Athenians themselves were conscious that they had not the shadow of a right to the island; and even if the conquest had been really necessary for the security of their empire, the utmost straining of the tyrant's plea could not palliate the extermination of the inhabitants. Indeed, it seems probable that they, and especially Alcibiades, were instigated to this deed rather by their hatred of Sparta than by any abstract principle, or by resentment against the Melians themselves.* the liberal policy which had been adopted in several other cases, to have been admitted to the full franchise of the city, and thus to have strengthened the democratical party.* Another effort which Sparta made this winter in the way of negotiation was attended with no better success. The Athenians had sent a body of cavalry to Methone, a town on the southern frontier of Macedonia, where it was joined by a number of Macedonians, discontented with the government of Perdiccas, who formed an auxil series of anpoying inroads into his territories. Sparta could devise no method of succouring her ally but by sending an embassy to the Chalcidians to induce them to exert themselves in his behalf. But they were not disposed to sacrifice themselves either for Sparta or for Perdiccas, and continued to prolong their precarious truce with Athens. CHAPTER XXV. OF GYLIPPUS IN SICILY. The language of the Athenians in the confer-iary squadron, and with the Athenians made a ence at Melos has been often thought to indicate an extraordinary degree of moral obliquity, and has been attributed to the pernicious influence of the Sophists; and perhaps it is true that their doctrines lie at the bottom of the whole argument. But, on the other hand, it may be observed, that the Athenian speaker only rejects the obligations of justice as a rule in political transactions, and that the expediency to which he professes to sacrifice it is the good of the state. Farther than this the question did not lead him; and this conclusion, though quite untenable in theory, seems to flow THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION BEFORE THE ARRIVAL from the ideas which generally prevailed among the ancients, as to the paramount claims of the THE tameness with which Sparta had looked public interest over every other consideration. The conduct of the Athenians in the conquestance which she offered to the incursions of the on during the siege of Melos, the feeble resistof Melos is far less extraordinary than the open- Athenian garrison at Pylus, the vacillation and ness with which they avow their principles. timidity which she betrayed in her transactions But, unjust as it was, it will not, to a discern- with Argos, and with her allies in Macedonia ing eye, appear the more revolting, because it and Thrace, encouraged Athens to resume the wanted that varnish of sanctity by which acts of projects of aggrandizement which the events of much fouler iniquity have been covered in ages the war had compelled her for a time to lay which have professed to revere a higher moral aside. We have seen how ill she brooked the law. Their treatment of the vanquished, what- disappointment which she had suffered through ever may have been its motive, was unworthy the sudden termination to which the quarrels of a civilized nation. Yet some allowance may of the Sicilian Greeks had been brought by fairly be claimed for the general rigour of the Hermocrates; and she had since shown that ancient usages of war. The milder spirit of she only waited for an opportunity of renewing modern manners would not have punished men her enterprises in their island. Such an opporwho had been guilty of no offence but the as-tunity had appeared to present itself not long sertion of their rightful independence more se- after the departure of the armament commandverely than by tearing them from their families, ed by Eurymedon. The Leontines, when they and locking them up in a fortress, or transport- saw the Athenians withdrawn, thought it exing them to the wilds of Scythia. But our ex-pedient to prepare themselves as well as they ultation at the progress of humanity may be consistent with a charitable indulgence for the imperfections of a lower stage of civilization. In the course of the same winter the Spartans at length found themselves permitted to cross the border, and not only ravaged a part of the Argive territory, but took possession of Orneæ, and lodged the exiles there. They left a small garrison for their protection, and their object seems to have been rather to provide for them than to annoy their enemies in Argos, for before their departure they concluded a truce between the two parties. The Athenians, however, did not permit this state of things to last long They sent a squadron of 30 galleys with 600 men, and with this re-enforcement the Argives laid siege to Orneæ. It seems that the place was not in a state fit for defence; and by a kind of tacit compromise the exiles, after having held out for a day, evacuated it, and the besiegers immediately razed it to the ground. The inhabitants appear now for the most partt to have been transported to Argos, and, according to Andocides, Alcib., p. 32. could against the attacks which, notwithstanding the counsels of Hermocrates, they had alseems to have been chiefly with this view that ways reason to apprehend from Syracuse. It they admitted a large body of new citizens. But it was necessary to provide for these new settlers, and this could not be done without, in some way, disturbing the previous state of prop erty. A proposal was accordingly made, and obtained general approbation among the commonalty, for a repartition of land. We have no information as to the precise nature of the measure, so as to be able to say whether it was an arbitrary act of power, or the exercise of a right. The changes caused by the revolution Ornea, which Strabo (viii., p. 376) distinguishes from the town of the same name. that the whole of the ancient population had been previous* Mueller (Dor., ii., c. 7. Æginetica, p. 49) supposes ly transplanted to Argos, and replaced by an Argive colony. Dr. Arnold (Thucyd., vol. ii., p. 839) infers from Herodotus, viii., 73, compared with Thucyd., 67, that the old popthe text. It seems rather more probable, from Paus., viii., 27, 1, that there had been-as Wachsmuth suggests, i., 2, p. 86-a partial removal of the original inhabitants before ulation was not disturbed before the occasion mentioned in † Some were probably allowed to occupy the village of the Peloponnesian war. which followed the death of Hiero leave just as called in the aid of Syracuse, with which she: much room for the one supposition as the other; threatened to overpower her weaker neighbour. but the burden or expense of the proposed meas- The Segestans, who were, perhaps, originally ure fell upon the rich; and, as it hurt their in- more nearly related to the Phoenicians than to terest, it was felt by them as a grievance. the Greeks, are said to have applied in vain to Their indignation-as we may safely conclude Syracuse and Agrigentum, and then to have from the experience of all ages and countries, sought aid from Carthage; but being rejected ́ as well as from that of the Roman patricians there also, they finally had recourse to Athens. would have been just as strong if they were Their envoys found willing listeners, when they called upon to resign what they had occupied represented the danger which would arise if the by abuse and held by sufferance, as if they were Syracusans should be permitted to proceed as deprived of what they had enjoyed by the clear- they had begun with Leontium; should crush est of titles; but, seeing themselves not strong the states of different origin one after another, enough to maintain their right or their wrong and then should combine all the Dorians of the before any step had been taken to dispossess island in a league to assist their kinsmen in them, they called in the aid of the Syracusans, Peloponnesus against Athens. They magnified and ejected the commonalty. They had now the opulence of Segesta, gave a dazzling detoo much room to feel safe, and, therefore, con- scription of the treasures contained in the temsented to abandon Leontium, and to transfer ples, as well as in the coffers of the state, and their abode to Syracuse, where they were re-undertook to defray the cost of the expedition ceived as citizens. There was, however, a which should be sent to its relief. If the fears party among them which had either yielded to of the Athenians were not alarmed, their ambithis sacrifice with regret, or found its new situ- tion was inflamed by the thought that the power ation unpleasant; and it quitted Syracuse and of Syracuse might be made to serve as an inreturned, not, indeed, to the deserted city, where strument for subduing their Peloponnesian eneit could not have defended itself, but to two mies. They knew enough of Sicily to covet it. strongholds in the Leontine territory, called as a most valuable conquest, but not rightly to Phocææ and Bricinniæ. Here they were join-appreciate the difficulty of the attempt. Noted by the greater part of the expelled commu-withstanding the ample means of information nity, and together they carried on a war against Syracuse. When this state of things became known to the Athenians in 422, about the time of Cleon's last expedition, they sent two galleys, with three ambassadors, headed by Phæax, whom we have already mentioned as a rival of Alcibiades, to use this handle, if he could, for the purpose of forming a new league among the Siceliots against Syracuse, and, at the same time, to promote the Athenian interest in the south of Italy. Phæax possessed talents well suited for negotiation, and he succeeded in his object at Camarina and Agrigentum; but at Gela he met with such opposition as to deter him from proceeding farther on the business of his mission. But, on his way back, he stopped at Bricinniæ to animate the resistance of the Leontines, and in Italy, on his passage both to and fro, opened negotiations with several of the Greek cities, and even concluded a treaty with Locri, which had before refused to become a party to the peace between Athens and the Siceliots, but now, being engaged in a war with two of its colonies, thought it prudent to come to terms with Phæax. It is not quite clear whether this was the last attempt made by Athens to regain her footing in Sicily before 415. We are informed of an embassy which seems to have been a different one, on which Andocides was sent, not only to Italy and Sicily, but also to Epirus, Thessaly, and Macedonia, for purposes similar to that of Phæax. But no distinct prospect seems to have been opened to the Athenians of again dividing the Siceliots and threatening Syracuse, until, soon after the reduction of Melos, they received a new and, apparently, unsolicited invitation to interfere in the affairs of Sicily. A quarrel had arisen between the neighbouring cities of Segesta and Selinus, partly out of disputed claims to land in their marches, and partly, it would seem, out of private feuds. Selinus which they possessed, great ignorance and many erroneous opinions prevailed among them as to the extent and population of the island. On the other hand, the waste of the pestilence had been now, in a great measure, repaired, and, during the late interval of repose, they had begun to recruit their finances. They again felt the consciousness of exuberant vigour, and among the young there was a general impatience for a new field of action. The cause of the Segestans found many zealous advocates; and all that could be obtained by those who opposed it was, that envoys should be sent to ascertain the means which they had of fulfilling their promises, and to learn the state of the war with Selinus. Alcibiades was foremost among their parti sans. If an expedition should be decreed, he might hope for a share in the command, and in the distant regions of the west his ambitious imagination found an unbounded range. It wandered from Sicily to Italy, Carthage, and Africa; and he considered the subjection of these countries as a step towards the conquest of Peloponnesus and of Greece. It seems to have been while he was indulging these dreams of greatness that he was threatened at home with a blow which would have dissipated them all. We have seen how evenly his influence balanced that of Nicias, and that before them their common rivals shrank into insignificance. Hyperbolus, who despaired of rising into the place of Cleon so long as they both stood in his way, devised a scheme for getting rid of one. He suggested to the people that their power and dissensions were formidable to liberty, and that this was a case in which the ostracism, which had fallen into disuse, might be advanta geously revived. It was, perhaps, through a different intrigue that a third person, either Phæax or Andocides, was associated with them as an object of public jealousy. But the result surprised the author of the scheme, and the people: NICIAS, ALCIBIADES, AND LAMACHUS. itself. Nicias and Alcibiades, or, according to But Nicias as little coveted the honour of the ticles of his simple personal expenditure incurred in the discharge of his public functions. Such a man, whose habits and character seemed to secure him from any bias towards either of his colleagues, might be thought singularly fitted to hold the balance between them, while Yet it was observed that, notwithhe zealously co-operated with them in the common cause. standing his indifference to money, he was not exempt from an instinctive respect for wealth, him, as over most of the persons who were asand that Nicias exercised some authority over The ambassadors returned in the spring, ac-sociated with him in office, by the weight of ties. companied by some of the Leontine exiles, and his fortune no less than of his personal qualiby envoys from Segesta, and confirmed the account which had been given of its opulence; but they brought no more than 60 talents--a month's pay for as many galleys-as an earnest of the promised subsidies. An expedition was now decreed for the relief of Segesta, the restoration of the Leontines, and for all other objects which concerned the interests of Athens in Sicily, and Alcibiades, Nicias, and Lamachus were appointed to the command. The choice of Alcibiades was naturally suggested by the active part he had taken in counselling the expedition; but the talents which he had display-ta had been carried, he did not despair of opened in the negotiations with which he had been ing the eyes of the people to the rashness of recently intrusted in Peloponnesus pointed him the enterprise; and in an assembly which was out as eminently fitted for a service in which held five days after, to deliberate on the strength there might be as much to be effected by the of the armament to be equipped, he ventured to arts of persuasion as by force or military skill. advise that, instead of entering upon the quesNor was it probably overlooked that his exten- tion which they were met to discuss, they too hastily adopted. He was the better entisive connexions and influence among the allies should review the resolution which they had tled to attention on this head, as he should of Athens might be usefully employed in procuring auxiliaries; while among the more sober citizens there were, no doubt, many who speak against his own interest, since no one were glad to see him removed to a distant field could have more honour to gain by the expediof adventure, where his restless and aspiring tion, or less personal risk to apprehend in it. spirit might have ample space, and who con- He knew their character too well to think of templated his departure with feelings not very diverting them from their purpose by any gendifferent from those with which they had once eral reflections on the imprudence of staking a sent out Cleon, divided between their fears of present possession for an uncertain acquisition; The but he would point out the unreasonableness the man and their hopes for the state. must not fancy that when they sailed to a disprincipal motive for the appointment of Nicias and the difficulties of the enterprise. They appears to have been the confidence which was inspired by his prudence and his uninterrupted tant war they should leave peace at home. good fortune; his name seemed to be one of The enemies by whom they were surrounded happy omen for every momentous enterprise; had not all so much as formally suspended hosand if his circumspection was sometimes car-tilities; but those who were now kept still by ried to an excess, where it degenerated into tardiness or timidity, it was not more than sufficient to counterbalance the impatient ardour of such a colleague as Alcibiades. Perhaps a latent feeling of jealousy also operated with many as an inducement for associating him with his ambitious and unsteady rival in so important a command, at so great a distance from the superintending eye of the people. Lamachus was recommended by his established reputation as a brave captain, though he had not been employed during the war in any He seems to very important commission. have been no less conspicuous for his integrity and disinterested devotion to the public service. Though he had been placed in situations which afforded him many opportunities of enriching himself-having been charged probably more than once with the collection of tribute or the levying of contributions from the subjects of Athens-he was so poor as to be forced to draw upon the treasury for the minutest arVOL. I.-FFF a short and hollow truce-which had been extorted by an ignominious necessity, and had bred many questions which were yet unsettled, and which had been rendered more complicated through the intrigues of a party adverse to peace both at Sparta and at Athens-would undoubtedly take the first opportunity of falling upon them, when their forces should be divided, and when they were engaged in a struggle with a state which Sparta had long been anxious to gain as her ally. They would be setting out to found a new empire while many of their old subjects were in open revolt, and others were wavering in their obedience. It would surely be time enough to send assistance to strangers. own dominions. From the Siceliots they had when they had provided for the security of their nothing to gain-for conquests in so remote a quarter could not be long retained-and, unless they wantonly provoked them, nothing to fear; least of all in the case supposed by the Segestans, from Syracuse, which, the farther she ex tended her sovereignty, would find the more employment at home, and would be the less tempted to assist in overthrowing an empire which rested on like foundations as her own. Athens would be most formidable to Sicily while her reputation was magnified by distance, and she did not expose it to the risk, which it would incur on a nearer approach, of being shaken by the first slight reverse. It was thus they had themselves been led to undervalue the power of Sparta, which was still unimpaired, as her animosity was unquenched, and only waiting for an opportunity of revenge. They might find a better use for their newly-recruited strength than to lend themselves to the desperate projects of a band of exiles, whose assertions were as little to be trusted as their gratitude. But they ought to be still more on their guard against the reckless ambition of their own citizens, especially of one who cared not in what danger he involved his country to gratify his desire of a brilliant command, which would afford him the means of supporting his extravagance, and of repairing the breach it had made in his private fortune. Notwithstanding the partisans of like age and character whom he had now collected round him, the elder part of the assembly ought fearlessly to vote as the safety of Athens required; that the Sicilians be allowed to adjust their own affairs; and the Segestans in particular, as they had begun the war without consulting Athens, be left to end it, as they might, by themselves. Though this mode of revising a decree of the people was not consistent with the established forms of the Athenian assembly, the presiding magistrate, probably perceiving signs of a general willingness to hear the subject again discussed, complied with the wish of Nicias, and put the question to the vote. Alcibiades took the opportunity of defending his own character, and the policy of the Sicilian expedition. He claimed the merit of a wise liberality for that use of his wealth which Nicias had censured as silly extravagance. The magnificence which he had displayed at Olympia had reflected lustre upon the city, and had raised its credit at a juncture when it was commonly supposed to be exhausted by the war. He delicately touched on the offence which he had given to individuals as an unavoidable effect of the envy which always attended prosperity. He urged the success with which he had conducted the affairs of the commonwealth in Peloponnesus, as a proof of his capacity for the command with which-he was now invested. The battle of Mantinea, in which so many of the ancient allies of Sparta were arrayed against her on grounds which she had long been used to consider as her own, he treated as a signal triumph of dexterous negotiation. He then endeavoured to show that the enterprise on which they had resolved was neither so difficult nor so dangerous as Nicias had represented it, but that it held out a prospect of great advantages at a trifling risk. The power of the Sicilian towns had been much exaggerated. Their mixed population had been agitated by such a series of revolutions that it had not yet become firmly attached to the soil, and was destitute of the feelings which led men to unite, and to sacrifice their private interests for the defence of the country. An invader would meet with no steady resistance, and might take advantage of their internal dissensions, and, in a war against Syracuse, would be sure to find allies among the barbarians whom she oppressed. The dangers with which Nicias had laboured to deter them were merely imaginary. The enemies whom they would leave behind were never less disposed to attack them, and, at the worst, could do nothing more than invade Attica, as they might at all times: naval forces would be left sufficient to prevent any other damage. The nature of their empire required that they should be always in action, and ready to comply with every call, whether from Greeks or barbarians, who sought their assistance, and might be made instruments of their aggrandizement. It was the condition of their greatness, that it must be always growing, and that it could not be safely confined to any limits; as soon as they ceased to attack, they would begin to be threatened. Such a token of their restless activity as they would give by the invasion of Sicily would cow the spirit of the Peloponnesians: their success would probably make them masters of Greece, or, at least, would crush the power of Syracuse; and even failure would be attended with no danger, since their fleet, which would be more than a match for the whole marine of the island, would enable them to stay as long as they thought fit, and to retire when they would with safety. Let them not listen to the insinuations by which Nicias had attempted to set the elder citizens in opposition to the younger. The fire of youth was no less needed in their public counsels than the sobriety of age. The state would grow torpid if its energies were not kept in constant play; and the mastery to which it had attained in the arts of war could only be preserved by an uninterrupted series of enterprises and contests. These arguments accorded with the prevailing temper of the assembly, which passed to the order of the day; and Nicias now rested his last hopes on the effect which he might produce by a statement of the preparations necessary for the intended expedition. He observed that they were going to invade an island which contained a number of great and independent cities, abundantly furnished with the means of defence; and among them none were more powerful and better provided with every kind of arms for naval and military warfare than the two which were the immediate objects of their hostility-Selinus and Syracuse. And neither were wanting in public or private opulence; great treasures were said to be accumulated in the temples of Selinus; and Syracuse drew a revenue from her barbarian subjects. There were, in particular, two important points in which the Siceliots had an advantage over Athens: the corn they used was of their own growth, and they were strong in cavalry. It would not, therefore, be sufficient to send out a powerful fleet; it must be accompanied by a land force capable of withstanding the superiority of the enemy's horse; for they might find themselves unable to procure any cavalry in Sicily except such as the Segestans could furnish. It must be remembered that the expedi tion in which they were about to embark was not like those which they were used to make At to neighbouring countries, where their arma- The stir of preparation immediately began, ments could receive supplies and re-enforce- both at Athens and in the ports and arsenals of ments from home in a few days. They were the allies whose contingents were required, and going to a land so distant that in the winter the news spread rapidly through Greece. season four months might elapse before de- Athens the public mind was entirely occupied spatches from the army could reach Athens. It by this one thought; all conversation turned was therefore necessary carefully to calculate upon this subject. The young greedily listened its demands beforehand, and to provide for them to the descriptions with which the veterans who amply. They would have need of a strong body had already served in Sicily fed their curiosity; of heavy-armed infantry; of archers and sling- and in the palæstra they would interrupt their ers in great numbers to face the enemy's cav-exercises to trace the form of the island in the alry; of a fleet which would keep undisputed sand, and to discuss its position with respect command of the sea; and, as they might be to Africa and Carthage. During this interval detained on their passage by contrary winds, of anxious expectation the desire of looking on points of the coast where provisions were into the future, always active among the Greeks, not to be purchased, they must load a sufficient was unusually excited. It was a time which number of vessels with corn, and press slaves of itself called forth omens and prophecies; and into their service from the mills. Above all, the leaders of the contending parties at Athens they must not go empty-handed, trusting to the seem not to have neglected the ordinary arts of vaunted riches of Segesta, which would proba- working on the popular superstition. Nicias, bly prove mere words. There could be no who was himself, in this respect, quite on a level prospect of success, nor even of safety, unless with the vulgar, had probably some influence their preparations were on such a scale as to among the Athenian priests; and they are said give them a decided superiority over the enemy to have announced a great number of sinister in every respect excepting the numbers of the auguries. An oracle directed the Athenians to heavy infantry. And they ought to make their fetch the priestess of Athené from Clazomena; calculations as if they were sending out a colo- it turned out that her name (Hesychia) signified ny to found a city in the midst of a hostile pop-quiet, and it was interpreted as a declaration ulation, where, unless they obtained the upper hand on the first day of their landing, they could never gain a footing. With all these precautions, they would leave much to depend on the favour of fortune; but what he had proposed could not be omitted without rashness. If, however, any one present was of a different opinion, he was willing to resign his command to him. that the gods forbade the expedition. News, too, was brought from Delphi of a portent which threatened the Athenian arms with some disaster.* On the other hand, Alcibiades was not at a loss for expedients of a like nature to keep up the spirits of the people. He, too, had his friendly diviners, who, among their oracular treasures, found some ancient predictions, importing that the Athenians were to reap great renown from Sicily. An answer which he obtained from the temple of Ammon seemed more distinctly to foretell the conquest of Syracuse;† and one no less encouraging was brought from Dodona.‡ with which the piety of private citizens and of public bodies had adorned the streets of Athens, had almost all been mutilated, in the course of the night, by unknown hands. So strange an occurrence would probably at any time have excited not only astonishment and indignation, but some degree of alarm; at this juncture the last of these feelings prevailed over every other. There were, indeed, two ways of explaining the mystery, either of which would have divested it of its most threatening aspect. might have been an unpremeditated drunken frolic; or it might have been contrived by an enemy, for the very purpose of preventing or delaying the expedition by the terror of the omen; and it seems that the Corinthians were suspected of having made the attempt to avert the danger which impended over their colony, Syracuse. But no one could think this a prob The impression which this statement made on the assembly was just the opposite of that which Nicias intended. Instead of being discouraged by the magnitude of the preparations which he described, they thought that they had now the fullest warrant of success that his exThe preparations for the voyage were nearly perience and judgment could give; even the completed, when one morning it was discoverelder and more cautious of the citizens now be-ed that the numerous stone busts of Hermes, gan to share the confidence of the youthful and sanguine spirits, who were attracted by the novelty of the enterprise and by the remoteness of its object; while the largest class reckoned, some upon a gainful service, and all upon a conquest which would yield an inexhaustible revenue. The few who still harboured any misgivings were ashamed to express them, and suffered themselves to be carried along by the current. Nicias was called upon distinctly to specify the amount of the force which he deemed necessary. He complied with reluctance, reserving, as he said, many particulars for a calmer deliberation with his colleagues; but as far as he could form an estimate on so short a notice, he believed that he must not ask for less than a hundred galleys, together with transports, and 5000 heavy infantry, with bowmen and slingers, and all other things needful in proportion. One of the warmest advocates of the expedition, named Demostratus, now came forward with a motion, which, he said, would deprive Nicias of every pretext for hesitation and reserve; and on his proposal a decree was passed by which the generals were empowered to use their own discretion, both as to the force of the armament, and all the circumstances of the expedition. It * Plut., Nic., 13. Paus., x., 15, 5. A statue of Athené, and a palm-tree, in bronze, dedicated after the battles of the Eurymedon, were stripped of a part of the gold with which they were overlaid. The Delphians attributed the loss to a vast flight of crows which attacked the images with their beaks; but they were suspected of having themselves committed the robbery, to serve at once themselves and the Syr + Plut., Nic., 13. Plut., Al., 18. acusans. Paus., viii., 11, 12. |