? Does it not fill up with water, vermin, and snakes after a period of time? Dr. FOSTER. Apparently not. Mr. SIKES. Are they dug above the water level? Dr. FOSTER. Yes, and the entrances are covered. Mr. SIKES. Are we permitting our forces to use gas to clear the tunnels? Dr. FOSTER. We have, through the use of emergency funds, developed a system that blows tear gas into these tunnels. That is in use in Vietnam. Mr. SIKES. How effective is it? Dr. FOSTER. Extremely effective. Mr. SIKES. Does the enemy not have gas masks? Dr. FOSTER. Generally not. What is usually done is to mount the unit at the entrance and start it up and pour in the tear gas. Mr. ANDREWS. They come out? Dr. FOSTER. Yes, they come out. Of course, we don't know where the other exits are. We can clear them out of there, all right. Mr. MAHON. A number of people throughout the area must know where the tunnels are. Dr. FOSTER. Mr. Chairman, as you know, we have learned a great deal from interrogation of both prisoners and the South Vietnamese. Mr. SIKES. There is no particular difficulty in getting information from prisoners, is there? Don't they talk rather freely? Dr. FOSTER. Yes, I believe they do. Mr. SIKES. That is my understanding. Dr. FOSTER. Very few have general knowledge of what is going on, however. Mr. ANDREWS. Some of those people have probably spent their whole lives around just one or two of those tunnels. Dr. FOSTER. That is right. (Discussion off the record.) IMMEDIATE GOALS Dr. FOSTER. 14. Better cross-country vehicles. 15. Better all-weather navigation and ground-directed bomb delivery systems. 16. Additional means of reducing helicopter attrition such as better armor and ground fire detection equipment. 17. Increased emphasis on the development of a balanced capability for all our forces to fight at night, offensively as well as defensively. 18. Increased ability to produce detailed and timely intelligence on enemy movements and guerrilla activity. 19. Better artillery munitions. 20. Better and more extensive psychological warfare capability, and a fuller understanding of the guerrilla motivations and aspirations, to assist the pacification program. FUNDING Finally, the research and development funding directly related to the war in southeast Asia has been steadily increasing. The fiscal year 1968 R.D.T. & E. budget requests a little over $400 million to continue current projects. This figure may well increase by June, at apportionment, should additional requirements develop, and current exploratory developments prove to be successful. In addition, the military departments will continue their practice of reprograming wherever necessary to meet urgent, unexpected requirements. TACTICAL WARFARE CAPABILITIES I have sketched some of the R. & D. designed to upgrade our current operational capability for the southeast Asia conflict. I will now outline our longer range, broader tactical warfare programs. These efforts form the basis for our continuing ability to respond to any form or level of military action anywhere in the world, other than a massive nuclear exchange. I will review our efforts in the context of six areas of tactical warfare: air, land, amphibious, sea, communications, and airlift/sealift. AIR WARFARE The southeast Asian conflict has revealed many problems in maintaining a superior air warfare capability for the future. We must improve our ability to locate and identify-quickly-small, mobile targets. We must develop greater weapon delivery accuracy. We must achieve better aircraft survivability in the presence of active defense. The complex environment in which air warfare systems now must operate has revolutionized the concept of the total aircraft weapon system. No longer can we separate the considerations of airframe, control, navigation and communications, missiles and armament, and the tactical command/control structure. Airborne warning and control is proving to be a key element in command and control of tactical air forces. Airborne elements provide the direction of air defense and strike forces, and support ground operations under battle situations where elements of the command structure are dispersed between command posts in the air and on the ground. To overcome deficiencies of the RC-121 radar and the C-130 command and control aircraft which are used in these roles in southeast Asia, two airframe system contractors, four radar contractors, and two command and control contractor teams are defining an advanced airborne warning and control system (AWACS). If the radar flight test portion of this AWACS program is successful in fiscal year 1968, I will support the next logical phase of the AWACS program. The USAF ground-based tactical air control system (TACS) that is planned to complement the AWACS is known as USAF TACS |