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Justice Department, the White House or any other agency of the Executive Branch.

Answer: The DoD participated in the Intelligence Evaluation Committee (IEC) from approximately the middle of December 1970 until its dissolution by the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, on 11 June 1973. The NSA furnished its own representation and its activities are set forth separately below. DoD participation was at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, initially under the direct control of the then Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration), Mr. Robert Froehlke. The OSD General Counsel, Mr. J. Fred Buzhardt, assumed the direction and supervision over DoD participation when Mr. Froehlke became Secretary of the Army. In addition, the Director, DIA, then LTG D. V. Bennett, and later VADM V. P. de Poix, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration), Mr. D. O. Cooke, were kept abreast of the activities by the DoD representative.

During organizational meetings held in early January 1971 Mr. Robert C. Mardian, the Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security, requested participating agencies to furnish both analytical and clerical support to the IEC. On 1 Feb 71, Mr. Froehlke approved the attachment of a U.S. Navy ensign to the analytical staff of the committee on a temporary basis, but declined to furnish clerical support. The services of the Navy officer to the IEC staff were terminated on 10 March 1972. After this time, DoD participation consisted of attendance by the DoD representative at meetings usually held at weekly intervals in the offices of the IEC.

From the beginning, DoD representatives made it clear to the Executive Director of the Committee that the Defense Department could neither collect nor would report information to the committee other than on persons or organizations affiliated with or who pose a threat to the DoD. Furthermore, Mr. Buzhardt repeatedly emphasized that IEC requests which were not within the purveiw of DoD policies were to be forwarded to his office for disposition. In no instance did DoD contribute information to the IEC which was not within the purview of DoD policies.

DoD participation in IEC activities consisted primarily of attendance at IEC meetings to review IEC estimates and other products which had been collated from information furnished by member agencies. The primary contributor throughout the existence of the IEC was the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It is noted that the DoD representative's main concern during these meetings were those matters of legitimate interest to DoD.

The DoD representative provided information in support of the IEC collation effort, only in rare instances, in those matters which were the concern of DoD and consistent with DoD directives. DoD contribution was limited to the following IEC projects:

a. In October 1971, the IEC compiled an estimate on the "Inter-relationship of Black Power organizations in the Western Hemisphere." In response to the IEC request, DoD furnished very limited information from file holdings of the Army, Navy and Air Force on such activities affecting military installations and activities.

b. DoD furnished information on DoD plans for troop dispositions in preparation for possible major civil disturbances during the 1972 National Political Conventions and the 1973 Presidential Inauguration.

c. In late 1972, the IEC prepared estimates on the terrorist threat in the U.S. DoD furnished the number and location (but not identity) of Arab and Israeli military students studying or being trained at DoD installations in the United States.

d. In support of IEC estimates of terrorism, DoD also furnished information on terrorism threatening U.S. military personnel and installations


e. In support of the IEC's compilation of a calendar of potential terrorist activities (in support of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism) DOD furnished information on scheduled visits to the U.S. of Ministers of Defense and senior military officials from the Arab countries and Israel.

f. In the fall of 1972, the IEC was tasked by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) to compile an intelligence requirements list. The DoD representative furnished DoD requirements to the list which was subsequently forwarded to ADM Anderson, the Chairman of the PFIAB.

Dissemination of the products of the IEC was limited to DoD agency principals only. One of the two copies of the IEC material received by DoD was forwarded to Mr. Buzhardt (usually through the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration), Mr. D. O. Cooke), the other to the Director, DIA. Both copies were normally destroyed within thirty days of receipt or sooner. The only exception to this procedure occurred when the possibility of civil disturbances arose involving the possible commitment of Federal resources or troops. This happened on three occasions: the first; the May 1971 demonstrations in Washington; the second, the National Political Conventions of 1972; lastly, the Presidential Inauguration in January 1973. On these occasions information was made available to the Under Secretary of the Army because of his responsibilities as DoD Executive Agent for civil disturbance matters.

In conclusion, it is noted that no investigations were ever conducted by the IEC, or by DoD at the request of the IEC. With the exception of the previously noted contributions DoD provided no substantive data to the IEC. The keen awareness on the limitations of DoD participation, of Messrs Buzhardt and Cooke, OSD, and ADM dePoix and General Bennett in DIA, as principal members of the Defense Investigative Review Council (DIRC), can not be overstated. Repeatedly, they directed the DoD representative to the IEC not to accept any tasking from or to provide information to the IEC which was not clearly defined as being legitimately within the DoD mission. DoD participation has been proper in all respects and has been consistent with DoD policy.

National Security Agency participation in the Intelligence Evaluation Committee

The NSA was first requested to attend an Intelligence Evaluation Committee meeting on December 16, 1970. On that date Secretary Froehlke, representing the Secretary of Defense, and Mr. Benson K. Buffham, representing the Director, NSA, attended the initial meeting at the Executive Office Building to establish the Committee. This meeting was chaired by Mr. Robert Mardian of the Department of Justice. NSA was asked to participate in order that signals intelligence information reflecting foreign involvement in civil disturbances or acts of terrorism might be provided and properly evaluated. The NSA participated in meetings of the IEC until it was discontinued on June 11, 1973. The Committee functioned as a standing group and met not oftener than twice weekly in 1971. Meetings in 1972 and 1973 were much less frequent. During this period, the NSA representative provided no intelligence information to the IEC.

Department of Justice Information Evaluation Center

Department of the Army, in its role as Executive Agent for the DoD in civil disturbance contingencies, provided three counterintelligence analysts to work in the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Information Evaluation Center in Miami Beach during the Democratic and Republication National Conventions in 1972. The analysts were placed in the Information Evaluation Center to assist the DOJ in processing civil disturbance information on a 24 hour basis and to act as a channel through which information furnished by civil authorities would reach Department of the Army and the Task Force Commander. The three analysts performed no operational intelligence activity whatsoever. Their participation was discontinued subsequent to the termination of the conventions. Department of the Army participated in no other interagency intelligence evaluation committees subsequent to 1 March 1971.


Question: If, indeed, there was such participation by Defense Department personnel, please provide the names of the intelligence committees, the names and offices of those participating, and the inclusive dates of such participation. Answer: Besides the persons identified in response to paragraph II.A. (1)

above, the following were the DoD participants (in chronological order) in the Intelligence Evaluation Committee (IEC).

John W. Downie, Colonel, U.S. Army
Francis H. Dillon, Jr., Colonel, U.S.
Army (as Asst. Dep. Dir. for
Counterintelligence and Security


William L. Vaught, Ensign, U.S.

Werner E. Michel, Colonel, U.S.
Army, Assistant Deputy Director
for Counterintelligence and Secu-
rity (DIA)

James E. Stilwell, Deputy Assistant Dep. Dir. for Counterintelligence and Security, (DIA)

DoD representative from the inception of the IEC until approximately Aug 71. (Col Downie has since retired) Charged with staff responsibility of IEC matters by Gen. Bennett 28 Dec 70 until 30 Apr 71.

Member of the analytical staff of the IEC (Ens Vaught returned to civilian life in March 1972) 8 Feb 71 until 10 Mar 72

DoD member Jul 71 until 11 Jun 73 Alternate DoD Member (Mr. Stilwell retired on 30 Jun 73)

The NSA representative on the IEC was Mr. Benson K. Buffham designated as the "NSA Representative, Department of Defense," assisted by Mr. Raymond J. Gengler of the NSA Office of Production.

The Department of the Army representatives detailed to assist the Attorney General during the 1972 Democratic and Republican conventions in the DOJ Information Evaluation Center were: Mr. Elihu Braunstein, Mr. John Blotzer, and Mr. Andrew Havre. The dates of participation were 15-25 July 1972 and 15-25 Aug 1972.


Question: Again, if there was such participation, please describe the purpose and authority of each committee. If there are written statements to this effect, please include a copy of them. The Subcommittee also requests that it be furnished copies of any reports which these committees may have produced.

Answer: The authority of the IEC was delineated in a draft charter marked SECRET-EYES ONLY, which was published and dispatched to committee members on February 10, 1971 by the Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security, Mr. Robert C. Mardian. It is not known whether this charter was ever formally promulgated. Copies of this charter and any reports produced by the IEC should be requested from the Department of Justice.

DOJ Information Evaluation Center

The sole Department of the Army participation during the 1972 conventions following a 17 May 1972 request from The Attorney General, Mr. Kleindienst, and as directed by the Under Secretary of the Army in Memorandum for the Director of Military Support, dated 30 June 1972, subject: Intelligence Support During Political Conventions at Miami Beach (Attachment 12), which reflects the Department of the Army role as Executive Agent for the DoD in civil disturbance contingencies. Information reports channeled to Department of the Army by the IEC were destroyed in accordance with criteria in Department of the Army letter, dated 1 June 1971, subject: "Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations not Affiliated with the Department of Defense."


Question: Please indicate if participation is continuing.

Answer: As noted previously, the activities of the IEC were discontinued on 11 June 1973 by memorandum from the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Mr. Henry E. Petersen (Attachment 13). The DA participation in the DOJ Information Evaluation Center was an ad hoc action which terminated after the close of the two conventions in August 1972.

Other Interagency Boards Concerned with Intelligence Matters

United States Intelligence Board

In addition to Defense participation in the IEC as set forth above, the DIA and the military departments have for many years participated on the United

States Intelligence Board (USIB), and its Subcommittees. The USIB is chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence. The Defense representative on th USIB has been the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. The Defense participation in this group has not and is not concerned wth domestic matters, civil disturbances in the U.S. or other matters within the ambit of your investigation.

Interdepartmental Intelligence Conferences

Also, the investigative organizations of the three military departments have since 1949 participated in close liaison with the Federal Bureau of Investigation pursuant to Supplemental Agreement to the Delimitations Agreement No. 1 (Attachment 14). (Attachment 14 omitted) The regulation pertaining to those relationships, which are formalized in a group called the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC), is DoD Directive 3115.1, "Organizational Arrangements for Internal Security, dated January 25, 1968, Attachment 15. This directive defines the duties of the IIC as "coordinɛng the investigation of all domestic espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversion and related matters affecting U.S. internal security." The composition of the IIC is also set forth in the directive. The identities of the various officials within military intelligence, AFOSI and the NIS has changed regularly over the years since its inception. In addition, field level conferences of investigative personnel have continued uninterrupted since 1949 on a monthly or bi-monthly basis. These local (field) meetings are chaired by the FBI Special Agent-in-Charge of the geographical area concerned.

The Interdeparmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) was originally chartered by the National Security Council in 1949. Since the early 1960's, the IIC has been chartered by the Attorney General. Although occasional staff level consultation has taken place since the rechartering of the IIC, the last meeting of the Conference itself was held in April 1964.

Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS)

The Department of Defense also participates as a member of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS), which was chartered by the National Security Council on July 18, 1949 (Attachment 16.) (Also see DoD Directive 3115.1, Attachment 15.) (Attachment 15 and 16 are omitted.)

On June 9, 1962, by National Security Action Memorandum 161, the President transferred responsibility for internal security from the National Security Council to the Attorney General. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed as Attachment 17.

Pursuant to the National Security Action Memorandum 161, the Attorney General reaffirmed the ICIS functions and responsibilities as defined in the charter, and indicated that the organization and procedure should continue unchanged, except that reports or recommendations should now be directed to the Attorney General.

In general, the charter provides that ICIS be responsible for coordinating all phases of the internal security field other than the functions assigned to the Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee (IIC).

Within the ICIS structure specialized subcommittees have been formed to deal with certain problem areas:

[blocks in formation]

Subcommittee V
Subcommittee B

Industrial Security
Countermeasures (Defense against the
clandestine introduction of fission-
able weapons or components).

The DoD representative to the ICIS is Mr. Joseph J. Liebling, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Security Policy), who has been serving as the Defense member since April 17, 1967. Mr. Charles M. Trammell, Jr., Director, Security Plans and Programs Directorate, Office, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Security Policy), has acted as the alternate member since July 18, 1966.

Requests for reports produced by the ICIS should be directed to the Chairman of that Committee, located in the Department of Justice Building.


Operation of the Defense Investigative Review Council (DIRC)

A. DoD Directive established the DIRC to monitor the operation of the Defense Department's intelligence activities in order to insure that the regulation was being complied with. The Subcommittee subequently did receive copies of inspection schedules which the DIRC had conducted or intended to conduct.

Comment: The DIRC was founded to monitor "investigative and related counterintelligence activities" not intelligence activities generally. It specifically has no responsibilities with respect to the acquisition of "foreign intelligence" nor does it concern itself with activities involved in ensuring communications security.


Question: The Subcommittee has never received any of the inspection reports. We now request that copies of all these reports be made available to us. We are, of course, particularly interested in any such reports which include evidence of (a) continued domestic surveillance of civilians by military agents in violation of the DoD Directive, (b) the maintenance of domestic intelligence information collected after the date of the regulation, or (c) the maintenance of domestic intelligence information which had not been destroyed as required by the regulation. Any record of corrective action taken by the DIRC or the unit involved should also be included.

Answer: DIRC Inspection Reports are internal documents of the Department of Defense which contain findings, evaluations, and some recommendations not ordinarily appropriate for release outside the Executive Branch. However, copies of these reports are furnished to the Subcommittee in a good faith effort to rebut the misgivings expressed on page 101 of the Subcommittee's recently issued Report entitled "Military Surveillance of Civilian Politics." In furnishing these reports to the Congress, we are not authorizing the release of the reports to the general public, for which they retain their "For Official Use Only" markings. In summary, (a) the attached inspection reports reveal no domestic surveillance of civilians by military agents in violation of DoD Directive; (b) they reveal no major discrepancies in the maintenance of domestic "intelligence" information acquired after the date of the regulation but do reveal minor technical/procedural violations of the strict screening and disposition procedures fashioned to assure compliance with the general policy of not acquiring or retaining information unless it falls into one or more of categories of threats against military personnel, property or functions; and (c) they do reveal some isolated maintenance of domestic "intelligence" information previously acquired which had not been as rigorously screened and purged as current directives require. In every instance, prompt corrective action was taken on the spot or immediately thereafter. In one instance, the responsible official was relieved of his command after it was found that certain 1964-1969 civil disturbance planning documents had not been purged, due to an apparent misunderstanding and lack of diligence on the part of his command in complying with the applicable rules. It should become obvious from reading these summaries and from learning of the stringent corrective action taken that there is no "primary interest in merely promoting an appearance of compliance on the part of senior officials of the DoD." (page 101, ibid)

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