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which they had derived great advantages; and that, as far as lay in themselves, they had not broken the last peace, but had been treacherously surprised by the Thebans, while they thought themselves secure in the faith of treaties. Even if their former merits were not sufficient to outweigh any later offence which could be imputed to them, they might insist on the Greek usage of war, which forbade proceeding to the last extremity with an enemy who had voluntarily surrendered himself; and as they had proved, by the patience with which they had endured the torments of hunger, that they preferred perishing by famine to falling into the hands of the Thebans, they had a right to demand that they should not be placed in a worse condition by their own act, but, if they were to gain nothing by their capitulation, should be restored to the state in which they were when they made it.

But, unhappily for the Plateans, they had nothing to rely upon but the mercy or the honour of Sparta-two principles which never appear to have had the weight of a feather in any of her public transactions; and though the Spartan commissioners bore the title of judges, they came, in fact, only to pronounce a sentence which had been previously dictated by Thebes. Yet the appeal of the Platæans was so affecting that the Thebans distrusted the firmness of their allies, and obtained leave to reply. They very judiciously and honestly treated the question as one which lay entirely between the Platæans and themselves. They attributed the conduct of their ancestors in the Persian war to the compulsion of a small dominant faction, and pleaded the services which they had themselves since rendered to Sparta. They depreciated the patriotic deeds of the Platæans as the result of their attachment to Athens, whom they had not scrupled to abet in all her undertakings against the liberties of Greece. They defended the attempt which they had made upon Platea during the peace on the ground that they had been invited by a number of its wealthiest and noblest citizens; and they charged the Platæans with a breach of faith in the execution of their Theban prisoners, whose blood called for vengeance as loudly as they for mercy.

the ceremony was finished by his answer or his silence, he was immediately consigned to the executioner. The Plateans who suffered amount. ed to 200; their fate was shared by twenty-five Athenians, who could not have expected or claimed milder treatment, as they might have been fairly excepted from the benefit of the surrender. The women were all made slaves. If there had been nothing but inhumanity in the proceeding of the Spartans, it would have been so much slighter than that which they had exhibited towards their most unoffending prisoners from the beginning of the war as scarcely to deserve notice. All that is very signal in this transaction is the baseness of their cunning, and perhaps the dullness of their invention.

The town and its territory were, with better right, ceded to the Thebans. For a year they permitted the town to be occupied by a body of exiles from Megara, and by the remnant of the Platæans belonging to the Theban party. But afterward-fearing, perhaps, that it might be wrested from them-they razed it to the ground, leaving only the temple standing. But on the site, and with the materials of the demolished buildings, erected an edifice 200 feet square, with an upper story, the whole divided into apartments for the reception of the pilgrims who might come to the quinquennial festival, or on other sacred occasions. They also built a new temple, which, together with the brass and the iron found in the town, which were made into couches, they dedicated to Heré, the goddess to whom Pausanias was thought to have owed his victory. The territory was annexed to the Theban state lands, and let for a term of ten years. So, in the ninety-third year after Platea had entered into alliance with Athens, this alliance became the cause of its ruin.

The fleet with which Alcidas had escaped from the coast of Ionia was afterward dispersed by a storm off Crete, but was again assembled in the port of Cyllene, where the admiral found a squadron of thirteen galleys from Leucas and Ambracia, and Brasidas, who had been sent to aid him with his counsels. The armament thus strengthened was destined to act on the coast of Corcyra, where affairs were in such a state as afforded a prospect that, while the Athenians had only a squadron of twelve galleys at Naupactus, the island might be detached from their influence.

These were, indeed, reasons which fully explained, and perhaps justified their own enmity to Platea, and did not need to be aided by so glaring a falsehood as the assertion that their enemies were enjoying the benefit of a fair trial. We have seen that, in the sea-fight which But the only part of their argument that bore was one of the occasions of the war, the Coupon the real question was that in which they rinthians had taken 250 Corcyræan prisoners, reminded the Spartans that Thebes was their whom they treated with great indulgence, in most powerful and useful ally. This the Spar- the hope of gaining them over to their interest. tans felt; and they had long determined that They afterward sent them back to Corcyra, no scruples of justice or humanity should en- nominally ransomed for 800 talents, on security danger so valuable a connexion. But it seems given by their friends at Corinth, but in truth that they still could not devise any more inge- on no other condition than that of restoring the nious mode of reconciling their secret motive Corinthian ascendency in the island. In this with outward decency than the original ques-undertaking they engaged the more readily, as tion, which implied that, if the prisoners were their enemies, they might rightfully put them to death; and in this sophistical abstraction all the claims which arose out of the capitulation, when construed according to the plainest rules of equity, were overlooked. The question was again proposed to each separately, and when

most of them belonged to that class for which such a revolution would open the way to power; and they at length succeeded in forming a party strong enough, in an assembly which was attended by envoys from Athens and from Co

* See

P. 281.

strong in numbers and in position, and actively
supported by the women, were driven to the ne-
cessity of setting fire to the houses in the agora.
The conflagration repelled their enemies, but
caused great damage, especially to the proper-
ty of merchants, and if it had been favoured by
the wind, might have destroyed the whole city.
The night brought a pause, during which the
Corinthian galley, and most of the foreign aux-
iliaries, who saw the cause of their friends
declining, made their escape. But the next
day an Athenian general, Nicostratus, son of
Diitrephes, arrived with twelve galleys and 500
Messenians, from his station at Naupactus. He
interposed to put an end to the contest, and
concluded a solemn agreement between the par-
ties, by which ten of the principal authors of
the late convulsion were to be brought to trial-
which, however, they did not wait for no one
else was to be molested, and an alliance, offen-
sive and defensive, was contracted with Athens.
Peace being thus restored, Nicostratus prepared
to depart; but the leaders of the commonalty
requested him to leave five of his galleys with
them, and to take away five which they would
man for him instead. Having gained leave,
they signified their intention of putting their en-
emies on board. They, fearing that they were to
be sent to Athens, took refuge in a sanctuary
of the Twins. Nicostratus in vain endeavoured
to allay their fears, and the opposite party, in-
terpreting their refusal as a proof of some treach-
erous design, rose, and searched their houses
for arms, and, but for the intervention of the
Athenian general, would have slain some who
fell in their way. Upon this, those who had
hitherto remained quiet betook themselves as
suppliants to the sanctuary of Heré; and the..
popular leaders were so alarmed at their num-
bers, which were upward of 400, that they in-
duced them to let themselves be carried over
to Ptychia, a little island not far off, where they
were supplied with provisions.

rinth, to procure a decree which revived the old system of neutrality between the belligerents; so that, though the Athenian alliance was not renounced, the Peloponnesians were to be treated as friends. The democratical party was headed by one Pithias, who, though not formally appointed by the state, or recognised by the Athenians, assumed the character of their proxenus. The party, which had gained a step by the decree, now proceeded to try its strength by arraigning Pithias on a charge of making Corcyra subservient to Athens. But he was acquitted; and being thus assured of his superiority, he laid hold of a handle which was perhaps supplied by the contiguity of some private property to certain public domains, or by the tenure on which these were occupied by private persons, and convicted five of the wealthiest among his adversaries of having cut stakes on ground sacred to Zeus and to the hero Alcinous. The legal fine for every stake was a stater ;* and, perhaps through long connivance or dormancy of the law, the whole penalty which each of the defendants had incurred was of ruinous amount. With the ensigns of suppliants, they besought the people to allow them to pay it by instalments; but Pithias, who was a member of the council, prevented them from obtaining this indulgence, and was preparing to use the advantage which his station afforded him, to reverse the decree of neutrality, when his adversaries, maddened by their personal losses, and by the threatened defeat of their plans, collected a band of conspirators, who suddenly rushed into the council-chamber, and despatched Pithias and about sixty others. The consternation excited by this outrage was such, that some of his party took refuge on board the galley which had brought the Athenian envoys, and accompanied them to Athens. The conspirators, whose strength was probably measured by their boldness, became masters of the assembly, and carried a motion for closing their ports against all but single vessels of the belligerent powers. At the same time they sent envoys to Athens to justify their proceedings, and to induce the refugees there to remain tranquil. But the Athenians arrested both the envoys and all their countrymen who had yielded to their persuasions or threats, and lodged them in custody in Ægina. In the mean while, the party which had gained the up-threw the party till then triumphant into disper hand in Corcyra, encouraged by the arrival of a Corinthian galley with ambassadors from Sparta, fell upon the commonalty, which at first was put to the rout, but in the following night took possession of the citadel and the other eminences in the city, and collected its forces there, and in one of the harbours called the Hyllaic. The other harbour was in the power of their adversaries, as well as the agora adJoining it, where most of them lived. The next day was chiefly spent by both parties in procuring re-enforcements. The slaves, whom each invited by the promise of freedom, mostly joined the commonalty; their opponents brought over 800 auxiliaries from the continent. The day after the struggle began; and the oligarchs, overpowered by the commonalty, which was

Probably the silver one of four drachmas; if it had been the gold stater of twenty drachmas, this would have been remarked.

Three or four days after this transaction, while the hopes and fears of the parties were still in the same state of suspense, the Peloponnesian fleet under Alcidas and Brasidas, fiftythree galleys, arrived in the channel. They anchored for the night in the harbour of Sybota on the mainland, and the next morning pushed across towards Corcyra. Their appearance

may and confusion. While the Athenian squa-
dron set out in good order to meet the enemy
and hold him in check, they manned sixty of
their own galleys, and sent them out in suc--
cession as they were got ready, but not with--
out misgivings, which were justified by the
event. For two immediately went over to the
enemy, and in others the crews began fighting
with one another. The Peloponnesians, seeing
their disorder, divided their own force, and with
twenty galleys attacked the Corcyræans as they
came up in small numbers, while the remaining
three-and-thirty encountered the Athenian squa-
dron. But as Nicostratus by superior tactics
avoided their centre, where he must have been
surrounded and overpowered, and having taken
them in flank, sank one galley, they formed into
a circle, and stood on the defensive. And now
the Athenians were about to repeat the mancu-
vre which Phormia had practised so successful-

ly in the Corinthian Gulf, when the twenty gal- | ned. In one sanctuary the suppliants were wallleys, which had been mastering the Corcyræans ed in, and died of hunger; from others they almost without resistance, at the sight of this were dragged out to death. A father was known danger came up and joined the main body. The to have dipped his hands in the blood of his Athenians, unable to make head against such a child. Political enmity, though the ordinary force, fell back, but in good order, so as to give motive of these murders, was often, during this their allies time for retreating. And thus the bat-season of anarchy, only a pretext, which enatle terminated, leaving the Peloponnesians mas- bled many to revenge their personal injuries, or ters of thirteen Corcyraan galleys, and of the sea. to get rid of troublesome creditors. When EuThe Corcyræans were alarmed lest the enemy rymedon sailed away, hatred and revenge were should make use of his victory to attack the almost forced to rest for want of work. A remcity, or, at least, to deliver the prisoners in Pty- nant, indeed, of the vanquished party, amountchia, and they removed them back to the sanc-ing to about five hundred, still survived; but it tuary of Heré, and made preparations for de- had escaped to the opposite coast, and there fence. But Alcidas, though he had an able having seized some forts, both kept possession counsellor, was supreme in command; it was of the continental territory of the state, and by near sunset, and he withdrew, without attempt-continual excursions harassed its adversaries ing to strike another blow, to Sybota.

in the island, interrupted their commerce, and even cut off their necessary supplies; success, which, in the end, by inspiring their assailants with hopes of a still deeper and more permanent revenge, hurried them on to their own destruction.

The next morning Brasidas pressed him to make for the city, where all was in terror and disorder; but Alcidas preferred the safer operation of disembarking his troops at the headland of Leucimna, and ravaging the country, to the great relief of the democratical party, which, The consideration of such dire excesses as expecting an early attack, had entered into ne- we have been relating induced the Greek histogotiation with its adversaries, and had prevail-rian to pause, and in a digression which is, pered on some of them to embark in their remain-haps, the most instructive part of his work, to ing serviceable galleys-now reduced to thirty- lay open the deep and spreading root which for the defence of the city. About noon, as if yielded these bitter fruits; in other words, to he had exhausted every opportunity of action, describe with searching minuteness the characAlcidas sailed away to his station, and at night-ter and progress of that spirit of party which, fall he received intelligence, conveyed by firesignals from Leucas, of the approach of an Athenian armament-sixty galleys, which had been sent, under the command of Eurymedon, to protect Corcyra. He now lost no time, but pushing by the shore under cover of the night, reached the Leucadian isthmus, and had his ships hauled over to the other side, and so pursued his voyage homeward in security.

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though it had long prevailed among the Greeks, and had already manifested itself in many terrible deeds, had never before broken out in a form quite so hideous as it displayed in the massacre of Corcyra. This, therefore, Thucydides looks upon as the opening of a new period in the history of the Greek factions, when, as the same causes continued to operate with increasing malignity, scenes which had before been rare, and were viewed with wonder and horror, grew common and familiar. Yet he was aware that so long as human nature remained the same, mankind would never cease to be afflicted, in various modes and degrees, with the same evils, and that the picture which he draws of his countrymen belongs, in its great outlines, to all ages and nations.

The arrival of the Athenians, and the enemy's departure, released the democratical Corcyræans from every restraint that prudence had hitherto laid on their vindictive passions, which were only exasperated by the danger they had just escaped. The Messenians brought by Nicostratus were now, for the first time, admitted within the walls; and the thirty galleys which had been manned for action in the harbour front- We have seen how the old aristocracies sank, ing the main land, were ordered to sail round and that they made way either for a tyranny or into the Hyllaic harbour. On their arrival all for a more or less comprehensive form of olithe partisans of the oligarchy who had helped garchy, and frequently, in the end, for a deto man them were secured. But in the mean mocracy. Even in those states in which a while a bloody prelude to more tragical scenes democracy was never established, there was a had begun in the city, with the murder of sev- commonalty which contained the germ, at least, eral who fell in the way of their triumphant en- of a democrat al party, and only needed favouremies. An attempt was then made to entice able circumst nces to unfold it. And where a the suppliants out of the sanctuary by the prom- popular government was most firmly settled, ise of a legal trial. It was a mere mockery, there was always a class, composed partly of and all who trusted to it were condemned to members of the ancient aristocracy, partly of death. The rest, when they saw their fears citizens who had more recently risen to opuverified by the fate of their friends, became des-lence, which viewed it with jealousy, and only perate, and destroyed themselves on the holy waited for an opportunity of overthrowing it. ground; some by hanging themselves on the But though there were everywhere seeds of boughs of the sacred trees. But even this was discord, tranquillity might long be preserved, only a signal for a more general massacre, which where either party was decidedly predominant. lasted seven days-as long as the Athenian com- The less it had to fear from the other, the mildmander stayed to encourage it with the pres-er would be its rule, and the less it provoked ence of his fleet and by his own implied approbation-and in which the ties of religion, of common humanity, and even of domestic affection, were all, in various forms, violated and profa

the desire of a revolution. The more nearly the two parties balanced each other, the more difficult it was to avoid a contest, and the less probable that it would be kept within moderate

bounds. But when Sparta and Athens had ward unfolded themselves in civil discord, were engaged in a struggle which called forth their at this time exempt from the evils which their whole strength, and induced them willingly to struggle occasioned in Corcyra. The internal receive all who sought their alliance, the great- state of Sparta seemed most prosperous; for est inequality between the parties in other states the signs of her inward decay had scarcely yet became of little moment, since it might be com- begun to appear. Athens was still suffering pensated by foreign aid; and hence jealousy from the plague, which, after having considerwas kept constantly awake on the one side, and ably abated for a twelvemonth, broke out with impatience easily roused on the other: their fresh malignity in the fifth winter of the war conflicts grew more frequent, their mutual ani- (427), accompanied by earthquakes, which shook mosity more implacable. The war also con- the city, Euboea, and Boeotia, but more especialtributed in another way to the same effect, asly Orchomenus. This second attack lasted a it ruined private fortunes, drained the sources year; and, from first to last, the sickness carof the general prosperity, spread a gloom over ried off 4400 of the citizens who served in the the prospects of many, and diverted their atten- regular infantry, 300 out of the 1000 who comtion from the pursuits of peaceful industry. posed the equestrian order, and a number of the Thus, by degrees, the evil rose to that fright- remaining population which Thucydides could ful height which Thucydides describes. The not pretend to ascertain. This void was, inties which bound men to their political associ- deed, gradually filled up in the course of nature; ates were felt to be stronger than those either but it seems to have been attended by one perof country or kindred; those who kept clear of nicious consequence, which continued to be felt such engagements incurred the resentment of long after the cause had ceased; as it produced both parties. The most violent men took the a relaxation of the laws which prescribed the lead, and gave the tone. He was accounted conditions of the Athenian franchise. Many the stanchest partisan and the best counsellor gained admission to its privileges by fraud; and who was most reckless and ruthless in com- though these surreptitious enfranchisements passing the destruction of his adversaries: one may have supplied the state with a number of who rather aimed at providing for the safety of useful citizens, it is probable that a large portion his associates, so as both to abstain and escape of those who thus crept in could have shown as from aggression, was looked upon as a luke-little title on the score of merit as of birth, and warm and suspicious friend. Defensive counsels were scorned as weak and timid; the only use of vigilance was held to be, to watch for opportunities of striking a blow. Courage and rashness, prudence and cunning, changed places in the vocabulary of party. Every fresh example of vindictive rage led to a still higher strain But Athens, as well as Sparta, enjoyed a deof revenge and cruelty, and stifled all move-gree of internal tranquillity which counterbalments of pity and remorse in those who took anced the evils of war and pestilence. The part with the sufferers. Every new breach of popular government was so firmly established, faith weakened the impulses of generosity, that as no man of sound judgment, even if he shook the confidence of open and unsuspecting had the will, could conceive the faintest hope natures, and enforced the arguments of those of subverting it, so the suspicion of such a dewho denounced moderation as cowardice and sign could not easily be instilled into any but candour as folly. The most liberal professions the weakest minds. Men of the highest birth, of an adversary were no otherwise regarded fortune, and abilities, though not, perhaps, satthan as if they either betrayed his weakness or isfied with the way in which the public affairs covered some hostile design. The most solemn were managed, were not the less zealous in the oaths were viewed only as means of gaining service of the commonwealth; and the people, time for a future attack, and were broken with though often misled by unworthy favourites, on the greater pleasure if they had been so far the whole steadily preferred the ablest mentrusted as to lull the opposite party into a tem- the more willingly if they were also recommendporary security. The poison of incurable sus-ed by wealth and noble descent to the most picion perverted every noble feeling and paralyzed every right intention. Yet the deepest cunning often overreached itself; and those who were conscious of their own inferiority in artifice were the more likely to forestall the machinations of their adversaries by the blind impatience of their fears. That it thus undermined all the moral foundations of civil society, piety, benevolence, justice, and honour, was the most baneful effect of the Peloponnesian war.

CHAPTER XXII.

FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE SIXTH YEAR OF THE
PELOPONNESIAN WAR TO THE GENERAL PACIFI-

CATION OF SICILY.

THE two leading states themselves, though they contained germs of discontent which after

possessed no more of the spirit of the ancient sons of Athens than of their blood. The good would have been obtained without the evil, if the thinned civic population had been recruited, by an honourable decree, from the most reputable and deserving of the aliens.

important posts. And thus, though Cleon could often carry his measures in the assembly, the fleets and armies were commanded by men of a very different stamp. Such were Demosthenes and Nicias, who, in the summer of 426, were appointed to conduct two expeditions, one destined for the west of Greece, the other for the Egean. Nicias, one of the wealthiest citizens of Athens, and a prudent and successful general, led an armament of sixty galleys, with 2000 heavy-armed on board, against the Island of Melos, which alone in the Ægean refused to acknowledge the supremacy of Athens, and adhered to its old connexion with Sparta, which it regarded as its parent state.* Nicias ravaged the island, but was not able to reduce the town, and probably abandoned the attempt the sooner, that he might take part in an attack upon Tana

* See p. 120.

gra, where he was to act in concert with an overpowering force; and the Acarnanians rearmy which was to march from Athens. The quested Demosthenes to lay regular siege to object seems to have been chiefly to retaliate the town. But it happened that at the same for the waste which Attica had suffered, by in- juncture he was urged by the Messenians of flicting like devastation on the fertile plain of Naupactus to undertake an expedition against Tanagra; for when Nicias, having disembarked Ætolia. He had private motives for desiring his troops at Oropus, was joined near Tanagra to oblige them, for he was connected with them by the whole force of Athens, under Hipponicus, by ties of friendship and hospitality; but he was son of Callias, and Eurymedon, though they chiefly attracted by the prospect of opening a gained a victory over the Tanagræans and a road through Etolia, by which he might penebody of Thebans who came to their assistance, trate with an army of foreign troops into the no farther use was made of this advantage. heart of Boeotia. This was an object, if not Hipponicus and Eurymedon marched back to more important, yet more tempting to his miliAthens, and Nicias, after ravaging the coast of tary ambition than a slow and uncertain siege. Locris, returned with his fleet. He therefore neglected the wishes of the Acarnanians, and sailed away to Sollium, where he communicated his plans to them, and requested their co-operation. This, as was natural, they refused. The Corcyræan galleys also returned home; so that Demosthenes, when he sailed round to Œneon, a town of the Ozolian Locris on the Crisæan Gulf, the point from which he intended to begin his march, had only his Messenian, Zacynthian, and Cephallenian auxiliaries at his command, besides 300 Athenians, who, however, were a band of the finest troops Athens could furnish, and had, perhaps, been induced to embark as volunteers by the personal influence of Demosthenes. With this force he immediately advanced into Etolia; but in the interior he expected to be joined by the whole strength of the Locrians, whose aid was peculiarly valuable, from their knowledge of the country, and because their own weapons and mode of fighting resembled those of their Etolian neighbours. On the first day after crossing the border he made himself master of three Ætolian towns or villages, Potidania, Crocyleum, and Tichium; and at this last place halted, and sent away the booty which he had collected to the Locrian town Eupalium. His plan was, first to reduce the part of Etolia belonging to the Apodotian horde,* which lay immediately north of Locris; and then, if the terror of his arms should not awe the rest into submission, after having returned to Naupactus, to make a second expedition into the territory of the Ophionians, which lay more to the northeast, and extended to the vale of the Sperchius, and finally to invade the Eurytanes, the most powerful, fierce, and barbarous of the Etolian tribes. But before he advanced farther, he wished to wait for the Locrians, whom he needed the more, as among his own men he had very few light troops. On the other hand, the Messenians urged the expediency of prosecuting his march without delay, and carrying the villages, which were unfortified, and lay wide apart, before the Etolians should have collected their forces. Demosthenes, elated with the easy conquests which he had already made, complied with this advice, and moved onward to Egitium, a village town situate about ten miles from the coast among high hills. He captured it without resistance; for the inhabitants had retired to the top of the mountains above the town. But the Etolians, who had received early intelligence of the meditated expedition, were already on their march with the whole force of the country, which was even joined by the Ophi

The Athenians were probably induced to undertake this expedition to Boeotia, in addition to their regular inroads upon Megara, by the exemption which they enjoyed this year from the usual Peloponnesian invasion. The Pelo ponnesian army, now led by Agis, who had succeeded his father Archidamus, only advanced as far as the Isthmus, where it was stopped by a series of earthquakes, which were thought to signify that the gods forbade its progress. These convulsions extended to some distance under the bed of the Egean, and produced partial inundations; such as may in ancient times have left their traces in the mythical traditions of Attica and Boeotia. The Spartans, however, were not entirely inactive this summer. At the request of the Malians of Trachis, who were reduced to extreme weakness by the incursions of their neighbours, the mountaineers of Eta, they sent a body of colonists, consisting partly of their own citizens, partly of Laconians, and founded a new city, which they named Heraclea, not quite a mile from the ancient Trachis. The sanction of the Delphic god had been duly procured, and all Greeks, with the exception of Ionians, Achæans, and a few other races, were invited to take part in the colony, which, as the power of Sparta promised security, soon became populous. The situation appeared to be eligible under a double aspect; for its vicinity to the Athenian possessions in Euboea-with a view to which an arsenal was built close to Thermopyla-and as lying on the high road to the more northern dependencies of Athens. Yet the jealousy of the Thessalians, and the enmity of the Etæan tribes, on whose territory the colony encroached, dispelled both the hopes and fears which it excited at first, and wore down its strength by incessant hostilities, while the arrogance and harshness of the Spartan governors drove a part of the population to seek a habitation elsewhere.

A little later in the summer Sparta was induced to make an effort to counteract the Athenian movements in the west. At the same time that Nicias embarked on his expedition to Melos, a squadron of thirty galleys, under Demosthenes and Procles, was sent round Peloponnesus, and having been joined by fifteen Corcyræan ships, and by troops from Zacynthus and Cephallenia, proceeded to attack Leucas, where its operations were supported by the Acarnanians, who had assembled their whole force-except that of Eniade-in the hope of at length crushing a dangerous and troublesome neighbour. The Leucadians kept within their walls while their territory was ravaged by this

* See p. 34.

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