HISTORY OF GREECE. CHAPTER XXI. THE ravages of the pestilence continued in ness became the more painful as the predominance of Athens gained ground, and threatened to swallow up all remains of their independence. Spartans, it is probable that the answer which When they first disclosed their wishes to the they received was such as might encourage them to renew their application at a more seasonable juncture; and the Boeotians, with whom they were connected by national affinity as well as by political sympathy, would not fail to inflame their animosity against Athens, and to strengthen their resolution by promises of support. caution, as well as boldness. It was necessary Yet their enterprise required great that, before they openly renounced the Athenian alliance, they should be well provided with the means of defence; and Mitylene could scarcely be secure unless she became mistress of Lesbos. These were objects which demanded the longer time, as every step towards them was to be carefully concealed from the Atheni ans. Preparations, however, were going forward; the building of new ships; the enlargement and strengthening of fortifications; the But in the mean while they were threatened ter to the enemy. filling up of harbours which would afford shelin a distant quarter with a blow which, if it had works were far advanced, and agents had been taken effect, not only would have immediately sent into the Euxine to bring a supply of stores In the spring of 428 these weakened their power, but might have proved and corn, and a body of light troops. At the ruinous in its remote consequences. We have same time, the population of Mitylene was realready mentioned that, before the war broke ceiving continual additions from the smaller out, Mitylene had only been prevented from towns subject to her influence, from which, by casting off the Athenian yoke by the reluctance persuasion or force, she transplanted their inwhich the Spartans felt to break the Thirty habitants within her own walls. Still, much Years' Truce. The motives which led to the remained to be done before matters could be design still continued; and the altered state of ripe for a hostile declaration; and when the affairs now opened a fair prospect of success. Lesbian contingents were called for, Mitylene Several causes conspired to render a part of the sent ten galleys to Athens. Mitylenæans eager for a revolution. The gov- her preparations had become too manifest to ernment was still in the hands of an aristocra- escape the notice of her neighbours, and among cy which traced its origin to the Baotian con- them she had rivals and enemies. Methymna. querors of the island; the civil wars, which the second city in the island, and Tenedos, had were made memorable by the names of Pitta- motives for dreading her success, and sent incus and Alcæus, seem only to have been con- formation to Athens of her designs. Their retests between rival factions of the nobles; and port was confirmed by the graver testimony of the commonalty appears never to have acquired some of her own citizens, whom the heat of much legal weight in the Constitution, but yet party spirit made traitors to the commonwealth. to have grown strong enough to excite jealousy One Doxander had, it appears, been disappointin the rulers. Knowing that their privileges ed in his hopes of marrying his sons to two were not viewed with a favourable eye at heiresses, who succeeded to the large estates Athens, they had perpetual reason to dread that of their father Timophanes. His pretensions their too powerful ally might encourage their gave rise to a violent feud, and, for the sake of subjects to revolt. But, besides this motive, revenge, he joined in attesting the meditated rewhich could only sway the ruling caste, there bellion. But the Athenians, afflicted by war and was another, which might be more generally pestilence at home, were as reluctant to believe felt as interesting to Mitylenæan patriotism. this intelligence as, at another time, they would Though fear of the Persians and the miscon- have been quick to take advantage of it. duct of Pausanias had driven them into the first tried the easiest and mildest course; they Athenian alliance, they probably could not for- sent envoys to remonstrate with the MitylenæThey get the time when Mitylene had carried on suc-ans, and to induce them to desist from their cessful wars with Athens, and had exercised a supremacy over the other towns of the island like that of Athens over her confederacy, and, it would seem, in quite as oppressive a manner. For we are informed that they punished their allies who attempted to revolt by prohibiting them from instructing their children in letters and music, and thus degraded them to the rank of Helots; a remarkable anticipation of the policy of similar governments in later times. These recollections of their city's ancient greatElian, V. H., ix., 17. But the intent of suspicious preparations. These envoys return- stant supply of provisions for the camp. The inactivity of the Mitylenæans did not, indeed, prevent their Lesbian allies from marching to their assistance; and their united forces were sufficient to confine the enemy, on the land side, to a narrow space immediately adjacent to his camps. But the Athenians were imboldened by the passiveness of the besieged, as they did not know its motive; and their allies, attributing the conduct of the Mitylenæans to weakness or fear, did not venture to imitate their example, or to withhold the assistance which the Athenians called for. with instructions to take this opportunity of surprising the city; or, if he failed in this attempt, to command the Mitylenæans to surrender their ships and demolish their walls, under pain of immediate hostilities. At the same time, they seized the ten Mitylenæan galleys which had joined their fleet, and put all the crews into prison. But the Mitylenæans received timely nofice of their danger from a friend, who, having crossed over to Euboea, found a merchantman at Geræstus, which, with a fair wind, reached Lesbos before the Athenian armament. They had only time to raise some slight works for the defence of their unfinished walls and imperfect- The envoys who sailed first from Mitylene ly-closed harbours, before Cleippides arrived, found, on their arrival in Peloponnesus, that the and proposed the alternative of submission or invading army had already returned from the war. They did not hesitate in their choice; invasion of Attica. And as the Olympic festibut after a faint show of resistance, being de- val was at hand, the Spartans bade them prosirous of gaining time, requested an armistice, ceed to Olympia, and there urge their petition for the purpose of sending an embassy to Ath- in an assembly of deputies from the allied states, ens, which the Athenian commanders, feeling to be held at the close of the games. When their forces inadequate to the siege of the city, the time came, they pleaded their cause in a readily granted. Among the envoys was either harangue which, if it has been faithfully repreDoxander or one of his partisans, who, repent-sented by Thucydides, turned in great part on ing of his late treachery, was now willing to make reparation by retracting his former statements, and persuading the Athenians that his countrymen were innocent of the designs he had imputed to them. But the falsehood was not believed, and the embassy returned with an answer which put an end to negotiation, and left the Mitylenæans no hopes but in their own courage and the aid of their allies. They relied chiefly on the succour which they expected from Peloponnesus. For at the same time that their envoys had set sail for Athens, they had despatched a galley with ambassadors to Sparta; and though they had secured the subservience of the whole island except Methymna, and had even gained the advantage in an engagement with the Athenians by land, they did not keep the field, but waited for relief. And in this policy they were confirmed by the arrival of a Spartan named Meleas, and Hermæondas, a Theban, who had been sent before the revolt was declared, but had not been able sooner to elude the vigilance of the Athenians, and make their way into the town; and now induced their friends to send another galley with envoys, to accompany them on their return to Greece, and enforce, if necessary, the first application. The Athenians, therefore, were permitted quietly to intrench themselves in two encampments on the south side of the city, and to blockade the two harbours formed by the little island on which the old town was built, which was separated by a narrow channel (now closed up) from the mainland, while their fleet, stationed at some distance from the city,* secured a con • At Malea There is, as readers of Thucydides know, a considerable difficulty in determining the position of this Malea, which Thucydides describes as north of Mitylene, while Strabo gives the same name to the southernmost cape of Lesbos, about seven miles from Mitylene. Plehn (LesInacs, p. 18) thinks it clear that Thucydides made a mistake. But this, on such a point, is quite incredible. Dr. Arnold, on the contrary, much more probably infers from the whole narrative of Thucydides, that there were two points on the east coast of Lesbos called Malea: a repetition, to be sure, somewhat singular at so short a distance, but not on that account to be deemed incredible, particularly as we see in the local worship of Apollo an occasion which might have given rise to it. Indeed, Picha himself furmishes an argument which appears to us more forcible than most of Dr. Arnold's. He observes, p. 16: "Aristoteles de Cœ-¡ a question of political morality. They labour to vindicate themselves from an imputation, which they were aware they might seem to deserve, of a breach of faith towards the Athenians. They show that their relation to Athens, though it had begun with an act of their own choice, had long ceased to be one of mutual confidence and good-will; that, although they and the Chians had been permitted to retain a nominal independence, while the other allies were reduced to undisguised subjection, they could not consider this as a favour, but as an effect of policy, by which the subjugation of the rest was accomplished with the greater ease and decency; nor could they expect to be spared any longer than might suit the interest of Athens. "If the peace had lasted a few years more, the remains of their liberty would probably have been extinguished. It was, therefore, with full right that they seized the first opportunity of preventing an aggression which nothing but the want of opportunity had delayed. They had been desirous of entering into alliance with Sparta before the war; now they had been invited by the Baotians, but had been forced to declare themselves before their preparations were complete, and could have no hopes of safety unless the Spartans would not only admit them into the confederacy, but make a vigorous effort in their behalf. Weakened as Athens now was by war and pestilence, if the Peloponnesians would but again invade Attica this cia, quem a Theba campo flantem a Lesbiis Onbatav vocari ait, ἐνοχλεῖ δὲ τὸν Μιτυληναίων λιμένα, μάλιστα δὲ τὸν Ματ Aóevra. Traxit portus nomen illud a campo Maloente Apollini sacrato, quem commemorant Thucydides et Hellanicus apud Steph. Byz. Uter portuum Mityleneorum id nomen gesserit definire non possumus, quia, ubi locus Apollini sacer situs fuerit ignoramus." But, as the plain of Thebe was northeast of Mitylene, it seems impossible to doubt that the harbour most exposed to the wind which blew from it was the northern one. On this side of Mitylene, therefore, must have been the sanctuary of Apollo Maλócis, where the Athenians hoped to have surprised the Mitylenæans, and the Malea where their fleet lay. The only points which-perhaps from the want of geographical details-still remain a little obscure are, that Thucydides speaks of the Mitylenean envoys (., 4) as λabóvres To Twv 'Anvaiwv VAUṬikóv, when their course lay southward, and again, c. 5, says of Meleas and Hermæondas, that they sail in pup, which might seem to imply in each case that those who eluded the observations of the Athenians had to sail past them. summer both by land and sea, she would be compelled to withdraw her forces from Lesbos, and would be deprived of a great part of the revenues which enabled her to prosecute the war. The eyes of the Greeks were turned towards Sparta, and they would judge from her conduct on this occasion how far they might trust to her as their deliverer.” expedition against Methymna, which they hoped to take with the help of a party among the citizens who were friendly to their cause. This enterprise failed; but before they returned home, they marched in succession to Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eressus, where they strengthened the fortifications, and secured the ascendency of their partisans. After their retreat, the MethymneThese arguments were addressed to a willing ans made an expedition against Antissa, but audience: Mitylene was adopted as an ally, and were defeated with great loss. These occurthe Spartans were roused to an extraordinary rences induced the Athenians, in the autumn, to exertion. They directed that the contingents, send a body of a thousand heavy infantry under which had been lately disbanded should be Paches, who, on his arrival at Mitylene, carried speedily reassembled at the Isthmus; and their a wall across the land side of the city, and built own arrived there first. They immediately be- forts in some of the strongest positions, so gan to make preparations for transporting a fleet that, before the end of the winter, Mitylene was across the Isthmusin to the Saronic Gulf. But completely invested by land and sea. But the their ardour was not seconded by their allies, growing expense of the siege rendered it neceswho, after having spoiled the Attic harvest, were sary to impose an extraordinary property tax now busied with their own, and reluctantly at Athens, which produced 200 talents; and a obeyed the summons to a fresh expedition. squadron was sent out under the command of But the spirit of the Athenians rose, as usual, Lysicles and four colleagues to levy contribuagainst the pressure of difficulty and danger. tions from friends and foes. In the second year They had already sent a squadron of thirty gal- of the war a squadron had been sent for the same leys round Peloponnesus, under Asopius, a son purpose to the coasts of Caria and Lycia, which of Phormio. Acarnania was the ultimate ob- were hostile to Athens, and gave shelter to priject of his expedition, and he had been appoint-vateers which infested her commerce. But the ed to gratify the Acarnanians, who had request- commander Melesander was slain in Lycia, ed that a son or kinsman of Phormio might be where he had advanced into the interior;* and placed in command among them. But on his Lysicles, with a great part of his troops, met with way he stopped to ravage the maritime districts the like fate in the vale of the Mæander, where of Laconia, and was thus employed while the he was overpowered by a body of Carians, and Spartans were at the Isthmus. And now the of the Samians who still kept possession of Athenians resolved to show that, without recall- Anæa. ing either this squadron, or the armament at The Athenians had been too fully occupied Mitylene, they were ready to encounter any na- with their own affairs to think of making any val force which Peloponnesus could send out attempt for the relief of Platea. The brave against them. They forthwith equipped a fleet garrison had begun to suffer from the failure of of a hundred galleys, manned partly with their provisions, and, as their condition grew hopeown citizens-those of the two highest classes less, two of their leading men, Theænetus, a being alone exempted from serving on this oc- soothsayer, and Eupompidas, one of the genercasion and partly with aliens; and coasting als, conceived the project of escaping across the Isthmus, exhibited it to the astonished Spar- the enemy's lines. When it was first proposed, tans, and then proceeded to make descents on it was unanimously adopted; but, as the time various parts of the Peloponnesian coast. The for its execution approached, half of the men Spartans, when they saw such a display of that shrank from the danger, and not more than 220 power which the Mitylenaan orators had rep- adhered to their resolution. The contrivers of resented as reduced to extreme weakness, be- the plan took the lead in the enterprise. Scagan to waver; and hearing that the enemy was ling ladders of a proper height were the first ravaging their own territory, while their allies requisite, and they were made upon a measuredelayed to join them, they returned home. ment of the enemy's wall, for which the beThe Athenians, having accomplished the pur- sieged had no other basis than the number of pose of their short expedition, followed their ex- layers of brick, which were sedulously counted ample. The state of their finances forbade over and over again by different persons, until them to keep such an armament at sea longer the amount, and, consequently, the height of than was absolutely necessary. For the time, the wall, was sufficiently ascertained. A dark the whole number of their ships in actual ser- and stormy night, in the depth of winter, was vice fell but little short of that which had been chosen for the attempt; it was known that in employed in the first summer of the war, which such nights the sentinels took shelter in the Thucydides estimates at 250, a source of ex- towers, and left the intervening battlements pense which, with the siege of Potidæa, had unguarded; and it was on this practice that the nearly drained the treasury. It was probably success of the adventure mainly depended. It on this account that Asopius, after he had stay- was concerted that the part of the garrison ed as long as he thought proper on the coast of which remained behind should make demonLaconia, sent back the greater part of his squa- strations of attacking the enemy's lines on the dron, and with twelve galleys pursued his voy-side opposite to that by which their comrades age to the west, where, after an unsuccessful attempted to escape. And first, a small party, attempt upon Eniadæ, he fell in battle with a lightly armed, the right foot bare, to give them part of his small force, which he seems to have a surer footing in the mud, keeping at such a pushed too far into the interior of the Leucadi-distance from each other as to prevent their an territory. arms from clashing, crossed the ditch, and plantThuc., 11, 69, In the mean while the Mitylenæans made an ed their ladders, unseen and unheard, for the | to abandon the design of invading Attica a secnoise of their approach was drowned by the ond time in the summer, they nevertheless rewind. The first who mounted were twelve solved to send succours to Mitylene, and dimen armed with short swords, led by Ammeas, rected their allies to equip a fleet of forty galson of Corobus. His followers, six on each side, leys, which their admiral Alcidas was to conproceeded immediately to secure the two near- duct in the course of the next summer to Lesest towers. Next came another party with short bos. But to keep up the spirit of the Mitylenaspears, their shields being carried by their com- ans, a Spartan, named Salæthus, was despatchrades behind them. But before many more ed early in 427, to give them notice of these had mounted, the fall of a tile, broken off from preparations. He contrived to make his way a battlement by one of the Plateans, as he laid into the city through the Athenian lines by ashold of it, alarmed the nearest sentinels, and cending the course of a torrent. He found afpresently the whole force of the besiegers was fairs in a state which called for his presence. called to the walls. But no one knew what | Scarcity began to be felt among the people; the had happened, and the general confusion was thought of a capitulation had already presented increased by the sally of the besieged. All itself, and there were many to whom it was by therefore remained at their posts; only a body no means unwelcome. Salæthus announced of three hundred men, who were always in himself to the magistrates as charged, not only readiness to move towards any quarter where to carry the good tidings, that next summer, they might be needed, issued from one of the while Alcidas sailed to their relief, a Pelopongates in search of the place from which the nesian army would invade Attica, but in the alarm had arisen. In the mean while the as- mean time to take upon himself the direction sailants had made themselves masters of the of their civil and military affairs; and he was two towers between which they scaled the suffered to regulate them at his discretion. wall, and, after cutting down the sentinels, When the summer came, the Spartans fulguarded the passages which led through them, filled their promise. They sent Alcidas with while others mounted by ladders to the roofs, the fleet, forty-two galleys, to the aid of Mityand thence discharged their missiles on all who lene, and then proceeded to invade Attica, unattempted to approach the scene of action. The der the command of Cleomenes, who acted in main body of the fugitives now poured through the place of his nephew Pausanias, son of the the opening thus secured, applying more lad- exiled king Pleistoanax, who was still in his ders, and knocking away the battlements; and nonage. Archidamus was probably kept at as they gained the other side of the outer ditch, home by illness.* The Peloponnesians lingerthey formed upon its edge, and with their ar- ed in Attica until the want of provisions comrows and javelins protected their comrades, pelled them to retire, and having time to penewho were crossing, from the enemy above. trate into almost every corner, committed ravLast of all, and with some difficulty for the ages only less destructive than those of the ditch was deep, the water high, and covered second invasion, which found many parts unwith a thin crust of ice-the parties which oc- touched. They protracted their stay, because cupied the towers effected their retreat; and they expected to receive intelligence of the opthey had scarcely crossed, before the three hun-erations of Alcidas; but the tidings for which dred were seen coming up with lighted torches. But their lights, which discovered nothing to them, made them a mark for the missiles of the Plateans, who were thus enabled to elude their pursuit, and to move away in good order. All the details of the plan seem to have been concerted with admirable forethought. On the first alarm fire signals were raised by the besiegers to convey the intelligence to Thebes. But the Platæans had provided against this danger, and showed similar signals from their own walls, so as to render it impossible for the Thebans to interpret those of the enemy. This precaution afforded additional security to their retreat; for instead of taking the nearest road to Athens, they first bent their steps towards Thebes, while they could see their pursuers with their blazing torches threading the ascent of Citheron. After they had followed the Theban road for six or seven furlongs, they struck into that which led by Erythra and Hysia to the Attic border, and arrived safe at Athens. Out of the two hundred and twenty who set out together, one fell into the enemy's hands after he had crossed the outer ditch. Seven It was the fault, or the misfortune, of Saleturned back panic-struck, and reported that all thus. Ignorant of the state of parties at Mitytheir companions had been cut off, and at day-lene, or thinking it necessary, at all hazards, to break a herald was sent to recover their bodies. make an attack on the Athenian lines, as he The answer revealed the happy issue of the ad- had begun himself to despair of the promised venture. When the Spartans found themselves forced they waited were long delayed, and when they came, crushed all the hopes with which they had begun the campaign. They had intrusted the command of the naval armament to a man very unfit for such a post, though he might have been useful in an inferior station. He seems to have possessed all the wariness of the Spartan character in a degree bordering on timidity, without any of the energy which sometimes relieved it. Instead of pushing vigorously forward to the main end of the expedition, he lost time on the coast of Peloponnesus, chiefly intent, it would seem, on eluding the observation of the Athenian cruisers; and he succeeded in reaching the Cyclades unobserved. But here he received news that Mitylene had already surrendered to Paches; nevertheless, as this might prove a false rumour, he proceeded as far as Embaton, a port in the territory of Erythræ, where the bad tidings were fully confirmed. Mitylene had fallen only seven days before: perhaps not more than the time which he had wasted If he had been already dead, Agis would probably have commanded the army. His fear of pursuit, indeed, was not groundless. He had been seen while he lay among the Cyclades by the two Athenian state-galleys, the Salaminia and the Paralas, which hastened with the information to Paches, who had been already advised, from Erythræ and other quarters, of the enemy's presence on the coast of Ionia. The danger seemed great to the Athenians, who did not know the character of Alcidas; for, as the Ionian cities had never been permitted to repair their fortifications since they had been dismantled in the Persian war, the smallest evil which he might have mflicted was to plunder them as he passed: the succours, and the provisions of the town were expostulated with him on the contrast between nearly spent, he in an evil hour determined to such proceedings and the language of a state intrust the commonalty with the arms of the which professed to be contending for the liberregular infantry, which the policy of the gov- | ties of Greece. And he was so far moved by ernment had hitherto reserved for the class their remonstrances as to release most of his which had privileges as well as a country to de- surviving prisoners. And now, with more vigfend. But the new soldiers, instead of sallying our than he had shown in his outward voyage, out to attack the enemy, collected in armed he quitted the coast, and pushed across the groups, became clamorous for bread, and de- open sea for Peloponnesus. clared that, unless the wealthy citizens would open their granaries and distribute their hidden stores among the famishing people, they would make their own terms with the Athenians. Either the supposed stores did not exist, or it was known that this demand was merely a pretext. The ruling body, dreading a capitulation from which they would be excluded, hastened to make the best which, under such circumstances, they could obtain. They agreed to surrender the city, and to cast themselves on the mercy of the Athenian people, and immediately to open their gates to the army; but Paches permitted them to send an embassy to Athens, and engaged that, until the pleasure of the Athe-greatest would have been done if he had folnians should be known, he would not deprive any Mitylenæan either of life or liberty. Yet, while his troops entered the town, the principal leaders of the revolt, unable to contain themselves, took refuge at the altars. Paches soothed their fears, and, under a promise of respecting their persons, removed them to safe custody in Tenedos to await the return of their envoys, who were sent, according to the agreement, to Athens. Salæthus had found a hidingplace in the town. lowed the advice of his Ionian counsellors. Paches, therefore, who had already reduced Antissa, deferred the subjugation of Lesbos, and immediately set out in pursuit of Alcidas, whom he chased as far as Patmos, but there finding that the enemy was too far ahead to be overtaken, he turned back, and at a more leisurely rate proceeded along the coast towards Lesbos. He had been called to the assistance of one of the parties by which Colophon had been for some time divided. Colophon itself had been Such was the state of Mitylene when Alcidas taken in the second year of the war by a Perarrived at Embaton; he immediately held a sian force under the command of Itamanes, council of war, to decide on the course which he who came as the ally of one of its factions. should adopt. Teutiaplus, the commander of Their adversaries, and all who dreaded Persian the Elean contingent, suggested a bold, yet government, took refuge in Notium, the port promising plan to sail with all speed to Mity- town of Colophon, which was only about two lene, and surprise the conquerors in the midst miles distant from the upper city; here they of their security. But Alcidas knew that he lived secure, until discord arose among them, had been sent to raise the siege, and, this being and the animosity of one party towards their no longer possible, thought that this part of his fellow-citizens proved stronger than their avercommission was at an end. He had with him sion to the barbarians. They procured a body some Ionian refugees, who, with the Lesbian of auxiliaries-partly Arcadian mercenaries, envoys, urged him to take possession either of the rest barbarians-from the satrap PissuthCuma, or of one of the Ionian cities, which nes, and with their aid expelled their oppomight be made the centre of a general insur- nents, who, it may be collected from Aristotle,* rection among the subjects of Athens on the consisted chiefly of the old population of NoAsiatic coast, who contributed the largest part tium. And now they invited the party which of her revenues, and were all impatient of her was in possession of the upper town to share rule. But this was too bold a step for the pru- the government with them; and, as Notium dence of Alcidas, who thought he should be was unfortified,† enclosed one quarter with a safer on the coast of Peloponnesus than on that wall by way of a citadel for the garrison. Such of Ionia, and had reason to fear that the ene- was the condition in which they were found by my might be already in pursuit of him. He Paches, when, at the request of the weaker therefore bent his course southward, though side, he appeared before Notium. As he could still along the coast. The chief fruit which his not well spare time for a siege, and was not expedition had hitherto yielded was the cap- scrupulous about the means of attaining his obture of a number of prisoners, chiefly Ionians, ject, he invited Hippias, the commander of who, little expecting to see a Peloponnesian the Arcadians, to a parley, under a solemn enfleet in their waters, had taken the enemy for gagement, that, if he did not approve of the Athenians, and had thus fallen into his hands. * Pul., v., 2. Notium and Colophon contrasted in their When he touched at Myonnesus, near Teos, he thought himself bound to observe the bloody rule which Sparta had laid down, and ordered most of these unhappy men-who, as he had been lately assured, were at heart his friends -to be put to death. But at Ephesus he was met by envoys from the Samians of Anæa, who political bias as Piræus and Athens. This may be inferred from the narrative of Thucyd ides, as well as from the general remark, iii., 33, about |