the Syracusans by his presence. Gylippus, ac- | Megara, set about erecting a fortress for the secordingly, directed the Corinthians to send two curity of their baggage and treasure. Not long of their galleys to meet him at Asine on the after they received the expected re-enforceMessenian coast, that he might begin his voy-ments of cavalry from Segesta and their other age without delay, while they completed their allies, amounting with their own to six hundred preparations for the relief of Syracuse. About and fifty; and now, leaving a garrison in Labthe same time, the galley which had been sent dalum, they began the work of circumvallation to Athens for supplies and re-enforcements ar- on the slope of Epipolæ near the city, in a line rived there; and the Athenians voted 300 tal- which was the shortest distance between the ents and a squadron of 250 cavalry, and thirty Great Harbour and the Bay of Thapsus. The horse-bowmen, for the prosecution of the war. rapidity with which the work proceeded struck The men, however, were sent without horses, the besieged with consternation, and the genwhich were to be procured in Sicily. These erals drew up their forces to interrupt it. But succours were found at Catana in the spring by as an engagement was about to begin, they obthe Athenian armament on its return from an served an appearance of unevenness and disorexpedition, in which it had made an unsuccess- der in their line, which induced them to retreat ful attempt on the Syracusan fortress at Me- into the city, leaving only a squadron of horse to gara, had reduced the Sicel town, Centoripa, annoy the Athenian workmen; and this also and had ravaged a part of the enemy's terri-was routed in a skirmish with the enemy's cavtory.

alry, supported by a battalion of foot.

Thus checked, the Syracusans took the advice of Hermocrates, and renounced all thoughtsof facing the Athenians in the field, and placed their whole reliance on the hope of baffling the besiegers by carrying a counterwork across the

It was now daily expected at Syracuse. No farther precautions had been taken by the fifteen generals, who were permitted to retain their command to the end of its legal term. Hermocrates and his colleagues did not enter into office before the spring. They seem forth-line of the intended circumvallation. Even the with to have concerted measures for guarding the approaches of Epipolæ ; and it was resolved to occupy the heights with a body of 600 picked men, under the command of Diomilus, an Andrian exile, who had probably gained experience and reputation in the wars of Greece. Before they proceeded to their station, their troops, with the remainder of the Syracusan forces, were one morning reviewed by the new generals on the level near the banks of the Anapus.

But already, the night before, the Athenians had sailed from Catana, and on the same morning had landed at a point called Leon, on the south side of the bay, which is parted from the Great Harbour of Syracuse by the ridge of Epipolæ, at less than a mile from the heights; and their fleet had been moored at the neighbouring peninsula of Thapsus, protected by a palisade which was carried across the narrow isthmus. The Athenian troops immediately at full speed mounted Epipolæ, and reached the top, where it rises into a rocky hump called Euryelus, before the enemy was apprized of their approach. As soon as it was known, the Syracusan forces set out to dislodge them; Diomilus and his corps among the foremost. But the place of the review was about three miles from the heights; they caine up disordered by the march, and the Athenians had the advantage of the rising ground. The Syracusans were defeated, and lost three hundred inen; Diomilus himself was among the slain. The next day the Athenians marched down towards the city and offered battle; but as the enemy did not come out, they returned to the high ground, and on the very top of Epipolæ, just before the slope towards Syracuse begins, at a point called Labdalum,* on the edge of the cliff looking towards On or near the point now called Belvedere (see the Map of Syracuse in Dr. Arnold's Thucydides). Mr. Hughes (Travels, i., p. 85, Svo edition) is led by Thucydides and Diodorus to think that Labdalus was considerably lower in the descent than even Mongibellisi. The opinion of a learned traveller on such a point deserves attention. But since he only refers to the ancient authors, it would have been desirable that he should have explained how his opinion is to be reconciled with the remark of Thucydides, vii., 3 that Labdalum was not visible from the Athenian lines.

attempt might interrupt the enemy's work, and would, it was thought, be sufficiently covered by a part of their own forces. They began, therefore, near the new quarter Temenitesnot sparing the olive-trees of the consecrated ground for the more sacred purpose-and while they proceeded with the erection of a wall flanked with wooden towers, they endeavoured to secure the points by which it was most easily accessible with palisades. The Athenians did not attempt to interrupt their operations, that their own might not be delayed or their forces divided. But when the Syracusans, aving carried their work forward as far as seemed necessary, had returned to the city or to their tents, leaving a guard at the counterwall, the Athenian generals ordered a select bard of 300 men, with some of the light troops, w' om they put into heavy armour for the occasioa, to surprise it, while they themselves, with the rest of the army in two divisions, prevented any succours from approaching, and perhaps watched for an opportunity of entering the city. It presented itself; for the Syracusan guard, overtaken by the careless languor of a sultry noon, was dislodged, and fled towards the postern of Temenites, near which one division of the enemy was stationed, which rushed in pell-mell along with other fugitives. They were, indeed, expelled by the Syracusans, with a trifling loss; but the whole army proceeded without interruption to the counterwork, broke down the wall, and tore up the palisades.

Still the besieged were not wholly disheartened. It was the design of the Athenian generals to prevent the repetition of such an attempt, by immediately fortifying that part of the line which lay between the foot of Epipolæ and the Great Harbour, reserving the rest, where they were less exposed to interruption, till this should be finished. The Syracusans, who were still masters of the Great Harbour, as the enemy's fleet lay at Thapsus, now began to carry a ditch and a palisade across the marsh nearer the shore. The Athenians, as before, offered no interruption; but when they had finished

tures were made to the Athenian general. It seemed as if fortune had deprived Nicias of his colleagues, in order that he might enjoy the undivided glory of bringing an enterprise which he had so strongly condemned to the happiest issue. It was a pause, like that of the Iliad, while Hector's hand was on the ship of Protesilaus.

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION FROM THE ARRIVAL OF
GYLIPPUS TO ITS CLOSE.

that part of their own work which secured the south side of Epipolæ, they descended at daybreak, under the command of Lamachus, to the marsh, where they could only make their way by laying down planks on the mud, and fell upon the new counterwork. The Syracusans were dislodged, but did not give up their last hope without a hard struggle. An engagement ensued, in which the Athenians were again victorious. The right wing of the defeated army fled towards the city; the left attempted to reach the bridge of the Anapus, which would have afforded them a passage to the Olympieum, and being interrupted by the 300 picked troops, drove them back on the Athenian right, which was thrown into partial disorder. Lamachus, GYLIPPUS had been joined at Asine, where who was in the other wing, advanced with a he had manned two Laconian galleys, by two small body of troops to restore order in his others from Corinth, under the command of right, but having crossed a ditch with a few Pythen. With these they sailed to Leucas, followers, was surrounded and slain. This new where they were led, by a concurrence of many skirmish, being observed by the fugitives of the false rumours, to believe that Syracuse was alSyracusan right wing, encouraged them to make ready completely invested; and Gylippus, cona stand, and even to conceive the design of sur- sidering the affairs of Sicily desperate, only prising the Athenian lines on Epipolæ, where hoped that he might be in time to counteract Nicias had been left behind, only because a pain- the influence of the Athenians among the Italful disorder disabled him from accompanying ian Greeks. While, therefore, the Corinthians his colleague. His presence prevented a great were fitting out a squadron, consisting of ten disaster. For a detachment of the Syracusans of their own galleys, two Leucadians, and three took and destroyed an outwork which had been from Ambracia, he and Pythen pushed across erected in front of the line of circumvallation, to Tarentum, and proceeded to Thurii, where, and would probably have overpowered the guard through his father, Cleandridas, who in his exwhich defended the main works, if Nicias had ile had been admitted a citizen there, he had not ordered the followers of the camp to set fire connexions which he hoped might enable him to the machines and the timber which lay in the to arm the Thurians against Athens. But his intervening space. The conflagration stopped small force, which seemed only fit for a piratical the enemy's advance, and they were soon for- adventure, did not encourage them to comply ced to retreat before the victorious Athenians with his wishes, and he continued his voyage who returned from the field of battle. At the westward. But before he reached Locri he same time the Athenian fleet, according to or- was driven out to sea by a gale from the north, ders which had been given in the morning, was and with some difficulty made Tarentum again, seen entering the Great Harbour, and by its ap- where he was forced to wait for a time to refit. pearance extinguished every remaining hope of Intelligence of his approach had gone before obstructing the completion of the circumvalla-him to the Athenian camp, and Nicias might tion.

easily have provided means for stopping or intercepting his little squadron. The military virtue which Nicias possessed in the highest degree was prudence; the failing towards which he most leaned, timidity. For the first time, perhaps, in his life, he was so elated by success as to despise his enemy, and neglected to take any precautions against the danger until they were too late.

Gylippus and Pythen, having refitted their shattered galleys, pursued their voyage along the coast to Locri; and there they discovered that the state of Syracuse, though one of extreme peril, was not yet past relief, but that an army might still be introduced into the town from the side of Epipolæ. They deliberated whether they should make directly for Syracuse, or should sail to Himera, and march across the island with what forces they could

The besiegers now prosecuted their work with fresh ardour, and, since the arrival of the fleet, with many additional hands. They brought down a double wall within a very short distance of the shore of the harbour; and all the preparations were made for finishing that which had been begun on the side of the Bay of Thapsus. Supplies and auxiliaries flowed in from many quarters to the prosperous party. Provisions came in abundance from all parts of Italy; three galleys brought re-enforcements from Tyrsenia, and many of the Sicels who had before wavered, now that the fate of Syracuse seemed fixed, joined their forces to the victorious side. The Syracusans themselves began to despair of their own safety. They had lost all confidence in themselves; no succours were known to be at hand; and before long none which they could hope for would be of any avail. They endeav-collect; and they decided on the latter course oured to persuade themselves that their rever- without being aware of the risk which they ses had been owing either to the treachery or would have run if they had attempted the other. to the adverse stars of their generals, and depo- Nicias, on hearing of their arrival at Locri, had sed them from their office; but saw no firmer at length despatched four galleys to arrest their ground of reliance in the zeal or the fortune of progress, which, if they had proceeded straight the three whom they elected in their room. towards Syracuse, would, perhaps, have fallen The question of capitulation began to be dis-in with them. But they passed without intercussed; the more anxiously, as suspicions were ruption through the Straits, touching at Rhegientertained of treasonable practices; and over- um and Messana, and reached Himera in safe

authority was likely to have the greatest weight
with his colleagues, was averse to the enter-
prise, and would seize any fair pretext for giv-
ing it up.

But Hermocrates was so far from being able
to carry this vigorous measure, that a large par-
ty of the assembly persisted in treating the ru-
mour as incredible; some made a jest of it;
others, supposing it well founded, could see no
danger; a very small number adopted his views.
A popular orator, named Athenagoras, who
seems to have been invested with a kind of

of the commonalty, not only rejected the report
with scorn, but inveighed severely against its
authors. It was, he observed, not at all likely,
though every Syracusan ought to wish it might
be true, that the Athenians would be so infatu-
ated as, while the Peloponnesians were still
hostile to them, to embark in a new war, quite
as full of difficulty and danger as that which
they left behind them. Should they come, they
would find Sicily much better provided with
means of defence than Peloponnesus; and Syr-

gree of anxiety. Hermocrates came forward
to confirm their truth, and to offer such coun-
sels as the occasion suggested. After assu-
ring his audience that, incredible as the fact
might appear, he had ascertained, on good
authority, that the Athenians had fitted out a
great armament, which by this time was on its
way, and which, under pretence of succouring
Segesta and restoring the Leontines, was de-
signed for nothing less than the subjugation,
first of Syracuse, and then of all Sicily, he de-
sired them not, through wilful incredulity or
presumptuous confidence, to neglect the pre-tribunician character, as the official advocate
cautions required for their safety; but, on the
other hand, to entertain no fears of the impend-
ing invasion. The greatness of the hostile ar-
mament would give them one great advantage,
as it would probably unite the other Siceliots
in their cause; and if, as experience had shown
to be the ordinary issue of expeditions sent out
to so great a distance from home, it should
either be totally defeated or should utterly fail
of its object, the state against which it was di-
rected would reap the glory, though the enemy
should have been baffled by natural or accident-acuse alone would be more than equal to twice
al obstacles. It was thus that the Athenians
had gained the largest share in the honour of
repelling the barbarians, because they were
principally threatened. He advised them calm-
ly, but actively, to prepare for meeting the ap-
proaching attack; to repair and strengthen the
defences of their city, to secure their dominion
over the Sicels who were subject to them by
fortifications and garrisons, and to endeavour
to gain the independent tribes to their alliance;
to send embassies over Sicily, and engage their
Greek brethren to join them in warding off the
common danger; and others into Italy, to make
a league with the Italiots, or, at least, to keep
them from siding with the Athenians. He even
thought that it might be advisable to apply to
Carthage, which he knew had long viewed the
power of Athens with apprehension, and when
she saw it threatening an island so near her
own shores, might be roused to interpose; and
no state had greater treasures at its command,
or was in other respects a more powerful ally.
But, at least, no time should be lost in sending
to Sparta and to Corinth to procure succours,
and to urge them to renew hostilities with
Athens. There was, however, another meas-
ure which he would propose, though he did not
feel equally confident of obtaining their consent.
He would not wait to be attacked, but would fit
out a fleet, the strongest which they could col-
lect with the aid of their Sicilian allies, and
would send it, victualled for a two months' voy-
age, to Tarentum. If they arrived there before
the Athenians had crossed the Ionian Gulf, they
might find an opportunity, on a friendly coast,
of assailing the invading armament to great ad-
vantage on its passage, and of weakening and
distressing it, even if they did not strike a fatal
blow. But he thought it still more probable
that by the boldness of this movement they
should so confound the enemy, who expected In the mean while, the three ships which had
no resistance, that he would be detained, delib- been sent forward from Corcyra came to the
erating and collecting intelligence, at Corcyra, camp at Rhegium. They brought a report from
until the sailing season was past, or would aban- Segesta, which did not surprise Nicias so much
don the expedition altogether. Such a result as it disappointed his colleagues. It now ap
would be the less surprising, as the most expe-peared that the envoys who had been first sent
rienced of the Athenian commanders, whose from Athens to inspect the state of the Seges-

such a force as they were said to have raised.
It was impossible that they could transport to
such a distance the cavalry, or the infantry, or
the stores and ammunition necessary for such
an undertaking. It would be a desperate one,
even if they had the command of a city as large
as Syracuse, and in its neighbourhood; how
much more when all Sicily would be hostile to
them, and when, even if they were able to land
and to keep their ground, they would be confined
to the precincts of such a camp as they could
form with their ships, and the scanty means at
their disposal. But the greater the absurdity
of such a project, the less readily ought they to
impute it to a people so politic and conversant
with affairs as the Athenians. It was, hower-
er, easy to trace these idle rumours to their
fountain-head, and to see that they sprang from
the criminal ambition of a restless faction,
which hoped, by spreading consternation among
the people, to veil its designs, and to steal its
way to power. He should be at his post to
protect the commonalty from the machinations
of its enemies. And he ended his speech by
addressing the oligarchical party in a strain of
dignified reproof and expostulation on the folly
and heinousness of their conduct.

One of the generals now rose to put a stop to
the debate, and censured the turn which Athe-
nagoras had given to it by his insinuations.
"Even if the alarm proved groundless, they
could take no harm from putting themselves on
their guard. He and his colleagues would use
all diligence, both to ascertain the truth and to
provide for the defence of the city." It was
not before the Athenians had arrived at Rhegi-
um that the doubts of the Syracusans were re-
moved. They then applied themselves earnest-
ly to make preparations, as expecting an imme-
diate attack.

tan finances had been imposed upon by a false | sana, to try his arts of negotiation, but he could show of wealth which had been prepared to prevail no farther with the Messanians than to meet their eye. They had been conducted to obtain the offer of a market for the troops outthe temple of Venus on Mount Eryx, which was side the walls. After his return to Rhegium, indeed rich in consecrated vessels; but, as they the generals manned sixty galleys, with which, were of silver, their value was not so great as leaving the rest at the camp under the care of the splendour of the display. The Athenians, one of his colleagues, most probably Nicias, he however, had been still more dazzled by the sailed, accompanied by the third, along the great quantity of gold and silver plate which coast to Naxos. Naxos opened its gates to they saw piled on the sideboards of the princi- them, and they passed on to Catana; but here pal Segestans by whom they were entertained. was a party favourable to Syracuse, which was But it turned out that these treasures had been strong enough to prevent the Athenians from borrowed for the purpose from some neighbour- being received into the town, and the squadron ing cities, and that they had served, in succes- proceeded to the mouth of the river Terias, sion, to adorn all the banquets at which the where it was moored for the night. The next Athenians had admired them. When it be morning it moved in a column towards Syrcame necessary for the Segestans to reveal acuse; ten galleys were sent forward to enter their real condition, it appeared that they were the Great Harbour, to ascertain the state of the unable to raise more than thirty talents to de- enemy's naval preparations, and to observe the fray the cost of the war. This disappointment general features of the town, the harbours, and increased the dejection with which the Atheni- the neighbourhood which was to be the theatre an generals had been struck by the repulse they of war. It was also ordered that, as they sailmet with in their application to Rhegium. And ed by the town, a proclamation should be made, when they now proceeded to confer with one declaring that the Athenians were come to reanother, Nicias proposed that they should forth-store their allies and kinsmen, the Leontines, with sail to Selinus, and call upon the Segestans to supply pay, if not for the whole armament, at least for the sixty ships which they had asked for that on this condition they should stay until they had brought the Selinuntians, either by force or negotiation, to a compromise; but as this was the avowed object of the expedition, with this he would end it, and -unless some opportunity should offer itself of doing a service to the Leontines, or of gaining any other ally among the Sicilian cities-after having coasted the island, to exhibit the power of Athens, he would return home, and not subject the state to any farther cost and risk. Alcibiades thought that it would be disgraceful to retire without having made any other use of their great armament: he advised that they should open negotiations with all the Siceliot towns except Syracuse and Selinus, and en-sembly, which was held to consider their prodeavour first to win Messana, which, on account of its situation, was peculiarly important; that they should excite the Sicels, subjects of Syracuse, to revolt; and persuade the rest to aid them with troops and corn; and then, having ascertained the allies on whom they had to reckon, that they should attack Syracuse and Selinus. Lamachus was of opinion that, before the terror excited by their first appearance was suffered to subside, they should sail to Syracuse, and endeavour to draw the enemy into a battle before he had collected his strength and his courage. They would probably find the Syracusans unprepared and in dismay they might expect to enrich themselves by much booty still left in the country; and a victory would be the most efficacious argument to decide the other Sicilian cities in their favour. For the farther pros-merous, and had probably only found a difficulty ecution of the war, he would encamp at Megara, which was uninhabited, and at a short distance, whether by sea or land, from Syracuse.

It was necessary that two at least of the generals should sacrifice their opinions; and, as the plan of Alcibiades was a middle course between the two extremes proposed by his colleagues, it was adopted by Lamachus much less reluctantly than by Nicias. Alcibiades then crossed over in his own galley to Mes

to their country, and inviting those who were residing at Syracuse to quit the hostile city, and to take shelter in the camp of their friends and benefactors. No hostile navy appeared in the harbour; but a Syracusan galley fell into the hands of the Athenians, as it was crossing over to the town with the tablets containing a list of the serviceable citizens, which were kept in a temple in the outskirts: a capture which was afterward interpreted as an ironical fulfilment of the prediction which had promised that the Athenians should take all the Syracusans.* When this commission had been executed, the whole squadron returned to Catana. During the absence of the Athenians their Catanian partisans seem to have bestirred themselves, and succeeded in gaining permission for the generals to enter the town and address the as

posals. Accordingly, they landed with a part of their troops, and, leaving them at the gates, were admitted to an audience. The attention of all Catana was attracted to the debate; and, while the people was listening to Alcibiades, some of the Athenian soldiers, straying round the walls, discovered a postern which had been walled up, but in so slight a manner that they were tempted to force it, and, having entered unobserved, they proceeded quietly, without any hostile intention, to the market-place; but, as they were followed by their comrades, their presence did not remain long unnoticed, and, being attributed to design, it struck the partisans of Syracuse with such consternation that they immediately withdrew from the city. The opposite party, which was by far the most nu

in overcoming the distrust excited by the magnitude of the Athenian armament, now met with no resistance, and carried a decree for concluding an alliance with Athens, and for inviting the generals to transfer their camp to Catana, and the whole armament was soon aiter brought over and encamped there.

Information was now received which encouraged the Athenian commanders to hope that Plut., Nic., 14.

mal prosecution of Alcibiades; but the mutilation of the busts was the subject which chiefly occupied public attention, as the most alarming sign of a conspiracy against the state. The rewards that had been offered were of them

the sight of their forces would induce Camarina the witnesses produced by Androcles, in a forto embrace their cause, and it was at the same time reported that the Syracusans were manning a fleet. They therefore sailed, with the whole armament, to Camarina, and in their way touched at Syracuse, where they discovered that the rumour of the Syracusan prepara-selves sufficient to attract informers; and it tions was groundless; but at Camarina, likewise, they were disappointed. The Camarinæans showed no disposition to receive them, but pleaded the old compact, by which they were only bound to admit a single Athenian ship at a time into their harbours, unless they sent for more of their own accord. In their way back to Catana they made a descent on the Syracusan territory, and, for the first time, were assailed by a party of the enemy's caval-portant revelations both as to the profanation ry, which cut off some of the light troops that were scattered in quest of plunder.

The course of proceeding which had been proposed by Nicias, though still the safest, could not be taken without a humiliating confession of weakness, after different designs had been disclosed. The movement which Lamachus had recommended no longer promised the same advantage after the opportunity on which he calculated had been let slip. The success of the plan which had been adopted depended, in a great measure, on the personal character and the peculiar talents of its author, Alcibiades; and of these Athens was now to be deprived. On his return to Catana, he found there the state galley, the Salaminia, which had been sent with orders to convey him and several other persons who were serving in the army to Athens, there to be put upon their trial, on charges relating either to the mutilation of the Hermes busts or to the profanation of the mysteries.

After his departure, his enemies, freed from every restraint, redoubled their efforts to inflame the passions of the multitude against him. To kindle its anger to a sufficient degree, they saw that it was necessary to work upon its fears. The foundation of their whole scheme was the persuasion which they had contrived from the first to instil into the public mind, that the mutilation of the images was the effect, not of levity and wantonness, but of a deep-laid plot for overturning the constitution. It is the nature of such suspicions to be daily gaining strength, and to find food in the most trivial and indifferent occurrences. The profanation of the mysteries was easily believed to have been part of the same plan which lay at the bottom of the other acts of sacrilege; and every proof that convicted Alcibiades of an offence against religion was held to confirm the reality of his treasonable designs; while, on the other hand, all discoveries which tended to strengthen the popular prejudice with regard to the affair of the images were considered as additional evidence against him.

His rivals and enemies were not confined to one class or party. Androcles was probably instigated by a merely personal animosity; but he was aided by Cimon's son, Thessalus, who had, perhaps, no motive but the hereditary feud between his family and the house of Alcibiades. Thessalus, it would seem, very soon after the expedition had sailed, imbodied the testimony of the slave Andromachus, and perhaps that of

was the interest of the enemies of Alcibiades to multiply informations, and to involve as many persons as they could in the charge, that the alleged conspiracy might appear the more extensive and formidable. Andromachus was followed by a new informer, an alien named Teucer, who had quitted his residence at Athens, and had retired to Megara, and now offered, upon assurance of impunity, to make im

of the mysteries and the mutilation of the buste He gave a list of eighteen persons who had been concerned in the latter offence; and all who did not make their escape before they were arrested were condemned and put to death. Both Andromachus and Teucer were rewarded; but Pisander and Charicles, two of the commissioners appointed to conduct the inquest, declared that the information hitherto received unfolded but a small part of the plot; that the conspirators were much more numerous than Teucer's list, and that it was necessary to prosecute the inquiry with unabated diligence. This declaration, which opened a door for an endless succession of false charges and executions, diffused universal terror among the honest citizens; so that, if we might believe an eyewitness, the signal which announced a meeting of the Five Hundred, before whom informations were commonly laid, scared the crowd from the market-place, each dreading that he might be the next victim. Fresh discoveries were made as to the mysteries. A lady, Agariste, the wife of Alemæonides, whom, from her name, we might suppose to have been a kinswoman of Alcibiades, and a slave named Lydus, successively gave evidence of new profanations committed in other houses besides that of Polytion; but still the public anxiety was most intent on the other branch of the plot; and now a witness named Dioclides came forward to supply the deficiencies of Teucer's information.

Dioclides was an impudent and reckless impostor. We have no ground but his own statement for suspecting that he had any accomplices in his villany. He could safely rely on the public credulity for an eager reception of any tale which he chose to invent, and he seems to have framed one which he thought best adapted to his two ends of popular favour and private extortion. He stated before the council that he knew the mutilators of the busts, and that they amounted to about 300 persons. Chance had led him into a street by the theatre on the night of the outrage, and he had seen about that number of men enter the orchestra, and stand there for a time in groups of fifteen or twenty. The full moon shone upon their faces, and, as he stood concealed behind a pillar, he was able to observe the features of almost all. Though he saw no more of them that night, the next day, when the sacrilege was discovered, he concluded for what purpose * Andocides, Myster., p. 6