If they felt we could be swayed by threats or intimidation-if they thought we could permit a repetition of last summer's deception-then surely they would lose faith in our will and our wisdom as well as our weaponry. I have no doubt that most of our friends around the world have shared my own hope that we would never find it necessary to test again-and my own belief that, in the long run, the only real security in this age of nuclear peril rests not in armament but in disarmament. But I am equally certain that they would insist on our testing once that is deemed necessary to protect free world security. They know we are not deciding to test for political or psychological reasons-and they also know that we cannot avoid such tests for political or psychological reasons. ར. The leaders of the Soviet Union are also watching this decision. Should we fail to follow the dictates of our own security, they will chalk it up, not to goodwill, but to a failure of will-not to our confidence in Western superiority, but to our fear of world opinion, the very world opinion for which they showed such contempt. They could well be encouraged by such signs of weakness to seek another period of no testing without controls-another opportunity for stifling our progress while secretly preparing, on the basis of last fall's experiments, for the new test series which might alter the balance of power. With such a one-sided advantage, why would they change their strategy, or refrain from testing, merely because we refrained? Why would they want to halt their drive to surpass us in nuclear technology? And why would they ever consider accepting a true test ban or mutual disarmament? Our reasons for testing and our peaceful intentions are clear-so clear that even the Soviets could not objectively regard our resumption of tests, following their resumption of tests, as provocative or preparatory for war. On the contrary, it is my hope that the prospects for peace may actually be strengthened by this decision-once the Soviet leaders realize that the West will no longer stand still, negotiating in good faith, while they reject inspection and are free to prepare further tests. As new disarmament talks approach, the basic lesson of some three years and 353 negotiating sessions at Geneva is this that the Soviets will not agree to an effective ban on nuclear tests as long as a new series of offers and prolonged negotiations, or a new uninspected moratorium, or a new agreement without controls, would enable them once again to prevent the West from testing while they prepare in secret. But inasmuch as this choice is now no longer open to them, let us hope that they will take a different attitude on banning nuclear teststhat they will prefer to see the nuclear arms race checked instead of intensified, with all the dangers that intensification is likely to bring: the spread of nuclear weapons to other nations; the constant increase in world tensions; the steady decrease in all prospects for disarmament; and, with it, a steady decrease in the security of us all. VI. If the Soviets should change their position, we will have an opportunity to learn it immediately. On the 14th of March, in Geneva, Switzerland, a new 18 power conference on disarmament will begin. A statement of agreed principles has been worked out with the Soviets and endorsed by the U.N. In the long run, it is the constructive possibilities of that conference-and not the testing of new destructive weapons on which rest the hopes of all mankind. However dim those hopes may sometimes seem, they can never be abandoned. And however far-off most steps toward disarmament appear, there are some that can be taken at once. The United States will offer at the Geneva conference-not in the advance expectation they will be rejected, and not merely for purposes of propaganda a series of concrete plans for a major "breakthrough to peace. We hope and believe that they will appeal to all nations opposed to war. They will include specific proposals for fair and enforceable agreements; to halt the production of fissionable materials and nuclear weapons and their transfer to other nations to convert them from weapon stockpiles to peaceable uses-to destroy the warheads and the delivery systems that threaten man's existence to check the dangers of surprise and accidental attack-to reserve outer space for peaceful use and progressively to reduce all armed forces in such a way as ultimately to remove forever all threats and thoughts of war. And of greatest importance to our discussion tonight, we shall, in association with the United Kingdom, present once again our proposals for a separate comprehensive treaty with appropriate arrangements for detection and verification-to halt permanently the testing of all nuclear weapons, in every environment; in the air, in outer space, underground or under-water. New modifications will also be offered in the light of new experience. The essential arguments and facts relating to such a treaty are well-known to the Soviet Union. There is no need for further repetition, propaganda or delay. The fact that both sides have decided to resume testing only emphasizes the need for new agreement, not new argument. And before charging that this decision shatters all hopes for agreement, the Soviets should recall that we were willing to work out with them, for joint submission to the U.N., an agreed statement of disarmament principles at the very time their autumn tests were being conducted. And Mr. Khrushchev knows, as he said in 1960, that any nation which broke the moratorium could expect other nations to be "forced to take the same road." Our negotiators will be ready to talk about this treaty even before the Conference begins on March 14th-and they will be ready to sign well before the date on which our tests are ready to begin. That date is nearly two months away. If the Soviet Union should now be willing to accept such a treaty, sign it before the latter part of April, and apply it immediately-if all testing can thus be actually haltedthen the nuclear arms race would be slowed down at last-the security of the United States and its ability to meet its commitments would be safeguarded—and there would be no need for our tests to begin. But this must be a fully effective treaty. We know enough now about broken negotiations, secret preparations and the advantages gained from a long test series never to offer again an uninspected moratorium. Some may urge us to try it again, keeping our preparations to test in a constant state of readiness. But in actual practice, particularly in a society of free choice, we cannot keep top-flight scientists concentrating on the preparation of an experiment which may or may not take place on an uncertain date in the future. Nor can large technical laboratories be kept fully alert on a stand-by basis waiting for some other nation to break an agreement. This is not merely difficult or inconvenient-we have explored this alternative thoroughly, and found it impossible of execution. In short, in the absence of a firm agreement that would halt nuclear tests by the latter part of April, we shall go ahead with our talks striving for some new avenue of agreement-but we shall also go ahead with our tests. If, on the other hand, the Soviet Union should accept such a treaty in the opening month of talks, that single step would be a monumental step toward peace-and both Prime Minister Macmillan and I would think it fitting to meet Chairman Khrushchev at Geneva to sign the final pact. VII. For our ultimate objective is not to test for the sake of testing. Our real objective is to make our own tests unnecessary, to prevent others from testing, to prevent the nuclear arms race from mushrooming out of control, to take the first steps toward general and complete disarmament. And that is why, in the last analysis, it is the leaders of the Soviet Union who must bear the heavy responsibility of choosing, in the weeks that lie ahead, whether we proceed with these stepsor proceed with new tests. If they are convinced that their interests can no longer be served by the present course of events, it is my fervent hope that they will agree to an effective treaty. But if they persist in rejecting all means of true inspection, then we shall be left no choice but to keep our own defensives arsenal adequate for the security of all free men. It is our hope and prayer that these grim, unwelcome tests will never have to be made that these deadly weapons will never have to be fired-and that our preparations for war will bring us the preservation of peace. Our foremost aim is the control of force, not the pursuit of force, in a world made safe for mankind. But whatever the future brings, I am sworn to uphold and defend the freedom of the American people and I intend to do whatever must be done to fulfill that solemn obligation. Thank you-and good night. Remarks by Secretary of State Rusk Before the Advertising Council, Incorporated, March 6, 1962 1 [Extract] Q. How much help did Colonel Glenn's flight do to our international prestige? A. Well, I am not sure that I should say this on the record, but I was, of course, watching his flight. My own sense of what was at stake there, from a foreign policy point of view, was such that I am quite sure my pulse was twice as fast as his at the moment of take-off. [Laughter and applause.] I will say this: It was very inspiring to see the world reaction, as it came through my office, to that performance. There were not only good wishes and respect, but it was quite clear that regardless of political orientation throughout most of the world there was real joy that that effort had succeeded. I think it made an enormous difference to us. very high there. But the stakes were Letter From President Kennedy to the Soviet Premier (Khrushchev) on Proposals for Common Action in the Exploration of Space, March 7, 1962 2 On February twenty-second last I wrote you that I was instructing appropriate officers of this Government to prepare concrete proposals for immediate projects of common action in the exploration of space.3 I now present such proposals to you. The exploration of space is a broad and varied activity and the possibilities for cooperation are many. In suggesting the possible first steps which are set out below, I do not intend to limit our mutual consideration of desirable cooperative activities. On the contrary, I will welcome your concrete suggestions along these or other lines. 1. Perhaps we could render no greater service to mankind through our space programs than by the joint establishment of an early operational weather satellite system. Such a system would be designed to provide global weather data for prompt use by any nation. To initiate this service, I propose that the United States and the Soviet Union each launch a satellite to photograph cloud cover and provide other agreed meteorological services for all nations. The two satellites would be placed in near-polar orbits in planes approximately perpendicular to each other, thus providing regular coverage of all areas. This immensely valuable data would then be disseminated through normal international meteorological channels and would make a significant contribution to the research and service programs now under study by the World Meteorological Organization in response 1 Department of State press release 149, Mar. 8, 1962, p. 9. 2 White House press release, Mar. 17, 1962. Letter dated Feb. 21, 1962, ante, p. 233. to Resolution 1721 (XVI) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 20, 1961.4 2. It would be of great interest to those responsible for the conduct of our respective space programs if they could obtain operational tracking services from each other's territories. Accordingly, I propose that each of our countries establish and operate a radio tracking station to provide tracking services to the other, utilizing equipment which we would each provide to the other. Thus, the United States would provide the technical equipment for a tracking station to be established in the Soviet Union and to be operated by Soviet technicians. The United States would in turn establish and operate a radio tracking station utilizing Soviet equipment. Each country would train the other's technicians in the operation of its equipment, would utilize the station located on its territory to provide tracking services to the other, and would afford such access as may be necessary to accommodate modifications and maintenance of equipment from time to time. 3. In the field of the earth sciences, the precise character of the earth's magnetic field is central to many scientific problems. I propose therefore that we cooperate in mapping the earth's magnetic field in space by utilizing two satellites, one in a near-earth orbit and the second in a more distant orbit. The United States would launch one of these satellites while the Soviet Union would launch the other. The data would be exchanged throughout the world scientific community, and opportunities for correlation of supporting data obtained on the ground would be arranged. 4. In the field of experimental communications by satellite, the United States has already undertaken arrangements to test and demonstrate the feasibility of intercontinental transmissions. A number of countries are constructing equipment suitable for participation in such testing. I would welcome the Soviet Union's joining in this cooperative effort which will be a step toward meeting the objective, contained in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI), that communications by means of satellites should be available to the nations of the world as soon as practicable on a global and non-discriminatory basis. I note also that Secretary Rusk has broached the subject of cooperation in this field with Minister Gromyko and that Mr. Gromyko has expressed some interest. Our technical representatives might now discuss specific possibilities in this field. 5. Given our common interest in manned space flights and in insuring man's ability to survive in space and return safely, I propose that we pool our efforts and exchange our knowledge in the field of space medicine, where future research can be pursued in cooperation with scientists from various countries. Beyond these specific projects we are prepared now to discuss broader cooperation in the still more challenging projects which must be undertaken in the exploration of outer space. The tasks are so challenging, the costs so great, and the risks to the brave men who engage in space exploration so grave, that we must in all good conscience try every possibility of sharing these tasks and costs and of Ante, p. 225. 5 Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. 91298-63-17 |