« PreviousContinue »
he might still be employed in the public service. The king very willingly complied, and sent him to the Hellespont, where not long after he achieved an acquisition of some moment to the Spartan arms. He prevailed on a Persian of high rank, named Spithridates, who had been offended by Pharnabazus, to revolt, and come with his family, his treasures, and 200 horse, to Cyzicus, and thence sailed with him and his son to Ephesus, and presented them to Agesilaus, who received them with great pleasure, and took this opportunity of gaining information about the state of Pharnabazus. This incident produced an apparent reconciliation between him and Lysander; but we shall see reason to suspect that on one side, at least, it was not sincere. Tissaphernes had no sooner received such an addition to his forces as appeared to him sufficient to overpower Agesilaus, than he threw aside the mask, and sent a message to the Spartan king, bidding him immediately quit Asia, or prepare for war. The council and the allies were somewhat daunted by his arrogant tone and apparent strength ; but Agesilaus, who had expected this result, and desired no other, told the envoys to carry back his thanks to their master for the advantage he had given the Greeks by his perjury. He then ordered his troops to put themselves in readiness for a long march; sent word to the towns which lay on the road to Caria to lay in provisions for the use of his army; and called on the cities of Ionia, AEolis, and the Hellespont, for their contingents. Tissaphernes thought he had the more reason to fear that the threat implied in these preparations would be verified, as Caria, besides that it contained the principal source of his private revenues, was a country ill suited for the operations of cavalry, in which his own strength lay, and Agesilaus' was extremely deficient.” He therefore concentrated all his forces there, and occupied the vale of the Maeander with his cavalry, to prevent the enemy reaching the passes which led into the heart of the province. Agesilaus had reckoned upon this effect of the satrap's selfish fears, and, instead of seeking him in Caria, marched in the opposite direction towards the residence of Pharnabazus. As this invasion was quite unexpected, he found the towns on his road unprepared for resistance, and collected an immense booty. He penetrated nearly to Dascylium without encountering an enemy. But in that neighbourhood he fell in with a body of Persian horse, and, by the issue of a skirmish which ensued, was made to feel its superiority in equipments and training over his own. The next day when he sacrificed, observes Xenophon—as if he was relating a providential warning, not a human contrivance—the victims were sound imperfect; and Agesilaus advanced no farther, but retreated towards Ephesus. There he spent the winter in preparations for the next campaign, and more particularly applied himself to the raising of a body of cavalry, which he perceived would be indispensable to the success and the safety of his suture operations. For this purpose he made a list of the most opulent men in the Greek cities, and compelled each of them, as
* Xenophon says, irrirby obk taxey. But immediately after (iii., 4, 13) we find that he had some.
the condition of his exemption from personal service, to furnish a trooper. In the spring he collected his forces at Ephesus, and put them into an active course of training, rousing their emulation by the prizes which he proposed for the most gallant show and the highest degree of expertness in every department of the service. Xenophon, as an old soldier, is delighted with the recollection of the military bustle which prevailed during this season at Ephesus. where the wrestling schools and the hippodrome were constantly enlivened by the exer. cises of the men, the market was abundantly supplied with horses, and arms of every kind. and all the trades subservient to war were kept in full employment. Among other devices for raising the spirits of his troops, Agesilaus borrowed a hint, it would seem, from one of Cimon's stratagems,” and ordered his Persian prisoners to be exposed to sale naked, that the Greeks might contrast the delicacy of their persons with the robustness of frames hardened by the exercises of the palaestra. Before he took the field again, a year having now elapsed from the commencement of his expedition, Lysander and his colleagues were superseded by a new body of councillors, and returned home. Herippidas seems to have been considered the chief of the new council, as Lysander had been of the last, and was appointed by Agesilaus to the command of the Cyreans ; and some of his colleagues were placed at the head of the principal divisions of the army. Agesilaus then gave public notice that he meant to take the shortest road into the richest part of the enemy's country. The notice was designed not more for the preparation of his own troops, than for Tissaphernes, who concluded that if this had been the intention of Agesilaus, he would not have disclosed it, and that now Caria was certainly his real mark. He therefore repeated the dispositions of the preceding summer, But while he waited for the enemy with his cavalry in the vale of the Maeander, Agesilaus directed his march towards the plains of Sardis, the richest of western Asia. During three days he traversed them without seeing an enemy; but on the fourth the Persian cavalry, which Tissaphernes seems to have sent forward as soon as he heard of the movements of Agesilaus, suddenly came up, and cut off many of the followers of the camp, as they were ranging over the country in quest of plunder. According to Xenophon, an engagement immediately ensued, in which the Persian horse, notwithstanding their great superiority in numbers—Diodorus makes them amount to 10,000 —were defeated by the Greeks, who were supported by their infantry. The victors followed up their advantage, and made themselves masters of the enemy's camp, where they found a booty which yielded upward of seventy talents Some of the camels taken on this occasion were reserved by Agesilaus to be carried, as a rarity, to Greece. Tissaphernes had already arrived at Sardos: and his countrymen, many of whom had probably suffered considerable loss from the invasion, bitterly censured him for leaving them urprotected, and even, it seems, charged him with treachery, though none of them could have lost
more by it than himself, if, as Diodorus relates, spatch which reached him as he lay near Cuma,
a magnificent park and pleasure-grounds, which he possessed in the neighbourhood of Sardis, were spoiled by the invaders. Still, his conduct afforded some pretext for such an accusation; and the complaints it excited were carried up to the court, where he had one implacable and powerful enemy in the fiendish Parysatis, who thirsted to revenge herself on him for his enmity to her favourite son. She had already found that Artaxerxes was weak enough to sacrifice his most faithful servants to her resentment, even when he knew that it was inflamed by the very services which they had rendered to himself; and according to the most probable account, it was in compliance with her request that he now ordered Tissaphernes to be put to death." He consented, perhaps, with the less reluctance, not only because he was persuaded that it was a just punishment, but because he had been led to believe that Tissaphernes was the main obstacle in the way of peace, and that his death would free his dominions from the presence of a formidable enemy. The execution of the sentence was committed to Tithraustes, who was appointed to succeed Tissaphernes in his satrapy, and was instructed to open a negotiation with Agesilaus. Accordingly, after executing the first part of his commission, which he did in the Turkish style by the hands of an underling, who surprised Tissaphernes in his bath,t Tithraustessent envoys to treat with the Spartan king. He affected to consider Tissaphernes as the author of the quarrel be: tween his master and the Greeks, and, as if the end of their expedition was now answered by their enemy's death, proposed that Agesilaus should return home. As to the Asiatic Greeks, Artaxerxes was willing to acknowledge their independence, on condition that they would pay their ancient tribute. Agesilaus replied, that he had no authority to conclude peace without the sanction of the government at home; but he would transmit the Persian overtures to Sparta. In the mean while, Tithraustes was very anxious that hostilities should be suspended in his province, and, pleading his own merits in the execution of Tissaphernes, begged Agesilaus, while he waited for an answer to the terms proposed, to turn his arms against the satrapy of Pharnabazus. To this Agesilaus consented, on condition that Tithraustes would defray the expense of the march; and he received thirty talents on that score. This was a step beyond former precedents; for even Tissaphernes, though he had not scrupled to conclude a separate truce, had not paid the enemy a subsidy for invading another part of his master's dominions.
On his march towards the territories of Pharnabazus, Agesilaus received a flattering testimony of the approbation with which his proceedings were viewed at Sparta, and of the disposition which prevalled there to support him in the prosecution of the war. By a de
• Diodorus, xiv., 80. Polyaenus, wii-, 16.1. According to Xenophon (see above, p. 539), he had provoked her reseatment by a wanton insult.
t Diodorus, u. s., owboatt Tuccasipuny &4 ruvos Aaptowallow ca-parov Motowevoy. Polyaenus, vol., 16, 1, calls him Anaus; but the words of Diodorus seem hardly to admit of Palmer's correction, Aptostov for Aaplegalov, and perhaps do root require any, unless thus is the Araus of the Anab and the Hellenics, rv., 1, 27.
Wol. 1.-4 B
he learned that he had been invested with the administration of naval affairs, that he was empowered to appoint whom he would to the office of admiral, and still to regulate the operations of the fleet at his discretion. Thus, to unite the supreme command of the army and of the navy in one person was an unexampled mark of confidence, and a striking indication of the new energy which ambition had infused into the Spartan counsels. Agesilaus immediately took measures for raising a fleet; and, by a judicious distribution of the burden among the maritime allies and his influence with wealthy individuals, collected 120 new galleys. But he was less prudent and fortunate in the choice of an admiral, and, instead of seeking the highest qualifications, consulted his private affection in the appointment of his wife's brother, Pisander. When this business was despatched, he continued his march to the satrapy of Pharnabazus.
These preparations, combined, perhaps, with other tokens, convinced Tithraustes that Agesilaus had no intention of withdrawing from Asia, but was inclined rather to extend than contract his views, and cherished strong hopes of effecting the conquest of the empire. He perceived that he had only purchased a temporary relief, and bethought himself how he might employ the gold, which was his last remaining stay, to greater advantage. The history of the contest between Greece and Persia afforded several instructive lessons, which were now peculiarly applicable. At the time when the first Artaxerxes was embarrassed by the success of the Athenians in Egypt, he sent an agent, as we have seen,” with bribes to Sparta, to procure a diversion in his favour. Tithraustes now resorted to a similar expedient. He sent a Rhodian, named Timocrates, to Greece, with a sum of fifty talents, which he was charged to distribute, with proper precautions, among the leading persons in the states which might be most easily induced to interrupt the progress of Agesilaus by kindling a war against Sparta at home. Not only was this mission itself a notorious and unquestionable fact, but Xenophon professes an equal degree of certainty as to the names of the persons who received the money. It was in Thebes, Corinth, and Argos, that Timocrates is said to have executed his commission. At Thebes he purchased the services of Androclidas, Ismenias, and Galaxidorus; at Corinth, those of Timolaus and Polyanthes; at Argos, those of Cyclon and his friends. Unless we suppose Xenophon to have placed too much reliance on a mere party rumour, it may perhaps be inferred, from the notoriety of the transaction, that the persons he mentions made no secret of their share in it, and considered the Persian gold as a subsidy granted for the support of a just and patriotic cause. We may at least venture to believe that, though it may have roused them to greater activity, it produced no change in their political sentiments; and we even doubt whether it gave rise to any events which would not have occurred nearly as soon without it. It was, indeed, natural enough for Agesilaus and his friends to attribute the disappointment of his hopes to the venality of their adversaries; but Xenophon himself observes that the Athenians, though they did not receive any share of the gold, were eager for war in the hope of recovering their independence. And it is clear, from his own narrative, that similar feelings of jealousy or resentment towards Sparta already prevailed at Thebes, Corinth, and Argos, and were only waiting for an opportunity of displaying themselves in open hostility, but needed no corrupt influence to excite them. The anti-Laconian party at Thebes—the same, no doubt, which had sheltered the Athenian exiles, and had contrived the affront offered to Agesilaus at Aulis, and which had, therefore, reason to dread his resentment if he should ever return to Europe as the conqueror of Asia —set the first springs of hostility in motion. The disposition to war they found already existing; a pretext only was wanting, and this they easily devised. Means were found to induce the Locrians of Opus to make an inroad upon a tract of land which had been long the subject of contention between them and their neighbours the Phocians. The Phocians retaliated by the invasion of the Opuntian Locris, and the Thebans were soon persuaded to take part with the Locrians, and invade Phocis. The Phocians, as was foreseen, applied for succour to Sparta, where, as Xenophon admits, there was the utmost readiness to lay hold on any pretence for a war with Thebes; and the present season of prosperity seemed to the Spartan government the most favourable for humbling a power which had given so many proofs of ill-will towards it. War, therefore, was decreed, and Lysander was sent into Phocis with instructions to collect all the forces he could raise there, and among the tribes seated about Mount CEta, and to march with them to Haliartus, in Boeotia, where Pausanias, with the Peloponnesian troops, was to join him on an appointed day. Lysander discharged his commission with his usual activity, and, besides, succeeded in inducing Orchomenus, which was subject to Thebes, to assert its independence. Pausanias, having crossed the Laconian border, waited at Tegea for the contingents which he had demanded from the allies. #. seem to have come in slowly, and Corinth refused to take any part in the expedition. The Thebans, seeing themselves threatened with invasion, sent an embassy to prevail on the Athenians to make common cause with them against Sparta. There were many feelings to be overcome at Athens before this resolution could be adopted: recollections of a long hereditary grudge, of the animosity displayed by Thebes during the last war, and especially at its close ; the sense of weakness, and the dread of provoking a power by which Athens had so lately been brought to the brink of destruction. The Theban orator thought it necessary, in the name of his countrymen, to disavow the vote which Erianthes had given in the congress, which decided the fate of the Athenians, as the unauthorized proposition of a private individual. On the other hand, he urged the important service which the Thebans had more recently rendered to Athens in her greatest need, and by which they had incurred the resentment of Sparta, and were now driven to seek protection from Athenian generosity.
* P. 301.
They had shown themselves the real friends of both the Athenian parties; while the Spartans had as little claim to the gratitude of that which they had abandoned to its magnanimous adversaries as to the good-will of that which they had helped to oppress. But it was chiefly to the hopes and fears of his hearers that the speaker addressed himself. The Athenians desired to recover their pre-eminence in Greece, and their readiest way to that end was to declare themselves the protectors of all who susfered under Spartan tyranny. If they were inclined to dread the enemy's power, they had only to reflect by what means their own had been overthrown. Sparta likewise now ruled over unwilling subjects and offended allies, who only wanted a leader to encourage them to revolt from her. Indeed, she had not one sincere friend left. Argos had always been hostile; Elis had just been deeply wronged. Corinth. Arcadia, and Achaia saw the services which they had rendered in the war requited with insolent ingratitude, and were subject to the control of harmosts, who were not even citizens of Sparta, but Helots; bondmen at home, masters abroad. The cities once subject to Athens. which had been tempted to revolt by the prospect of liberty, found themselves cheated of their hopes, and groaned under the double yoke of a foreign governor and a domestic oligarchy. The Persian king, to whom Sparta mainly owed her victory, she had immediately afterward treated as an enemy. Athens might now place herself at the head of a confederacy much more powerful than the empire which she had lost: and the Spartan dominion would be more easily overthrown than the Athenian had been, in proportion as the allies of Sparta were stronger than the subjects of Athens. These arguments found a willing audience; they were seconded by many voices, and the assembly was unanimous in favour of the all:ance with Thebes. Thrasybulus, who moved the decree, reminded the Thebans that Athens was about to repay the obligation which they had laid on her when they refused to concur in riveting her chains, by active exertions, and at a great risk; for she would have to face the enmity of Sparta, while Piraeus remained still unfortified. Both states prepared for war. Pausanias found an account that the Athenians sent envoys to Sparta, with a request that she would abstain from hostilities against Thebes, and would submit their differences to arbitration; he adds that the embassy was indignantly dismissed.* It can scarcely have been sent with any other view than to gain time. Lysander, having collected all the forces be could raise in the north, marched to Haliartus; but he found that Pausanias had not yet arrived there. It was not in his character to remans anywhere inactive, and he was desirous of making himself master of the town. He first tried negotiation to engage it to revolt; but there were some Theban and Athenian troops in the place, whose presence overawed the dissaffected, and he then resolved to venture on an assault. In the mean while his movements were known at Thebes, according to Plutarch, by means of an intercepted letter, which he bad addressed to Pausanias, who was at this toe at Plataea. Plutarch also relates that an Athenian army had already reached Thebes, and that it was intrusted by the Thebans with the guard of the city, while they marched to Haliartus, where they arrived before Lysander, introduced a small detachment into the town, and encamped the rest without. But Xenophon represents the Theban forces as arriving after Lysander, though he owns that he could not ascertain whether they fell upon him by surprise, or he was aware of their approach: it was only certain that a battle took place close to the walls, in which Lysander was slain. It seems clear, however, from a comparison of all accounts, that he was intercepted between the main body of the Thebans and the garrison, which made a sally; and he was known to have fallen by the hand of a citizen of Haliartus. His troops were put to flight, and betook themselves to the hills—a branch of the range of Helicon—which rose at no great distance behind the town. The conquerors pursued with great vigour, and incautiously pressed forward up the rising ground until the difficulties of the ground brought them to a stand, and the fugitives, perceiving their perplexity, turned upon them, assailed them with a shower of missiles, rolled down masses of rock on their heads, and finally drove them, in disorder, with the loss of more than 200 men, into the plain. The dejection caused by this disaster was relieved the next day by the discovery that the remains of Lysander's army had dispersed during the night. But the exultation of the Thebans at this fruit of their victory was damped in the course of a few hours by the appearance of Pausanias, who had received the news of the battle on the road from Plataea to Thespiae, and had hastened his march to Haliartus. Yet, according to Diodorus, he brought with him no more than 6000 men; but so small a force could scarcely have produced the alarm described by Xenophon, who, with a slight touch of humour, exhibits the Theban camp as fluctuating between the extremes of presumption and despondency; for, the next day, their spirits were again raised by the arrival of Thrasybulus and an Athenian army, and their confidence was heightened when they perceived that Pausanias showed no disposition to seek an engagement. His situation was extremely embarrassing. According to Greek usage, it was absolutely necessary for him to recover the bodies of the slain, who are said to have amounted to a thousand, either by force or by consent of the victors. The greater part lay so near to the town walls, that the attempt to carry them away by force would be one of great difficulty and danger, even if he should gain a victory; and the enemy was so strong in cavalry, that the event of a battle would be very uncertain, especially as his own troops had engaged in the expedition with reluctance. He therefore held a council of war; and, after mature deliberation, the majority came to the decision—if, indeed, it was not unanimous—to apply for permission to carry away the dead. The Thebans, however, were not satisfied with this confession of their superiority, and refused to grant a truce, except on condition that the invaders should withdraw from Boeotia. These terms were gladly acceptcd by Pausanias and his council, though they
* iii., 9, 11.
were felt by the troops as a degradation, such as a Lacedaemonian army had never before experienced. The general dejection and ill-humour which prevailed in the retreat were heightened by the insulting demeanour of the Thebans, who accompanied them on their march through Boeotia, and drove back all who deviated in the least from the line, with blows, into the road, The conduct of Pausanias appears to have been, in the whole of this affair, perfectly blameless. He had failed, indeed, to reach Haliartus by the preconcerted day, but he arrived the day after; and when it is considered that he had to collect his army from many quarters, and that the allies were generally averse to the expedition, he may seem rather to have deserved praise for bringing it up so nearly within the appointed time. The disastrous issue could only be attributed to Lysander's imprudence; and the decision of the council of war with regard to the recovery of the slain, even if it was not clearly required by the circumstances of the case, could not reasonably be imputed as a crime to Pausanias. Yet, on his return to Sparta, he was capitally impeached; and the nature of the charges brought against him showed that he could not expect a fair trial, but was foredoomed to be sacrificed to public prejudice or to private passion, for the accusation embraced not merely his conduct in his last expedition, but the indulgence which he had granted to the Athenian refugees in Piraeus, though his measures on that occasion seem to have been viewed with general approbation at the time, and had only been proved to be impolitic by the event. But, under the irritation produced by the recent shame and disappointment, the Spartan senate was no more capable of listening to reason and justice than the Athenian assembly on some similar occasions; and it is probable that Lysander's friends did the utmost to inflame the public feelings against his old adversary. Pausanias did not appear at the trial; he was condemned to death, and was obliged to seek shelter in the venerated sanctuary of Athena Alea at Tegea, where he ended his days. His son Agesipolis succeeded to the throne. Lysander left his family in a state of poverty, which proved that his ambition was quite pure from all sordid ingredients. But, if we may believe a story which became current after his death, and is related upon such authority that we can scarcely suppose it to have been without foundation, he was not satisfied either with fame or with the substance of power. He is said to have conceived the project of levelling the privileges of the two royal houses, and of making the kingly office elective and open to all Spartans, no doubt with the hope of obtaining it for himself. But the plan which he is said to have devised to compass this end, notwithstanding the superstition of his countrymen, which it was meant to work upon, sounds so marvellous that we do not venture to give it a place here, but only to mention its leading features in a note." It is only a little less strange that he should have employed the pen of an Asiatic rhetorician—one Cleon of Halicarnassus—to compose an oration, which he once meant to deliver, in recommendation of the measure, as if it was one that could ever have been carried by force of argument. Agesilaus, it is said, having occasion to search Lysander's house, after his death, for some public document, lighted upon Cleon's harangue, and was about to publish it, till he was persuaded by a more discreet friend to suppress so dangerous a piece. This only makes the story the more suspicious. Yet the main fact accords well enough with the enterprising and intriguing character of Lysander; and his quarrel with Pausanias and Agesilaus may be thought to have suggested such a mode of revenge. We might, indeed, have been disposed to consider this plan as the beginning of a series of liberal measures for a reformation, which Cinadon's plot proved to be so urgently needed, if the manner in which he regulated the government of other states did not render it doubtful whether he was capable of such enlarged and enlightened patriotism.
* See the Appendix.
rrom the death or Lysanner to the peace or anta Leinas.
While these movements were taking place in Greece, Agesilaus was carrying on the war in Asia with an activity and success which might well have alarmed the Persian court, and proved the wisdom of the precautions adopted by Tithraustes. On his march into the province of Pharnabazus, he was accompanied by Spithridates, who urged him to advance into PaphlagoThia, and undertook to make Cotys, the king of that country, his ally. Cotys, who is elsewhere named Corylas,” was one of those powerful hereditary vassals of the Persian king whose subjection had become merely nominal, and he had lately renounced even the appearance of submission. Artaxerxes, imprudently or insidiously, had put his obedience to the test by summoning or inviting him to court; but the Paphlagonian prince was too wary, and knew the character of the Persian government too well, to trust himself in its power, and he had openly refused to obey the royal command. It would add nothing to his offence, though something to his security, to treat with the enemies of Artaxerxes. Nothing could be more agreeable to Agesilaus than the opportunity of gaining so powerful an ally; he gladly accepted the mediation of Spithridates, who not only fulfilled his promise, and engaged Cotys to come to the Greek camp, and conclude an alliance with Sparta in person, but prevailed on him, before his departure, to leave a re-enforcement of 1000 cavalry and 2000 targeteers with the army of Agesilaus.
To reward Spithridates for this important service in a manner which would strengthen the Greek interest in Asia, Agesilaus, with great address, negotiated a match between Cotys and the daughter of Spithridates, so as to lead each party to consider himself as under obligations to the other, and both to look on him as their benefactor. As the season was too far advanced for a journey by land across the Paphlago
nian mountains, the young lady was sent by sea, under the charge of a Spartan officer, to the do. minions of her intended consort; and Agesilaus returned to take up his winter quarters in the territories of Pharnabazus, and in the satrap's own residence of Dascylium. Here were parks, chases, and forests abounding in game of every kind, and round about were many large villages plentifully stocked with provisions for the ordi. nary supply of the princely household. The domain was skirted by the windings of a river, full of various kinds of fish. Here, therefore, the Greek army passed the winter in ease and plenty, making excursions, as occasion invited, into the surrounding country far and wide, while Pharnabazus was forced to range over it as a houseless fugitive, carrying with him his fami. ly and his treasures, for which he could find no place of permanent shelter, and, even in this Scythian mode of life, never free from apprehensions for his personal safety. Sometimes, however, he hovered in the neighbourhood of the Greeks, and once surprised them in one of their marauding excursions; and though he had with him only two scythe-chariots, and about 400 cavalry, he dispersed a body of 700 Greek horse with his chariots, and drove them, with the loss of 100 men, to seek shelter from their heavy infantry. A few days after this skirmish, Spithridates learned that the satrap was encamped in the village of Cava, about twenty miles off, and communicated the discovery to Herippidas. Herippidas, who loved a brilliant enterprise, was immediately fired with the hope of making himself master of the satrap's camp and person, and requested Agesilaus to grant him, for this purpose, 2000 heavy infantry, as many targeteers, the Paphlagonian cavalry, and those of Spithridates, and as many of the Greek horse as might be willing to take part in thead. venture. He obtained all he asked ; but at night, at the hour of departure, he found that not half of his volunteers appeared at the appointed place. Nevertheless, fearing the raillery of his colleagues if he should desist, he perseve in his undertaking, and after marching all night, arrived at daybreak at the encampment of Pharnabazus. He overpowered a body of Mysians at the outpost; but their resistance afforded time for the escape of Pharnabazus and his family, who, however, left the camp, with a great treasure of drinking vessels and costly furniture, in the possession of the assaulants. But Herippidas, being anxious, for the sake of his own honour, to deliver the whole booty into the hands of the officers who in the Spartan army answered to the Roman quaestors,” took precautions to exclude his allies from all share in it; and he thus deprived the Spartan arms of an advantage much more important than the value of the spoil. For Spithridates and the Paphlagonians, indignant at this treatment, deserted the camp the next night, and repairing to Sardis, entered the service of Ariaeus, who had again revolted, and was at war with the king: Agesilaus was more deeply affected by this loss than by any mischance that he mo with in the course of his expedition; and he seems to have regretted it still more on private than on public grounds. Not long after, a prospect seemed to be open