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D. Political Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare 1. One-year projection

The rise in political terrorism, as exemplified by attacks on police, bombing and arson, is likely to continue over the next year. Campus communities will remain focal points for much of this activity, particularly those attacks directed at symbols of the Federal government and its policies in Indochina. Additional deaths of students might help bring about a more unfavorable atmosphere for such activity, however. Attacks on police will continue to be seen in the larger urban areas, particularly in black communities. Kidnapping of officials, already common elsewhere, may also become a problem in this country in the next year. There has already been one instance of the kidnapping of a judge and this may indicate a trend in the offing, particularly in view of the wide media coverage of such activity elsewhere. Hijacking of airliners may decline somewhat, as it did over this past year, particularly as increased security measures come into play. Political terrorism will have the greatest impact on urban police forces and local, state and Federal investigative agencies. Political terrorism is not likely to involve National Guard or active Federal forces, except perhaps in security guard roles or in the restoration of essential public services disrupted by sabotage. The use of Canadian Armed Forces personnel in Fall 1970 to provide protection for government officials may be an unwelcome precedent for this country. The short term use of National Guard or active Federal forces as guards for state or Federal facilities is also a possibility. 2. Five-year forecast

Political alienation in campus communities will probably continue and some terrorist activity will probably remain associated with such alienation. The end of the war in Vietnam should reduce the most important source of moral and political outrage, although other issues may provide suitable pretexts for acts of terrorism. Overall, the end of the five year period may see a decline in the levels of this kind of activity, as repercussions from all levels of society begin to be felt. It is conceivable that the society will polarize to such an extent, politically, socially, and culturally, that such activity continues to rise as such frustrations on both sides grow. Stabilizing forces in the society should preclude this occurring, although it remains a possibility. Whatever the impact of political terrorism during this period, it will remain largely a police problem at the local level. National Guard or active Federal forces should be involved only in ordnance disposal problems, security roles or in the restoration of essential public services which may have been disrupted by terrorist activity.

E. Labor Disturbances 1. One-year projection

Strikes and other labor disputes involving violence will occur over the period ending April 1972. They should remain only a police problem. Only in exceptional cases should disputes require National Guard intervention. There should be no need for active Federal forces to contain violence growing out of labor disputes. In addition to the violence traditionally associated with some labor disputes, the period may see a rise in disturbances connected with minority group pressures for equal employment opportunities, particularly in the construction and automotive trades. This also should remain a police problem. Strikes by public workers and other labor disputes may lead to the interruption of essential public services. It is possible that this may result in the employment of National Guard or active Federal forces to restore such services. 2. Five-year projection

There should be no substantial rise in the levels of violence associated with traditional labor disputes over the five year period. Conflicts over minority group employment may grow somewhat. Both matters should remain a matter primarily of police concern, although the National Guard may be called out occasionally in connection with particularly bitter strikes. Active Federal forces should not have any peace keeping functions to perform. Both the National Guard and active Federal forces may be more likely to become involved in the restoration of essential public services than over the one year period. This development will depend primarily on how well the “no strike” tradition of public employees holds up.

F. Developing Sources of Civil Disturbances 1. Other minorities

a. One-year forecast.—The Spring or Summer of 1971 may see civil disturbances involving Chicanos in the Southwest or West. If they do occur, it is unlikely that containment problems would exceed the capabilities of local or state police. The use of National Guard forces should be unlikely, although it cannot be ruled out. There should be no need for active Federal forces. The likelihood of Puerto Rican involvement in significant civil disturbances should be less, with civil authorities able to control any disorders which may develop. This period may also see small scale incidents involving American Indians, although this too should remain a matter of only police concern.

b. Five-year forecast.The five year period may see substantially increased minority unrest grow out of an awakening sensitivity to existing social and economic injustices. The civil disturbances which have been associated with the growth of racial tensions may be paralleled by disturbances related to the drive for equality on the part of Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, American Indians, or other ethnic groups. Should such disturbances occur they should be able to be contained by local and state security forces. It is possible, however, that the National Guard may have to be employed on occasion. There should be no requirement for intervention on the part of active Federal forces. 2. Right-wing violence

a. One-year forecast.Given the current small size of right-wing extremist groups, their fragmented nature and their lack of substantial resources, the period ending in April 1972 should not see the development of significant right-wing violence. Violence associated with such groups should remain isolated, infrequent, and generally within the purview of local police forces. There should be no impact on National Guard or active Federal forces.

b. Five-year forecast.-—It is conceivable that more significant right-wing violence may develop over the five year period. If events in Indochina come to be looked on as a defeat for the United States, the search for scapegoats may begin. Some may conclude the enemy was really here at home and try to take what they consider to be appropriate measures to deal with this fact. Sharply escalated radical or racial violence over this period might also set in motion vigilante movements or other counter-reactions. The continuing growth of sharply different values and lifestyles among the young could add to the possibility of right-wing violence developing. Stabilizing forces in the society should minimize such violence, should it begin to develop. The most likely form of violence would be street clashes between opposing political factions, violent counter-demonstrations, or hit-and-run attacks on headquarters or symbols of opposing political groups. Most of such activity would be a police problem. It would not involve the National Guard, except perhaps as they might be called upon to supplement local police forces where potentially violent demonstrations were expected. There should be no impact on active Federal forces.

G. Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies 1. One-year projection

Natural disasters or other emergencies are sporadic and unpredictable. Local meteorological records, insurance statistics or other such compilations may assist in drawing geographical patterns and noting the frequency of particular occurrences. However, anticipation rather than prediction of such events is usually all that can be accomplished to assist in preparations. Civil authorities will be the primary agencies with responsibilities in this area. The National Guard will also be frequently employed in giving assistance in such cases. The use of active Federal forces will be unusual and will depend on local circumstances. 2. Five-year forecast

Again, natural disasters are sporadic and not predictable. The five year period may see an increase in emergencies traceable to the growing technological complexity of our society. Smog emergencies, electrical power shortages or

“brown outs”, or possibly, nuclear incidents are a reflection of this development. As with the one year projection, civil authorities and the National Guard will be the primary agencies of responsibility, with active Federal forces acting only in an infrequent and supplementary capacity.

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Arkansas.
Mississippi.

do.
Alabama.

do
-do

do
Michigan.
Chicago..
Baltimore
Washington, D.C.
New York.

Little Rock school integration crisis.
University integration disorders.

Do.
Racial disturbances in Birmingham.
University Integration disorders.
School integration disorders in Three Cities.
Civil Rights March—Selma to Montgomery.
Detroit riots.
Racial disorder,

Do.

1965. 1967 1968.

Do.
Postal strike.

1970.

EMPLOYMENT OF NATIONAL GUARD IN STATE STATUS-1945-70

Total troops

employed

Year

Times employed

1945-59.
1960-64.
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969.
1970 (Jan.-May).

55
33
17)
17
40 248
107
67
43

NONN

33, 539 65, 867 25, 051 18,598 43, 300 150,000 49, 264 41,046

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Prevention and Control of Mobs and Riots, FBI, April 1967.
Civil Rights 1960–1966, Facts on File, Inc New York, 1967.
Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, March 1968.

The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, A Report by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, November 1968.

Violence in America Vols. I and II, Staff Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, December 1969.

Riots, Civil and Criminal Disorders; Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations; Part 18, June 1969, and Part 24, July 1970.

The National Guard in an Age of Unrest, A Report to the National Governor's Conference Committee on Law Enforcement, Justice and Public Safety, August 1970.

In addition to the above published studies and official reports, information on which the estimate has been based derives from FBI and Department of Justice sources as well as newspapers (including the underground press), periodicals, radio and television.

THE CIVIL DISTURBANCE THREAT 1971-75—UPDATE 1. The civil disturbance threat study was originally written in September and October of 1970. By mid-winter 1971, a number of shifts in public mood had occurred bearing on the civil disturbance problem. The major shifts are noted below. With these modifications, the civil disturbance threat study remains generally valid at this time as a basis for the Study Group's deliberations.

2. The most notable change in the civil disturbance picture was what one university president referred to as the “eerie tranquillity” which had come to prevail over the nation's campuses. In marked contrast to the student disorders in May 1970, the Fall of 1970 and the Winter of 1971 saw a new calm present on many campuses. This calm was not substantially disturbed by the movement of South Vietnamese troops into Laos in February 1971. The difference in this student reaction compared to the reaction to the Cambodian incursion may be in part only a reflection of seasonal distinctions, winter versus spring. However, the extended quiescence tends to support the view that May 1970 marked the high water mark for the six year long period of increasing student unrest. Campuses might again become highly inflamed in conjunction with some new military action or political policy deemed particularly provocative. Nevertheless, it now appears that the decline in large scale campus disorders may be occuring at a significantly faster pace than foreseen in the October threat estimate. This may result in a sharper decline in the likelihood of police and National Guard employment on campuses than was predicted in October 1970.

3. The alteration of mood on the nation's campuses was only one part of what seemed to be a more general relaxation of tensions Increasing polarization in the society was a hallmark of the 1960s. While mid-winter of 1971 saw no healing of the racial, political or cultural cleavages in the society, the widespread sense of a continuing degeneration of public order seemed to clearly abate. Of course there remains the possibility that this new sense is merely the calm before the storm, that it is indeed an "eerie tranquillity” subject to abrupt alteration. It is currently felt, however, that something more than a mere pause in the momentum of past disorders is involved. It is quite possible that there has been a distinct reversal of the trends towards increasing large scale civil disorders. Only time will bear out the validity of this assessment. If it is valid, then an accelerated return to more normal conditions will be particularly evident in the areas of racial disturbances, student disturbances, and mass demonstrations with associated violence. There will no doubt be significant civil disturbances over the 1971–1975 period. Calls have been made recently, for instance, for anti-war protests involving civil disobedience in Washington, D.C. this Spring. At the present time, however, it is judged that the levels of these disorders may generally diminish at a faster pace than noted in the October estimate.

Senator Ervix. Colonel, you speak on page 3:

In none of the four areas which I have discussed do I propose extending the investigative jurisdiction of the Armed Forces. I argue the need to receive appropriate information from the civil agencies properly charged with investigative jurisdiction and the need to retain appropriate information.

I take it that the four areas discussed at the top of page 2: first, a successful conduct of military operations in foreign sovereignties; second, the detection and neutralization of foreign espionage directed against the Armed Forces; third, maintenance of the morale, discipline and loyalty of members of the Armed Forces; and fourth, the rational, equitable and legal conduct of that part of the business of the United States which is entrusted to the Armed

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