2. Calls upon Member States to strengthen weather forecasting services and to encourage their scientific communities to co-operate in the expansion of atmospheric science research; 3. Recommends that the World Meteorological Organization, in consultation with other United Nations agencies and governmental and non-governmental organizations, should develop in greater detail its plans for an expanded programme to strengthen meteorological services and research, placing particular emphasis on the use of meteorological satellites and on the expansion of training and educational opportunities in these fields; 4. Invites the International Council of Scientific Unions through its member unions and national academies to develop an expanded programme of atmospheric science research which will complement the programmes fostered by the World Meteorological Organization; 5. Invites United Nations agencies concerned with the granting of technical and financial assistance, in consultation with the World Meteorological Organization, to give sympathetic consideration to requests from Member States for technical and financial assistance to supplement their own resources for these activities, including the improvement of meteorological networks; 6. Requests the World Meteorological Organization, following its Congress in April 1963, to report to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, and to the Economic and Social Council at its thirty-sixth session, on steps taken relating to these activities; IV 1. Notes with appreciation the prompt initial response of the International Telecommunication Union to the request of the General Assembly, as embodied in resolution 1721 D (XVI), that it report on those aspects of space communications in which international cooperation will be required; 12 2. Believes that communication by satellite offers great benefits to mankind, as it will permit the expansion of radio, telephone and television transmissions, including the broadcast of United Nations activities, thus facilitating contact among the peoples of the world; 3. Emphasizes the importance of international co-operation to achieve effective satellite communications which will be available on a world-wide basis; 4. Observes that the Secretary-General of the International Telecommunication Union has invited members to submit information on: (a) Technical progress and developments in space telecommunications: (b) Subjects which they regard as appropriate for international co-operation in order to achieve the objective set forth in General Assembly resolution 1721 D (XVI); (c) Which of those subjects, if any, should be included in the agenda of the Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference to be held in October 1963; 5. Notes that the Secretary-General of the International Telecommunication Union, in the light of the replies, will report on these questions to the next meeting of its Administrative Council in March 1963 in order that the Council may complete the agenda for this Conference; 6. Considers it of the utmost importance that this Conference make allocations of radio frequency bands sufficient to meet expected outer space needs; 7. Requests the International Telecommunication Union to report to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, and to the Economic and Social Council at its thirty-sixth session, on progress made relating to its outer space activities. 1192nd plenary meeting, Letter From the Soviet Premier (Khrushchev) to President Kennedy on Nuclear Tests, December 19, 1962 1 DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, 1 In our recent correspondence related to the events in the Caribbean area we have touched on the question of cessation of nuclear weapon tests. Today I would like to come back again to that problem and to set forth my views concerning possible ways of its speediest solution which would be mutually acceptable to both our sides. It seemed to me, Mr. President, that time has come now to put an end once and for all to nuclear tests, to draw a line through such_tests. The moment for this is very, very appropriate. Left behind is a period of utmost acuteness and tension in the Caribbean. Now we have untied our hands to engage closely in other urgent international matters and, in particular, in such a problem which has been ripe for so long as cessation of nuclear tests. A certain relaxation of international tension which has emerged now should, in my view, facilitate this. The Soviet Union does not need war. I think that war does not promise bright prospects for the United States either. If in the past after every war America used to increase its economic potential and to accumulate more and more wealth, now war with the use of modern rocket nuclear weapons will stride across seas and oceans within minutes. Thermonuclear catastrophe will bring enormous losses and sufferings to the American people as well as to other peoples on earth. To prevent this we must, on the basis of complete equality and with just regard for each other's interests, develop between ourselves peaceful relations and solve all issues through negotiations and mutual concessions. One of such questions with which the governments of our countries have been dealing for many years is the question of concluding a treaty banning all tests of nuclear weapons. Both of us stand on the same position with regard to the fact that national means of detection are sufficient to control banning experimental nuclear explosions in outer space, in the atmosphere and under water. So far, however, we have not succeeded in finding a mutually acceptable solution to the problem of cessation of underground tests. The main obstacle to an agreement is the demand by the American side of international control and inspection on the territories of 1 Department of State press release 43, Jan. 20, 1963, pp. 2-4. nuclear powers over cessation of underground nuclear tests. I would like to believe that you yourself understand the rightness of our arguments that now national means are sufficient to control also this kind of tests and be sure that agreement is observed by any side. But so far you do not want to recognize openly this actual state of things and to accept it as a basis for concluding without delay an agreement on cessation of tests. Striving to find a mutually acceptable basis for agreement the Soviet Union has made lately an important step toward the West and agreed to installing automatic seismic stations. This idea, as is known, was put forward not by us. It was introduced by British scientists during the recent meeting in London of the participants of Pugwash movement. Moreover, it is well known to us, that when this idea was proposed, it was not alien to your scientists who were in London at that time. We proposed to install such stations both near the borders of nuclear powers and directly on their territories. We stated of our agreement that three such stations be installed on the territory of the Soviet Union in the zones must frequently subjected to earthquakes. There are three such zones in the Soviet Union where these stations can be installed: Central Asian, Altaian and Far Eastern. In the opinion of Soviet scientists the most suitable places for locating automatic seismic stations in the Soviet Union are area of the city of Kokchetav for Central Asian zone of the USSR, area of the city of Bodaibo for Altaian zone and area of the city of Yakutsk for Far Eastern zone. However, should, as a result of exchange of opinion between our representatives, other places be suggested for locating automatic seismic stations in these seismic zones, we will be ready to discuss this question and find mutually acceptable solution. Beside the above said zones there are two more seismic zones in the Soviet Union-Caucasian and Carpathian. However these zones are so densely populated that conducting nuclear tests there is practically excluded. Of course, delivery to and from international center of appropriate sealed equipment for its periodic replacement at automatic seismic stations in the USSR could well be made by Soviet personnel and on Soviet planes. However if for such delivery of equipment to and from automatic seismic stations participation of foreign personnel were needed we would agree to this also, having taken, if necessary, precautionary measures against use of such trips for reconnaissance. Thus our proposal on automatic seismic stations includes elements of international control. This is a major act of good will on the part of the Soviet Union. I will tell you straightforwardly that before making this proposal I have consulted thoroughly the specialists and after such consultation my colleagues in the Government and I came to a conclusion that so far as the Soviet Union is concerned the above said considerations on the measures on our part are well founded and, it seems to us, they should not cause objections on the part of the American side. You, Mr. President, and your representatives point out that without at least a minimum number of on-site inspections you will not manage to persuade the U.S. Senate to ratify an agreement on the cessation of tests. This circumstance, as we understand, ties you and does not allow you to sign a treaty which would enable all of us to abandon for good the grounds where nuclear weapons are tested. Well, if this is the only difficulty on the way to agreement, then for the noble and humane goal of ceasing nuclear weapon tests we are ready to meet you halfway in this question. We noted that on this October 30, in conversation with First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR V. V. Kuznetsov in New York, your representative Ambassador Dean stated that, in the opinion of the U.S. Government, it would be sufficient to carry on 2-4 on-site inspection each year on the territory of the Soviet Union. According to Ambassador Dean's statement, the United States would also be prepared to work out measures which would rule out any possibility of carrying on espionage under the cover of these inspection trips including such measures as the use of Soviet planes piloted by Soviet crews for transportation of inspectors to the sites, screening of windows in the planes, prohibition to carry photo-cameras, etc. We took all this into account and, in order to overcome the deadlock and to arrive at last at a mutually acceptable agreement, we would agree, on those cases when it would be considered necessary, to 2-3 inspections a year on the territory of each of the nuclear powers in the seismic areas where some suspicious earth's tremors might occur. It goes without saying that the basis of control over an agreement on underground nuclear test ban would be the national means of detection in combination with automatic seismic stations. On-site inspections could be carried on with the precautions mentioned by Ambassador Dean against any misuse of control for purposes of espionage. We believe that now the road to agreement is straight and clear. Beginning from January 1 of the new year of 1963 the world can be relieved of the roar of nuclear explosions. The peoples are waiting for this this is what the U.N. General Assembly has called for. With the elimination of the Cuban crisis we relieved mankind of the direct menace of combat use of lethal nuclear weapons that impended over the world. Can't we solve a far simpler question-that of cessation of experimental explosions of nuclear weapons in the peaceful conditions? I think that we can and must do it. Here lies now our duty before the peoples of not only our countries but of all other countries. Having solved promptly also this question-and there are all the preconditions for that we shall be able to facilitate working out an agreement on disarmament and with even more confidence proceed with solving other urgent international problems, which we and you unfortunately are not short of. Letter From President Kennedy to the Soviet Premier (Khrushchev) on Nuclear Tests, December 28, 19621 DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I was very glad to receive your letter of December 19, 1962, setting forth your views on nuclear tests. There appear to be no differences between your views and mine regarding the need for eliminating war in this nuclear age. Perhaps only those who have the responsibility for controlling these weapons fully realize the awful devastation their use would bring. 1 Department of State press release 43, Jan. 20, 1963, pp. 5–6. Having these considerations in mind and with respect to the issue of a test ban, I therefore sincerely hope that the suggestions that you have made in your letter will prove to be helpful in starting us down the road to an agreement. I am encouraged that you are prepared to accept the principle of on-site inspections. These seem to me to be essential not just because of the concern of our Congress but because they seem to us to go to the heart of a reliable agreement ending nuclear testing. If we are to have peace between systems with far-reaching ideological differences, we must find ways for reducing or removing the recurring waves of fear and suspicion which feed on ignorance, misunderstanding or what appear to one side or the other as broken agreements. Το me, the element of assurance is vital to the broader development of peaceful relationships. With respect to the question of on-site inspections I would certainly agree that we could accept any reasonable provision which you had in mind to protect against your concern that the on-site inspectors might engage in "espionage" enroute to the area of inspection. In a statement at the United Nations, Ambassador Stevenson suggested that the United States would accept any reasonable security provision while the inspectors were being taken to the site, so long as they had reasonable provision for satisfying themselves that they were actually at the intended location and had the freedom necessary to inspect the limited designated area. With respect to the number of on-site inspections there appears to have been some misunderstanding. Your impression seems to be that Ambassador Dean told Deputy Minister Kuznetsov that the United States might be prepared to accept an annual number of on-site inspections between two and four. Ambassador Dean advises me that the only number which he mentioned in his discussions with Deputy Minister Kuznetsov was a number between eight and ten. This represented a substantial decrease in the request of the United States as we had previously been insisting upon a number between twelve and twenty. I had hoped that the Soviet Union would match this motion on the part of the United States by an equivalent motion in the figure of two or three on-site inspections which it had some time ago indicated it might allow. I am aware that this matter of on-site inspections has given you considerable difficulty although I am not sure that I fully understand why this should be so. To me, an effective nuclear test ban treaty is of such importance that I would not permit such international arrangements to become mixed up with our or any other national desire to seek other types of information about the Soviet Union. I believe quite sincerely that arrangements would be worked out which would convince you and your colleagues that this is the case. But in this connection, your implication that on-site inspections should be limited to seismic areas also gives us some difficulty. It is true that in the ordinary course we would have concern about events taking place in the seismic areas. However, an unidentified seismic event coming from an area in which there are not usually earthquakes would be a highly suspicious event. The United States would feel that in such a circumstance the U.S.S.R. would be entitled to an on-site inspection of such an event occurring in our area and feels |