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of these may be called upon to perform "clandestine" (defined as "illegal") acts. How many such "confidential sources" are now maintained by USAINTC? How many of these are classified as "clandestine" sources?

Answer: USAINTC currently maintains 29 confidential sources who operate in support of ACIPS. None of these is classified as "clandestine," and none is involved in illegal activities.


Question: Is the Interagency Source Registry, provided for in Section VIII, Chapter 6, USAINTC Regulation 381-100, still in existence? If not, on what date did it cease operation?

Answer: The Interagency Source Registry is still in existence.

SECTION 1.C. (8)

Question: Para 6-62 (d) of USAINTC Regulation 381-100 authorizes offpost monitoring of "subversive activity" under certain circumstances if the approval of the Department of Army has been obtained. How many requests to conduct such monitoring have been made to USAINTC since 1 June 1971? How many were approved by USAINTC? By Department of the Army? Please specify the requesting unit, the approving authority, the activity monitored and the results of such operations.

Answer: No requests for off-post monitoring have been made to USAINTC since 1 June 1971 nor have any been approved by HQ USAINTC or by the Department of the Army.


Question: Section XII, Chapter 6 of USAINTC Regulation 381-100 provides for use of video tape and equipment to conduct intelligence operations. How many operations plans calling for use of such equipment were submitted to USAINTC since 1 June 1971? How many were approved by USAINTC. By Department of the Army? Again, please specify the requesting unit, the approving authority, and how such equipment was employed.

Answer: No operations plans calling for the use of video tape and equipment have been submitted to USAINTC since 1 June 1971. None has been approved by HQ USAINTC nor by DA.


Question: We have noted that neither the DoD Directive nor the USAINTC Regulation applies specifically to military units stationed outside the 50 states or territories and possessions of the United States. The Subcommittee is interested in knowing whether USAINTC collects information on American citizens living outside the United States and its territories and possessions who are not affiliated with the Department of Defense. Specifically:

(1) If there are such operations, are they then governed by the limitations of DoD Regulation 5200.27 or USAINTC Regulation 381-100?

Answer: No. Normally, USAINTC does not collect information on American citizens living outside the United States and its territories and possessions. USAINTC's geographic area of jurisdiction and responsibility for providing counterintelligence investigative support to US Army elements consists of CONUS (the 48 contiguous states, Alaska, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands). (Note that Hawaii is not included in USAINTC's area of jurisdiction). In the extremely rare cases in which USAINTC might become involved in such activities, the activities will not be governed by DoD Directive 5200.27 or USAINTC Regulation 381-100. (See response to question (3) below). Overseas major Army commands possess and control organic counterintelligence elements.


Question: If they are so governed, please furnish the Subcommittee with the number of special operations plans authorized under the provisions of para 6-14 of USAINTC Regulation 381-100; the number of these plans which involved "clandestine" activities under para 6-16 (b) (2); the number of ACIPS authorized under Section IV, Chapter 6; the number of OFCO's authorized

under Section VI, Chapter 6; and finally, the number of instances where offpost monitoring under para 6-62(d) have been authorized in overseas locations. (The Subcommitee realizes that these figures may be included in the totals furnished in the previous answers.

Answer: See answer to Question (1) above.


Question: If intelligence-gathering activities are being carried out by USAINTC against American civilians living abroad, and these are not governed by DoD Directive 5200.27, and USAINTC Regulation 381-100, under what regulation are they being carried out? If such an alternative regulation exists, the Subcommittee asks that it be furnished a copy.

Answer: Counterintelligence activities carried out in overseas areas are governed by Army Regulation 381-130, Counterintelligence Investigations Supervision and Control, and Army Regulation 381-47, US Army Offensive Counterintelligence Operations. Copies of these regulations were previously furnished the Subcommittee. As indicated in paragraph 6b (3) of AR 381-47, USAINTC may assume control of an overseas counterintelligence investigation/operation, but only with the specific approval of HQ, Department of the Army. Currently, USAINTC is not controlling any such activities in oversea Army commands. The US Army does not carry out information gathering (investigative) activities against American civilians anywhere in the world unless such individuals are involved in activities which threaten the accomplishment of the Army's mission and functions.


Question: If intelligence-gathering activities are being carried out by USAINTC against American civilians living abroad, which, if any, of the following techniques have been employed to collect such intelligence?

a. Wiretapping

b. Electronic bugging

c. Covert infiltration

d. Opening, copying or tampering with mail

e. Burglaries or other clandestine means

f. Informants

g. Overt observation

h. Videotape equipment

i. Liaison with foreign governments
j. Liaison with US agencies

Answer: As previously stated, USAINTC is not conducting intelligence gathering activities against American civilians living abroad. However, as indicated in response to question (3) above, U.S. Army elements overseas may from time to time investigate U.S. civilians who pose a threat to Army personnel, property or functions, in which event differing investigative techniques may be employed. Liaison with foreign governments and other U.S. agencies, as well as overt observation, would be more or less routine. The extraordinary techniques of wiretaps, covert infiltration, informants, opening mail, etc., might be used depending upon the individual circumstances of the case, the nature and seriousness of the threat, operational exigencies and the domestic law of the country involved.


Question: Has any intelligence operation been conducted by USAINTC involving the activities of one Thomas Schwaetzer or one Max Watts, residing in Heidelberg, West Germany? If so, has this operation entailed a wiretap by USAINTC on telephone number 06223-3316? To what intelligence operation does the USI case number A-0088 refer?

Answer: USAINTC has conducted no intelligence operations involving one Thomas Schwaetzer or one Max Watts. The 66th MI Group, HQ, US Army Europe (USAREUR), however, conducted an investigation of Thomas (Tomi) Schwaetzer (alias: Max Watts). Further answer to this question is included in a classified attachment 8 hereto.


Question: Does USAINTC maintain a dossier on Lawyer's Military Defense Committee attorney Howard DeNike, residing in Heidelberg, West Germany? If so, what is the authority for the maintenance of such dossier?

Answer: Neither USAINTC nor USAREUR maintains a dossier on Howard DeNike. His name does appear in USAREUR's investigative file on Thomas (Tomi) Schwaetzer.


Question: The subcommittee is interested in learning the extent of surveillance activity over civilians which is carried out by all subordinate units of the Department of Defense, and not simply those of the Army or USAINTC. What other agencies or units under departmental jurisdiction are now authorized to collect intelligence on civilians and civilian organizations-either within or without the 50 states and the territories and possessions of the United States? Answer: The acquisition of information on civilians and civilian organizations by all Department of Defense components is restricted to that which is essential to the accomplishment of assigned Department of Defense missions. The other Department of Defense investigative organizations which may, in strictly limited situations, acquire information relating to persons or organizations not affiliated with the Department of Defense, are the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI) and the Naval Investigative Service (NIS). Question: What directives or regulations govern such activities? Answer: The Directives of the Air Force and the Navy which implement DoD Directive 5200.27 are as follows: Air Force Regulation 124-13, dated 23 June 1971; Department of the Navy SECNAV Instruction 3820.2A, dated 1 Nov 1971.

Question: Please furnish the Subcommittee with copies of such regulations. Answer: Copies of these directives are attached as Attachments 9 and 10. (Attachment 9 is printed at page 1256 of the 1971 hearings. Attachment 10 is printed at page 1248.)

Question: In particular the Subcommittee has not received copies of the regulations issued by the Navy or Air Force which correspond to USAINTC Regulation 381-100. Accordingly, we request copies of these regulations issued by the other Services since March 1, 1971, which govern their intelligence activities both within and without the continental United States.

Answer: The subcommittee has previously been furnished copies of the Navy and Air Force regulations which implement DoD Directive 5200.27. No directly parallel regulations corresponding to USAINTC Regulation 381-100 exist in the Air Force; however, the nearest comparable directives relating to investigative activities (not intelligence) within the Air Force are furnished herewith as Attachment 11. (C) (Attachment 11 omitted) The Department of the Navy does not have a current regulation corresponding to USAINTC Reg. 381-100. The NIS did have a "Counterintelligence Manual" which was promulgated in 1968, however, it had become obsolete and was cancelled. Provisions of that Manual dealing with civilians not affiliated with the DoD were superseded by the policies contained in SECNAV INSTR 3820.2A, dated 1 Nov 1971 (Attachment 10). Certain highly sensitive and compartmented counterespionage directives used by the military departments are not included inasmuch as they have no relation to your inquiry. Similarly, directives relating to the collection of foreign intelligence information are not relevant to the Subcommittee's inquiry, and are not furnished.


Question: To what extent, if any, did Department of Defense personnel continue to participate in any interagency intelligence evaluation committees after the promulgation of DoD Directive 5200.27 on 1 March 1971? The SubCommittee is interested in participation in any sort of domestic intelligence committee, whether formal or ad hoc, or whether created under the auspices of the IDIU, the Internal Security Division or any other Division of the

Justice Department, the White House or any other agency of the Executive Branch.

Answer: The DoD participated in the Intelligence Evaluation Committee (IEC) from approximately the middle of December 1970 until its dissolution by the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, on 11 June 1973. The NSA furnished its own representation and its activities are set forth separately below. DoD participation was at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, initially under the direct control of the then Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration), Mr. Robert Froehlke. The OSD General Counsel, Mr. J. Fred Buzhardt, assumed the direction and supervision over DoD participation when Mr. Froehlke became Secretary of the Army. In addition, the Director, DIA, then LTG D. V. Bennett, and later VADM V. P. de Poix, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration), Mr. D. O. Cooke, were kept abreast of the activities by the DoD representative.

During organizational meetings held in early January 1971 Mr. Robert C. Mardian, the Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security, requested participating agencies to furnish both analytical and clerical support to the IEC. On 1 Feb 71, Mr. Froehlke approved the attachment of a U.S. Navy ensign to the analytical staff of the committee on a temporary basis, but declined to furnish clerical support. The services of the Navy officer to the IEC staff were terminated on 10 March 1972. After this time, DoD participation consisted of attendance by the DoD representative at meetings usually held at weekly intervals in the offices of the IEC.

From the beginning, DoD representatives made it clear to the Executive Director of the Committee that the Defense Department could neither collect nor would report information to the committee other than on persons or organizations affiliated with or who pose a threat to the DoD. Furthermore, Mr. Buzhardt repeatedly emphasized that IEC requests which were not within the purveiw of DoD policies were to be forwarded to his office for disposition. In no instance did DoD contribute information to the IEC which was not within the purview of DoD policies.

DoD participation in IEC activities consisted primarily of attendance at IEC meetings to review IEC estimates and other products which had been collated from information furnished by member agencies. The primary contributor throughout the existence of the IEC was the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It is noted that the DoD representative's main concern during these meetings were those matters of legitimate interest to DoD.

The DoD representative provided information in support of the IEC collation effort, only in rare instances, in those matters which were the concern of DoD and consistent with DoD directives. DoD contribution was limited to the following IEC projects:

a. In October 1971, the IEC compiled an estimate on the "Inter-relationship of Black Power organizations in the Western Hemisphere." In response to the IEC request, DoD furnished very limited information from file holdings of the Army, Navy and Air Force on such activities affecting military installations and activities.

b. DoD furnished information on DoD plans for troop dispositions in preparation for possible major civil disturbances during the 1972 National Political Conventions and the 1973 Presidential Inauguration.

c. In late 1972, the IEC prepared estimates on the terrorist threat in the U.S. DOD furnished the number and location (but not identity) of Arab and Israeli military students studying or being trained at DoD installations in the United States.

d. In support of IEC estimates of terrorism, DoD also furnished information on terrorism threatening U.S. military personnel and installations


e. In support of the IEC's compilation of a calendar of potential terrorist activities (in support of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism) DOD furnished information on scheduled visits to the U.S. of Ministers of Defense and senior military officials from the Arab countries and Israel.

f. In the fall of 1972, the IEC was tasked by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) to compile an intelligence requirements list. The DoD representative furnished DoD requirements to the list which was subsequently forwarded to ADM Anderson, the Chairman of the PFIAB.

Dissemination of the products of the IEC was limited to DoD agency principals only. One of the two copies of the IEC material received by DoD was forwarded to Mr. Buzhardt (usually through the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration), Mr. D. O. Cooke), the other to the Director, DIA. Both copies were normally destroyed within thirty days of receipt or sooner. The only exception to this procedure occurred when the possibility of civil disturbances arose involving the possible commitment of Federal resources or troops. This happened on three occasions: the first; the May 1971 demonstrations in Washington; the second, the National Political Conventions of 1972; lastly, the Presidential Inauguration in January 1973. On these occasions information was made available to the Under Secretary of the Army because of his responsibilities as DoD Executive Agent for civil disturbance matters.

In conclusion, it is noted that no investigations were ever conducted by the IEC, or by DoD at the request of the IEC. With the exception of the previously noted contributions DoD provided no substantive data to the IEC. The keen awareness on the limitations of DoD participation, of Messrs Buzhardt and Cooke, OSD, and ADM dePoix and General Bennett in DIA, as principal members of the Defense Investigative Review Council (DIRC), can not be overstated. Repeatedly, they directed the DoD representative to the IEC not to accept any tasking from or to provide information to the IEC which was not clearly defined as being legitimately within the DoD mission. DoD participation has been proper in all respects and has been consistent with DoD policy.

National Security Agency participation in the Intelligence Evaluation Committee

The NSA was first requested to attend an Intelligence Evaluation Committee meeting on December 16, 1970. On that date Secretary Froehlke, representing the Secretary of Defense, and Mr. Benson K. Buffham, representing the Director, NSA, attended the initial meeting at the Executive Office Building to establish the Committee. This meeting was chaired by Mr. Robert Mardian of the Department of Justice. NSA was asked to participate in order that signals intelligence information reflecting foreign involvement in civil disturbances or acts of terrorism might be provided and properly evaluated. The NSA participated in meetings of the IEC until it was discontinued on June 11, 1973. The Committee functioned as a standing group and met not oftener than twice weekly in 1971. Meetings in 1972 and 1973 were much less frequent. During this period, the NSA representative provided no intelligence information to the IEC.

Department of Justice Information Evaluation Center

Department of the Army, in its role as Executive Agent for the DoD in civil disturbance contingencies, provided three counterintelligence analysts to work in the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Information Evaluation Center in Miami Beach during the Democratic and Republication National Conventions in 1972. The analysts were placed in the Information Evaluation Center to assist the DOJ in processing civil disturbance information on a 24 hour basis and to act as a channel through which information furnished by civil authorities would reach Department of the Army and the Task Force Commander. The three analysts performed no operational intelligence activity whatsoever. Their participation was discontinued subsequent to the termination of the conventions. Department of the Army participated in no other interagency intelligence evaluation committees subsequent to 1 March 1971.


Question: If, indeed, there was such participation by Defense Department personnel, please provide the names of the intelligence committees, the names and offices of those participating, and the inclusive dates of such participation. Answer: Besides the persons identified in response to paragraph II.A. (1)

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