(a) Air operations including joint operations.

(b) Gaining and maintaining general air supremacy.

(c) Establishing local air superiority where and as required.

(d) The strategic air force of the United States and strategic air reconnaissance.

(e) Air lift and support for airborne operations.

(f) Air support to land forces and naval forces, including support of occupation forces.

(g) Air transport for the armed forces, except as provided by the Navy in accordance with paragraph 1 (f) of Section III.

2. To develop weapons, tactics, technique, organization and equipment of Air Force combat and service elements, coordinating with the Army and Navy on all aspects of joint concern, including those which pertain to amphibious and airborne operations.

3. To provide, as directed by proper authority, such missions and detachments for service in foreign countries as may be required to support the national policies and interests of the United States.

14. To provide the means for coordination of air defense among all services. 5. To assist the Army and Navy in accomplishment of their missions, including the provision of common services and supplies as determined by proper authority.

PART I. CHRONOLOGICAL STATEMENT

This discussion takes as a starting point the hearings on a single department of the armed forces conducted by the Select Committee of the House on Postwar Military Policy in the second session of the Seventy-eighth Congress, April-May 1944. The earlier history of the unification problem is important and interesting, but is not essential to any analysis of the current controversy.1 The major events from 1944 on are summarized below, in the order of their occurrence. 1. Hearings before the Select Committee of the House of Representatives on Postwar Military Policy (78th Cong., 2d sess., pt. 1)

Under the chairmanship of Representative Woodrum the committee held hearings from April 24 to May 19, inclusive, on the proposal to establish a single department of armed forces. Representatives of the War Department testified in favor of the proposal as a postwar measure. Lieutenant General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, United States Army, presented a plan of unification. Representatives of the Navy Department were generally noncommittal, and recommended further study. The committee reported June 15, 1944 (H. Rept. No. 1645, 78th Cong., 2d sess.) that the time was inopportune for legislation, and strongly urged the armed services to make further studies of the problem. 2. Study by Joint Chiefs of Staff

On May 9, 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed a special committee to study the reorganization of national defense and make recommendations. The basic question was stated in the following terms:

"What is the organization which will provide the most effective employment of our military resources in time of war and their most effective preparation for war, in time of peace?"

The special committee, consisting of two representatives of the War Department and two representatives of the Navy Department, reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 11, 1945. A majority favored a single department, and reported that of the field officers interviewed almost all Army officers and almost exactly half of the Navy officers also favored one department. Detailed proposals were presented by the committee. One Navy representative, Admiral J. O. Richardson (retired), dissented, proposing that the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization be continued after the war by statute and that further study of the problem in the light of war experience be made. The Joint Chiefs of Staff took no action on the report.

For brief summaries of unification proposals and studies prior to the outbreak of World War II see "Unification of the War and Navy Departments and Postwar Organization for National Security" (Eberstadt Report), Senate Committee print, 79th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 184-187), and "Army-Navy Consolidation," Editorial Research Reports, vol. II, 1945, pp. 239-242.

3. Eberstadt report

On May 15, 1945, Chairman Walsh of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs sent a letter to Secretary of the Navy Forrestal suggesting that a study be made to determine whether or not it would be desirable to propose the establishment of a Council of National Defense as an alternative to the proposal for a consolidation of the War and Navy Departments. On June 19, Secretary Forrestal requested Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt to prepare a report and recommendations on the following matters:

"1. Would unification of the War and Navy Departments under a single head improve our national security?

"2. If not, what changes in the present relationships of the military services and departments has our war experience indicated as desirable to improve our national security?

"3. What form of postwar organization should be established and maintained to enable the military services and other Government departments and agencies most effectively to provide for and protect our national security?"

The report was transmitted to Secretary Forrestal September 25, and by him to Senator Walsh on October 18. It was printed for the use of the Naval Affairs Committee October 22, 1945.

The Eberstadt report opposed the establishment of a single department. It recommended three coordinate departments-War, Navy, and Air-each headed by a civilian secretary of Cabinet rank; and tied together by interdepartmental committees, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff the major link. It also placed great stress on committees and agencies linking the armed forces with the civilian departments.

4. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs

This committee held hearings on two unification bills (S. 84 and S. 1482) from October 17 to December 17, 1945. Representatives of the War Department testified in favor of unification. General Collins presented a detailed plan for the War Department. Representatives of the Navy Department opposed a single department type of organization and other features of unification, and supported the "coordination" principle, largely as set forth in the Eberstadt report. 5. President Truman's unification message of December 19, 1945

In this message the President laid down a seven-point program for the reorganization of the armed forces. He strongly urged the establishment of a single department with three coordinate branches with a Chief of Staff to act as chief military adviser to the Secretary and the President.

6. Report of Senate Military Affairs Committee

On April 9, 1946, Senators Thomas, Hill, and Austin, members of a subcommittee of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, introduced S. 2044. The Thomas-Hill-Austin subcommittee reported to the full committee April 11, 1946. Its report was adopted by the committee and S. 2044 was favorably reported, 13 to 2, on May 13. It followed fairly closely the President's recommendations, and incorporated much of the Eberstadt report mechanism for civilian-military coordination.

7. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs.

The committee begain hearings on S. 2044 on April 30 and continued to hold hearings through July 11. Representatives of the Navy Department opposed S. 2044. The committee did not report out the bill.

8. Presidential efforts to secure Army-Navy agreement

On May 13 the President instructed the War and Navy Departments to attempt to reach an agreement on a plan for the organization of the armed forces. On May 15 a letter was sent by Senator Walsh, chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, and Representative Vinson, chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee, to Secretary Forrestal, in which it was stated that it was doubtful if any agreement providing for a single department would meet with the approval of Congress. Other features of the bill were also said to have little chance of securing congressional approval. The letter concluded:

"Any compromise which results from a conference by the War and Navy Departments which does not embody most of the views of those Members of Congress who have made a study of the importance of sea-air power in our national defense structure, and which in general does not conform with the

views expressed in this letter would not, in our opinion, be in the best interests of the United States."

On June 15 President Truman sent identical letters to Senators Thomas and Walsh, and Representatives May and Vinson transmitting documents showing points upon which the War and Navy Departments had agreed and disagreed, and submitting his own recommendations on the items of disagreement. S. 2044 was revised, but opposition continuing, the President requested that the measure be dropped.

9. Unified command announcement of December 16, 1946

The War and Navy Departments announced on this date that unified command had been established in seven command areas in various parts of the world. The commander in each area was to be responsible directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (The principle of unified command in theaters of operation was established after Pearl Harbor, and was generally applied during the war. It was not used in the Pacific area for the assault on Japan. With the end of the war the idea of unity of command in the field had gradually disintegrated.) 10. Presidential announcement of Army-Navy agreement, January 16, 1946

Letters to the President from Secretary of the Navy Forrestal and Secretary of War Patterson stated that agreement had been reached to support legislation providing for a Secretary of National Defense with general over-all direction over three departments-War, Navy, and Air-and for other coordinating agencies. There was also agreement on a draft of an Executive order assigning functions to the three branches of the armed forces. The President stated that in his opinion the agreement reached was "an admirable compromise," and "a thoroughly practical and workable plan of unification," and that he heartily approved it.

11. Transmittal of proposed bill by the President, February 26, 1947

In a communication directed to the Speaker of the House and Senator Vandenberg the President stated that the proposed bill had been drafted by representatives of the armed services and had the approval of the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He added:

"It is my belief that this suggested legislation accomplishes the desired unification of the services, and I heartily recommend its enactment."

PART II. SUMMARY OF MAJOR PROPOSALS

Beginning with the War Department plan submitted to the House Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy (Woodrum committee) in the spring of 1944, there has been a succession of proposals for the reorganization of the armed forces. Particularly significant in the development of the controversy were the proposal of the special committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs, April 11, 1945; the Eberstadt plan; the plans presented by the War Department at the hearings of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs; the President's proposals of December 19, 1945; the Thomas-Hill-Austin bill (S. 2044); the President's plan of June 15, 1946; and the draft of a proposed bill submitted to the Congress by the President February 26, 1947. There follows a summary of each of these proposals.

1. 1944 War Department proposal 2

This proposal had three general features:

(a) There would be a single Department of Armed Forces headed by a Secretary who would be the principal adviser to the President and the Congress on political and administrative matters relating to national defense. There would be Under Secretaries for the Army, Navy, and Air, and also a Director of Common Supply Services.

(b) There would be a United States Joint Chiefs of Staff headed by a Chief of Staff and including the Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces. The Director of Common Supply Services would be included on a subordinate status. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would be the President's military advisers and would report directly to him in the field of military strategy and on budgetary recommendations and the allocation of appropriated funds.

2 See testimony of Lieutenant General McNarney, hearings before the Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy, House of Representatives, 78th Cong., 2d sess., pt. I, pp. 34–37. chart p. 38.

(c) It was recommended that the legislation establishing a single department be general in character. The Secretary for the Armed Forces would have over-all control of such matters as procurement, supply of common items, storage, construction, provision of facilities, welfare, financial administration, hospitalization, personnel standards and administration, recruiting, military education in civilian institutions, and public relations. The manner of administering the department and the extent of decentralization would be left to develop in an evolutionary manner.

2. Report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Committee for Reorganization of National Defense *

8

The recommendations of the majority of the special committee go into considerable detail. The essential features of the plan recommended are as follows: (a) There would be a single Department of Armed Forces headed by a civilian Secretary, who would be the principal adviser to the President on the political, economic, and industrial aspects of military problems, be responsible for the administration of the Department, and act as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Directly responsible to him would be a Commander of the Armed Forces, an Under Secretary for business matters, and several Assistant Secretaries for staff functions.

(b) There would be an Under Secretary for business matters, occupying roughly the same position for such matters as the Commander of the Armed Forces has for military mattes. He would have such Assistant Secretaries as might be required for the various duties that would have to be performed.

(c) There would be one military Commander of the Armed Forces who would also be Chief of Staff to the President and a member of the United States Chiefs of Staff. He would have responsibility for the decision of all questions involving command and military control of the armed forces. He would have a staff which would be concerned with matters involving more than one component. There would also be Deputy Chiefs of Staff for personnel, intelligence, plans and operations, and logistics.

(d) There would be three coordinate components-Army, Navy, and Air Force-each headed by a single commander, and each having a considerable measure of autonomy in operation.

(e) There would be a United States Chiefs of Staff to advise the President on broad matters of military strategy and on budgetary matters. The members would be the Secretary, the Commander of the Armed Forces, and the Commanders of the three components.

3. Eberstadt report recommendation*

(a) Three coordinate departments-War, Air, and Navy-were recommended. Each would have a civilian secretary, a civilian under secretary, and such assistant secretaries as might be needed, commanded by a military officer. Naval and Army air arms would be retained.

(b) A National Security Council would be established to link up military and foreign policy. It would be composed of the Secretaries of State, War, Navy, and Air, the chairman of the National Security Resources Board, and the joint chiefs of staff. The President would be the chairman, and in his absence the Vice President or the Secretary of State. The council would have a permanent secretariat. It would have policy-forming and advisory functions and would, among other things, advise on the combined military budget. The Central Intelligence Agency would be a part of it.

(c) The joint chiefs of staff would be given a statutory basis and would advise on strategy, logistic plans, and budgetary matters. In these areas the joint chiefs of staff would constitute the major coordinating mechanism for the three departments.

(d) A National Security Resources Board would be set up to work out industrial and civilian mobilization plans. It would be composed of representatives of the War, Navy, and Air Departments, the chairman of the Military Munitions Board, and representatives of such other temporary or regular agencies as might be involved. The chairman would be an appointee of the President with full power of decision.

3 Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs, U. S. Senate, 79th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 411 ff., chart opposite 412.

See report to Hon. James Forrestal on Unification of the War and Navy Departments and Postwar Organization for National Security, Senate committee print, 79th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 6 ff., also chart opposite p. 6.

(e) A Military Munitions Board, with functions broader than those of the Army-Navy Munitions Board, would act as a coordinating agency in the field of procurement and logistics. Its members would be the civilian under secretaries of the three departments. A civilian chairman appointed by the President would have full power of decision. The committee would supervise all joint committees on procurement and logistics matters.

(f) Each department would have an assistant secretary for scientific research and development. A civilian research agency was recommended to link civilian and military research.

(g) A Military Education and Training Board, under the supervision of the joint Chiefs of Staff, would coordinate military education and training. It would be composed of representatives of the three departments, and would have an advisory board on military education and training.

(h) A Central Intelligence Agency would be established in the National Security Council.

4. War Department (Collins) plan

The War Department plan proposed at the Senate Military Affairs Committee hearings in 1945 was a modification of the plan recommended by the special committee of the joint chiefs of staff.

(a) There would be a single Department of Armed Forces, with a civilian secretary, a civilian under secretary, and three or more civilian assistant secretaries to coordinate scientific research, procurement and industrial mobilization plans, and legislative affairs and information:

(b) A Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, assisted by a small staff for military personnel matters, intelligence, joint training, and logistics, would be in command of the military aspect of the department, under the secretary.

(c) Under the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces would be the three major components, each headed by a chief of staff (Chief of Naval Operations in the case of the Navy). Each component would have a considerable measure of autonomy and would retain its own service system. The secretary would be able to consult directly with the three chiefs of staff. The theater commanders would also be under the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.

(d) There would be a Director of Common Supply and Hospitalization, also under the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.

(e) The United States Chiefs of Staff, consisting of the Chief of Staff to the President, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, and the Chiefs of Staff of the three components, would have powers of recommendation on military policy, strategy, and budgetary requirements. Their recommendations would go to the President through the Secretary, with his comments. Any dissenting member could report to the President through the Secretary.

(f) The Chief of Staff to the President and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces would not be taken from the same component at any given time. Their terms as well as those of the Chiefs of Staff of the components would be limited in order to insure rotation of office.

5. President Truman's first plan®

(a) There would be a single Department of National Defense, with a civilian Secretary. A civilian Under Secretary, and several civilian Assistant Secretaries, would be available for assignment to whatever duties the President and the Secretary might determine from time to time.

(b) The Department would have three coordinate branches, each under an Assistant Secretary. The Navy would retain its own carrier-ship and waterbased aviation, and the Marine Corps.

(c) The President and the Secretary would be given ample authority to establish central coordinating and service organizations, military and civilian. The details should not be specified in legislation, but should be left to executive decision.

(d) There would be a Chief of Staff of National Defense and a commander for each of the three components.

(e) The Chief of Staff and the three commanders would constitute an advisory body to the President and the Secretary. The position of Chief of Staff would

See hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs, U. S. Senate, 79th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 156 ff.. also chart opposite p. 156.

Message to Congress from the President, December 19, 1945, daily Congressional Record, pp. 12573-12577.