Macedonian king assumed the tone rather of a | oppressed, covered some ambitious and unjust master than an ally. "He had not brought designs. To satisfy his audience on both these Brasidas to be an arbitrator in his quarrels, but points, he does not scruple to assert that, with to fight his battles; it was for this he main- the troops which he had brought from Pelopontained the half of his troops; and it would be a nesus, he had delivered Megara from the Athebreach of faith if, while he received his wages, nians, who, though superior în numbers, dehe should enter into negotiation with his ene-clined the battle which he offered; and he inmy." But the Spartan persisted in his resolution, and, in spite of the remonstrances of Perdiccas, had an interview with Arrhibæus, who finally prevailed on him to withdraw his forces from Lyncestis. Perdiccas vented his displeas-city which he should bring over to their alliure by reducing the amount of the pay which he furnished from the half to a third.

forms those who might suspect the purity of his intentions that, before he left home, he had bound the Spartan magistrates by the most solemn oaths to respect the independence of every

ance; probably another politic falsehood, though with a greater mixture of truth, by which he claimed for himself the whole merit of an engagement which had really been required from the Spartan government by the Chalcidian envoys.

He then proceeds to quiet the fears of the Acanthian commonalty by assuring them that he is not come to espouse the interests of any party, and that he should deem it an encroachment on their rights, which he was sent to vindicate, if he attempted to alter an established form of government in favour either of the few or the many. This would be to imitate the example of Athens, and would be doubly odious in those who reprobated her conduct, and were therefore obliged, as well by regard to their own reputation and interest as by their oaths, to observe an opposite course. And, finally, he enforces his arguments with a threat, which touched a great number of his hearers in their personal capacity. He could not patiently suffer them to reject the boon which he offered, and from motives of prudence, though they secretly wished well to his cause, to continue to augment the Athenian revenue by their tribute, and thus to injure Sparta and obstruct the liberation of Greece. He must endeavour, by ravaging their territory, to force them to declare themselves, and to prevent them from sacrificing the general welfare to their selfish fears. But he hoped they would be better advised, and would learn the glory of having taken the lead in the cause of liberty.

Brasidas was perhaps the less inclined to prosecute this expedition, as objects of greater importance demanded his attention elsewhere. The Athenian possessions in Chalcidice and on the coast of Thrace were the chief mark of his enterprise; and he had received invitations which induced him, immediately after quitting Perdiccas, to make the first attempt upon Acanthus, an Andrian colony, near the Isthmus of Mount Athos. His little army was strengthened by a body of Chalcidian auxiliaries, and he appeared before the town just before the vintage. Within parties were divided in the usual manner, but perhaps with less than the ordinary animosity. There was one-an oligarchical minority-which had invited him, and warmly contended for opening the gates to his army. The mass of the people was almost suspended between two opposite feelings; impatience of the Athenian dominion, and dread lest, if they should connect themselves with Sparta, they might lose their political constitution, and still remain subject as before, though to a different power. These wishes and fears were so nearly balanced, that a slight motive was sufficient to turn the scale; and in this state of things, apprehension of the damage which the invading forces, if provoked to hostility, might do to their fields and vineyards, powerfully inclined the Acanthians to listen to the friends of Sparta. Brasidas obtained leave to enter the city alone, and to plead his own cause in the popular assembly. He was well The Acanthians, who had much experience aware of the prejudices and suspicions which of Athenian oppression, but none of Spartan duhe had to encounter: he possessed a full share plicity, and who in Brasidas saw a representaof the Spartan prudence, and was gifted with tive of his countrymen whose character and an easier flow of speech than was commonly language were suited to inspire confidence, found among his countrymen, or had been led swayed partly by the desire of independence, by the new emergencies of the times to culti-partly by the fear of immediate loss, and pervate his talent in a manner more agreeable to haps not a little by the reflection that they had the taste of the age than to the institutions of already taken a step which might provoke the Lycurgus. That the yoke of the Athenians resentment of Athens, after a long debate, was an evil from which all their subjects must came to the resolution of renouncing the Atheeagerly desire to be delivered, he assumes as nian alliance. The votes on this occasion were universally admitted; and only thinks it neces- taken secretly, a precaution which probably consary to apologize for the tardiness of the Spar-tributed to decide the majority; and before the tans in sending the succours which he had Peloponnesian troops were admitted into the brought. But he affects to be surprised that city, Brasidas was obliged to take the same the Acanthians, for whose sake he had accomplished a difficult and dangerous march, should have shut their gates against his army, and should not have received him with joy as a protector and an ally; and complains that their coldness has not only disappointed him, but alarms him, lest it should elsewhere be construed into a token, either that his force was inadequate to the object of his enterprise, or that his professions of restoring liberty to the

The Scholiast of Thucydides on iv., 86, explains rò Aucas. And it seems necessary to adopt this interpretation πάτριον παρεὶς by τὴν πάτριον ἑκάστοις πολιτείαν κατα for the sake of the argument. Brasidas would disclaim an intention of establishing oligarchy or democracy, not becould not mean to make a model for his new allies, but because of his respect to the constitution of Sparta, which he cause it was inconsistent with his liberal professions to change their hereditary institutions. It would have been difficult to make the democratical Acanthians believe that

the Spartan Constitution resembled their own, which Dr. Arnold thinks was his meaning.

oath which he professed to have exacted from left at leisure to complete his preparations for the ephors before his departure from Sparta.* his approaching enterprise. Not long after, the neighbouring town of Stagirus followed the example of Acanthus.

It was in the autumn, soon after the revolt of Acanthus, that he set sail for Sipha with 400 In the mean while the Athenians were en-heavy-armed Athenians, a body of Acarnanian gaged at home in an undertaking similar to auxiliaries, and some from the newly-conquered those by which they had so greatly distressed Agræans. But he found the plan completely the enemy in Peloponnesus, and which prom-disconcerted. A mistake was made either by ised no less important advantages. Immedi- himself or his colleague as to the time of their ately after his retreat from Megara, Demosthe-joint operations, and he arrived at Sipbæ before nes had sailed with a squadron of 40 galleys to Hippocrates had left Athens. In the mean Naupactus, to be in readiness for taking part in while a Phocian of Phanoteus, named Nicomaan extensive plan which had been concerted chus, had betrayed the secret to the Spartans; for a general revolution in Boeotia. Some par- the Baotians were put on their guard, and betisans of Athens had agreed to betray the port fore any diversion was made on the side of Deof Siphæ on the Corinthian Gulf, in the territo- lium, marched with all their forces against ry of Thespia, into her power. Charonea, on Siphæ and Chæronea, which they secured so the borders of Phocis, was to be delivered up as to prevent the malecontents from stirring. by a body of refugees from Orchomenus, to They had already returned from this expediwhich Charonea belonged; and these exiles tion, when Hippocrates, who had drawn out the were prepared to give active assistance in oth-whole serviceable population of Athens, citier ways, and at their own charge had begun to zens and aliens, both residents and sojourners, levy troops in Peloponnesus. In Phocis, too, came to Delium, which he immediately prothere was a party which knew and favoured ceeded to fortify. He enclosed the consecrated the design. The Athenians, on their part, un-ground with a ditch, a rampart, and a palisade, dertook to seize and fortify the sanctuary of for which he found materials in the adjacent Apollo, called Delium, on the coast opposite vineyards, and strengthened the work with Eubœa, at about five miles from Tanagra. It stones and bricks taken from the neighbouring was settled that these movements should take houses. The holy ground was surrounded on place on the same day, in order that the atten- most sides with a screen of buildings; in one tion of the country might be distracted, and its part where a gallery once stood, but had now force divided. If they were successful, it seem- gone to ruin, Hippocrates surmounted the ramed probable that even if the oligarchical gov-part with wooden towers. The labour of the ernments throughout Boeotia were not imme- multitude assembled in the Athenian camp had diately overthrown, they would not be able to nearly finished the intrenchment by the afterstand long, while three points at remote ex-noon of the third day after it was begun. tremities of the country were occupied by the enemy, and afforded so many rallying-places for the disaffected, from which incessant inroads might be made into the heart of the land. Demosthenes, therefore, was sent to Naupac-mile from Delium to wait for the general, who tus that he might collect a body of troops from Acarnania and the other western allies, and, at the appointed time, might sail up the Corinth- In the mean time the Boot an army had asian Gulf to take possession of Sipha, while sembled in the district of Tanagra, not far from Hippocrates marched from Athens into Bootia. the place where the Athenians had halted, which The affairs of the Acarnanians appear to have belonged to Oropus, and was therefore, politiprospered after the happy termination of their cally considered, Attic ground. For this reawar with Ambracia. The year before, with the son most of the Bootarchs,* who were all aid of the Athenians stationed at Naupactus, present, were unwilling to attack the retreatthey had made themselves masters of Anacto- ing enemy, who was no longer in Boeotia, but rium, had expelled its Corinthian inhabitants, within his own confines. But Pagondas, one and occupied their place with Acarnanian set- of the two Theban Bootarchs, and supreme in tlers; and not long before Demosthenes arrived command, was eager to give battle. Yet he they had compelled Eniada to join the Athe- did not venture to exert his authority against nian alliance. In the interval preceding his the judgment of his colleagues without the intended expedition to Boeotia he assembled all general approbation of the army, and he therethe forces of the allies in the west, and march-fore harangued it in separate divisions, to rouse ed against Salynthius, king of the Agræans, whom he reduced to subjection, and was thus

Whether he himself had already taken the same oath at Sparta before he set out, as the position of duocavra in Thuc., iv., 88 (see Dr. Arnold's note), seems to intimate, must depend on the circumstances under which the oath was required from the Spartan government. If these were such as Brasidas represented to the Acanthians, there would certainly, as Dr. Arnold observes, be no reason why the government should have required such an oath from him. But if, as seems much more probable, the oath was really required by the Chalcidians, it would be quite conceivable that they might have required it from Brasidas as well as from the government. Whether Thucydides, after the language which he had put into the mouth of Brasidas, would in this manner have alluded to a fact somewhat at variance with it, is a different question.

The

troops were then ordered to set out on their march homeward. The light infantry for the most part went forward, and made straight for Attica; but the heavy-armed halted at about a

stayed behind to give orders for the regulation of the garrison and the completion of the works.

its patriotic pride and resentment. He reminded them that the Athenians were not the less enemies and invaders because they had just recrossed the border; that to abstain from resenting such an aggression as they had suffered would be no less unwise than dishonourable; their passiveness would only provoke a repetition of the insult. The neighbour whom they had to deal with was not content with petty encroachments on their territory: the Athenians aimed at nothing short of the subjugation of all Boeotia; and the example of Eubœa might warn them of the treatment which they had to

* See p. 168.

expect if they should ever become subject to mentioned, had left a squadron of horse at DeAthens. Nothing would encourage the Athe-lium, to surprise the Beotians by a sudden nians more than to find that they might at any charge. But the Baotian general had been aptime invade Boeotia with impunity, if they could effect their retreat to Attic ground before they were overtaken. It became the descendants of the brave men who conquered at Coronea, to repeat the lesson which their forefathers gave to the Athenians in that glorious field; and the god, whose sanctuary their enemy had profaned, would guide them to victory.

prised of his intentions, and had taken precautions to counteract the threatened movement; and perceiving the distress of his own left, he had sent two brigades of cavalry round by the back of the ridge which he had crossed to its relief. The victorious Athenians, when they saw this squadron appearing on the height above them, imagined that a fresh army was Having thus inspirited his troops, he led on its march to pour down upon them, and this them at full speed to seek the enemy-for the delusion concurring with the success of the day was now far advanced-and, on reaching a Thebans, soon spread irreparable confusion place where the two armies were only parted throughout the whole Athenian line. The army by a ridge, made his dispositions for the battle. was completely dispersed, some of the fugitives Hippocrates was still at Delium when he re-taking the direction of Delium, some making ceived the first intelligence of the approach of for Oropus, some for Parnes, and other quarthe Boeotians. He immediately despatched or- ters. A body of Locrian cavalry, which came ders for putting his army in battle array, and up as the rout began, aided the Baotians in the soon after came to the field. At Delium he slaughter of the flying enemy, which would have left about 300 horse, partly for the protection | been much more destructive if it had not been of the place, but likewise with instructions to stopped by the night. But near a thousand of look out for an opportunity of suddenly charging the heavy infantry, and a still greater number the enemy in the heat of the action. The Athe-of the irregular troops and followers of the nian line was scarcely formed before the Boo-camp, were left in the field, and Hipponicus, tians appeared on the top of the ridge, where one of the generals, was among the slain.* they halted to take breath while Pagondas The conquerors lost less than 500 men. The again addressed them with a few animating spoil served to adorn the Theban agora with words. His forces, which amounted to about new edifices and statues.† 7000 heavy and 10,000 light infantry, with 500 The next day the fugitives who had escaped targeteers and 1000 horse, were drawn up, not to Delium and Oropus found means of returning in any uniform order, but according to the vary-to Attica by sea; and the Boeotians, when they ing strength or military usages of the confederThe Thebans, who occupied the right wing, stood five-and-twenty deep: the cavalry and light troops were stationed at the two wings. The Athenian heavy infantry was about equal in number to that of the enemy, and was drawn up in a uniform line of eight deep, and each wing was flanked by a squadron of cavalry. But they were almost entirely destitute of light troops, which did not at this time enter into the composition of an Athenian army; and out of the multitude which had accompanied the regular forces to Delium, many, who went not to fight, but to work, were wholly unarmed, and most of the rest had continued their march homeward.

ates.

Hippocrates had scarcely time to cheer his men by setting before them the advantages of Victory, which would deliver Attica from future invasions of the Baotian cavalry-the main support of the Peloponnesians in their past invasions and by recalling the remembrance of their triumph at Enophyta, before the enemy raised the pæan, and was seen descending from the top of the ridge. The Athenians advanced running to meet them, and a warm action ensued, though at each end of the two lines a part of both armies was kept unemployed by the nature of the ground, being on opposite banks of two rapid brooks. The Athenians in the right wing broke the ranks of the Boeotian left; and the Thespians who were stationed there were surrounded by the enemy and suffered considerable loss. But the mass of the Theban division bore down all resistance, and drove the Athenians before it as it moved steadily forward. Yet the event of the battle was decided more by chance than by either prudence or valour. Hippocrates, we have

had raised their trophy, taken up their dead, and spoiled those of the enemy, marched to Tanagra, and turned their thoughts towards the recovery of Delium, which was still occupied by an Athenian garrison; but they left a guard on the field of battle in the hope of extorting a high price for the usual permission to bury the slain. The Athenian herald who was sent to ask it, on his way to the enemy's camp was stopped by a Baotian herald, who desired him to turn back, since his errand would be fruitless, until he himself had delivered the message with which he was charged to the Athenians. This was a complaint against the sacrilegious occupation of the temple at Delium, which, the Bootians alleged, was contrary to the national custom hitherto observed by all Greek states in their wars with one another, of sparing the temples in the enemy's territory. The Athenians had turned the sanctuary of Apollo into a fortress, and had profaned it with all the acts of ordinary life; they had polluted the holy water, which before had always been reserved for sacred rites, by applying it to common uses. In the name of Apollo and of the deities who were his partners in the consecrated ground, they bade the Athenians withdraw from it before they asked for anything which it was in the power of the Baotians to withhold.

But, on the other hand, the Athenian herald was instructed to reply that the Athenians had only occupied Delium in the prosecution of a just war, and had committed no wanton damage there; that, according to the laws of Grecian warfare, the temples in an enemy's country belonged to the invader who had taken possession of the district in which they stood, and he was only bound to treat them with due reverence as * Andocides, c. Alc., ◊ 13, Bekk.

+ Diodor., xii., 70.

far as he was able. The Boeotians, when they were only restrained from revolt by their fears, conquered their present territory, had not scrupled to seize the temples which before belonged to another people. It was the same right which the Athenians claimed in the small tract which they had now made their own, and which they meant to keep, as they would any other which they might be able to conquer. The water they had used to supply their natural wants, and they trusted that the gods would pardon an involuntary encroachment on their property. If there had been any breach of piety, it was in the proposal of the Baotians to barter the bodies of the dead for things sacred to the gods. The ground which they had conquered was no longer to be considered as a part of Boeotia, but, while they held it, as Attic soil; and, therefore, they could not fairly be called upon to cede it as the condition of recovering their dead. The Baotians sent a reply, in which they seem wilfully to have confounded the position of the Athenians at Delium with that of their slain in the territory of Oropus, which they acknowledged to belong to Attica. "If the Athenians were in Boeotia, they must quit it before they could reasonably expect any indulgence from the Boeotians; but if, as they pretended, they were on their own ground, the Baotians had nothing to do with a matter pertaining to a foreign soil." A dilemma which can only have been meant for the ear, and signified nothing more than that it was their pleasure to reject the application of the Athenians.

and were anxiously watching the progress of her arms, and when all her reputation was needed to counterbalance the efforts of Brasidas. Though it was now winter, the season, which hindered the enemy from sending succours by sea for the defence of their possessions, rather encouraged than checked him in his military operations; and he was meditating a blow more hurtful to Athens than any which she had suffered during the war. Amphipolis was not only in itself, on account of its wealth and magnitude, one of her most valuable tributaries, but was still more important on account of its position, which commanded the only passage by which a hostile land force from the south could reach the Thracian coast, which, with its subject towns and gold mines, was one of the main sources of her revenues. One of her generals, named Eucles, had already been sent to ensure the fidelity of Amphipolis by his presence; and the historian Thucydides was associated with him in command, with an especial view to the protection of the towns north of the Strymon. Thucydides, whose father, Olorus, was a de scendant, probably a grandson of Miltiades, and had married a lady of the same name, and, most likely, of the same blood with the Thracian princess, Hegesipyle, the wife of Miltiades, had come, either by inheritance or by marriage, into the possession of a rich estate in the gold mines of Scaptesyle, near the coast north of Thasos, to which they belonged before they were seized by the Athenians. It was probably the influence which he had acquired in this quarter by his property and connexions, rather than his abilities or his military experiencethough he is said to have held a command on some preceding occasions that induced the people to send him with a squadron to the coast of Thrace. He was stationed at Thasos, about half a day's sail from the mouth of the Strymon, when Brasidas moved, with a body of auxiliaries in addition to his own troops, from the Chalcidian town of Arnæ, to surprise Amphipolis. He had been urged to this attempt by the promises held out to him at Argilus, a small town a little to the south of the Strymon. The Argilians, who had in some way given umbrage to Athens, were themselves desirous of casting off their dependance on her, and wished, for their own security, to draw their powerful neighbour Amphipolis into the like revolt. They had an additional motive in the connexion which they had formed with her, through a number of their own citizens who had been admitted to her franchise; and this connexion gave them To complete the disastrous consequences of hopes and means of effecting their purpose. this Boeotian campaign, Demosthenes, when he The Argilian Amphipolitans promised their aid was repulsed from Siphæ, crossed over to the towards reducing their adopted city under the coast of Sicyon, and proceeded to land his power of Brasidas. But he knew that his suctroops as his galleys came in. But as they cess would depend on the secrecy and rapidity happened to follow each other very wide apart, of his movements; and he so calculated the the division first landed was attacked by a su- time of his march as to arrive at Argilus in the perior Sicyonian force, routed, and driven to its course of the night after he left Arnæ. He was ships with some loss, both of lives and prison- admitted at once into the town, and, before ers, while the rest were still at a distance; and, morning, was conducted by his Argilian friends instead of booty, the fleet only carried away the to the bridge which crossed the Strymon near slain when they had been obtained from the Amphipolis. Partly by surprise, partly by force, victorious enemy. These reverses were chief- and partly with the help of his Amphipolitan ly important, because they occurred at a time partisans, he made himself master of it, and when many of the distant subjects of Athens, immediately occupied the open ground which

But as this extraordinary proceeding did not produce the desired effect, they prepared to recover Delium by force. They thought it necessary to send for dartmen and slingers from the Malian Gulf; and after the battle they had received a re-enforcement of 2000 Corinthians, together with the Peloponnesian garrison of Nisæa and some Megarian troops. Yet they made many fruitless attempts upon the rude fortifications of Delium, and at length owed their success to a new engine, with which they kindled so fierce a flame against that side of the wall which had been constructed chiefly of timber, that its defenders could not keep their posts, or prevent the enemy from entering. Two hundred of them were made prisoners, but the greater part of those who escaped the sword took refuge in some ships which were lying in the harbour, and were carried back to Attica. Immediately after the capture of Delium, which took place on the seventeenth day after the battle, another herald came from Athens to solicit for the remains of the slain, and the Bootians no longer withheld them.

Surrender OF AMPHIPOLIS.—CONQUESTS OF BRASIDAS.

383

the same circumstances. Yet his unavoidable failure proved the occasion of a sentence under which he spent twenty years of his life in exile; and he was only restored to his country in the season of her deepest humiliation by the public calamities. So much only can be gath

he has not condescended to mention either the charge which was brought aganist him, or the nature of the sentence, which he may either have suffered or avoided by a voluntary exile.* A statement very probable in itself, though resting upon slight authority, attributes his banishment to Cleon's calumnies; that the irritation been so directed against an innocent object, would perfectly accord with the character of the people and of the demagogue. Posterity has gained by the injustice of his contemporaries, and he himself found consolation for the losses and sufferings of his exile, in the consciousness of his admirable labours, and in the presentiment of imperishable fame. It was to the liberty which he acquired by his exclusion from public duties that he owed the opportunities he enjoyed of collecting the materials of his history from the best sources, and of obtaining access to persons and places which, during the war, could not have been visited by an Athenian who had not lost his country. With a greatness of soul equal to the strength of his mind, he mentions his misfortunes only to record this advantage, which he and his readers have derived from them.

lay between the city and the river. Many of the citizens had houses in this quarter; and the invasion was so sudden that a great number of them had not time to take refuge within the walls, and fell into the enemy's hands. Eucles saw himself threatened both from within and from without. The citizens of Athe-ered with certainty from his own language, for nian blood formed but a small part of the population; the rest were either disaffected or lukewarm; and so great was the alarm and confusion created by the occupation of the populous suburb and the flight of its inhabitants, that Brasidas, if he had not suffered his troops to be detained by the pillage, but had advanced immediately to the gates, might, it was gener-produced by the loss of Amphipolis should have ally believed, have taken the city. A despatch was sent without delay to Thucydides for succour; and as the enemy contented himself with overrunning the suburban district, quiet was in some degree restored within the walls, and the friends of Athens maintained the ascendency. But Brasidas, who at first relied on the strength of the party which had invited him, seeing that it was not quite so powerful as he had hoped, began to fear that his enterprise would be utterly defeated by the arrival of Thucydides, whose authority and personal influence, both among the Greek towns on the Thracian coast and among the tribes in the interior, would encourage the partisans of the Athenian government to look for effectual protection. He therefore sent a herald to demand the surrender of the city upon terms which relieved all classes of the inhabitants from their worst fears. All who would, whether Athenians or of different race, were allowed to quit the town, with all their movable property, within five days; the rest would remain in the unmolested enjoyment, both of their estates, and of all their civil and political rights. This proposal, at a time when the prospect of relief appeared very uncertain, met the wishes of all. The Athenians, who, if the city was taken or betrayed, had the worst to fear, were glad to withdraw in safety, and without much pecuniary loss. Of the rest, the greater number felt no attachment to Athens, and were only anxious to preserve their property and franchises, while many whose friends had been taken in the surprise of the suburb were delighted with the prospect of recovering them. The partisans of Brasidas, seeing the bias of the public mind, threw off the mask, and openly seconded his proposal; and the Athenian general, when he attempted to interpose his authority, found that it had lost all its weight, and was compelled to witness the surrender of the city.

|

The acquisition of Amphipolis opened a wide field for conquest and negotiation to Brasidas, and his activity justified the dismay with which the Athenians were struck by their loss. His winning manners, liberal professions, and equitable conduct, enhanced the effect produced by his success on the subjects of Athens. They flattered themselves with the hope that the disaster of Delium had given a fatal shock to her power, and the longer Brasidas pursued his victorious career, the more easily he gained credit for his assertion, that the whole force of Athens had shrunk from a contest with his little army at Megara. The desire of change, and the enthusiasm excited by a new, untried ally, worked strongly in his favour, and the disposition to revolt became so general, that many towns vied with each other for the honour of being the first to receive him within their walls. The Athenians were not able immediately to check this spirit, as the season prevented them from sending an armament strong enough to overawe it, though they made the best provision they could for the defence of those points which seemed to be in the greatest danger. But Brasidas also was in want of troops as well as of ships. The latter of these wants he endeav oured to supply himself by building some galleys on the Strymon; but he applied in vain for a re-enforcement to Sparta, where several of the leading persons in the state were jealous of his glory, and the wish to recover the pris

On the evening of the same day Thucydides, with seven galleys which he happened to have with him at Thasos, when he received the despatch from Eucles, sailed into the mouth of the Strymon, and learning the fall of Amphipolis, proceeded to put Eion in a posture of defence. His timely arrival saved the place, which Brasidas attacked the next morning, both from the river and the land, without effect, and the refugees who retired by virtue of the treaty from Amphipolis, found shelter at Eion, and contribIt seems quite as probable that he was condemned to uted to its security. The historian rendered an Greek language would infer from the expression of Thucydimportant service to his country, and it doesides, v., 26, that he was banished for twenty years, even if not appear that human prudence and activity could have accomplished anything more under

death as to exile. Nobody decently acquainted with the

the fact mentioned by Pausanias, i., 23, 9, did not afford a clear indication of the contrary. The point is fully discussed by Krueger, Laben des Thukydides, p. 46, fol.