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the at Ironola was not d. It was, therefore, a larger body. That the Spartan assembly, such as we suppose the

axxxncia to have been, should have remai wn to the latest times as completely under the control of the istrates as in the heroic age, is certainly a o but in itself by no means incredible; and the powers of the :. instead of being inconsistent with it, seems to afford

e most natural explanation of it, both according to Lachmann's view of the origin and character of their office, and according to that which we proposed in the first volume. Between these views, indeed, it will be seen there is very little difference: both are o nearly in the same manner to those of Mueller and Wachsmuth. Mueller's motion that the ephoralty was the movable element, the principle of change in the S Constitution (Dorians, iii., 7, 1, 7), seems to contradict the whole course of its history, in which - steadily d to all *-*:

it ap r y r-7 and the main stay of the oligarohical or aristocratical gov. ernment. On the other h."Wachsmuth's inference fro

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finding himself unable to cope with the democratical Rho#"o. Wyey or ris Kvåg. Lysias, Eratosth., p. 127. he patriots in the Athenian assembly, overawed by Lysander, of uivalrot pivovre; ão tlyov. As in Appendix II. we ventured to offer some conjectures on the organization of the Spartan army, we will take this opportunity of mentioning Lachmann's †. on this subject. He sets out from the statement of Herodotus, i. 65 thentioned p. 582), and infers from it, with Mueller, that the army was organized according to the divisions of the tribes; but observes, that the syssitia of which Herodotus speaks cannot have been the greater—which were no wa connected with the lochu or the pentecostyes—but the smaller, of fifteen men each, which must therefore, he thinks, have been originally, as well as the triacades, subdivisions of the tribes. In the same way he conceives the six moras to have corresponded to the three tribes, according to that bipartition of which, as we have seen, he finds other examples in the Dorian and the Attic tetrapolis, and in the Asiatic hexapolis. The six Spartan moras he supposes to have formed the cadres of the army, in which the contingents of the provincial towns were incorporated; and he thinks it probable that it was only when they were thus filled up that they bore the name of mora. hen, as at Mantinea, the army was com of citizens only, the Spartan mora, being considered only as a part of the co properly so called, was termed a lochus; and when the whole Spartan force was brought into the field, four of the ordinary lochi were thrown into one; but when only a part of it was called out, the smaller lochi were retained as subdivisions of the mora; and hence he would account for the various statements as to the strength of the mora, which fluctuate between three and nine hundred men.

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rexonerow of the Scholiast he supposes to have arisen from a misapprehension of the poet's meaning, and therefore rejects : opinion of Morus, who, on the authority of the Scholast, concluded that in the decree alluded to by Artstophanes there was ao that the defendant should be guarded on each side while he pleaded his cause, but on this very account, and because the Scholast calls the process an elaa), exia, thought that this must to a dufferent decree from the one mentioned by Xenophon. Hudtwalcker (Die Doet., p. 94, note) agrees with Schneider as to the meaning of Aristophanes, and thinks that the Scholiast musunderstood it, but nevertheless believes that the clause soTexous vow doorspoofla droMoyticoat was really contained in the decree of Cannonus, though it is not the part to which Aristophanes anoi." He compares the

ings in the case of Callixenus, and the others who deceived the o: in the affair of the generals, described by Xenophon, Hell., 1, 7, 39, where it is said that, in consequence of the decree which directed them iyyenra, ouragrou. they were kept in custody by their suretics: fotonguy oro row lyrongauerwy. In like manner, nnder decree of Cannomus, it is probable that the defendant was either to be thrown into prison, and brought up to trial in chauns, or, if he found bai, to be attended by his sureues at the bear

ing. Schneider's motion that ouaxonunivor in the passage of Aristophanes is to be understood in a middle sense, seems to us to destroy all the humour, and, indeed, all the meaning, of the comparison; for then it is not the embarrassed youth, but his two tormentors, who are compared to the ãonians under the dorse of commonus oo for to: speaker himself there would be no point of comparison at all. It is not, however, on this allusion, but on Xenophon's description, that we rest our belief that the decree of Cannonus made no provision for the case of a plurality of defendants. The general purpose of the decree, as it is described by Euryptolemus, is well explained by Platner Der Process und die Klagen bei den Attikern, p. 376), though he has likewise adopted the common opinion as to the clause in question. It was an extremely rigorous decree (taxorurov), designed to deprive the delinquent of all runans of evading justice. Its peculiarity as to the process preceding conviction consisted in three points : First, the offenee was described in language so comprehensive as to include ever, possible case of treason, lávris rôy diinaw doux - he was on be tried before the assembled people, or ro, ouw; and he was to be kept in close custody till the trial was over, &couévoy droëvrov. Considering the ordinary temper of the Athenian tribunals, we can hardly doubt that a clause far separating the cases of several defendants would have been considered as favourable to them; and, accordingly, Wachsmuth (1, 2, p. 205, note 178), who adopts the common nion as to the distinguishing feature of the decree toes sephisma des Kannonos von Sonderung der Sachen mehrerer Angeklagten), supposes, it to have been passed or o which followed the overthrow of the four hundred. A clause of such a tendency would clearly not have been in harmony with the general spirit of the measure, and we are therefore obliged to view it with the more sopicion. On point, at least, is evident: that this clause was not the distinguishing feature of the decree : for Euryo lemus supposes that the generals would no less have the benefit of a separate hearing for each, if they were prosecoted under the other law which he mentions, against sortlege and a certain class of treasonable offences. But we go farther, and observe, that such a clause would have beesuperfluous, as it only prescribed that which the law pre viously required; for otherwise the proposition of Casive nus would not have been contrary to law, as we presuo that no one will contend that the vöuo; mentioned to 24, 15, 27, is either the decree of Cannonus, or the other law against sacrilege and treason. This seems proof sufferent that no such clause existed; and the common opinwassers to have arisen solely out of the two words Mixon Exorror * 37, which have been erroneously referred to the deeree o' Cannonus, though they may just as easily be taken to express a distinct part of the proposition of Euryptolemus.

XIV. ox THE constitution of Arness torrs rst thtary.

LAchmann has endeavoured, in the work above no. to determine the constitution of the provincial towns of 1conia, and conceives that it is illustrated to the mesores which Lysander adopted in the cities subjected to the sotan dominion after the Peloponnesian war. As Locoaccording to Ephorus, was divided into six pronaces to besides that which included Sparta itself), he turns on the division of Messonia into five provinces was also ense by the Spartans after the conquest. There were thrs to provinces, besides the tract occupied by the soverers pple. Now the Scholiast of Pindar, Col. vi., 154. sars on a passage which has very much the appearanco oftenor == tilated, or otherwise corrupted) that there were resort

harmosts of the Lacedamomans. This would gover- or

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the atrocities of his government from those of the French Reign of Terror; and then he proceeds—Critins autem, solum patriae remedium paucorum vel unius dominationeum esse ratus, quum tyrannidem Athenis constituere studeret, non videbat suam de optima republica doctrinam neque tempori neque loco convenire. The first professions of Critias and his party are indeed well described by the antiquum tempus reducere; his real designs by the tyrannidem constituere ; but we do not perceive any other connexion between the tyrannis and the antiquum tempus.

We ought, perhaps, to have noticed a conjecture of Sievers with regard to the number of the council under the Thirty, of which he says, p. 47, puto senatum illum monut antea ex quingentis constitisse sed multo minorem ejus fuisse numerum. He does not, however, pretend to determine what the number was. If we suppose it to have been Three Hundred, this would both correspond to the Thirty and the Three Thousand, and would confirm a conjecture which we threw out, p. 183, as to the constitution of the council before Solon.

XW. on Lysander's Revolutionary projects

THE account which Plutarch gives, on the authority of Ephorus (dvāpd; saroporoi kai poogdoou, Lys., 25), of the mode in which Lysander meant to bring about the revolution which he meditated at Sparta, is chiefly remarkable as it shows the degree of credulity which he attributed to his countrymen. here was, it seems, somewhere on the coast of the Euxine a young impostor named Silenus, who gave himself out as the son of Apollo. Lysander had prevailed on this youth to lend himself to his designs, and hoped first to gain the sanction of the Delphic oracle for the impostor's pretensions, and then to use his authority to confirm a forged prophecy which was to be brought to light at Sparta, to the effect that the state would be more prosperous if the kings were elected from the worthiest citizens. Plutarch conceives that Lysander did not fall upon the thought of this machinery in aid of his revolutionary plans until they had been so far matured that he had procured a speech to be written for him by Cleon of Halicarnassus, with which he intended to recommend the measure. He was then struck with the difficulty of the enterprise, and bethought himself of playing upon the superstition and credulity jo. Spartans. All was ready for the execution of his project, when one of his associates became frightened, and withdrew; and his own untimely death soon after put an end to it. Nor was it discovered until the speech was found in his house, which, however, Agesilaus was induced to suppress by the advice of the ephor Lacratidas.

We cannot agree with Manso (Sparta, iii., 2, p. 47), that the circumstantial details with which the ancients relate Lysander's project place the fact beyond doubt; if its credibility rested on no other ground, we should not have been inclined to censure the temerity with which it has been rejected by a modern author, though the reason which he assigns for his incredulity—Xenophon's silence—would not be the less absurd ; for the same motives which induced the Spartan government to hush up the affair, would certainly have led Xenophon carefully to avoid all allusions to it. Our conviction of the truth of the main fact is grounded chiefly on its perfect congruence with the character and the position of ło, and with several well-attested events in his history. The motives which urged Pausanias and cinadon to a similar enterprise were all combined in Lysander. The ancients, indeed, do not agree in their accounts of his motives, and .*.*. as to the epoch when he first formed the design. But these discrepancies may be easily reconciled. The authors followed by Nepos ascribed it to his resentment against the ephors who abolished his decarchies; Plutarch, to his quarrel with Agesilaus. Both motives may have conspired to fix his resolution. It was not only, or for the first time, in the abolition of the decarchies that he had been thwarted by the ephors. It appears from Plutarch (Lys., 19, 20) that still earlier after his triumph at Ægos-potami he had expenenced some personal humiliation from them, which must then have been peculiarly irritating to him, from its con: trast with the extravagant flattery which he had received abroad, especially in the Ionian cities.

Nevertheless, {* again it is only the general fact that we can accept as probable, for it seems impossible to reconcile Plutarch's details with Xenophon's narrative. Plutarch says that Pharnabazus sent envoys to Sparta with complaints against Lysander, on account of damage done to his territory, and that the ephors put his friend and colleague Thorax to death, and sent a scytale to recall him. Lysander was alarmed by this message, and, before he quitted the Hellespont, prevailed on Pharnabazus to give him an exculpatory letter for the ephors; but Pharnabazus craft

ily submitted one which contained a repetition of his for

|

mercharges. Yet no punishment appears to have been inflicted on him, and a few days after he obtained leave, it is said, to set out on a journey to the oracle of Jupiter Am

each of the provinces, corresponding to the Spartan kings.
But again we read of a hundred provincial towns, which, as
one of those named among them (Æthea) was in Messenia,
must have answered to the ten provinces, so that the dis-
trict subject to each harmost included five towns. If, as
Lachmann thinks clear, Messenia was comprehended in the
30,000 parcels mentioned by Plutarch (Lyc., 8), there would
be 300 to each town, and this may therefore be considered
as the number of the families which possessed landed prop-
erty in each township, and formed a provincial nobility.
From them were elected the Councils of Ten, which, ac-
cording to the analogy of Lysander's institutions, Lachmann
supposes to have governed the towns under the harmosts.
But the decarchy was only introduced in the towns which
had been subject to another state, as the provincial towns
to Sparta. The Constitution of an imperial city, like Ath-
ens, was regulated on the model of Sparta itself, as nearly
as the difference of circumstances would permit. Hence a
council of Thirty was established there, in imitation of the
Spartan senate, while Piræus, as a distinct provincial town,
was ruled by a decarchy. Even for the Three Thousand
Lachmann finds a parallel in the Spartan institutions. It
was, as we have seen, according to him, the number of the
families contained in the three tribes before the admission
of the commonalty.
Ingenious as these combinations are, we doubt whether,
with regard to Athens, they do not place the state of the
case in a false point of view. That in the Athenian oli-
rchical party there was a predilection, or at least an af-
ectation of respect for the Spartan institutions, cannot be
denied. It is sufficiently indicated by the name of ephors,
which was assumed by Critias and his four colleagues be-
fore the surrender of the city. Among the remaining frag-
ments of the poetry of Critias is part of an elegy, in whic
he celebrates the superiority of the Spartan convivial usages
over those of the other Greeks. He had paid particular at-
tention to the institutions of the Greek states, many of which
he had described in a poetical work, which, it seems, bore
the same title as Aristotle's on the same subject. It would
therefore be possible that he might be better acquainted
than even Lysander himself with the Spartan constitutional
antiquities, for among them must be numbered the original
complement of the three Spartan tribes. But the question
is, how far it was the design either of Lysander or of the
Athenian oligarchs to assimilate the new Constitution of
Athens to that of Sparta. That it was the number of the
Spartan senate that suggested the council of Thirty is in-
deed highly probable, # not absolutely certain; but this
fact seems to be of very little importance, unless it was
part of a plan, such o: attributes to Lysander
and his partisans, of ordering everything strictly upon the
Spartan model. But of this assertion we find no proof; and
something very different seems to be implied in the lan-
guage of Xenophon where he speaks of the institution of
the Thirty. He would lead us to suppose that it was
avowedly only a temporary measure, preliminary to a new
Constitution, which was to be framed by Critias and his
colleagues, not, however, upon the Spartan, but upon the
ancient Attic model; and, indeed, it would appear as if
Lachmann had entirely overlooked that, besides the Thirty,
a larger council and other magistrates were actually ap-
inted, for whom there was no pattern to be found at
parta. Such professions especially became Critias, who
descended in a collateral line from Solon. But as Lysan-
der probably aimed at nothing beyond the establishment of
a very narrow oligarchy, so Critias, perhaps, never intend-
ed to make any farther changes as long as the councils and
the other magistrates were subservient to his will. As to
the reasons which induced him to fix upon the number 3000
for that of the citizens who were to enjoy the new fran-
chise, it does not seem necessary to resort to Lachmann's
hypothesis for an explanation. That number was naturally
suggested by its proportion to the number of the supreme
council, when the o was, whether the forms of the
preceding oligarchy should in this respect be retained or
altered. But it seems clear from Xenophon's account that
the institution of the Three Thousand was merely an after.
thought, which had not entered into the original plan el-
ther of Critias or of Lysander, and would never have been
conceived but for the opposition of Theramenes, and the
dangers which threatened the tyrants both from within and
without.
Severs, in his excellent little work on Xenophon's Helle-
nius, which has thrown more light than any other we have
met with on the period included in the first two books, ex-
an opinion which we think much too favourable of
the character and motives of Critias. This, however, is a
point with which we have here nothing to do. But the lan-
guage in which he speaks of the designs of Critias seems to
us hardly consistent with itself. He says, p. 50, Critins, juve-
nilo quolam et generoso ardore flagrano, antiquum to -
ut it a durain, reducere conatu-est. Sed hoc in consulio ex-
sequendo—ld hand facile quoquam negaret-nuhil pensin-
hil sancti hubuit, dummodo nd id quod vellet perveniret.

Then follows an attempt to excuse him, and to listinguish man. It seems clear that in this account there is much dis

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