not be disputed; but the army, which believed by which he had flung away so fair an opportuitself secure of a decisive victory, loudly mur-nity of reducing Argos to subjection. The pubmured at its disappointment. On the other lic resentiment was still more violently inflamed hand, the Argives, who had no less confidently by the news of the breach of the truce, and the looked for an easy and brilliant triumph, was loss of Orchomenus; and measures of extraorequally indignant at the conduct of their gen-dinary rigour were proposed against the author eral, who had suffered the enemy to escape. of this misfortune. Yet the Spartan moderaAccording to the law of Argos, the generals, on tion showed itself even in the heat of a just antheir return from an expedition, before they en- ger; for the penalty with which the delinquent tered the city, were liable to render an account was threatened did not extend beyond a fine of their proceedings at a place without the and the disgrace of pulling down his house, and walls, on the banks of the Charadus. On this thus would have fallen short of the punishment occasion the troops, now become the judges of inflicted on Thrasyllus for saving his country. Thrasyllus, were so transported by their fury But Agis, by humble deprecations, induced the as to forget both characters, and assailed him ephors or the people to pardon his fault, pledg with stones, from which he only found refuge ing himself to make amends for it by his future at a neighbouring altar; but though his life was services: They contented themselves with spared, his property was confiscated by a formal marking their displeasure and distrust by the appointment of a new council of war, composed of ten Spartans, without whose sanction he was no longer at liberty to take the field.

sentence.

In

His colleagues, however, and most of the persons in office, appear to have thought differently, and to have been awed by the display Shortly after advice was received from Tewhich Sparta had made of her force, and were gea that the party there friendly to Sparta, unwell content to observe the truce. But short-less it was promptly supported by aid from ly after a body of 1000 infantry and 300 horse without, must soon give way to the machinaarrived from Athens, under the command of tions of its adversaries, which were backed by Laches and Nicostratus, accompanied by Alcib- all the weight of the Argive confederacy. This iades as ambassador. The Argive government danger excited so much alarm, that the whole was with difficulty persuaded, by the importu- force of Laconia was put in motion with ununity of the Eleans and the Mantineans, who sual rapidity, and proceeded to the border, while had not yet taken their departure, to grant him the Arcadian allies were summoned to join it an audience before the assembly. There, how- at Tegea. After passing the frontier, Agis sent ever, the eloquence of Alcibiades prevailed over back a sixth of his army. - the veterans and their prudence. He easily convinced the peo- striplings-and, while his presence restored ple that the truce, concluded without the con- tranquillity at Tegea, he despatched orders to sent of their allies, was void, and urged them the northern states-Corinth, Boeotia, Phocis, to take the favourable opportunity of striking a and Locris-to meet him before Mantinea. blow while the enemy was unprepared for re- the mean while, with the Arcadian re-enforcesistance. The allies of Argos eagerly adopted ments, he prosecuted his march into the Manhis proposal, which was, to march against the tinean territory, and having encamped near a Arcadian Orchomenus, where the Spartans had sanctuary of Hercules, began to ravage the deposited some hostages which they had taken plain. The Argive-Athenian army, which was from several of the Arcadian towns, Yet, in the neighbourhood of Mantinea, took up a though the Argive assembly annulled the truce strong position, and prepared for battle; and, and approved of the expedition, the influence of notwithstanding the steepness of the ground, some of their leading men seems to have delay- Agis, eager to repair his late error, advanced ed hostilities a little longer, and the Argive to attack it, and was within reach of the enetroops did not set out till their confederates had my's missiles, when one of the elder Spartans, sat down before Orchomenus. The town was who was near his person, cried out to him not weakly fortified, and succour uncertain. The to mend one evil with another. Struck either Orchomenians made no resistance, but deliver- by the hint or by a sudden thought of his own, ed up the hostages intrusted to them, gave oth- Agis suddenly halted, and gave orders for reers of their own to the Mantineans, and became treat, and marching back into the plain of Temembers of the Argive confederacy. The al- gea, set about turning the course of the waters, lies then deliberated upon the next operation. which thence found a subterraneous discharge, The Eleans proposed that they should turn their so as to make them overflow the lands of Manarms against Lepreum, which, though a point tinea. As the diversion of these streams had of no importance to the rest, was the only ob- frequently been a subject of contention between ject in which they felt any concern. The Man- the Tegeans and their neighbours, he hoped tineans were desirous of gratifying their own that the enemy would be drawn from his posiambition and old animosity by the reduction of tion to give battle upon the even ground; and Tegea. This was an enterprise of great mo- he was not disappointed. His sudden retroment to the general interests of the confedera-grade movement had astonished the Argives, cy; and a secret correspondence, which had been opened with a party in Tegea, afforded strong hopes of success. The Argives and Athenians, therefore, acceded to this proposal; but the Eleans were so angry because their wishes were not consulted before any other motive, that they marched away home.

Agis, on his return to Sparta, had been severely censured for his imprudent concession,

both commanders and men; the men, after recovering from the first surprise, were eager to pursue; and when the Lacedæmonian army was suffered to retreat unmolested, reproached their generals with a repetition of the fault which they had committed near Argos. The commanders, perplexed by the enemy's unexpected movement, and apprehensive of some stratagem, were still more confused by the im

BATTLE OF MANTINEA.-BLOCKADE OF EPIDAURUS.

patience of their troops; at length, however, they descended from their position, and encamped upon the plain.

403

Yet the battle of Mantinea was not only, as Thucydides observes, the most memorable that had been fought for a long time on account of the parties engaged in it, but was attended with important results. The absence of the northern allies left Sparta the whole honour of the victory; and it was rendered the more signal by the faults which had been committed by the conquerors. It effaced the impression which their disaster at Sphacteria had made on the minds of the Greeks, revived the high reputation of their military qualities, and thus gave new confidence and strength to their partisans throughout Greece. With these fruits of their victory they seemed to be satisfied, and showed as little eagerness to push their advantage after the battle, as they had on the field in the pursuit. They countermanded the re-enforcements which were coming up from the north, and returned home to celebrate the Carnean festival.

was not obeyed; and the left wing, remaining insulated, was routed, and pursued with much slaughter to the baggage wagons; but the The next day they put the army in battle ar- rest of the Lacedæmonian army obtained an ray, though they did not know where they might easy victory. The mere terror of its approach light upon the enemy. In the mean while Agis was sufficient to put the greater part of the enwas returning to ascertain the effect of his ma- emy to flight, and the Athenians who were in noeuvre, with the design of occupying the ground the left wing were nearly surrounded. They where he had posted himself the day before. would have suffered a much greater loss, notA projecting ridge concealed the Argive-Athe-withstanding the protection which they receivnian army from his view, until, by a suddened from their cavalry, had not Agis thought it turn, the head of his column came close upon it. necessary to proceed with his main body to the Greater consternation, Thucydides observes, relief of his left wing. The victorious Mantiwas not remembered ever to have seized a La- neans did not wait for him; but in the mean cedæmonian army. Yet on this occasion the while the Athenians had leisure to effect their excellence of their system of tactics, as it retreat. The Spartans, according to their usage, was brought to an unusual test, was the more made no long pursuit; and the whole loss of signally displayed. The line of battle was qui- the enemy was not reckoned at more than 1100 etly and rapidly formed-every man falling into men; their own at about 300. his place with his wonted ease-before the enemy could take any advantage of their vicinity. Thucydides who has described the engagement which ensued with a minuteness which seems to indicate that he was either himself present,* or had access to some peculiarly accurate information-still does not venture to state the numbers on either side, but observes that the superiority appeared to the eye to be on the side of the Lacedæmonians. While the commanders of the Argive confederacy animated their men with the various motives proper to each national division-the Mantineans with the danger of their native land, and the alternative of subjection or imperial rule; the Argives with the hope of regaining their ancient supremacy, the Athenians with that of disabling their old enemy from again invading their country the Spartans needed no other incitement than the war songst which had roused the valour of successive generations, perhaps from the time of Tyrtæus; and, while the foe rushed impetuously forward, they advanced with their usual steadiness to the sound of their flutes, preserving an even and unbroken front. The event of the battle was only rendered doubtful for a short time, through a breach of discipline which exposed a part of the Spartan line to imminent danger. There was a constant tendency in the ancient armies, as Thucydides remarks, when they came to action, to lean towards the right wing, so as gradually to outflank the enemy's left, each man endeavouring to keep close to his right-hand neighbour, for the protection of his own unshielded side. This had taken place to an unusual extent before the battle began; and Agis saw his left wing-which was occupied, according to a hereditary privilege, by the men of Sciritis, next to whom, on this occasion, were posted the Brasidean freedmen, and Neodamodes from Lepreum-in danger of being taken in flank by the Mantineans, who held the enemy's right wing. To guard against this danger, he ordered the Scirites and Brasideans to break away from the main body, and move towards the left, and directed two of the polemarchs to draw off their divisions from the right wing, where they could be better spared, and to fill up the vacant space. This last command, given just as the onset was taking place,

The enemy was more alert; after the battle, the loss he had sustained was repaired by the arrival of 3000 Eleans and 1000 Athenians, and the allies determined to avail themselves of the leisure in which they were left by the inactivity of the Spartans, to make a more vigorous attack on Epidaurus. To this they were more especially excited by the spirit which had just been shown by the Epidaurians, who, the day before the battle of Mantinea, had made an irruption into the Argive territory, and had wasted that part of the Argive forces which was left to defend the city. To avenge this insult, while the Spartans were keeping their holyday, the confederates set about investing. Epidaurus with a wall. The work of circumvallation was to be divided among them according to the amount of the national forces, and the Athenians soon completed the part assigned to them, which was the fortification of a promontory, called, from a temple which stood there, the Heræum. But their allies wanted zeal or patience to finish their task, and finally resolved to content themselves with putting a garrison, drawn from each division of the army, into the Heræum: this done, all returned home.

But as soon as the festival was at an end, the Spartans again took the field, and advanced on the road to Argos as far as Tegea; here they halted to try the effect of negotiation, for which a fair opening seemed now to be made at Argos. They were in correspondence with a

Ar

party there which desired to overthrow the | Athenians, until they should have evacuated democratical government, and which had ac- all the fortified places which they held in Pelquired new boldness and influence from the oponnesus, and made an agreement with Spardefeat at Mantinea. It was concerted that the ta, by which the parties attempted to restrain Argive assembly should be first attracted by each other from making war or peace but with the offer of peace with Sparta, to which, in the mutual consent; they even joined the Spartans fear now prevailing of the Spartan arms, it in an embassy to Perdiccas, who, though he was strongly inclined, and that it should next did not venture at once openly to break with be drawn into an alliance to secure the peace. the Athenians, was persuaded to enter into the After this it was hoped that the machinations Peloponnesian confederacy; swayed, Thucydof the oligarchical party would have freer play ides seems to think, in some measure by the to bring about a revolution. In pursuance of ancient affinity between his house and the this plan, Lichas-the same Spartan who re- Temenids of Argos; and, at the same time, ceived the insult at Olympia, and who was the engagements into which Sparta had enproxenus of Argos-was sent to propose the tered with the Chalcidian towns were renewed alternative of war or peace. Alcibiades was and ratified by the Argive government. still at Argos, where he seems to have stayed to give ministers were then sent to Athens to rewatch the turn of events. He exerted all his quire that the Athenian troops should be witheloquence to keep the Argives firm in their drawn from the Heræum; and the Athenians, union with Athens. But, on the other side, who saw that they could not keep it against stronger than words were the recollections of the will of the states which furnished the maMantinea, and the Spartan army within two or jority of the garrison, sent Demosthenes to three days' march of Argos. The assembly de- bring their men away. He had the address to cided for peace, and accepted the terms pre- entice the other troops out of the place under scribed by Sparta. A treaty was concluded colour of a gymnastic spectacle, and locked the without any limitation of time, by which the gates upon them. But either thinking himself hostages taken at Orchomenus were to be re- unable or not authorized to keep possession of stored; the Athenians, under pain of being it, he delivered it up to the Epidaurians, who, on treated as common enemies of Argos and Spar- this condition, renewed their ancient friendly ta, to be required to evacuate the Epidaurian relations with Athens. territory; the Epidaurians to be allowed to clear themselves by an oath tendered by the Argives in the matter of the sacrifice. All the states of Peloponnesus, both small and great, to be independent, as in old times (a change levelled against the pretensions of Mantinea and Elis). The states to unite in repelling all foreign aggression on Peloponnesus (a provision against Athenian interference). The allies of Sparta beyond the Isthmus to be on the same footing of amity and independence as those of both the contracting powers within Peloponnesus. The treaty was to be communicated to the allies of each, but not to depend upon their sanction.*

This change in the policy of Argos compelled the Mantineans, after a short resistance, to abdicate their sovereignty over their subject cantons. And now only one step was wanting to the accomplishment of the plan which had been concerted between the Spartan government and the party which had the ascendency at Argos. Early in the spring of 417 this concluding step was taken, and a revolution effected, which completely united the two governments in feelings and interests. It is perhaps more surprising that it was so long delayed, than that it was easily achieved. Instruments sufficient for the work had been for some time This first success imboldened the party which in readiness. The Argives, when they began carried the measure at Argos to follow it up to cherish hopes of recovering their ancient with the proposal of an alliance with Sparta, rank in Peloponnesus, had been tempted to try which implied a total abandonment of that hith- a dangerous experiment, to maintain a standing erto subsisting with Athens, Elis, and Manti-army without political privileges. They wished As the step already taken placed Argos to unite the advantage of an armed oligarchy. in a neutral position which she could not safely maintain, there was the less difficulty in persuading the people to attach itself to Sparta; and an alliance defensive and offensive was concluded for fifty years, to be open to all the other Peloponnesian states, with guarantees for their independence, and provisions for the pacific adjustment of all their quarrels. After this treaty, the administration of affairs at Argos seems to have fallen entirely into the hands of its authors, who carried a series of measures dictated by their enmity to Athens. They not only obtained a decree forbidding any embassy, and even a herald, to be received from the

nea.

* This seems to be the purport of the obscure clause at

the end of the treaty, Thuc., v., 77. But the omission of the four words which Dr. Arnold has printed in brackets, instead of freeing the passage from all difficulty, would leave the following words wholly without coherence and meaning. The οίκαδ' ἀπάλλειν may perhaps refer to the saine precaution which the Spartans adopt with the Argive ambassadors. Thuc., v., 41. The concurrence of the Athenians would scarcely, one would think, have been provided for as a possible case.

like that which at Sparta and elsewhere was supported by the labour of a servile population, with the equality of the citizens under a democratical constitution. For this end they raised a corps of 1000 young soldiers, who were maintained at the public expense, and were enabled and enjoined to devote their whole time to military exercises. The new corps had, indeed. done good service on several occasions, and particularly at Mantinea. But the Argive government seems to have been guilty of great imprudence in the execution of the plan. Instead of selecting the Thousand from the citizens of the lowest class, who might have depended on their pay for subsistence, they-perhaps from an unwise economy-chose young men of good fortune, who might, therefore, be ill-affected towards the constitution, and could

* Diodorus (xii., 75) seems to suppose that the Thousand were instituted only a very short time before the battle of Mantinea; but Thucydides (v., 67) speaks of them as having been long established.

have no prepossession in favour of democracy. | of carpenters and masons from Athens. It was The oligarchical faction appears to have gained some time before the Spartans heard of this unthe Thousand over to its views, and then to dertaking, though it was known to several of have taken the pretext of a joint expedition to the other Peloponnesian states. But as soon Sicyon, which Sparta and Argos undertook as they were informed of it, Agis led an army each with 1000 men, for the purpose of strength- against Argos, where there was still a remnant ening the oligarchy there, to admit the Spartan of the defeated party, with which he was in cortroops into Argos, and with their aid to have respondence. His expectations, however, were abolished all the forms of the constitution, which disappointed in this quarter; but he came in they replaced by one conformable to the Spar- time to take and demolish the unfinished walls, tan system.* and on his return took Hysiæ, and put the Argive garrison to the sword. Argos was now reduced to a state of miserable weakness; deprived by the civil war of the flower of its military force, threatened by the exiles who were collected near the frontier at Phlius, and agitated by fears of treachery within. To remove this last cause of uneasiness, Alcibiades was sent in the year following with a squadron to Argos, and carried away 300 persons, who were suspected of disaffection, and lodged them in some of the islands near the coast of Attica.

While Athens and Sparta remained on this equivocal footing towards each other, the revolted towns on the coast of Thrace continued to defy the Athenian power, and from time to time gained some new points. In 421 Olynthus had surprised Mecyberna; and after the encouragement which the Chalcidians received from Sparta and Argos, they won possession of Dium, on the peninsula of Athos. Athens did not, indeed, rest quite passive. An expedition had been prepared for the reduction of Amphipolis, and Nicias had been appointed to the command. Perdiccas had promised his co-operation, and it seems to have been concerted that a land force should march through his dominions. His accession to the confederacy between Sparta and Argos defeated this plan, and the Athenians revenged themselves by blockading the coast of Macedonia. Yet in 416, instead of making a fresh effort for the recovery of these important

The new institutions thus forced upon the people depended upon the continued support of the hands which had founded them. The supreme power in the state rested with the Thousand, and, consequently, with any leader who could attach them to himself. They were commanded, it is said, by a chief named Bryas, who, while he upheld the oligarchy, exercised a despotic power over the disfranchised commonalty, and abused it to the utmost excess of wantonness. He at length filled up the measure of his license by carrying off a bride from a nuptial procession to his house. But he was blinded by the victim of his lust, who took refuge at an altar, and implored the protection of the people.+ The author who tells this story represents this as the occasion of a popular insurrection, in which the Thousand were overpowered and massacred. But Thucydides, without mentioning any particular causes of popular discontent, relates that the commonalty, after it had recovered from the first dismay of the revolution, began to meditate the overthrow of the oligarchy, and at length took the opportunity of the great Spartan festival, the Gymnopædia, to rise against its enemies, of whom some fell in the affray, and the rest fled from the city. The Spartans had been long apprized of the danger which threatened their friends, but had delayed sending them the aid which they called for, till the news of the insurrection arrived in the midst of the festival. They then interrupted the solem-possessions, they concluded an armistice, terminity, and despatched a body of troops towards Argos. But at Tegea they received the intelligence of the total discomfiture of the oligarchs, and though they were pressed by the Argive exiles to continue their march, they preferred the claims of piety or amusement, and returned to celebrate their holyday. It would seem that the conduct of the oligarchical Argives had been such as a little to embarrass their Spartan friends; for when, after the festival, envoys came to Sparta, both from the defeated party and from the victorious commonalty, a long debate took place in the presence of the deputies of the confederate states; and though Sparta decided in favour of the exiles, and declared its resolution of supporting their cause, it was tardy in renewing hostilities. But in the mean while the people of Argos, dreading an attack, and now placing all its hopes in Athenian succour, that it might be in condition to receive them even in the last emergency, began to carry down long walls to the sea. The whole population, men, women, and slaves, put their hands to the work, and they were assisted by a body

Thuc., v., 81. Compare Diodor., xii., 81. Thucyddes leaves it uncertain whether the thousand Argives, whom he mentions on this occasion, were the λoyades; but perhaps this may be inferred from Diodorus and Plutarch, AL., 15. + Paus., ii., 20, 2.

nable at ten days' notice, with the Chalcidians,* and in the mean while fitted out an armament for an object to which they seem to have been directed rather by passion than by a calm estimate of its value. A squadron of 30 Athenian galleys, with six Chians and two Lesbians, having on board 1200 heavy-armed Athenians, and 1500 allied troops, together with 320 Athenian archers, sailed, under the command of Cleomedes and Tisias, to reduce the isle of Melos, which had long irritated the pride of Athens by its independence, but, perhaps, at this juncture chiefly provoked her enmity by its attachment to Sparta. The influence of Alcibiades seems no less discernible in the expedition itself than in its tragical issue. He probably wished to wound Sparta through the side of her faithful colony, and either to humble her by extorting a practical confession of her inability to save it, or to provoke her to an open rupture with Athens. The Athenian commanders, after landing their forces, did not immediately commence hostilities, but sent an embassy into the town to induce the Melians to submit. They seem to have had hopes of creating a division among the people which might favour their operations, even if it did not immediately disarm all resistance. But the Melian government, aware of * Thục., vi., 7.

to Sparta and to Athens. He asserts as a notorious fact and the Melians do not deny itthat of all states, Sparta is that which has most glaringly shown by her conduct that, in her political transactions, she measures honour by in

this danger, refused to permit the envoys to address the popular assembly, and would only admit them to a conference with the magistrates and the members of the oligarchy, which was probably extremely narrow. Thucydides has composed a dialogue, such as, from his knowl-clination, and justice by expediency. She might, edge of the views and feelings of the parties, therefore, be expected, instead of being swayed he conceived might have passed on this occa- by the fair names of piety or generosity, calmly sion, for there seems to be no ground for attrib-to calculate the danger to which she would exuting to it any greater degree of historical truth. The arguments and tone of the Athenians might lead us to believe that Alcibiades himself was one of the interlocutors, if their language was anything more than an expression of the prevailing maxims of political morality.

pose herself by the effort which would be necessary for the deliverance of a weak, unprofitable island. On the other hand, Athens had sufficiently shown, by many examples, that she would not be deterred or diverted from her purpose by threats, or by any attack made upon her in another quarter.

The envoys withdrew, that the Melians might deliberate on their final answer; and when they were called in again, they were informed that the Melians would not so despair of their fortune, or distrust their natural allies, as all at once to renounce an independence of seven centuries; but they repeated their offer of neutrality and a fair compromise. The Athenians, as they withdrew, expressed their surprise at the singular infatuation which was hurrying the Melians to inevitable ruin. The siege of this town was immediately begun, and the bulk of the armament did not withdraw till it was closeblockaded both by sea and land.

The threats of the Athenians were accomplished; the hopes of the Melians proved baseless. It does not appear that so much as a thought was entertained at Sparta of stirring for their relief. The Spartans were too much occupied by the incursions with which, about this time, the Athenian garrison at Pylus was infesting their territory; and even these they only resented by permitting individuals to make reprisals on Athenian property. They neither aided Corinth, when, on some private quarrel, it renewed hostilities with Athens, nor second

The Athenians at the outset lay down the grounds on which they proposed to argue the question. They reject all appeals to justice as distinct from political expediency; not because they are conscious of a flagrant wrong, but because they have made up their minds on this head, and wish to prevent a waste of words. They do not charge the Melians with any offence, or pretend to deny that, though colonists of Lacedæmon, they had not so much as taken part in any of her expeditions; and the Melians were willing to engage to observe a strict neutrality for the future. But the power of Athens depended on the maintenance of a system which was inconsistent with the independ-ly ence of Melos. Her empire was in a great measure founded on opinion, and its stability would be endangered if it was observed that a single island might defy her with impunity; for the world would not give her credit for such singular moderation as willingly to abstain from a conquest which lay within her reach, but would certainly attribute her acquiescence to a sense of weakness. She was following what seemed to be the universal law of nature, in securing and strengthening her dominion, and had reason to hope that her conduct was no less conformable to the will of the gods than it wased the efforts of the Argive exiles; the sacrifisanctioned by the uniform practice of mankind. The Melians vainly endeavoured to prove that the interest of Athens herself required that their neutrality should be respected, on the ground that other independent states would be alarmed and provoked by such an aggression as they were now threatened with; an argument which could only have been cogent if Athens had had a reputation for equity and moderation to main-closely, and the miseries of the siege began to tain. The question, therefore, was reduced to a simple point, whether the Melians could gain anything by resistance. And the Athenian speaker intimates to them that their resistance, if unsuccessful, would involve them in the most And now the Athenians crowned their unjust dreadful calamities. They acknowledge that, aggression with an act of deliberate cruelty. besides the chances of war, and the favour of They put to death all the adult citizens, and enthe gods towards a righteous cause, they have slaved the women and children. It would seem, no ground of hope but the assistance which they from the threats which Thucydides puts into are entitled to expect from the parent state. the mouth of the Athenian speaker in the conThey will not believe that Sparta will suffer a ference, that the same decree which ordered colony which had been true to her for seven the expedition, had also fixed the punishment to hundred years to fall the victim of its fidelity; be inflicted on the Melians, if they resisted; as that even if she cannot find means of sending had been done in the case of Scione. In either an armament across the sea to their relief, she case, the guilt of proposing, or, at least, of supwill make an effectual diversion in their be-porting the inhuman decree, is laid to the charge half, either by a fresh invasion of Attica, or by of Alcibiades, whom we thus find sanctioning an expedition like that of Brasidas. The Athe- and even outdoing the most hateful of Cleon's nian in vain endeavours to correct the error into atrocities; for the case of Melos differed widewhich they seem to have fallen with regard bothly from those of Scione and Mitylene. The

ces, it was alleged, did not permit them to cross the border. The Melians, left to their own resources, made a gallant resistance. Twice they succeeded in surprising a part of the Athenian lines, and introduced some supplies into the town. But towards the end of 416 a re-enforcement was sent from Athens to the camp of the besiegers. As the place was pressed more

be more generally felt, symptoms of disaffection appeared within the walls; and the dread of treachery hastened the fall of the town, which surrendered at discretion.