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mora of Lacedæmonians, and a body of Sicy.
onians and of Corinthian exiles, to a gate where
the conspirators had contrived to get them
selves placed on duty. He was introduced
without any opposition; but, as the space be-
tween the wails was large, and he had brought
but a small force with him, he threw up a slight
intrenchment to secure himself until the sue-
cours which he expected should arrive. During
the next day he remained quiet, and was not
attacked, though, besides the garrison of the
city, there was a body of Boeotians behind him
at Lechæum; but aid had been summoned from
Argos, and on the day following the Argive
forces arrived, and, confident in their numbers,
immediately sought the enemy. They were
supported by their Corinthian partisans, and by
a body of mercenaries commanded by Iphicra-
tes, an Athenian general, who in this war laid
the foundation of his military renown. The
superiority of the Lacedæmonian troops over
the other Greeks, and the terror they inspired
even when they were greatly outnumbered,
was again strikingly manifested in the engage-
ment which ensued. The Argives forced their
way through the intrenchment, and drove the
handful of Sicyonians before them down to the
sea; but, when the Lacedæmonians came up,
they took to flight, without offering any resist-
ance, and made for the city; but, meeting with
the Corinthian exiles, who had defeated the
mercenaries, and were returning from the pur-
suit, they were driven back, and those who did
not make their escape by ladders over the
wall* were slaughtered by the Lacedæmonians
like a flock of sheep. Lechæum was taken,
and the Baotian garrison put to the sword. Af-
ter his victory, Praxitas was joined by the ex-
pected contingents of the allies, and he made
use of them first to demolish the long walls for
a space sufficient to afford a passage for an ar-
my. Next, crossing the Isthmus, he took and
garrisoned the towns of Sidus and Crommyon.
'On his return, he fortified the heights of Epie-
icea, which commanded one of the most impor-
tant passes, and then disbanded his army and
returned to Sparta.

Two battles had now been fought, in which almost the whole force of Greece had been engaged much blood had been shed, yet the war had not been brought a step nearer to an issue, and the only important object hitherto attained was the recall of Agesilaus. The belligerents were growing weary, and yet were not willing to withdraw from the contest; but, instead of putting forth their whole strength in joint expeditions, and running the risk of general actions, they contented themselves with an easier and safer, though a wasteful and bootless kind of warfare. Two important consequences of the long series of hostilities in which all the

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Greek states had been engaged now became apparent. The number of persons who went thrown upon war as a means of subsistenc had so much increased, that the contenta powers were able to carry on the strugge wi mercenary troops. Another result of the ang practice of war was, that it had begun to more and more studied as an art, and cultiva ted with new refinements. Thus Iphrates had been led to devote his attention to the provement of a branch of the light mantry, which had hitherto been accounted of litte no ment in the Greek military system. He ha formed a new body of targeteers, which a some degree combined the peculiar advantages of the heavy and light troops, and was ey adapted for combat and pursuit. To all these objects, he had substituted a linen corsin for the ancient coat of mail, and had reduced the size of the shield, while he doubled the length of the spear and the sword. At the head of this corps be made frequent roads into Peloponnesus, and in the territory of Phlius he surprised the forces of the little sta in an ambuscade, and made so great a slaugh ter of them that the Phliasians were obliged to admit a Lacedæmonian garrison into the town. They had before shrunk from this mode of securing themselves, through fear that ther allies might abuse their confidence, and might compel them to receive their exiles, who prefessed a more zealous attachment to the Lacedæmonian interest. The Spartans, howevet. acted on this occasion with perfect honour and good faith: they abstained from interiering a favour of their partisans, and, finally, when their protection was no longer needed, left the town, with its institutions unaltered, in the possession of the party which had intrusted them with it. But in Arcadia, such was the terror inspired by the troops of Iphicrates, that they were suffered to plunder the country with impunity, and the Arcadians did not venture to meet them in the field. On the other hand, they were themselves no less in dread of the Lacedæmonians, who had taught them to keep aloof in a manner which proved the peculiar excellence of the Spartan military training. They had found, by experience, that they were not safe within a javelin's throw of the Lacedæmonian heavy infantry; for, even at that distance, they had on one occasion been over. taken by some of the younger soldiers. The Spartans even ventured to laugh at the fears of their allies, which they probably observed with complacency, as evidence of their own superiority. A Lacedæmonian mora, stationed at Lechæum, accompanied by the Connthian exiles, ranged the country round about Corinth without interruption; yet it was not able to prevent the Athenians from repaining the breach which Praxitas had made in the Long Walls, which they regarded as a barrier that screened Attica from invasion. The whole serviceable population of Athens, with a com

Xenophon, with his usual brevity, omits to explain how these ladders were procured, as he frequently neglects minute circumstances necessary to the clearness of his narrative for instance, iv., 4, 5, Toù Kiovos-where Schneider's remark, that there were many pillars in the Acroco-pany of carpenters and masons, sallied forth to rinthus, does not account for the article-and iii., 3, 8, T Yovaika. But it is quite clear that these ladders were not fet down by the Corinthians in the city from the city walls. The wall (rod reixos) which the Argives scaled is plainly distinguished from the city wall (ὁ περὶ τὸ ἄστυ κύκλος); nor was there any reason why they should have killed themselves by jumping down the city wall, which was guarded by their friends

the Isthmus, and, having restored the western wall in a few days, completed the other at their leisure. Their work, however, was destroyed, in the course of the same summer, by Agestlaus, on his return from an expedition which he had made into Argolis, for the purpose of

Jetting the Argives taste the fruits of the war | the morning the garrison of Piræum, seeing the which they had helped to stir, and were most enemy above them, considered resistance as forward to keep up. After having carried his hopeless, and evacuated the fortress with the ravages into every part of their territory, he women, slaves, and all the property that had marched to Corinth, stormed the newly-repair-been sheltered there, and took refuge in a neighed walls, and recovered Lechæum. Here he bouring sanctuary of Here, which lay nearer to met his brother Teleutias, who, through his in- the seaside. But after the troops on the heights fluence, which in this case was better exerted above Piræum had descended and taken the than in that of Pisander, had been appointed to fortress of Enoe on the north, and Agesilaus the command of the fleet; and, having come had come up from the opposite side, the fugiwith a small squadron to support his opera- tives in the Heræum surrendered to him untions, made some prizes in the harbour and the conditionally. Among them were some of the docks. persons implicated in the massacre at Corinth.

But the appearance of Teleutias in the Co-These he gave up to the vengeance of the exrinthian Gulf was connected with other events, iles; the rest, with all their property, he exmore important than any which took place in posed to sale. Peloponnesus after the return of Agesilaus from Asia. That we may exhibit them in an uninterrupted series, together with their consequences, we shall follow Xenophon's order, and return to them after having briefly related how the war was carried on in Greece, in the campaigns which ensued down to its close.

The captures and the booty were brought out, and passed in review before Agesilaus, as he sat in an adjacent building on the margin of a small lake. His triumph was heightened by the presence of envoys from various states, among the rest, from Thebes, where the party which desired peace had succeeded in procuring an In the spring of 392, Agesilaus made a fresh. embassy to be sent for the purpose of ascerexpedition for the purpose of bringing the Co-taining the terms which Sparta would grant. rinthians to terms, by cutting off one of their Agesilaus, the more fully to enjoy their humilichief resources. The fortress of Piræum, at ation, affected to take no notice of their presthe foot of Mount Geranea, on the western gulf,tence, while Pharax, their proxenus, stood by afforded shelter for the flocks and herds which him, waiting for an opportunity to present them. were transported into its precincts from other Just at this juncture a horseman came up, his parts of the Corinthian territory, and maintain-horse covered with foam, and informed the king ed a numerous garrison, and the whole surrounding district had hitherto been exempt from the ravages of war. There was a prospect of at once gaining a rich booty, and striking a blow which would reduce the enemy to great distress; more especially as this was the easiest road by which the Boeotians could send their succours to Corinth. Agesilaus, perhaps by design, arrived at the Isthmus at the season of the Isthmian games, which the Argives were celebrating in the name of Corinth, the legitimate president. They were in the midst of the sacrifice, when the Lacedæmonian army appeared, and immediately abandoning all their preparations for the festival, fled to the city. Agesilaus remained encamped on the Isthmus, while the Corinthian exiles completed the sacrifice, and presided over the games, and then marched towards Piræum. After his departure the Argives celebrated the games afresh, in which it was observed that many of the late competitors returned to the contest, and that some were again successful. Agesilaus found Piræum so strongly garrisoned, that he did not venture to attack it, until, by feigning an intention of marching upon Corinth, so as to raise a suspicion of a secret understanding with a party in the city, he had drawn away most of the garrison, and among the rest, the greater part of the corps of Iphicrates. As soon as they had passed his camp-and though it was night, he perceived their movements—he only waited for daybreak to return towards Piræum, and the following evening detached a mora to occupy the heights which commanded it, while he encamped with the rest of his troops below. In Plut., Ages., 21.

Tu be carefully distinguished from the desert harbour of Pireus, at the other extremity of the Corinthian territory

on the Saronic Gulf, which we have had occasion to mention above. p. 440. It is strange that Schneider should intimate a doubt on this subject.

of a disaster which had just befallen the garrison of Lechæum, the loss of almost a whole mora, which had been intercepted and cut off by Iphicrates and his targeteers. The action was in itself so trifling, that it would scarcely have deserved mention, but for the importance attached to it at the time, and the celebrity which it retained for many generations. The occasion, however, was remarkable on another account. The inhabitants of the Laconian canton of Amycle never permitted any engagement, civil or military, to prevent them from attending the Hyacinthian festival. As this festival was approaching at the time when Agesilaus was on his march against Piræum, he had left all the Amyclæans in his army at Lechaum, to be sent home; and the commander of the garrison had escorted them with a mora of infantry and a troop of cavalry on their way through the enemy's territory. But deeming himself secure from attack, he had permitted the cavalry to accompany them a little farther than he went himself, while he returned towards Lechæum with the infantry. The movements of this little band were observed from Corinth, where, in addition to the ordinary force of the place, there was a body of Athenian heavy infantry, under Callias, son of Hipponicus, and Iphicrates had arrived with his targeteers. Callias and Iphicrates undertook to cut off the enemy's retreat. The infantry was drawn up not far from the city; the active service fell upon Iphicrates. Notwithstanding the terror with which, according to Xenophon, the Lacedæmonians had inspired his men, they did not now fear to venture within a javelin's throw of the enemy, and the Lacedæmonians, when galled by their missiles, were no longer able to overtake them, but only exposed themselves to increasing loss, while they spent their strength in repeated attempts for that purpose. An ex

cite them.

only to reflect by what means their own had been overthrown. Sparta likewise now ruled over unwilling subjects and offended allies, who only wanted a leader to encourage them to refriend left. Argos had always been hostile; Elis had just been deeply wronged. Corinth, Arcadia, and Achaia saw the services which they had rendered in the war requited with insolent ingratitude, and were subject to the control of harmosts, who were not even citizens of Sparta, but Helots; bondmen at home, masters abroad. The cities once subject to Athens, which had been tempted to revolt by the prostheir hopes, and groaned under the double yoke of a foreign governor and a domestic oligarchy. The Persian king, to whom Sparta mainly owed her victory, she had immediately afterward treated as an enemy. Athens might now place herself at the head of a confederacy much more powerful than the empire which she had lost. and the Spartan dominion would be more easily overthrown than the Athenian had been, in proportion as the allies of Sparta were stronger than the subjects of Athens.

serves that the Athenians, though they did not | They had shown themselves the real friends of receive any share of the gold, were eager for both the Athenian parties; while the Spartans war in the hope of recovering their independ- had as little claim to the gratitude of that which ence. And it is clear, from his own narrative, they had abandoned to its magnanimous adverthat similar feelings of jealousy or resentment saries as to the good-will of that which they towards Sparta already prevailed at Thebes, had helped to oppress. But it was chiefly to Corinth, and Argos, and were only waiting for the hopes and fears of his hearers that the an opportunity of displaying themselves in open speaker addressed himself. The Athenians dehostility, but needed no corrupt influence to ex-sired to recover their pre-eminence in Greece, and their readiest way to that end was to deThe anti-Laconian party at Thebes-the clare themselves the protectors of all who sufsame, no doubt, which had sheltered the Athe- fered under Spartan tyranny. If they were innian exiles, and had contrived the affront offer-clined to dread the enemy's power, they had ed to Agesilaus at Aulis, and which had, therefore, reason to dread his resentment if he should ever return to Europe as the conqueror of Asia -set the first springs of hostility in motion. The disposition to war they found already ex-volt from her. Indeed, she had not one sincere isting; a pretext only was wanting, and this they easily devised. Means were found to induce the Locrians of Opus to make an inroad upon a tract of land which had been long the subject of contention between them and their neighbours the Phocians. The Phocians retaliated by the invasion of the Opuntian Locris, and the Thebans were soon persuaded to take part with the Locrians, and invade Phocis. The Phocians, as was foreseen, applied for suc-pect of liberty, found themselves cheated of cour to Sparta, where, as Xenophon admits, there was the utmost readiness to lay hold on any pretence for a war with Thebes; and the present season of prosperity seemed to the Spartan government the most favourable for humbling a power which had given so many proofs of ill-will towards it. War, therefore, was decreed, and Lysander was sent into Phocis with instructions to collect all the forces he could raise there, and among the tribes seated about Mount Eta, and to march with them to Haliartus, in Boeotia, where Pausanias, with These arguments found a willing audience; the Peloponnesian troops, was to join him on they were seconded by many voices, and the an appointed day. Lysander discharged his assembly was unanimous in favour of the allicommission with his usual activity, and, be- ance with Thebes. Thrasybulus, who moved sides, succeeded in inducing Orchomenus, which the decree, reminded the Thebans that Athens was subject to Thebes, to assert its independ- was about to repay the obligation which they Pausanias, having crossed the Laconian had laid on her when they refused to concur in border, waited at Tegea for the contingents riveting her chains, by active exertions, and which he had demanded from the allies. They at a great risk; for she would have to face the seem to have come in slowly, and Corinth re- enmity of Sparta, while Piræus remained still fused to take any part in the expedition. The unfortified. Both states prepared for war. Thebans, seeing themselves threatened with Pausanias found an account that the Athenians invasion, sent an embassy to prevail on the sent envoys to Sparta, with a request that she Athenians to make common cause with them would abstain from hostilities against Thebes, against Sparta. There were many feelings and would submit their differences to arbitrato be overcome at Athens before this resolution; he adds that the embassy was indignanttion could be adopted: recollections of a long hereditary grudge, of the animosity displayed by Thebes during the last war, and especial- Lysander, having collected all the forces he ly at its close; the sense of weakness, and the could raise in the north, marched to Haliartus. dread of provoking a power by which Ath- but he found that Pausanias had not yet arrived ens had so lately been brought to the brink of there. It was not in his character to remain destruction. The Theban orator thought it ne- anywhere inactive, and he was desirous of macessary, in the name of his countrymen, to dis-king himself master of the town. He first tred avow the vote which Erianthes had given in negotiation to engage it to revolt; but there the congress, which decided the fate of the were some Theban and Athenian troops in the Athenians, as the unauthorized proposition of a place, whose presence overawed the dissaffectprivate individual. On the other hand, he urged cd, and he then resolved to venture on an asthe important service which the Thebans had sault. In the mean while his movements were more recently rendered to Athens in her great-known at Thebes, according to Plutarch, by est need, and by which they had incurred the resentment of Sparta, and were now driven to seek protection from Athenian generosity,

ence.

ly dismissed.* It can scarcely have been sent with any other view than to gain time.

means of an intercepted letter, which he had addressed to Pausanias, who was at this time * iii., 9, 11.

were felt by the troops as a degradation, such as a Lacedæmonian army had never before experienced. The general dejection and ill-humour which prevailed in the retreat were heightened by the insulting demeanour of the Thebans, who accompanied them on their march through Boeotia, and drove back all who deviated in the least from the line, with blows, into the road.

The conduct of Pausanias appears to have been, in the whole of this affair, perfectly blameless. He had failed, indeed, to reach Haliartus by the preconcerted day, but he arrived the day after; and when it is considered that he had to collect his army from many quarters, and that the allies were generally averse to the expedition, he may seem rather to have deserved praise for bringing it up so nearly within the appointed time. The disastrous issue could only be attributed to Lysander's imprudence; and the decision of the council of war with regard to the recovery of the slain, even if it was not clearly required by the circumstances of the case, could not reasonably be imputed as a crime to Pausanias. Yet, on his return to Sparta, he was capitally impeached; and the nature of the charges brought against him showed that he could not expect a fair trial, but was foredoomed to be sacrificed to public prejudice or to private passion, for the accusation embraced not merely his conduct in his last expedition, but the indulgence which he had granted to the Athenian refugees in Piræus, though his measures on that occasion seem to have been viewed with general approbation at the time, and had only been proved to be impolitic by the event. But, under the irritation produced by the recent shame and disappointment, the Spartan senate was no more capable of listening to reason and justice than the Athenian assembly on some similar occasions; and it is probable that Lysander's friends did the utmost to inflame the public feelings against his old adversary. Pausanias did not appear at the trial; he was condemned to death, and was obliged to seek shelter in the venerated sanctuary of Athena Alea at Tegea, where he ended his days. His son Agesipolis succeeded to the throne.

at Platea. Plutarch also relates that an Athenian army had already reached Thebes, and that it was intrusted by the Thebans with the guard of the city, while they marched to Haliartus, where they arrived before Lysander, introduced a small detachment into the town, and encamped the rest without. But Xenophon represents the Theban forces as arriving after Lysander, though he owns that he could not ascertain whether they fell upon him by surprise, or he was aware of their approach: it was only certain that a battle took place close to the walls, in which Lysander was slain. It seems clear, however, from a comparison of all accounts, that he was intercepted between the main body of the Thebans and the garrison, which made a sally; and he was known to have fallen by the hand of a citizen of Haliartus. His troops were put to flight, and betook themselves to the hills-a branch of the range of Helicon-which rose at no great distance behind the town. The conquerors pursued with great vigour, and incautiously pressed forward up the rising ground until the difficulties of the ground brought them to a stand, and the fugitives, perceiving their perplexity, turned upon them, assailed them with a shower of missiles, rolled down masses of rock on their heads, and finally drove them, in disorder, with the loss of more than 200 men, into the plain. The dejection caused by this disaster was relieved the next day by the discovery that the remains of Lysander's army had dispersed during the night. But the exultation of the Thebans at this fruit of their victory was damped in the course of a few hours by the appearance of Pausanias, who had received the news of the battle on the road from Platea to Thespiæ, and had hastened his march to Haliartus. Yet, according to Diodorus, he brought with him no more than 6000 men ; but so small a force could scarcely have produced the alarm described by Xenophon, who, with a slight touch of humour, exhibits the Theban camp as fluctuating between the extremes of presumption and despondency; for, the next day, their spirits were again raised by the arrival of Thrasybulus and an Athenian army, and their confidence was heightened when they perceived that Pausanias showed no disposition to seek an engagement. Lysander left his family in a state of poverty, His situation was extremely embarrassing. Ac- which proved that his ambition was quite pure cording to Greek usage, it was absolutely neces- from all sordid ingredients. But, if we may sary for him to recover the bodies of the slain, believe a story which became current after his who are said to have amounted to a thousand, death, and is related upon such authority that either by force or by consent of the victors. we can scarcely suppose it to have been withThe greater part lay so near to the town walls, out foundation, he was not satisfied either with that the attempt to carry them away by force fame or with the substance of power. He is would be one of great difficulty and danger, said to have conceived the project of levelling even if he should gain a victory; and the ene- the privileges of the two royal houses, and of my was so strong in cavalry, that the event of making the kingly office elective and open to a battle would be very uncertain, especially as all Spartans, no doubt with the hope of obtainhis own troops had engaged in the expeditioning it for himself. But the plan which he is with reluctance. He therefore held a council of war; and, after mature deliberation, the majority came to the decision-if, indeed, it was not unanimous-to apply for permission to carry away the dead. The Thebans, however, were not satisfied with this confession of their superiority, and refused to grant a truce, except on condition that the invaders should withdraw from Boeotia. These terms were gladly accepted by Pausanias and his council, though they

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said to have devised to compass this end, notwithstanding the superstition of his countrymen, which it was meant to work upon, sounds so marvellous that we do not venture to give it a place here, but only to mention its leading features in a note.* It is only a little less strange that he should have employed the pen of an Asiatic rhetorician-one Cleon of Halicarnassus-to compose an oration, which he once See the Appendix.

The

meant to deliver, in recommendation of the |
measure, as if it was one that could ever have
been carried by force of argument. Agesilaus,
it is said, having occasion to search Lysander's
house, after his death, for some public docu-
ment, lighted upon Cleon's harangue, and was
about to publish it, till he was persuaded by a
more discreet friend to suppress so dangerous
a piece. This only makes the story the inore
suspicious. Yet the main fact accords well
enough with the enterprising and intriguing
character of Lysander; and his quarrel with
Pausanias and Agesilaus may be thought to
have suggested such a mode of revenge. We
might, indeed, have been disposed to consider
this plan as the beginning of a series of liberal
measures for a reformation, which Cinadon's
plot proved to be so urgently needed, if the
manner in which he regulated the government
of other states did not render it doubtful wheth-
er he was capable of such enlarged and enlight-hensions for his personal safety. Sometimes,
ened patriotism.

nian mountains, the young lady was sent by sea,
under the charge of a Spartan officer, to the do-
minions of her intended consort; and Agesilaus
returned to take up his winter quarters in the
territories of Pharnabazus, and in the satrap's
own residence of Dascylium. Here were parks,
chases, and forests abounding in game of every
kind, and round about were many large villages
plentifully stocked with provisions for the ordi-
nary supply of the princely household.
domain was skirted by the windings of a river,
full of various kinds of fish. Here, therefore,
the Greek army passed the winter in ease and
plenty, making excursions, as occasion invited,
into the surrounding country far and wide, while
Pharnabazus was forced to range over it as a
houseless fugitive, carrying with him his fami-
ly and his treasures, for which he could find no
place of permanent shelter, and, even in this
Scythian mode of life, never free from appre-

CHAPTER XXXVI

FROM THE DEATH OF LYSANDER TO THE PEACE OF

ANTALCIDAS.

WHILE these movements were taking place in Greece, Agesilaus was carrying on the war in Asia with an activity and success which might well have alarmed the Persian court, and proved the wisdom of the precautions adopted by Tithraustes. On his march into the province of Pharnabazus, he was accompanied by Spithridates, who urged him to advance into Paphlagonia, and undertook to make Cotys, the king of that country, his ally. Cotys, who is elsewhere named Corylas, was one of those powerful hereditary vassals of the Persian king whose subjection had become merely nominal, and he had lately renounced even the appearance of submission. Artaxerxes, imprudently or insidiously, had put his obedience to the test by summoning or inviting him to court; but the Paphlagonian prince was too wary, and knew the character of the Persian government too well, to trust himself in its power, and he had openly refused to obey the royal command. It would add nothing to his offence, though something to his security, to treat with the enemies of Artaxerxes. Nothing could be more agreeable to Agesilaus than the opportunity of gaining so powerful an ally; he gladly accepted the mediation of Spithridates, who not only fulfilled his promise, and engaged Cotys to come to the Greek camp, and conclude an alliance with Sparta in person, but prevailed on him, before his departure, to leave a re-enforcement of 1000 cavalry and 2000 targeteers with the army of Agesilaus.

To reward Spithridates for this important service in a manner which would strengthen the Greek interest in Asia, Agesilaus, with great address, negotiated a match between Cotys and the daughter of Spithridates, so as to lead each party to consider himself as under obligations to the other, and both to look on him as their benefactor. As the season was too far advanced for a journey by land across the PaphlagoIn the Anabasis, vii., 8, 25.

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however, he hovered in the neighbourhood of the Greeks, and once surprised them in one of their marauding excursions; and though he had with him only two scythe-chariots, and about 400 cavalry, he dispersed a body of 700 Greek horse with his chariots, and drove them, with the loss of 100 men, to seek shelter from their heavy infantry. A few days after this skirmish, Spithridates learned that the satrap was encamped in the village of Cava, about twenty miles off, and communicated the discovery to Herippidas. Herippidas, who loved a brilliant enterprise, was immediately fired with the hope of making himself master of the satrap's camp and person, and requested Agesilaus to grant him, for this purpose, 2000 heavy infantry, as many targeteers, the Paphlagonian cavalry, and those of Spithridates, and as many of the Greek horse as might be willing to take part in the adventure. He obtained all he asked; but at night, at the hour of departure, he found that not half of his volunteers appeared at the appointed place. Nevertheless, fearing the raillery of his colleagues if he should desist, he persevered in his undertaking, and after marching all night, arrived at daybreak at the encampment of Pharnabazus. He overpowered a body of Mysians at the outpost; but their resistance afforded time for the escape of Pharnabazus and his family, who, however, left the camp, with a great treasure of drinking vessels and costly furniture, in the possession of the assailants. But Herippidas, being anxious, for the sake of his own honour, to deliver the whole booty into the hands of the officers who in the Spartan army answered to the Roman quæstors, took precautions to exclude his allies from all share in it; and he thus deprived the Spartan arms of an advantage much more important than the value of the spoil. For Spithridates and the Paphlagonians, indignant at this treatment, deserted the camp the next night, and repairing to Sardis, entered the service of Ariæus, who had again revolted, and was at war with the king: Agesilaus was more deeply affected by this loss than by any mischance that he met with in the course of his expedition; and he seems to have regretted it still more on private than on public grounds.

Not long after, a prospect seemed to be open * Δαφυροπώλαι

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