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DIOCLIDES.-ANDOCIDES.

they had been assembled; and his suspicions were soon confirmed by the admission of some of them whom he recognised when he taxed them with the deed. They had offered him hush-money, and he had kept their secret for a month; but, as they broke their promise, he was now come to inform against them. He then gave a list of forty-two persons whom he had already recognised, reserving to himself the power of proscribing as many more as he should think fit.

upon his information was the orator Andocides,
his father Leogoras, and many other members
of his family; a family which, by its noble de-
scent, was peculiarly exposed to the suspicion
of oligarchical views. One of the mysterious
circumstances in the occurrence which had
been the occasion of their misfortune was that,
amid the general mutilation of the Hermes
busts, one very celebrated image, which had
been erected by the Egean tribe, and stood
near the door of Andocides, was left entire: a
fact which tended to strengthen the belief that
he had been privy to the sacrilege committed on
the rest. With the prospect of death-the in-
evitable issue of their approaching trial--before
his eyes, Andocides, or one of his partners in
misery, seems to have been struck by the
thought of an expedient by which he might ex-
tricate himself and his friends, and might foil
Dioclides at his own weapons. He resolved to
turn informer himself. He adopted the evi-
dence of Teucer, combined it with a story by
which he plausibly accounted for the preserva-
tion of the Hermes near his own house, and
cleared himself and most of his friends of all
participation in the sacrilege. But he added
four new names to Teucer's list of persons
who were sufficiently connected with him to
His statement
confirm his credit for veracity, and yet had
means of making their escape.
was received with the firmer confidence, as the
calendar demonstrated the falsehood of that of
Dioclides, who confessed it, and pretended that
he had been suborned by two persons, one of
whom was a namesake and a kinsman of Alcib-
iades. This was probably another falsehood,
suggested by the prejudice which he knew to
prevail against all the friends of Alcibiades, and
which he hoped might operate in his favour.
The persons whom he named thought it prudent
to go abroad; but he was put to death, and
was, perhaps, among all who had been con-
demned in the course of these proceedings, the
first who deserved to suffer.

It is probable that, at the time when this story was told, no attempt was made to sift it. Delight at so interesting a discovery, and the desire of detecting the unknown conspirators, must have been the prevailing feelings, and would leave no room for doubts or objections. Afterward it was remembered that the night on which Dioclides pretended to have noted the features of so many persons by the light of the full moon, was a night on which the moon was not to be seen at all. But the council was not in a mood for such reflections. At the head of the list made out by Dioclides were Mantitheus and Aphepsion, two of the councillors who were in the room. Pisander moved that the persons on the list should be put to the torture, that all their accomplices might be known before night: a proceeding directly contrary to law, but which seems to have been considered as within the extraordinary powers with which the council had been invested; and his proposal was received with general acclamations. But the two accused councillors took refuge at the altar, and were at length permitted to give sureties for their appearance: they did not, however, wait for their trial, but immediately left the city. The council then proceeded in person to arrest all the others named by Dioclides, and threw as many as it found into prison. It was one great object of those who desired to prolong and heighten the prevailing excitement, to persuade the people that the plot, although detected, was still subsisting, and that liberty not only Thucydides could not satisfy himself as to had been, but was still in danger. About the same time that Dioclides laid his information, the credit due to the story of Andocides, and it news was brought that a Baotian army was would therefore be presumptuous for any one moving towards the frontier,† and it was im- now to pronounce upon it; but the narrative mediately concluded that the enemy was in which we have still remaining from the hand The of Andocides himself, in an oration composed correspondence with the conspirators. council sent for the generals, and ordered them some years after in his own defence, raises a to make a proclamation, enjoining all the citi- strong suspicion that it had, at most, but a very zens to assemble in arms in certain public places slender groundwork of truth. All appears to of the city and Piræus, and to remain there all have been artfully accommodated to the prevailnight. The presiding part of the council (the ing opinion as far as was consistent with his perPrytanes) slept in the council-chamber, and the sonal objects. He chimes in with the popular rest of the Five Hundred in the citadel. In the suspicion by representing the mutilation of the midst of this alarm Dioclides was honoured images as the result of a deliberate plan, but as with extraordinary marks of public gratitude, as signs no motive for it. And thus, although his the benefactor of his country. He was crown-information set the public anxiety at rest with ed, and drawn in a chariot to the council-house, to be entertained there among the privileged guests at the public table.

Among the prisoners who had been arrested

regard to this affair, and put an end to the pros-
ecutions grounded on it, so as to restore com-
parative tranquillity, it left the general appre-
The attention of the people
hensions of a plot against the democracy as
active as ever.
was now directed with undivided earnestness
to the profanation of the mysteries, in which
Alcibiades was more immediately concerned.

Yet this circumstance rests only on the evidence of Plutarch, Alcib., 20, who does not seem to know which of the informers it was, and Diodorus (xii., 2), whose account, if it was meant to apply to Dioclides, differs totally from that of Andocides; while Andocides, who mentions that Diochdes pretended to have seen the Hermes break-It does not appear that he was even charged ers by the light of the full moon, does not intimate that he was detected in his falsehood by the real age of the moon.

On the variance between Andocides and Thucydides as
to this point, see Appendix IV.
VOL 1-G OG

with having personally taken a part in the other sacrilege; possibly he was at the time absent from the city on business connected with the

expedition. But this mattered little, so long as | ciated together as they were in the minds of

the Athenians. But, perhaps, the difficulty may not without reason have appeared much less to the contemporaries of Alcibiades, who were rather disposed by their views of religion to regard them as inseparable. The readiness with which they listened to the suggestion of his enemies is chiefly remarkable, as it shows the high estimate they had formed of his talents and activity, which seemed to render it credible, that he might at the same time be conducting the war in Sicily, and a conspiracy at Athens.

The strong apprehensions which were entertained of his influence with the army were indicated by the orders which accompanied the decree for his recall, that he should not be arrested, but only summoned to his trial. Accord

persons involved in the like charges, to accompany the Salaminia in his own galley. His resolution on the course which he should take was formed almost as soon as he received the summons. He determined not to return to Athens, but, as he was no longer able to serve his country, to show how deeply he could injure it. Before he left Sicily, he took measures for defeat

both were believed to be links in one conspiracy; yet great efforts were needed to induce the people to take the step, which it was the aim of his enemies to accomplish, of recalling him from his command to a trial in which the verdict was already given against him. The detriment which the Sicilian expedition would suffer from his absence, the danger which might arise from driving him to extremities, were determents that struck every one who was not blinded by personal hatred. It was necessary to goad the people by its fears, and to impress it with the belief that it was in hourly danger of an oligarchical revolution, and that it would never be safe from the machinations of the friends of Alcibiades as long as he, though at a distance, encouraged them to rely on his sup-ingly, he was permitted, together with the other port. But perhaps it would have been scarcely possible to work so far upon popular credulity, if some occurrences had not taken place at the same juncture which powerfully confirmed the suspicion of domestic treachery. A Spartan army marched as far as the Isthmus, and remained there while some negotiation, the object of which was unknown, was carried on with the Boeotians, whose forces were, perhaps, stilling a plan that had been concerted with a party near the borders of Attica.* These movements were all interpreted as connected with the supposed conspiracy; and the alarm was heightened by the intelligence that fears were entertained at Argos of a plot against the democracy, which was there imputed to the citizens who were allied by hospitality with Alcibiades. This, indeed, was an almost unavoidable effect of the scenes which were now passing at Athens; but his enemies at home magnified the danger of Argos, and obtained a decree, by which those Argive citizens whom Alcibiades himself had carried away for the security of the democratical government, were consigned to the discre- The departure of Alcibiades left his colleagues tion of the opposite party, which put them all to at liberty to make any change which they might death. The coincidence of so many alarming think fit in their plans. Lamachus was disposed events, which were all referred to Alcibiades as to pay great deference to the authority of Nithe secret mover of their hidden springs, crea- | cias. Yet it seems to have been no longer a ted a new panic at Athens, in which the people question between them, whether the war was -now regardless of every object but that of to be carried on, nor whether Syracuse was to getting their dreaded enemy into their power-be the main point of attack; nor was the course passed the decree which the Salaminia carried to Catana.

When we review the whole course of these proceedings at a distance, which secures us from the passions that agitated the actors, we may be apt to exclaim, "In all history it will be difficult to find such another instance of popular phrensy." But the recollection that these are the very words in which Hume spoke of our own Popish Plot, may serve to moderate our surprise and our censure of the Athenians.† Their credulity was in one respect, at least, less absurd than that of our forefathers, inasmuch as there was an evident, strange, and mysterious fact on which it reposed. We, indeed, see so little connexion between acts of daring impiety and designs against the state, that we can hardly understand how they could have been asso

See Appendix IV.

t it is curious enough that Wachsmuth, as if he had forgotten the history of our Popish Plot, observes of the Athenian proceedings in the affair of the Hermes busts, that their like will hardly be found in any state of mature civilization.-L., 2, p. 191.

in Messana for betraying the town to the Athenians. At Thurii he went on shore with his companions, and concealed himself until the Salaminia sailed away. When his escape was known at Athens, sentence of death was passed upon him, his property was confiscated, and the priests and priestesses were ordered to curse him according to the forms prescribed by an ancient custom, waving red banners, with their faces turned towards the west. The priestess Theano alone refused to obey this order; cursing, she said, was no part of her priestly funetions.

of negotiation proposed by Alcibiades wholly abandoned. But Nicias was still bent on inspecting the state of things at Segesta in person; partly with the view of collecting all the supplies that the Segestans could raise, and partly, perhaps, with the hope of composing their differences with Selinus, and thus, it might be, of gaining one step towards a safe and honourable termination of the enterprise. The want of money may have seemed to render this voyage necessary, though in all other respects it was a mere waste of precious time. The armament was disposed in two divisions, one under each general, which proceeded together along the north coast. At Himera they could not gain admittance; but advancing westward, they made themselves masters of a town named Hyceara, belonging to the Sicanians, who were at war with their neighbours of Segesta. On this pretext the Athenians carried away the whole population to slavery; the real motive was, no doubt, the value of the captives, with whom the fleet sailed back to Catana, while the army returned by land through the country of

the Sicels. Nicias himself proceeded to Se-
gesta, where he could obtain no more than thir-
ty talents; but the sale of the captives yielded
a hundred and twenty.

419

[graphic]

to attack. They were not interrupted in these operations until the return of the Syracusan army was announced to them by the appearance offered battle. But as the Athenians did not of the cavalry, and it soon after came up and move from their position, the Syracusans fell back behind a causeway which led across the marshes to the town of Helorus on the eastern coast, and there encamped for the night.

al, who, after landing in an enemy's country, The seeming timidity of the Athenian genertook so many precautions to avoid fighting, revived all the confidence of the Syracusans, which had been a little abated by the vigour he had displayed in the execution of his stratagem. They concluded that he did not intend to risk a battle, and were surprised the next day to see the Athenian forces drawn out for action. The Syracusan generals hastily formed their line; but some of their men, on the presumption that they would not be wanted, had been permitted to go home, and did not return till the battle had begun. They were probably superior in numbers; but their great advantage consisted in their cavalry, which was 1200 strong, of which Gela contributed 200. Selinus furnished a larabout twenty horse and fifty bowmen. On the other hand, the Athenian army was composed of disciplined soldiers, while in the Syracusan militia there were many who had never fought before. Yet Nicias, in the harangue by which he encouraged his troops, did not think it useless to remind them that they were about to fight on ground where defeat would be destructive, since their retreat would be cut off by the enemy's cavalry. The Syracusans fought bravely; but they were, for the most part, so new to arms, that even a thunder-storm which happened during the engagement helped to disconcert them. They were at length put to flight; but their cavalry checked the pursuit, and enabled them to collect themselves again on the Helorine Causeway, and to retreat in good order to the Olympieum. Nicias had, it seems, been the city, after having sent a garrison to protect prevented by religious scruples from stripping it of its treasures, though he was in great want of money.*

After this expedition, as the armament was not to be employed against Selinus, Syracuse appeared to be the only object remaining for its operations. Yet it was not before the autumn that the generals prepared to move against it. In the mean while they sent round to the Sicels on the coast for re-enforcements, and made an assault on the town of Hybla near Gela, in which they were repulsed. The circumstances under which Lamachus had first proposed to land the army near Syracuse were now completely changed. The fears which their first appearance had raised in the Syracusans had subsided as the expected invasion was delayed, and at length-when, instead of approaching Syracuse, the Athenians moved away to the most distant part of the island, and then were baffled before Hybla-made way for contempt. The Syracusans called upon their generals, since the enemy would not come to them, to lead them against Catana. And their parties of horse, sent out to observe the motions of the Athenians, would ride up to the camp and ask wheth-ger body of infantry; but Camarina only sent er they were come to reinstate the Leontines, or themselves to settle in Sicily. But this excess of confidence might be no less serviceable to a prudent enemy than the dejection which it succeeded; and Nicias skilfully took advantage of it to effect a landing and take up a position near Syracuse, without the hinderance which was to be apprehended from the Syracusan cavalry. He sent a Catanian, whom the Syracusan generals believed to be in their interest, to say that their partisans in Catana had laid a plan for burning the Athenian fleet. "Most of the Athenians were used to pass the night in the town. If the Syracusans would march with their whole force so as to reach Catana by daybreak, their friends would shut the gates on their Athenian guests, and set fire to their ships, and the Syracusans would thus be enabled easily to make themselves masters of the camp, and of the whole armament." The Syracusan generals fell into the snare the more readily, as they had before purposed, in compliance with the public wish, to make an expedition to Catana. A day was fixed for the execution of the ment, for the Syracusans only lost between two This victory, though in itself of no great moplan, and when it approached the whole force and three hundred men, answered the purpose of Syracuse set out for Catana. The Athenian of restoring the reputation of the Athenian generals were apprized of their movements, and arms; and this seems to have been the only embarked their troops so as to enter the har- end that the generals had proposed to thembour of Syracuse nearly at the same hour of selves in the expedition. But the battle itself the morning that the enemy reached Catana, proved that they could not hope to carry on the and discovered the stratagem. While they retraced their march, the Athenians had leisure was also necessary to raise fresh supplies of war against Syracuse without cavalry; and it to occupy a strong position near the shore of money before they engaged in a difficult and exthe Great Harbour, between the river Anapus pensive siege. They therefore sailed away imand the foot of a steep eminence, on which stood mediately after the battle, intending, while they an Olympieum, or temple of Olympian Zeus, at waited for remittances from Athens, to reap the about a mile's distance from the city, where most important fruits of their victory in negothey would be protected from the enemy's cav-tiation with the Sicilian towns, some of which alry, on one side by the cliffs of the Olympieum, on the other by trees, buildings, and the Lysimelian marsh, through which the Anapus runs into the sea. They destroyed the bridge of the Anapus, enclosed their ships with a palisade, and threw up a hasty work at a point called Dascon, by which their position was most open

ly contracted with the Athenians could not properly be pleaded as an excuse for letting them crush the independence of Sicily. Nor were they so formidable as to justify an unwilling accession to their alliance, which even their kinsmen of Rhegium had declined. They had shown, by their late retreat from Syracuse after a victory, how little their forces were able to cope with those of the Sicilian states, if leagued together; and now aid was to be expected from Peloponnesus. By keeping aloof from the struggle Camarina would either betray the independence of Syracuse, as well as her own; or, if the Syracusans prevailed, would incur their just vengeance no less than by open enmity.

the friends of Syracuse on their guard, and they | complained, however, not of the Athenians, who had overpowered their adversaries. After stay- merely followed the impulse of natural ambiing thirteen days before the city, the Athenian tion, but of the disunion of the Sicilian Greeks, generals, seeing no prospect of success, sailed which had encouraged such projects against away to Naxos, where they took up their win- their liberty, and exposed them to the danger ter quarters, perhaps to avoid molestation from of being separately subdued, Dorians as they Syracuse, and sent a galley to Athens, to soli- were, by an inferior race. He reminded those cit a supply of money and of cavalry, that they who were jealous of the power of Syracuse, that might be able to prosecute the war in the spring. her strength, which exposed her to the first atMeanwhile the Syracusans had been suffi- tack of a foreign enemy, was likewise a ramciently humbled by their defeat to listen to the part to the weaker states, and that it was idle advice of Hermocrates, who easily persuaded to wish that this barrier might be strong on one them that their disaster was owing, not to any side and weak on the other; or that Syracuse inferiority in valour, but to the defects of their might continue to protect her neighbours from military system and their discipline; and pre- aggression, and yet be so humbled as not to exvailed on them to reduce the number of their cite their envy. Camarina, as her nearest generals the supreme command had hitherto neighbour, was bound even by a sense of interbeen divided among fifteen-and to enlarge their est to lend the most active aid in warding off powers, which were before so limited that nei- | the danger, which was removed only by the disther secrecy nor subordination could be preserv-tance of Syracuse from her own door. Neued. The people now elected three generals-trality in her case would be equally unjust and of whom Hermocrates himself was one-with impolitic. The relations which she had formerunlimited authority, which was secured to them by an oath. At the same time, other measures were adopted for putting the army on a better footing; and envoys were sent to Corinth and Sparta, to obtain succours, and to induce them to make a diversion in favour of Syracuse, by attacking the Athenians at home. It was probably at the suggestion of the same judicious counsellor, that the Syracusans, in the course of the winter, took a precaution against the siege, which was to be expected if the enemy should be victorious in the field. To render circumvallation more difficult, they enlarged the circuit of the city wall, and enclosed a new quarter on the north side of the Great Harbour, taking in a Temenos, or tract consecrated to Apollo, which contained a celebrated colossal statue of the god, hence named, as was the new quarter itself, Temenites. A much more ef fectual precaution, that of securing the long broad ridge which sloped down towards the city from the northwest-from its commanding position called Epipolæ, as we should say, Overton-over which a besieging army must carry its line of circumvallation, was neglected or deferred. It was thought sufficient for the present to fortify the deserted site of Megara, which lay to the north of Epipolæ, and the Olympieum, where before there had been only an open hamlet round the temple. The army was also led against Catana, where it ravaged the land and burned the camp left there by the enemy. And when it was known that the Athenians were renewing their attempt to draw Camarina into their alliance, Hermocrates was sent at the head of an embassy to secure the Camarinæans, who had betrayed their lukewarmness in the cause of Syracuse by the scanty succours they had sent, and might be tempted by the late success of the Athenians openly to side with them. In an assembly which was held at Camarina to give audience to the Athenian and the Syracusan envoys, Hermocrates exposed the shallowness of the pretext by which the Athenians attempted to cover their real designs in the in-states the power of Syracuse must always be vasion of Sicily. He contrasted their professions of sympathy towards the Chalcidians of Leontium with their conduct towards the Chalcidians of Euboea, whom, notwithstanding their affinity, they held in degrading subjection. He

On the side of Athens, Euphemus filled the part which, if the occasion had arisen some months sooner, would probably have been assigned to Alcibiades. He contended that though Athens had been compelled, by the hereditary enmity of the Peloponnesian Dorians, to establish her maritime empire in her own defence, she could not be rightly charged with injustice towards her Ionian subjects, who had forfeited all claim to milder treatment, when, through a pusillanimous selfishness, they lent their forces to the barbarian against their common parent. The Athenians did not wish to exaggerate the merit of their sacrifices in the cause of Greece, or pretend to be governed by any more exalted views than a politic regard to their own safety; but, if tried by this test, their professions as to the designs of their present expedition might be safely believed. It was as much their interest to maintain the independence of their Sicilian allies, as a counterpoise to the power of Syracuse, as it was to deprive their subjects in the east of the means of resisting them. Yet even there policy prescribed some exceptions to their general rule, as in the case of Chios and Methymna; and several of the islanders in the Western seas, on account of their position with regard to Peloponnesus, were allowed to enjoy entire independence. To the Sicilian

an object of reasonable jealousy; but the fears which had been suggested of Athens-as if she could either make conquests in Sicily, or retain them, without the concurrence of the Sicilians themselves-were chimerical and absurd; and

it was an affront to the understanding of the Camarinæans to call upon them to take part with the oppressors of Sicilian liberty against its upholders. It was sufficient for them to know that their interests were intimately united with those of Athens, and that they might securely take advantage of that stirring spirit, which prompted her to interpose wherever her aid was required, and which rendered her very name a restraint to ambition and a bulwark for the helpless.

conciliate the prejudices of his hearers by a liberal sneer at the Athenian Constitution, and by ascribing his expulsion to the party which carried democratical license to its most extravagant excess,* he proceeded to relate the design with which the Sicilian expedition had been undertaken; those which he himself, perhaps, in his visions of greatness had really conceived. The conquest of Sicily was to be a step to that of the Italian Greeks, which was to be followed by an attempt upon the Carthaginian But the Camarinæans could neither shut empire. If these enterprises succeeded, Peltheir eyes to the danger with which the inde- oponnesus was to be blockaded with a fleet, for pendence of Sicily was threatened by the Athe- which plentiful materials would be furnished by nians, nor suppress their habitual jealousy and the forests of Italy, and with an army raised aversion towards Syracuse; and they decided from the Greek cities and the most warlike baron observing a strict neutrality. The Athe-barians of the west, in addition to the present nians were more successful in their negotia-military and naval force of Athens, and maintions with the Sicel tribes. Almost all those tained at the expense of the conquered counwhich were independent of Syracuse joined tries. Thus the reduction of Syracuse would them, and supplied corn, and even money. The lead, by easy gradations, to the subjugation of alliance of a Sicel chief named Archonides, Greece, and to a universal empire. It was who had united several cantons under his au- therefore before Syracuse that they must fight thority, mainly conduced to their success. But for the safety of Peloponnesus; and he advised the Sicels subject to Syracuse were, for the them to lose no time in sending a body of troops most part, restrained from revolting by the to Sicily; but, above all, a Spartan commander, troops which garrisoned their towns, or march- who would be of more use than a whole army, ed upon the points threatened by the Athe- to direct the operations of their allies, to ennians. The success of the Athenian arms had courage the timid, and to decide the wavering. even drawn offers of assistance from some of At the same time, to show that they are in the Etruscan cities, which were probably ani- earnest, and to give employment to the Athemated, partly by the desire of revenging their nians at home, they should openly renew hosancient defeats, and partly by the hope of sha-tilities, and carry war into the heart of Attica. ring the spoil of Syracuse and of Sicily. The But they should no longer content themselves Athenian generals did not neglect these offers, with their old system of yearly inroads, which and they even sent envoys to treat with Car-made but a slight and transient impression. If thage; more, it must be supposed, for the purpose of counteracting or anticipating the solicitations of Syracuse, than in the hope of obtaining assistance from a power so jealous of their rivalry. As the winter wore, they shifted their quarters again from Naxos to Catana, where they repaired their camp; and they summoned the Segestans to send all the cavalry they could muster, and began to lay in stores of building materials, to be ready for commencing the siege of Syracuse in the spring.

they wished really to injure the enemy, and to inflict the blow which he himself most dreaded, they would occupy a permanent post in the country, for which they would find no point more convenient than Decelea. A garrison placed there would completely deprive the landowners of the enjoyment of their property, would interrupt the working of the Laurian mines, afford a ready asylum for runaway slaves, and would not only drain most of the internal sources of prosperity, but would prove a powerful incentive to revolt among the allies of Athens, who would estimate her prospects by her domestic condition. Such was the advice which he offered, with all the sincerity of a just resentment against the country which had cast him off, and which forced him to show the warmth of his patriotism by the efforts which he made to recover it.

In the mean while, the Syracusan envoys who had been sent to Greece found the warmest interest prevailing at Corinth in their behalf; and Corinthian ministers accompanied them to Sparta to second their application. There they met with a new auxiliary in the man who had been the chief author of their danger. Alcibiades, with his fellow-exiles, had crossed from Thurii in a merchant vessel to the The Spartan government had already meditaElean port Cyllene, and had received an invited the invasion of Attica, and was therefore tation from the Spartan government to proceed predisposed to take the advice of Alcibiades on to Sparta. Yet, before he went, he thought it that head. But being now awakened to a sense necessary to require a solemn pledge for his of its imminent danger, it appointed Gylippus, a safety. He found the ephors well disposed to son of the exiled Cleandridas,† to sail to Sicily assist the Syracusans with their good wishes with such succours as he should be able, in and exhortations, but backward to lend them concert with the Corinthians, to raise immeany more solid support. An assembly which diately, and, while the rest followed, to animate was held to deliberate on the question, afforded him an opportunity of seconding the request of the envoys with arguments more efficacious than their own, and of stimulating the sluggish enmity of the Spartans against Athens, by dis-ly improbable. The natural interpretation is to be sought

closing dangers which they had never dreamed of. After apologizing for his forced opposition to the Spartan interests, and endeavouring to

* Thuc., vi., 89, οἱ ἐπὶ τὰ πονηρότερα ἐξῆγον τὸν ὄχλον oirrp Kal ipi acav. Dr. Arnold's opinion, that these words refer to the high aristocratical party, seems extreme

in Thucydides, viii, 65, where the demagogue Androcles
is described as the man, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν ̓Αλκιβιάδην οὐχ
Šklora & Ainer: as Plutarch, Alcib., 19, observes, yu yup
ου τος ἐχθρὸς ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα τοῦ ̓Αλκιβάδου.
† See above, p. 305.

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