tion failed on one occasion conspicuously and disastrously. The Supreme Court of the United States did not succeed in preventing by its mediation the War of Secession. But the inference is not just. The framers of the Constitution of the United States, like succeeding generations of American statesmen, deliberately thrust the subject of Slavery as far as they could out of their own sight. It barely discloses itself in the method of counting population for the purpose of fixing the electoral basis of the House of Representatives, and in the subsequently famous provision of the Fourth Article, that persons "bound to service or labour in one State" shall be delivered up if they escape into another. But, on the whole, the makers of the Constitution pass by on the other side. They have not the courage of their opinions, whatever they were. They neither guarantee Slavery on the one hand, nor attempt to regulate it on the other, or to provide for its gradual extinction. When then, about seventy years afterwards, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the owner of slaves taking them into one of the territories of the Union, not yet organised as a State, retained his right of ownership, it had not in reality sufficient materials for a decision. The grounds of its judgment in the Dred Scott case may have been perhaps satisfactory to lawyers, but in themselves they satisfied nobody else. It is extremely signifi
cant that, in the one instance in which the authors of the Constitution declined of set purpose to apply their political wisdom to a subject which they knew to be all-important, the result was the bloodiest and costliest war of modern times.
Let me repeat the points which I trust I have done something towards establishing. The Constitution of the United States is a modified version of the British Constitution; but the British Constitution which served as its original was that which was in existence between 1760 and 1787. The modifications introduced were those, and those only, which were suggested by the new circumstances of the American Colonies, now become independent. These circumstances excluded an hereditary king, and virtually excluded an hereditary nobility. When the American Constitution was framed, there was no such sacredness to be expected for it as before 1789 was supposed to attach to all parts of the British Constitution. There was every prospect of political mobility, if not of political disorder. The signal success of the Constitution of the United States in stemming these tendencies is, no doubt, owing in part to the great portion of the British institutions which were preserved in it; but it is also attributable to the sagacity with which the American statesmen filled up the interstices left by the inapplicability of certain of the then existing British institutions to
the emancipated colonies. This sagacity stands out in every part of the "Federalist," and it may be tracked in every page of subsequent American history. It may well fill the Englishmen who now live in face Romuli with wonder and envy.
ABSOLUTISM
ABSOLUTISM, 169
America, U.S. of, revolution in,
18; Government of, 18, 211; sta-
bility of, 18; universal suffrage
in, 34, 51; results of industry in,
50; oppression of the weak, 51;
corruption in, 103; party system
dependent on corruption, 104;
democracy tolerable in, 110; cha-
racteristics of, 196; extent and
population, 196; jealousy of Great
Britain in bygone years, 206;
British King and his relations to,
209, 211; War of Secession, 111,
a war of Revolution, 18, 244; in-
fluence of Patent laws, 247; railway
incorporations, 248
American Constitution, English ori-
gin, 11, 60, 207, 218. 224, 230, 253;
compared with British, 54; its
characteristics, 67, 202; safeguards
of, 110, 120, 218, 235, 240, 242;
Articles of the Constitution of New
York, 121; and of Ohio, 122; and
of Massachusetts, 122; origin of
the Senate, 179, 186, 211, 226
sqq., 250; its importance, 196, 226;
prospects of, 197; its rise and pro-
gress, 199, 205; its success, 202;
its framers, 205, 216, 249; its
institutions described, 211; Minis-
ters have no seat in the Legislature,
213 (see President); Supreme Court,
217; its success, 223; Congress,
224; House of Representatives,
211, 230; differs from British, 233,
245; its forty Standing Commit-
tees, 234; amendments of, 242 sqq.;
abolition of slavery, 244, 252
Arana, referred to, 19 n
Aristocracy, influence of, 42; Austin's
opinion of, 56; compared with
democracy, 61, 66, 79, 188; and
party disputes, 101; does not exist
in Russia and Turkey, 181
Armies, their relation to popular go-
vernments, 22; their control of
governments, 23; tyranny of, in
France, 200
Athens, democracy in, 9; really an
aristocracy, 42, 74
Austin, John, his plea for the Consti-
tution, 56, 164; on democracy, 70;
a follower of Bentham, 165
ACON, Church's Life of, cited, 77
Bagehot, Mr., on the Cabinet, 213
Ballot, 106
Bancroft on democracy, 68, 77, 79
Belgium, electoral experiment in, 109
Bentham, J., on the Turkish Govern-
ment, 48; criticised by Austin, 56;
admirer of democracy, 82; his
school, 84, 152, 165; flaws in his
theory, 84; his views of human
nature, 85; ignorance of history,
86; scheme of law-reform, 146,
162, 167; influence on Parliament,
148; his Radicalism, 152, 162;
compared with Rousseau, 163
Blaine, Mr., referred to, 104
Bolivia, Republic of, 19
Bonapartes, the, 15, 147; as
formers, 65; destroyed military
tyranny, 200
Bourget, Paul, on modern French
society, 189 n
Bright, Mr., narrow view of history,
Brissot on property, 75
British Constitution, the, duration of,
53, 81; envied by other nations. 54,
136; Alexander Hamilton's idea,
102, 209; contradictory opinions
of, 112; changes in, 119, 149, 240;
violence of discussion about, 124;
Bentham's views, 162, 165; Aus-
tin's, 165 n; pattern of the Ameri-
can (q. v.), 207 sqq.; Montesquieu's
and Madison's views, 219; differ-
ence from American, 233, 245;
legislation under, its dangers, 240
Broglie, Duc de, quoted, 216
Broughton, Lord, memoirs of, referred
Caucus, the, 93, 102, 106
to Rousseau, 156, 158, 166; affected
by Reform, 169, 171
Congress in United States, 224
Conservatism, a mischievous form of,
produced by Radicalism, 35; inhe-
rent in large portion of the human
race, 133; in women. 140
Constitution (vide also British; Ame-
rican), historical and à priori, 171;
350 said to have sprung up in pre-
sent century, 174; dangers and diffi-
culties, 175; popular element in,
178, 184; the French, 220
"Contrat Social," the, of Rousseau,
155
Corruption, influence of, 102; in
America, 104; in France, 105;
comparative freedom of England,
105; in Senate of United States,
251
Corsica, Rousseau's saying concern-
ing, 167
Cromwell, referred to, 26, 81, 135
Crown, British, power of, 113, 11,
213, 22; right of, 173; relation
to American colonies, 209, 212
Chambers, First and Second, 176 Dives, 94; idea of, repudiated in
$94, 209; Mr. Freeman's views,
Change, passion for, 132; a modern
growth, 134; limited to Politics,
136; not inherent in women, 139;
or mankind generally, 132, 146,
170
Charles the Great, a great reformer,
Charles X. and the Revolution, 72
Chesterfield's Letter on French Revo-
lution, 1
Chinese, their hatred of change, 132;
progress of, 192
Civilisation, Western, 134. 143
Commons, House of, powers, 118,
221; compared with House of
Representatives, 230; its executive
power, 232, 235
Community, the. theories of, 8; its
relation to government. 9, 83, 86,
179, 210; insecurity of its power,
21; belief in the enlightenment of,
36; in the East and West, 145;
formation and powers of, according
Democracy, ascendency of, 5; defi-
nition of the word, 6, 59, 76; in-
stances of instability, 20, 71; chief
rights of, 22; political power in,
29; influence of party feeling (9. v.)
in, 33; opposition to science, 37,
190; n Switzerland, 39; Mr. Grote's
theories, 39; the Athenian, 42, 74;
Austin's opinion of, 56; in France,
M. Scherer's book, 57; a particular
form of Government, 59, 70, 87;
compared with monarchy, 60, 66,
83, 86, 188; its virtues and vices,
64, 87, 109; false ideas of, 68 sqq.;
opinion of Bancroft. 68; of Sir W.
Lawson, 69; conflicting ideas of,
72; in England, 81; principal
argument against, 86; adjudicating,
91; not a progressive form of
government, 97; its inherent diffi-
culties, 98, 184; power of gene-
ralities in, 108; expectations of,
129; regarded as inevitable, 131,
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