tain rations of bread, meat, and wine to be sent missioners might be appointed to treat with in daily to the besieged, under their own in- them in private. This proposal Cleon conspection. If any of these articles should be in-strued into a proof of double dealing, for which fringed, the truce was to be considered at an alone the veil of secrecy could be sought, and end. The ships, about sixty, were delivered up, induced the people to reject it. On this the amand the ambassadors were conducted to Athens.bassadors, deeming negotiation hopeless, quitThe proposals which they made when they ted Athens. On their return, the truce being were admitted to an audience before the peo- at an end, the Spartans demanded the restituple, included no other condition than the recov- tion of their ships. But the Athenians, alleery of the men in the island, as the price of ging that the truce had been infringed by some peace and alliance. As a few years before the acts of hostility—in the judgment of ThucydiAthenians had sued for peace, the Spartans im- des frivolous pretences refused to restore agined that it would now be accepted as an them. Hostilities were renewed with redoubequivalent for the object of their own desires. led activity and bitterness. The island was Yet the tone of the address attributed to them watched in daytime by two Athenian galleys, is that of an humbled enemy, who appeals to the which were continually cruising round in oppogenerosity as well as to the policy of his vic-site directions; and at night the whole fleet, torious antagonist. The Athenians are admonished to remember the fluctuating chances of war, which might still afford the garrison of Sphacteria means of escape, and might soon reverse the relative position of both parties. They are exhorted to grant peace on moderate terms, and thus to confer an obligation on Sparta which would ensure her friendship, as the loss of her citizens now in danger would inspire her with implacable enmity, and to earn the gratitude and good-will of the other Greeks, who were tired of the conflict, and uncertain to which of the two rival powers their miseries were to be imputed, but would hail Athens as their benefactress if she put an end to them, now that the decision rested entirely with herself.

now increased to seventy sail by a re-enforcement from Athens, was moored round the coast, unless the state of the weather prevented it from lying in the open sea. The Peloponnesians made repeated attacks on the fort, less with the hope of reducing it than of finding some opportunity of delivering their besieged friends.

But gradually a change took place in the situation and prospects of the two parties. The Athenians began to feel their own position irksome and embarrassing, and to lose much of the confidence with which they had looked forward to a speedy surrender of the island. They were themselves suffering from the scarcity both of victuals and water; for Pylus contained only one small spring in the citadel, and many of the troops were forced to drink the brackish water which they got by digging into the beach. The narrowness of the room in which so great an armament was crowded, and the difficulty of landing, which compelled the crews to go on shore for their meals by turns, aggravated the inconvenience of their situation. On the other hand, notwithstanding all the vigilance of their cruisers, the Lacedæmonians in the island continued to be supplied with provisions. Their commander, Epitadas, had carefully husbanded those which he had received during the armistice, which lasted about twenty days, and after it expired, means were found of introducing fresh supplies. Large rewards, or high prices, were offered by the Spartan government to all

Unhappily, the Athenians were more inclined to follow the example of the Spartans than to take their advice. They were intoxicated with their unexpected good fortune, as their enemy had been elated by their temporary distress. The men in the island they looked upon as already their own, and, consequently, that they might always command peace; but the present seemed a favourable opportunity for exacting some farther concessions. Yet they would probably have been more moderate in their demands, if their counsels had not still been swayed by Cleon, who was, perhaps, personally averse to peace, or saw that the most extravagant terms would be most agreeable to the mood of the assembly. He prevailed on it to decree an answer, which required that the men in the island should surrender themselves with their arms-persons who carried in flour, wine, cheese, or an aggravation of the disgrace-and be convey- other food suited to the emergency; and the ed to Athens, to be restored to their country Helots were excited by the promise of freedom. only after the Spartans should have reinstated They showed the greatest courage and address the Athenians in the possession of all the places in accomplishing their purpose; sometimes sailwhich had been ceded, in a moment of urgent ing to the back of the island in the night, more peril, as the price of the thirty years' truce, and especially when the weather was too rough for that, when these preliminaries had been execu- the enemy to keep his station there, and runted, a treaty of peace should be concluded, for ning their boats fearlessly on shore, a liberal alany term which might seem fit to the parties. lowance being made for their losses; sometimes These conditions were not only degrading to reaching the island by diving within the harthe honour of Sparta, but such as she would bour, dragging after them bags filled with a numost likely have found it impossible to fulfil, so tritive mixture of bruised seeds and honey, and that the probable result would have been a dis- by other devices eluding the Athenian guardgraceful sacrifice of the very object for which ships. And thus between two and three months she was treating without any equivalent. It passed away, after the blockade had begun, was dangerous to the reputation of Sparta without any progress having been made. among her allies to be known to listen to such terms, and the envoys did not venture to lower the dignity of their state, by publicly making any larger offers, before they knew whether they would be accepted, but desired that the comVOL. I.-A ▲▲

The reports brought to Athens of the state of things at Pylus created both impatience and alarm. There was reason to fear that the prey after all might slip through the hands which seemed to grasp it. If winter should find the

parties in the same position, it would be diffi- | fer an important advantage on the commoncult to victual the fort, and scarcely possible to wealth, or, if he failed, and so lost either his life maintain the blockade of the island, and prevent or his influence, it would be delivered from a the escape of the besieged. The offers which still greater evil. But since those who thought Sparta had made looked more tempting now thus were probably the few, we might be surthat they were withdrawn, and many began to prised by the levity shown by the majority in regret that they had been rejected. Cleon felt an affair of such inoment, and in which they that the growing discontent of the people was took so deep an interest, if the whole transacpointed against himself, and at first tried to pa- tion had not been placed in a different point of cify it by denying the truth of the accounts which view by another circumstance, which proves had been brought from the scene of action. But that Cleon's presumption was not so great as it when the persons whose veracity he thus call- at first appeared, or, rather, that there was ed in question desired that, if they were not be- much more of cunning than of rashness in his lieved, other agents might be sent to ascer- conduct. He had learned, and, perhaps, it was tain the truth, Cleon himself was appointed with generally known, that Demosthenes, urged by a colleague to this office. The commission was the growing difficulties of his position, had alembarrassing to him; for he saw that he should ready formed the design of attacking the island, not be able to lie without being detected, or to and he had the prudence to request that this speak truth without convicting himself of cal-able and experienced general might be joined with him in command. And thus, without any extravagant confidence in his own military skill, he might reasonably hope that, bringing a considerable re-enforcement to Pylus, and aided by the preparations, the judgment, and vigour of his colleague, he might further rather than impede the enterprise, the honour of which, if successful, he should be able to appropriate to himself. The appointment of Demosthenes as secqnd in command, which was granted by the assembly, removed the apprehensions which even the most thoughtless must have felt, if the issue of the expedition had been left to depend entirely on the abilities of Cleon.

umny.

He therefore shifted his ground, and anticipating the wish which he perceived to be prevailing, of quickening the operations of the besieging forces, he advised the people not to lose time in procuring farther information, but, if they were satisfied as to the truth of the reports brought to them, at once to send some man of spirit who would force the besieged Spartans to surrender. "If their generals had been any better than women, they would not have suffered so easy a conquest to be so long delayed; had he been in office, it would have been already done." Every one knew that the taunt was aimed at Nicias, who was one of the generals of the year, and whom he hated as his rival in popular favour; the boast excited some ironical murmurs in the assembly: "If he thought the thing so easy, let him try." Nicias, catching at the sneers of the multitude, gravely proposed that he should take any force which he might think necessary, and make the attempt: "he had full leave from the generals." Cleon, not supposing at first that Nicias was in earnest, declared himself ready to engage in the undertaking; but when he found that the proposal was meant seriously, he began to recede: "he did not wish to usurp the functions of Nicias." But Nicias solemnly renewed his offer, and called upon the assembly to attest it. The multitude enjoyed the visible perplexity of their swaggering favourite, and the more he shrank from his undertaking, pressed him the more loudly to fulfil it. He found, at last, that the humour of the people was not to be resisted or eluded, and he made up his mind to yield with a good grace. He resumed his intrepid air, and declared that he was ready to face the Lacedæmonians; that he did not even require a single Athenian to accompany him. He would take only the Lemnians and Imbrians who were then at Athens, a body of targeteers which had just come from Ænus, and 400 foreign bowmen; and with this force, added to that which they had already at Pylus, within twenty days he would either bring the Lacedæmonians away prisoners, or kill every man."

Again the assembly was amused by language which sounded like an empty vaunt; yet it did not shrink from intrusting Cleon with the command and the forces which he required. Even those who best understood the man's character were glad to see him engaged in an undertaking, by which, if he succeeded, he would con

The forces, indeed, which Demosthenes had already at his disposal seem to have been quite sufficient for his purpose; but he had hitherto been deterred from using them. The strength of the besieged was not exactly known to the Athenians, who believed their numbers to be smaller than they really were. But, on the other hand, they were formidable as the flower of the Spartan warriors, who were commonly deemed almost invincible; they might be expected to dispute every inch of the ground, and had the advantage of a strong position. The island was uninhabited, and thickly covered with wood, which, as it concealed the amount of the besieged forces, would enable them to watch all the movements of the enemy, so long as he kept on open ground, and to profit by all his mistakes, while it screened them from his attacks, or, if he ventured into it, would expose him to be cut to pieces in detail. This was a danger with which Demosthenes was deeply impressed by the remembrance of his disaster among the forests of Ætolia. But not long before Cleon's arrival, this obstacle had been cleared away. A party of Athenians, having landed on a corner of the island, to take thes meal, lighted a fire, which happened to catch the adjoining wood; and the flames were spread by the wind, until almost the whole island was left bare. The enemy's numbers now became visible; and the Athenians perceived that the prize was more valuable than they had imagined; and, the main difficulty having been removed, Demosthenes had collected all the snecours he could draw from the nearest allies of Athens, and was in the midst of his preparations for invading the island, when he received s message from Cleon to announce his approach: and soon after the new general arrived.

The day was wearing, the combatants growing faint from thirst and fatigue, and yet the issue of the conflict did not seem to have been brought a step nearer, when the commander of the Messenian auxiliaries proposed a new attempt to the Athenian generals. If they would intrust him with a few archers, and other light troops, he would try to find a passage which would bring him upon the enemy's rear. And accordingly, with such a detachment as he required, he began his march from a point of the coast not in view of the fort, and having, with great difficulty, wound his way along the foot of the cliffs, he at length mounted by a side which, on account of its strength, had been left unguarded, and suddenly appeared on the high ground at the back of the Lacedæmonians, who found themselves in a position which Thucydides compares to that of Leonidas at Thremopylæ. As their hopes sank under this new danger, the ardour of the Athenians revived at the sight of the Messenians on the height; and they pushed forward to overpower the divided and enfeebled resistance of the disheartened garrison. It was evident that it could not hold out much longer, and that, if the slaughter once began, it would only end with the destruction of the vanquished. But this was not the object of the Athenian generals; they wished to carry as many as they could prisoners to Athens. They therefore checked their troops, and suspended the attack, while by the voice of a her

The first step taken by the two commanders | When the enemy saw them give way, he presswas to send a herald to the enemy's camp to ed them more hotly than ever; but the greater propose that the besieged should surrender part made good their retreat, and having reachthemselves and their arms, on condition of be- ed the fort, took their stand with their coming detained in mild custody till the conclusion rades on the side where it was most open to of a general peace. The proposal was reject-attack; and as the nature of the ground preed; and another day only was permitted to in- vented the Athenians from encompassing them, tervene before the blow was struck. The main they now enjoyed a temporary relief, and sufbody of the besieged, commanded by Epitadas fered, perhaps, less than the assailants from the himself, was stationed near a spring in the cen-heat and the toil of the protracted struggle. tral and most level part of the island. Thirty men guarded a post near one of its extremities, and another small force occupied the northern point, facing Pylus, where the ground was naturally strong, both on the sea and the land side, and was defended by an old rude fortification. The heavy-armed Athenian troops, to the number of 800, embarked in the night, and a little before daybreak landed in two divisions on opposite sides of the island, and immediately proceeded at full speed to surprise the nearest post, where they found the thirty who guarded it just starting from sleep, and snatching up their arms-for the approach of the enemy's ships to their usual station had excited no alarm -and cut them all to pieces. With the dawn the light infantry, which formed the bulk of the army, disembarked; 70 ships' companies, all but the rowers of the lowest order,* with such arms as they could find; 800 bowmen, and as many targateers,† with as large a part of the garrison of Pylus as could be spared from the walls. The plan of Demosthenes was to distribute his light troops in detachments of between 200 and 300 men, to occupy the highest ground on every side of the enemy, and annoy him with their missiles, while the heavy infantry came slowly up. Epitadas and his little band soon found themselves assailed in all directions by showers of arrows, javelins, and stones, from a distance at which, under the encumbrance of their heavy armour, they were unable to overtake their assailants. They de-ald they called on the Lacedæmonians to lay sired to meet the Athenian heavy-armed, who were advancing towards them, to provoke, but not to accept a combat; but the incessant attacks of the parties which hung on their flanks and rear prevented them from ever coming to close quarters with those who were in front. By degrees their strength began to be spent in unavailing onsets, and their spirit to flag. The assailants, who at first quailed before the invincible Spartans, and kept aloof, observing their resistance slacken, and imboldened by success and by their own visible superiority of numbers, now redoubled their efforts, and poured down upon them with a simultaneous charge and a deafening shout. The Lacedæmonians were encumbered and impeded by the broken shafts of the weapons which had pierced through their armour; they were almost blinded and choked by a cloud of dust which rose under the trampling of the crowd from the ashes of the recently-consumed wood; all orders were drowned in the enemy's clamour; their minds were perplexed by the confusion of the scene, and the various pressures of the danger. At length, rallying all the force which toil and wounds had left in them, they closed their ranks and made for the fort at the north end of the island.

• Θαλάμιοι.

+ IleAracra, from the short buckler called in.

down their arms, and surrender at discretion. Most of those who heard the summons lowered their shields, and waved their hands, in token of compliance, and soon the commanders on both sides came to a conference. Epitadas had been slain; Hippagretas, the second in command, lay wounded without signs of life; Styphon, who, according to Spartan usage, had been appointed to succeed if his superiors fell, treated with Cleon and Demosthenes. He desired leave to send over to consult his countrymen on the mainland as to the course which he should adopt. The Athenians would not let any of his men leave the island, but themselves sent for heralds from the Peloponnesian camp to bear Styphon's message. After a few inquiries had been interchanged, an answer was finally brought, to the effect "that the Lacedæmonians in the island were at liberty to act as they thought fit, so as to preserve their honour." This was construed by Styphon and those with whom he deliberated as a permission to accept the terms offered by the Athenians; and they surrendered; in all 292, and of these about 120 were Spartans. Within twenty days, according to his promise, Cleon returned with his prisoners to Athens. What part he had taken, either as general or soldier, in the combats of Sphacteria, Thucydides does not intimate otherwise

coast by daybreak, and landed his troops on an open beach, seven or eight miles south of Corinth, but not more than two or three from the position of the Corinthian army. Above this landing-place, about a mile and a half from the sea, stood the ancient village of Solygia, memorable, as we have seen, in the early history of the Corinthian Dorians.* The Corinthian generals, Battus and Lycophron, were immediately apprized by signals of the enemy's presence; yet they seem to have apprehended that this movement was no more than a feint, and that Crommyon was the real object of the invaders. They therefore left one half of their troops at Cenchrea for the protection of the northern border, and Battus, with one battalion, marched to defend Solygia, which was unwalled, while Lycophron proceeded directly to the shore, where he arrived just after the Athenians had landed. A warm action ensued, in which, after several vicissitudes, the Athenians were victorious, chiefly through the support which they received from their cavalry, the enemy having none. Lycophron himself was slain, and the right wing, in which he fought, lost about 200 men; but the rest of the army retreated in good order, and took up a position on the higher ground, not far from the shore. The Athenians did not pursue them, but contented themselves with spoiling their slain enemies, taking up their own dead, who were a little short of 50, and raising a trophy. In the mean while, the troops left at Cenchreæ, though at first, being separated from the field of battle by a low ridge of Mount Oneum,† they could not see the peril of their countrymen, were alarmed by the cloud of dust which rose above the hill, and set out for the scene of action. Corinth, too, sent forth her citizens who had

than by his silence; but it is probable that the more clear-sighted viewed the whole affair in the same light with the comic poet, who, under a homely figure, represented Cleon as slyly purloining the laurels of Demosthenes.* But the result of his success was not the less important, and, through the new aliment which it ministered to his self-confidence, it was ultimately attended, as will be afterward seen, with the very advantage which would have consoled the best patriots if he had totally failed. The immediate effect was to raise the spirit of the Athenians, to deject the Spartans, and to astonish the rest of Greece. That Spartans, with arms in their hands, and sufficient food, should surrender themselves prisoners, was something new to the Greeks, who expected that they would all have died at their posts, and could hardly believe that the survivers were men of the same stamp with the slain; though, as one of them remarked, when he was insultingly asked at Athens whether his comrades who had fallen were of the true Spartan blood, they died, not in close combat, but as the dart or the arrow happened to speed. The Athenians resolved to take the utmost advantage both of the capture they had made, and of the footing which they had gained at Pylus. They declared that, if the Peloponnesians should again invade their territory, they would put their prisoners to death; and they garrisoned Pylus-from which the Peloponnesians withdrew their army after the reduction of the island-with a body of Messenians, who, as Demosthenes had foreseen, found abundant opportunities of annoying their hereditary foes in the land of their fathers. The Spartans were distressed and alarmed; for Pylus was an asylum for fugitive Helots, and might become the focus of a dangerous revolt; and they again sounded the dispositions of Ath-been left at home as past the age of service; ens towards peace; but the demands of the enemy rose so high that, after several attempts, the negotiation was again dropped.

and Nicias, hearing of the approach of these fresh troops, and thinking it probable that they might soon be re-enforced by their nearest PeloThe Athenians now resumed their offensive ponnesian allies, embarked his men in haste, operations with increased activity; and, hav- and sailed away. His departure was, indeed, so ing secured themselves at home, made the ene- hurried that he was obliged to leave two of his my feel the weight of their naval superiority. own slain, whom their comrades could not find, An armament of 80 galleys with 2000 heavy-in the power of the enemy; and the effect of armed Athenians, and horse-transports with this omission marks both the character of the 200 cavalry, together with auxiliaries from Mi-general and the manners of the age. The posletus, Andros, and Carystus, was sent, under the command of Nicias and two colleagues, to invade the territory of Corinth and the eastern side of Peloponnesus. The Corinthians had received early notice of the expedition and its object from some of their friends at Argos, where, as in a neutral state, it was easy to procure information concerning the counsels of Athens; and they had made preparations to meet the threatened attack as well as they could without knowing the precise point against which it would be directed. They posted their forces in the Isthmus, that they might bring the speediest succour either to the north or the south side of their territory; but they feared most for Crommyon on the Megarian border. But Nicias, having put out from Piræus in the night, arrived off the Peloponnesian * Aristophanes, Eq., 54, f.:

session of the slain, as on it depended the satisfaction of some most urgent claims of Greek piety, was the ordinary test of victory or de feat. The party which was forced to solicu the enemy's leave to inter its dead was held to acknowledge itself worsted; yet Nicias did not hesitate to sacrifice the honours of victory, by sending a herald on shore to recover the two corpses. It is difficult to say whether his predominant motive was the fear of the gods or of men; for, though there was a strong tincture of superstition in his character, he was no less habitually governed by the dread of affording any handle for calumnies which might injure him in public opinion.

The Corinthians seem to have had some reason for expecting an attack on Crommyon Nicias shaped his course next to that quarter; but he did not make any attempt on the town, which was probably too well defended ; but, * P. 118.

+ P. 3 + Diodorus, indeed (xii., 65), relates that he took the for

for want of an executioner. Behind them were other ministers of blood, who, with scourges, urged the faltering steps of those who shrank from the deadly vista; but, after three bands had been thus despatched, their surviving friends, who at first supposed that they had only been transported to another prison, learn

after having ravaged the territory, and passed the night there unmolested, he the next day made for the coast of Epidaurus. Here his views were not confined to temporary plunder. He carried a wall across the isthmus which connected the rocky peninsula of Methone with the mainland, and behind it erected a fort, where he left a garrison, which, from this cen-ed their fate and their own danger. They now tral position, was enabled to make continual inroads into the territories of Epidaurus, Træzen, and Haliæ. He then returned home.

called on the Athenians, if they would not save their lives, at least to put them to death themselves, and declared that they would neither go out nor suffer their enemies to enter. Though they were unarmed, the murderers had no mind to force the doors and close with them, but mounted on the roof, and made an opening, through which they attacked them with their arrows, and with the tiles of the building. The greater part of the prisoners hastened to baffle the malice of their enemies by putting an end to their own lives; yet it was not without difficulty that they found instruments of death, some in the weapons discharged at them, others in the cordage of some couches, or strips of their own garments, with which they strangled themselves. Night fell upon the scene of blood, but did not stop the work either of slaughter or of self-destruction; but when the next day dawned, there remained only a heap of corpses, which were piled in carts and carried out of the city. The free women who were taken in the stronghold of Istone were made slaves. It was some consolation to humanity that this massacre was followed by a long period of tranquillity, for no antagonists were left capable of giv ing umbrage to the popular party, and its fury is less odious than the barbarity of the Athenian generals, who sacrificed so many lives to their pitiful jealousy. Their commission having been thus executed at Corcyra, they pro

In the mean while, Eurymedon and Sophocles, on their way to Sicily, had stopped, according to their instructions, to succour their friends at Corcyra, who were again threatened by the remnant of the contrary faction. The refugees were not more than 500, and they had engaged about a hundred other adventurers in their service; but they were formidable from the spirit with which they were animated by revenge and despair. After having applied in vain to Sparta and Corinth for aid, they crossed over to Corcyra, burned the ships from which they landed, to cut off all hope but that of victory, and intrenched themselves on a hill called Istone, from which they carried on an incessant warfare against the city, so as to deprive their enemies of all benefit from the land. The events which have been related put an end to their prospects of foreign support, and exposed them to the undivided hostility of the Athenian armament. The Athenians attacked them in their stronghold, and made themselves masters of it, but not of its defenders, who took refuge in a higher part of the mountain; but, seeing that their situation was now utterly hopeless, they agreed to surrender themselves to the Athenians. No conditions were made on behalf of their auxiliaries; but their own doom was to be decided by the sentence of the Athe-ceeded to Sicily. nian people, and they were to be kept in custody until they should be sent to Athens for trial, in the isle of Ptychia; and it was stipulated that an attempt to escape should be considered as an infraction of the agreement. The leaders of the opposite party were afraid that their thirst for vengeance might be disappoint-possession of it much more than six months. ed by the lenity of an Athenian tribunal, and they contrived a stratagem for getting the prisoners into their own hands. They found instruments who, under the mask of friendship, induced some of these unhappy men to believe that the Athenian generals intended to deliver them up to their enemies, and persuaded them to make their escape, for which they offered to provide a vessel. The artifice was the more specious, and its authors felt the more secure of impunity, if not of success, as the Athenian commanders had not disguised their reluctance to let prisoners of such importance be conducted to Athens by another; and hence, when the fugitives were arrested, the whole body, as having violated the agreement, was abandoned to their adversaries, who immediately proceed-The substance of its prolix contents was a comed to glut their revenge. The victims were lodged in a spacious building, and then led out, bound together, in companies of twenty at a time, between two rows of armed men, who, as they passed, aimed their blows, each at the object of his personal hatred, and none escaped trees, but this is disproved by the silence of Thucydides,

IV., 45.

In the course of the following winter Artaxerxes died, and was succeeded by Xerxes II., his only legitimate son, who, after a reign of forty-five days,* was murdered by one of his half brothers, Sogdianus, or Secyndianus. The assassin mounted the throne, but did not keep

He was then deposed and put to a cruel death by Ochus, another of the seventeen natural children of Artaxerxes, who reigned for many years under the name of Darius II. The death of Artaxerxes interrupted a prospect which had just opened upon the Athenians of entering into friendly relations with the court of Persia, or, at least, of diverting it from giving assistance to their enemies. Aristides, one of the officers whom they sent out, from time to time, to raise contributions from their allies, arrested a Persian named Artaphernes, as he was passing through Eion on the Strymon, on his way to Sparta with a commission from the king. He was brought to Athens, and the royal letter which he carried was opened and translated.

plaint "that Artaxerxes could not understand what the Spartans were aiming at: they had sent many envoys to him, but the messages which they bore had been all at variance with one another; he therefore desired them to send

* According to Ctesias, Pers., 45. But this period is probably a little too short. See Mr. Clinton, F. H., ii., p.

315.