else, and slug and fight. It is a disagreeable job. There is not much glamour about it.

In peacetime, the visible need for it pretty much disappears, while we in the Navy have visible evidence of the force of the Navy in our ships and planes, and the people in the Air Forces have visible evidence in their planes.

The foot soldier's place in war is shadowy, but awfully vital when you come to a point where you have to take Iwo Jima or walk up the Normandy beaches. I have deep sympathy with that, and I know that that prompted most of General Marshall's very strong feeling that there should be this single unit to run all national defense.

They had their point of view. The Air Forces had theirs. The Navy had a strong desire for independence. We did not feel, for example, that because the Air Forces had become of age, had become 21, that the adult Navy should be locked up and put in the reformatory. Now, this bill is an accommodation of all three of those viewpoints, and I tell you quite sincerely that I believe it represents the protection of the Navy and at the same time realizes the basic needs of the other two services.

In the case of the Army's appropriation under this bill in peacetime will meet their need, to have the cadres of an army which we may have to use again. And in the case of the Air Forces, it is that sense of independence, of growth, of arrival at maturity, which is again an imponderable which I recognize.

Senator BRIDGES. Well, Mr. Secretary, you, however, said earlier here that it would depend upon the system of checks and balances and various outside influences as to whether these component parts of the Navy were protected, rather than the specific language in this bill. You said that; did you not?

Secretary FORRESTAL. Yes; in general that is what I said.

Senator BRIDGES. What is there in the general bill, then, that specifically changes your feeling on the matter and leads you to support this bill, as against your opposition to the last one?

Secretary FORRESTAL. Well, specifically, the dictum of Congress that the administration of these departments shall be separate. I mean by that, that the navy yards are to be run by naval people; that the intent of that would be that there would be no disturbance of the chiefs of bureaus of the Navy; because the Navy knows better than any civilian coming in from outside who can run, say, the Bureau of Ships.

Secondly, of course, the mere fact that the entity of the Navy is preserved, that there is a Secretary of the Navy, gives me some assurance, substantial assurance, which dispels the earlier fears that I voiced.

Senator BRIDGES. Of course, the Secretary of the Navy is an inferior officer; is he not?

Secretary FORRESTAL. That depends, again.

Senator BRIDGES. It depends upon what comes in the future. Secretary FORRESTAL. I do not regard myself as a superior person, but I still have a voice.

Senator BRIDGES. I do not mean an inferior individual; I refer to the fact that the post will not be at a top level. The Secretary of National Defense is the top level individual, and the Secretary of

the Navy, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Air Force, would certainly be on a lower level.

Secretary FORRESTAL. I am not trying to avoid your question, but I think the success of this undertaking is going to depend upon the kind of men that man all those posts, not only the Secretary of National Defense, but also the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of Air, and secondly, as I said in my statement, success depends upon the conviction of the services that this step is a wise step, and that it can work.

That is why I have always said to Judge Patterson and to General Marshall and others concerned that if anything were done that the Navy or the Army or the Air Forces honestly were convinced was not workable, the thing would not work. Because whether it is business, or whether it is politics, or whether it is Government, or whether it is the military services, men can say, "Aye, aye, sir," but they can still give you that cold, fishy look which lets you be quite aware of the fact that they do not agree with you, that you do not have the kind of support from the heart that you need in fighting.

Senator BRIDGES. So you think there would be some economy, but it would be small.

Secretary FORRESTAL. I would rather say that I would not want to speculate upon it. I think in wartime it will be great. In peacetime I think it will be not substantial.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Tydings?

Senator TYDINGS. Mr. Secretary, the fundamental element in this bill is one of management; is it not?

Secretary FORRESTAL. Yes; I think that is a fair statement.
Senator TYDINGS. It is a partial change in management.

Now, even without this bill, and under existing conditions, could the President, as Commander in Chief of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, transfer naval aviation from the Navy to the Army?

Secretary FORRESTAL. Could he, under the terms of the act?

Senator TYDINGS. Could he under existing law, if we were at war, for example, even without this act?

Secretary FORRESTAL. I do not think so.

Senator TYDINGS. Why not?

Secretary FORRESTAL. Well, the President of the United States, at the present time, could extinguish any branch by the method that Senator Bridges indicated.

Senator TYDINGS. In other words, to put my question a little more in the form of an example:

Suppose an operation was to be undertaken against Territory X; is there anything to stop the President now from putting the Army, Navy, and Air Forces under the command of General Jones?

Secretary FORRESTAL. No; there is nothing to my knowledge that stops him.

Senator TYDINGS. So that in time of war, there could be a pretty thorough scrambling of the departments, if you had the type of President who thought that that was the advisable thing to do.

Secretary FORRESTAL. That is correct.

Senator TYDINGS. And to that extent, this bill makes no change.
Secretary FORRESTAL. That is right.

Senator TYDINGS. Is it your opinion that in time of war it would be advisable to write into the bill the precaution that the Secretaries of Army, Navy, and Air should sit with the President's Cabinet?

I

Secretary FORRESTAL. Well, I had not thought of that. Of course, may be wrong, but I do not regard the fact as to whether a man sits in the Cabinet or not as of very great consequence,

Senator TYDINGS. I am talking about wartime now.

Secretary FORRESTAL. Well, in looking back at the conditions of the last war, it becomes apparent that the tempo, the speed, and the complexity of war makes it almost necessary for the President to operate through an always available group of men.

Senator TYDINGS. Would you mind reflecting on that question and giving yourself more time to think it out; and would you then give me a brief memorandum for insertion in the record, as to whether or not it would be advisable in time of war to provide that these three so-called Under Secretaries, for the sake of examples, should sit concurrently with the Secretary of National Defense in the President's Cabinet? Secretary FORRESTAL. I would be very glad to, Senator.

Senator TYDINGS. And I would like you to consider, in that connection, this circumstance: That unless it is done, you may have a transition from peacetime to wartime in which the other three secretaries would not be in the Cabinet, war would start, and that same set-up would prevail in the President's Cabinet. It might be that if you did not have as alert a Secretary of National Defense in wartime as you might visualize for the moment, procedures would be put in operation of which the three other Secretaries; namely, Army, Navy, and Air, would not be cognizant until the die had been cast, and it might be too late to rectify a mistake. It seems to me they ought to be more or less silent members of the Cabinet if put in there in time of war, except where their own department might be impinged upon, as they see it, unwisely or unfairly.

Secretary FORRESTAL. Of course, as I visualize the practical application of this new organization, it is one in which the man who takes this job, this top job, would, I hope, have the right to select the men who work with him. Because while some of my associates in the War Department have wanted to insist upon the right to fire, I maintain that in Government the right to hire is the important thing.

If you hire men of good will, that is the important thing. I do not care what your right to fire is.

You know, as well as I do, that once a man is in Government for some length of time it takes quite a lot of blasting to get him out. Senator TYDINGS. The original bill that was introduced brought forth understandable objections that perhaps some of the things we have been discussing previously might occur, namely, that one or more of the arms of the services might be subordinated.

The original testimony was that that could be accomplished by a President, perhaps, anyway, under the existing circumstances. Therefore, you have tried to build a safeguard against that contingency of Executive action, by requiring that either one of the three Secretaries under the Secretary of National Defense shall have direct access to the President.

But you have to know what is going to take place before you have direct access to the President; you cannot know what goes on in Cabi

net meetings unless the Secretary of National Defense, or someone else, tells you.

Secretary FORRESTAL. Well, of course, I think under those conditions, no organization would work. It has been my own feeling about the Navy Department, as I am sure it has been Judge Patterson's experience in the War Department, that we have been a team of associates.

I undertake to keep Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Kenney, and Mr. Brown, my associates, fully informed of whatever transpires, so that I may have the benefit of their expressions before action is taken. Because you cannot run an organization, in my opinion, on any other basis.

Senator TYDINGS. Well, you and I are going along the same line of thought. But here is what I am leading to: It has taken you, and would take any man who is alert, quite a good bit of time to learn a great deal about the Army, the Navy, or the Air Force. Each one is a very absorbing subject, and if you spent 50 years as Secretary of the Navy there would still be other things to learn. And that applies to the other two branches.

Secretary FORRESTAL. And if he did learn it, he would be a nuisance, Senator.

Senator TYDINGS. Now, the Secretary of National Defense is to be on top of it all, and if you have a global war, with flights over the pole, with sea lanes to keep open, with transportation to keep going, with munitions to develop, with training programs, with warehousing, with bases, with all the thousands of problems that come up, just like that, overnight, the Secretary is going to, obviously, be not as well informed about the Army as Judge Patterson is, or about the Navy as you are, or about the Air Force as that Secretary will be.

Therefore, I think we ought to approach this problem in this way: That when he advises with the President he must necessarily advise with a more limited scope of knowledge in the particular department than either one of the three men who served at the head of these departments would have. They would see things that would not occur to the over-all man because of a more thorough knowledge of just what they had, where it was located, what the logistics were, what the possibilities were, what the imponderables were, and so on.

Now, in order to meet that objection, you have safeguarded, and very rightfully, in my opinion, your right to go to the President directly if you think some grave error is being made by the man who is at the top. So it occurred to me, to be logical about it, if that point is well worth safeguarding, it ought to be required that in time of war these three Secretaries sit with the President as members of his Cabinet. Otherwise, you have only got half of what you set out to get.

Do you agree with that?

Secretary FORRESTAL. Well, certainly I would not like to say I agree, Senator, but I am impressed by a thought that had never occurred to me, and I am sure had never occurred to any of the other people participating in these discussions.

Senator HILL. Would the Senator let me ask a question at this point?

Senator TYDINGS. Certainly.

Senator HILL. I would just like to ask the Secretary, in considering that question, which is a good question, to consider this Council of National Security.

In our bill last year, we gave it a little stronger name, I think: Council of Common Defense.

In other words, as the Secretary has suggested, in time of war, the President has to have men that he calls in immediately, perhaps a much smaller group than the entire Cabinet. The Cabinet today is a very large group of men. And it seems to me that this Council of National Security you have here very much fills the need that the Senator from Maryland sees or suggests here. I just hope you will consider that in connection with your considerations.

Secretary FORRESTAL. Yes; that council is designed for that.
Senator HILL. For that very purpose; yes.

Senator TYDINGS. And I would like to ask you, Mr. Secretary, co reflect, in the light of your experiences of the recent war, when you were Secretary of the Navy for a very large part of the time, upon a situation in which you and Secretary Patterson and whoever is to be selected to be the Secretary of the Air Force, might be excluded from the Cabinet meetings in wartime. And let us suppose that Mr. X was the Secretary of National Defense, was not able to to visualize the multitudinous problems, which we will not take the time to bring out here, which you thought you needed to bring direct to the President from time to time, for study.

There would be the constant embarrassment of having to go to the Secretary of National Defense to ask his permission, so to speak, to go to the President, because you wanted to keep peace in the organization.

Perhaps it would be the building of a base at Guam, the building of the big harbor there, which you would want to discuss, as being absolutely essential from a Navy point of view, rather than from the general over-all picture.

There are many other problems that might have come up.

I wish you would try to put yourself in that position, when you were not in those Cabinet meetings, and try to figure from that premise whether or not it is wise for these three men to be in the Cabinet in time of war.

Secretary FORRESTAL. Of course, my own feeling is that regardless of what the law puts upon you, it comes down to a human situation. I have sufficient misgivings as to my own infallability not to want to' make decisions without getting full advice and counsel. Because, whenever an adequate amount of thinking is brought to bear upon any question, whether business, politics, or war, provided the brains that are brought to bear are good ones, and the advice and counsel given has substance, I think the results will be beneficial.

Senator TYDINGS. One more question along the same line: Do you or do you not feel that it would make for more efficiency, more economy, and a better teamwork and higher morale, if these three members of the Cabinet, these three members heading the respective branches of the armed services, were to sit in the Cabinet in time of war? Or would those highly desirable qualities still be present if they did not sit in the Cabinet to the same extent?