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SECTION I.B.

Question: Section I of DoD Directive 5200.27 states that the directive applies to the collection of information regarding all persons and organizations not affiliated with the Department of Defense. Section II of the Directive provides, however, that it is applicable only to the use of military forces located within the 50 states and the territories and possessions of the United States. Paragraph 1-13 of USAINTC Regulation contains these same provisions.

(1) Does the DoD Directive prohibit the collection of information on American civilians living abroad by military forces stationed outside the 50 states or the territories and possessions of the United States ? Answer: No.

SECTION 1.B. (2)

Question: If not, are there other directives, regulations or orders which do prohibit such information-gathering? (Underlining added)

Answer: No. However, it is important to point out that any investigation done by military investigators anywhere must be authorized. Prohibitions alone do not set the stage for what an investigator can or cannot do. In order for a military investigator to undertake an investigation, there must be some authorized and legitimate mission-related military purpose in doing so. Moreover, in drafting DoD Directive 5200.27, it was only thought necessary to prohibit certain activities within the US, its territories and possessions, because it was in these geographical areas where the military previously had been tasked to gather civil disturbance information circa 1968–1969, which the Directive issued on March 1, 1971, was designed to prohibit, except in carefully delimited circumstances.

SECTION I.B. (3)

Question: If there are not such regulations, are there other directives, regulations or orders which limit or regulate such information gathering?

Answer: Yes. For example, Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) in some countries severely delimit or prohibit our investigative activities within the civilian community. This varies from country to country. Our internal regulations of overseas commands reflect these SOFA's, and other written or unwritten accords. As a different kind of example, overseas command within the Army require approval for counterintelligence wiretaps to be given only at theatre (USAREUR or USARPAC) level. Thus, in Europe the authority who approves all requests for such wiretaps is the Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Headquarters USAREUR, acting for the CINC, USAREUR. In West Germany, the actual wiretap is performed by Federal Republic authorities in accordance with the provisions of German law, but only after initial approval for the wiretap is given by the DCSI, USAREUR. In Army criminal investigations, world-wide, initial approval for all wiretaps must be obtained from the Commander, CID Command in Washington, D.C.

SECTION I.C.

Question: Change 1 to USAINTC Reg. 381–100, dated 1 June 1971, added Section IV of Chapter 1, entitled “Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations not Affiliated with the Department of Defense,” and Section X of Chapter 6, entitled "Counterintelligence Information Reporting." Para. 1–13(a) of USAINTC Reg. 381–100 states that it implements a Department of Army letter directing the implementation of DoD Directive 5200.27. It does not purport to supersede the existing provisions of USAINTC 381-100 except where they are in conflict with the policies stated.

(1) Are the procedures authorized by Chapter 6 of USAINTC Regulation 381-100 still valid as long as the intelligence collecting does not exceed the limits established by DOD Directive 5200.27 and Chapter 1, Section IV of USAINTC Regulation 381–100 ?

Answer: Yes, procedures authorized by Chapter 6 of USAINTC Regulation 381-100 are still valid under the conditions set forth in this question.

SECTION I.C. (2)

Question: If so, how many covert special operations plans have been proposed under the provisions of para 6–14 since 1 June 1971, the date of Change 1 to USAINTC Regulation 381-100? How many received approval by USAINTC? By Department of the Army? By the Chairman of the Defense Investigative Review Council (DIRC)? Please specify the nature and circumstances of each plan which received approval.

Answer: Since 1 June 1971, one covert special operation has been proposed to USAINTC by a subordinate element and is currently under consideration. No plans for such operations have been approved by HQ, USAINTC nor have any such plans been submitted for approval to Department of the Army (DA).

SECTION I.C. (3)

Question: Para 6–16 (b) (2) alludes to the fact that some of the covert operations plans may entail “clandestine” (defined as “illegal") activities. Did any covert special operations plans proposed under para 6–14 since 1 June 1971 entail “clandestine' activities? How many such plans were approved by USAINTC? By Department of the Army? By DIRC? Please specify the nature and circumstances of each plan which received approval.

Answer: The proposed covert special operation mentioned in the response to Question (2) above, does not entail “clandestine” activities, nor does it entail “illegal” activities.

SECTION I.C. (4) Question: Section IV, Chapter 6 of USAINTC Regulation 381–100 authorizes Aggressive Counterintelligence Programs (ACIP) to be initiated on the request of local commanders. How many such requests for ACIPs were received by USAINTC after 1 June 1971? How many were approved by USAINTC? Is approval for such plans required by any higher level of authority? Please specify the nature and circumstances of each request which received approval of USAINTC or any higher authority ?

Answer: USAINTC has received a total of seven requests for ACIPs since 1 June 1971. Of these, two have been approved by USAINTC and by DA. DA approval of all ACIPs is required. Each of the ACIPs which has been approved was requested because the installation commander felt that a threat to the security of his installation existed or because he felt that the sensitivity of the installation's activities dictated expanded security protection. (ACIP operations are on-post operations designed to give indications of internal security problems.) There are 9 other ACIPs, approved prior to 1 June 1971, which are still on-going.

SECTION I.C. (5) Question: Section VI, Chapter 6 of USAINTC Regulation 381–100 authorizes covert Offensive Counterintelligence Operations (OFCO), to be initiated by MI group commanders. How many such operations were proposed by MI group commanders after 1 June 1971? How many were approved by USAINTC? Is higher authority required to be informed either before or after initiation ? Please specify the nature and circumstances of each plan which received approval of USAINTC or any higher authority.

Answer: Countersubversion Offensive Counterintelligence Operations can be proposed but not initiated by MI Group commanders. As indicated in response to Section 1.C.(2) above, one such covert operation has been proposed since 1 June 1971. No such operations have been approved by USAINTC. Approval for all such plans must be given by the Under Secretary of the Army and by the Chairman of the DIRC before initiation of an OFCO.

SECTION 1.C. (6)

Question: Section VII, Chapter 6 of USAINTC Regulation 381-100 provides inter alia, for the selection and development of “confidential sources” among Department of Army personnel. Para 6–39(C) (e) further alludes that some

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of these may be called upon to perform "clandestine” (defined as “illegal") acts. How many such “confidential sources” are now maintained by USAINTC? How many of these are classified as “clandestine" sources ?

Answer: USAINTC currently maintains 29 confidential sources who operate in support of ACIPs. None of these is classified as "clandestine,” and none is involved in illegal activities.

SECTION I.C. (7) Question: Is the Interagency Source Registry, provided for in Section VIII, Chapter 6, USAINTC Regulation 381-100, still in existence? If not, on what date did it cease operation ?

Answer: The Interagency Source Registry is still in existence.

SECTION I.C. (8)

Question: Para 6–62 (d) of USAINTC Regulation 381-100 authorizes offpost monitoring of "subversive activity” under certain circumstances if the approval of the Department of Army has been obtained. How many requests to conduct such monitoring have been made to USAINTC since 1 June 1971? How many were approved by USAINTC? By Department of the Army? Please specify the requesting unit, the approving authority, the activity monitored and the results of such operations.

Answer: No requests for off-post monitoring have been made to USAINTC since 1 June 1971 nor have any been approved by HQ USAINTC or by the Department of the Army.

SECTION I.C. (9) Question: Section XH, Chapter 6 of USAINTC Regulation 381-100 provides for use of video tape and equipment to conduct intelligence operations. How many operations plans calling for use of such equipment were submitted to USAINTC since 1 June 1971? How many were approved by USAINTC. By Department of the Army? Again, please specify the requesting unit, the approving authority, and how such equipment was employed.

Answer: No operations plans calling for the use of video tape and equipment have been submitted to USAINTC since 1 June 1971. None has been approved by HQ USAINTC nor by DA.

SECTION I.D.

Question: We have noted that neither the DoD Directive nor the USAINTC Regulation applies specifically to military units stationed outside the 50 states or territories and possessions of the United States. The Subcommittee is interested in knowing whether USAINTC collects information on American citizens living outside the United States and its territories and possessions who are not affiliated with the Department of Defense. Specifically :

(1) If there are such operations, are they then governed by the limitations of DoD Regulation 5200.27 or USAINTC Regulation 381–100?

Answer: No. Normally, USAINTC does not collect information on American citizens living outside the United States and its territories and possessions. USAINTC's geographic area of jurisdiction and responsibility for providing counterintelligence investigative support to US Army elements consists of CONUS (the 48 contiguous states, Alaska, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands). (Note that Hawaii is not included in USAINTC's area of jurisdiction). In the extremely rare cases in which USAINTC might become involved in such activities, the activities will not be governed by DoD Directive 5200.27 or USAINTC Regulation 381–100. (See response to question (3) below). Overseas major, Army commands possess and control organic counterintelligence elements.

SECTION I.D. (2)

Question: If they are so governed, please furnish the Subcommittee with the number of special operations plans authorized under the provisions of para 6–14 of USAINTC Regulation 381-100; the number of these plans which involved “clandestine” activities under para 6–16(b) (2); the number of ACIPs authorized under Section IV, Chapter 6; the number of OFCO's authorized under Section VI, Chapter 6; and finally, the number of instances where offpost monitoring under para 6-62(d) have been authorized in overseas locations. (The Subcommitee realizes that these figures may be included in the totals furnished in the previous answers.

Answer: See answer to Question (1) above.

SECTION I.D. (3)

Question: If intelligence-gathering activities are being carried out by USAINTC against American civilians living abroad, and these are not governed by DoD Directive 5200.27, and USAINTC Regulation 381-100, under what regulation are they being carried out? If such an alternative regulation exists, the Subcommittee asks that it be furnished a copy.

Answer: Counterintelligence activities carried out in overseas areas are governed by Army Regulation 381-130, Counterintelligence Investigations Supervision and Control, and Army Regulation 381–47, US Army Offensive Counterintelligence Operations. Copies of these regulations were previously furnished the Subcommittee. As indicated in paragraph 6b (3) of AR 381–47, USAINTC may assume control of an overseas counterintelligence investigation/operation, but only with the specific approval of HQ, Department of the Army. Currently, USAINTC is not controlling any such activities in oversea Army commands. The US Army does not carry out information gathering (investigative) activities against American civilians anywhere in the world unless such individuals are involved in activities which threaten the accomplishment of the Army's mission and functions.

SECTION I.D. (4)
Question: If intelligence-gathering activities are being carried out by
USAINTC against American civilians living abroad, which, if any, of the fol-
lowing techniques have been employed to collect such intelligence ?

a. Wiretapping
b. Electronic bugging
C. Covert infiltration
d. Opening, copying or tampering with mail
e. Burglaries or other clandestine means
f. Informants
g. Overt observation
h. Videotape equipment
i. Liaison with foreign governments

j. Liaison with US agencies Answer: As previously stated, USAINTC is not conducting intelligence gathering activities against American civilians living abroad. However, as indicated in response to question (3) above, U.S. Army elements overseas may from time to time investigate U.S. civilians who pose a threat to Army personnel, property or functions, in which event differing investigative techniques may be employed. Liaison with foreign governments and other U.S. agencies, as well as overt observation, would be more or less routine. The extraordinary techniques of wiretaps, covert infiltration, informants, opening mail, etc., might be used depending upon the individual circumstances of the case, the nature and seriousness of the threat, operational exigencies and the domestic law of the country involved.

SECTION I.D. (5) Question: Has any intelligence operation been conducted by USAINTC involving the activities of one Thomas Schwaetzer or one Max Watts, residing in Heidelberg, West Germany? If so, has this operation entailed a wiretap by USAINTC on telephone number 06223–3316? To what intelligence operation does the USI case number A-0088 refer?

Answer: 'USAINTC has conducted no intelligence operations involving one Thomas Schwaetzer or one Max Watts. The 66th MI Group, HQ, US Army Europe (USAREUR), however, conducted an investigation of Thomas (Tomi) Schwaetzer (alias : Max Watts). Further answer to this question is included in a classified attachment 8 hereto.

SECTION I.D. (6)

Question: Does USAINTC maintain a dossier on Lawyer's Military Defense Committee attorney Howard DeNike, residing in Heidelberg, West Germany ? If so, what is the authority for the maintenance of such dossier ?

Answer: Neither USAINTC nor USAREUR maintains a dossier on Howard DeNike. His name does appear in USAREUR's investigative file on Thomas (Tomi) Schwaetzer.

SECTION I.E.

Question: The subcommittee is interested in learning the extent of surveillance activity over civilians which is carried out by all subordinate units of the Department of Defense, and not simply those of the Army or USAINTC. What other agencies or units under departmental jurisdiction are now authorized to collect intelligence on civilians and civilian organizations—either within or without the 50 states and the territories and possessions of the United States?

Answer: The acquisition of information on civilians and civilian organizations by all Department of Defense components is restricted to that which is essential to the accomplishment of assigned Department of Defense missions. The other Department of Defense investigative organizations which may, in strictly limited situations, acquire information relating to persons or organizations not affiliated with the Department of Defense, are the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI) and the Naval Investigative Service (NIS).

Question: What directives or regulations govern such activities?

Answer: The Directives of the Air Force and the Navy which implement DoD Directive 5200.27 are as follows: Air Force Regulation 124–13, dated 23 June 1971; Department of the Navy SECNAV Instruction 3820.2A, dated 1 Nov 1971.

Question: Please furnish the Subcommittee with copies of such regulations.

Answer: Copies of these directives are attached as Attachments 9 and 10. (Attachment 9 is printed at page 1256 of the 1971 hearings. Attachment 10 is printed at page 1248.)

Question: In particular the Subcommittee has not received copies of the regulations issued by the Navy or Air Force which correspond to USAINTC Regulation 381–100. Accordingly, we request copies of these regulations issued by the other Services since March 1, 1971, which govern their intelligence activities both within and without the continental United States.

Answer: The subcommittee has previously been furnished copies of the Navy and Air Force regulations which implement DoD Directive 5200.27. No directly parallel regulations corresponding to USAINTC Regulation 381-100 exist in the Air Force ; however, the nearest comparable directives relating to investigative activities (not intelligence) within the Air Force are furnished herewith as Attachment 11. (C) (Attachment 11 omitted) The Department of the Navy does not have a current regulation corresponding to USAINTC Reg. 381–100. The. NIS did have a “Counterintelligence Manual” which was promulgated in 1968, however, it had become obsolete and was cancelled. Provisions of that Manual dealing with civilians not affiliated with the DoD were superseded by the policies contained in SECNAV INSTR 3820.2A, dated 1 Nov 1971 (Attachment 10). Certain highly sensitive and compartmented counterespionage directives used by the military departments are not included inasmuch as they have no relation to your inquiry. Similarly, directives relating to the collection of foreign intelligence information are not relevant to the Subcommittee's inquiry, and are not furnished.

SECTION II.A (1)

Question: To what extent, if any, did Department of Defense personnel continue to participate in any interagency intelligence evaluation committees after the promulgation of DoD Directive 5200.27 on 1 March 1971? The SubCommittee is interested in participation in any sort of domestic intelligence committee, whether formal or ad hoc, or whether created under the auspices of the IDIU, the Internal Security Division or any other Division of the

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