Marine Corps officers from top to bottom are disturbed over what is happening and are calling on their friends everywhere to become informed on what is going on.

The problem lies in the utter vagueness of the proposed bill which is supposed to merge the armed services. Almost everything is left to Executive order. The Marine Corps, which has hitherto enjoyed the protection of a statutory definition of its role and mission, could be abolished overnight if the pending bill is passed.

EXCLUDED FROM STAFF

The bill before Congress, which is supposed to reflect the administration point of view, gives the new Secretary of Defense authority to modify or redistribute functions in the future as he sees fit. As the bill is now written, Marine officers are excluded from serving on the Joint Chiefs of Staff or as aides or assistants to the Secretary of Defense. The reference in the present bill is to officers of the Navy. This phrasing, according to legal experts, would not include Marine Corps officers. Also, the Secretary of Defense has absolute power over the budget and could decline to recommend funds for the Marine Corps any time he wished to do so.

Senator Byrd, Democrat, of Virginia, already has announced that he will not vote for the merger bill unless functions are more specifically defined in the statute than is done in the pending bill.

It is significant that President Truman in his message to Congress on June 15 last did include a clear and satisfactory definition of the roles and missions which he favored for the Marine Corps, so the President can hardly blame the Marine Corps for being disturbed by the sins of omission in the present bill. Mr. Truman recommended, in identical letters to the Senate and House committees, that roles and missions such as he outlined be enacted into legislation.

It is puzzling that the Commandant of the Marine Corps should not be given the right to participate in conferences of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was not even put on the list of witnesses in connection with the hearings, though individual members insisted on calling for next week.

SPECIALIZATION IGNORED

When General Vandegrift, the hero of Guadalcanal, testified last year he referred to secret papers in the War Department General Staff containing discussions looking toward the crippling of the Marine Corps. It seems certain that publication of these will be forced, and this will bring into the open something which the public has a right to know-the deliberate effort to wipe out the Marine Corps as it has been previously known.

The marines, it appears, would be relegated to the status of light units of the commando type. This would be a blow to the security of the United States, for experience teaches that the marines are the finest kind of troops. They are, in fact, an intelligent variety of "suicide troops," for they take objectives, such as were faced in Saipan and Iwo Jima, in a manner that has won the admiration of fighting men the world over.

It isn't that other American troops are any less brave. On the contrary, it is not a matter of bravery merely but of specialized training and corps spirit. To make a merger on paper which deprives America of the marines-whose units have been fighting, especially in amphibious operations, since 1789—is to ignore specialization and set the clock back in amphibious warfare.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any further question to ask Secretary Kenney? If not, the committee will be glad to hear now from Vice Admiral Carney.

I understand you have a prepared statement. Admiral.

Mr. KENNEY. Do you wish me to stay, Mr. Chairman.

Senator ROBERTSON. There is just this one point that I made note to ask you.

The CHAIRMAN. You want to ask another question of Secretary Kenney?

Senator ROBERTSON. Yes. Because he has mentioned these particular offices, or some of them.

General Eisenhower testified that he has no objection to including the basic functions of the branches of the armed services in the bill. Admiral Nimitz testified to the same effect. Admiral Sherman has likewise testified to the same effect, but has suggested that any amendments to place functions in the bill should be acceptable to the War and Navy Departments.

What are your views on that, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. KENNEY. Well, I feel that if there is any statement of functions in the bill, it should be in the very broadest of terms. Otherwise we freeze our organization which, in my opinion would be detrimental to efficiency. I personally would prefer to leave out of the bill any reference to functions.

The CHAIRMAN. You say it would be detrimental to efficiency. How about effectiveness?

Mr. KENNEY. I am afraid I am not enough of a student of semantics to appreciate fully the difference. I think efficiency and effectiveness go hand in hand, and if you reduce efficiency, you are going to reduce effectiveness.

The CHAIRMAN. What I had most concern about was effectiveness against any possible enemy. In other words, if we retained the flexibility which is now contained in the bill, or which can be had because of the provisions of the bill, would you not feel that our flexibility would be increased?

Mr. KENNEY. Flexibility is more desirable in time of war than any other time, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, if there are no further questions, we will hear from Admiray Carney. And if there is no objection from other members of the committee, I am sure that if the Secretary wants to go back to his office, that will be all right.

Mr. KENNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. ROBERT B. CARNEY, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (LOGISTICS), NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Admiral CARNEY. Mr. Chairman, I have a statement here that deals with the logistics aspects of S. 758, primarily from the standpoint of the operating forces. It supplements the remarks that Mr. Kenney has made.

Greater efficiency and economy are the goals for striving for better integration in the application of the Nation's entire military potential. Many aspects of the problem have received wide publicity, but not much has been said about logistics per se; actually, logistics is a vital factor in any plan for such integration. Logistics may be briefly defined as the supply, maintenance and resupply of the men and material needed for the conduct of operations.

We know that courage and skill can win a single battle, but logistics is the real life's blood of campaigns and wars. And obviously without logistic support and effective logistic support, a strategic plan is only a piece of paper. Consequently, examination of the logistical implications will provide a very important key to a correct answer to the integration problem.

No plan for integration is acceptable if it fails to provide a proper logistical organization. We have objected to some aspects of the various merger proposals on those grounds. But we have gone a little further than that: We have developed a plan for unified logistic support for the national defense establishment. And I feel from the standpoint of the operating forces that this bill, S. 758, meets the practical requirements of that plan.

I have a copy of the plan here, which I would be pleased to leave with the committee. It is in a summary form, and it is less in the form of a manual than a discussion.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be glad to receive it, so that it will be available for the inspection of any committee members who want to look at it.

Admiral CARNEY. This bill does not, nor does it need to, deal directly with logistics in the operating theaters. We feel that the existing field command structures are adequate for that purpose and nothing new is required.

S. 758 stresses the top management and the policy control and the proposed organization appears sound from the viewpoint of the combat forces and of their logistics planners.

In order to see how logistics affect combat efficiency under any merger proposal, it is necessary to look at the sequence of events in providing logistic support.

Reduced to its simplest form, logistics is a three-phase operation. First you have the statement of requirements; then the procurement phase; and then the distribution phase.

The first and third phases are chiefly military, and the second is principally a commercial task, which is performed in the Navy Department under the direction of the Assistant Secretary.

This statement of requirements is quite obviously a military task. When for strategic reasons an operation is necessary, it devolves upon the military to say what men and materials are needed for its accomplishment. In other words, the military state the "what," the "when," and the "where.' ""

The procurement phase is the "how," that meets with the demands of "what," "when," and "where."

It is largely a commercial task, but the military have a very vital interest insofar as insuring that the methods of procurement do not adversely affect what we get or when and where we receive it.

Also, even in the procurement phase there are supply aspects of procurement which are performed by uniformed personnel, both here and in the forward areas.

The third phase of logistics, which is distribution, involves such functions as transportation, storage, and outloading in the continental United States; and it also involves overseas shipping, overseas stockpiling, inventory control overseas, replenishment of the mobile naval forces, and the delivery of the men and materials to overseas contingents for all services.

Senator ROBERTSON. Admiral, it seems to me from your statements (1), (2), and (3), that the logistical aspect of any operation is very much a military concern; in fact almost entirely a military concern. Admiral CARNEY. In its inception and its ultimate execution; yes, sir. But the second phase-procurement-is also very definitely a part of the logistic system.

Senator ROBERTSON. Yes. At present, during the late war, was that under the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Admiral CARNEY. The Joint Chiefs of Staff first drew a tentative logistics support plan, which was then submitted to the Departments for the test of feasibility, more or less of an endless chain process. The Departments then determined from their inventory what they had, what deficiencies remained to be filled; and that, again, was returned to the Joint Chiefs.

The commercial side of the house would determine, in connection with this bill, with the Munitions Board, the schedules of procurement: As to when these things could be delivered to the distribution or collection points. That, again, would have to be referred to the Joint Chiefs, because it might affect the selected day for the initiation of the operations. So it is a constant check back, until finally they arrive at a figure in which the men and materials for the operation can be furnished, or the Joint Chiefs decide to take a calculated risk with something less than they had originally prescribed as necessary.

Senator ROBERTSON. I see that there are already in existence under the Joint Chiefs of Staff a Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Logistics Committee, a Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Munitions Allocations Committee, a Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Military Transportation Committee. They would handle most of these items, would they not?

Admiral CARNEY. Yes, sir.

Senator ROBERTSON. Is there anything in S. 758 that would take that out of the hands of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Admiral CARNEY. I only see one point, sir, in which there might be a change; and it is my interpretation that that would be an administrative matter.

In the diagram which Mr. Kenney has introduced, and which the committee has seen before, there is no line connecting the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, which would be necessary in the establishment of this endless chain procedure of logistics planning. Otherwise, it is my understanding, sir, that S. 758 would preserve the committee structure and the function structure that now exists.

Senator ROBERTSON. I think you have pointed out a very important point: That there is no connecting line in the chart captioned "National Security Act of 1947," which is S. 758, connecting the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.

Admiral CARNEY. That may be implied, Senator, in subparagraph (5). That is line 8, on page 13. And it would be my interpretation of the language of the bill that there was such an implication; where it says that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are to "review major material and personnel requirements of the military forces, in accordance with strategic and logistic plans."

And later in my statement, I have recorded that interpretation of the continuity between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the departments. The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Carney, does not the Joint Chiefs of Staff work under the National Security Council? Is it not proposed that they shall? And can they not now, under the Secretaries of the Army and Navy?

Admiral CARNEY. No, sir; I think that the workings of S. 758 give the Joint Chiefs of Staff functions at two levels. At the top level I would say that it is on a parallel echelon with the National Security Council and the National Resources Board as the top military agency in the national structure, and, therefore, would be called upon for its recommendations on appropriate matters.

The CHAIRMAN. The Joint Chiefs of Staff report to the President and also report to the Secretary of National Defense, under the provisions of 758; is that not right?

Admiral CARNEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And then, the Secretary of National Defense, of course, reports his findings to the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and Air Force. That is the way the lines are laid out on the plan we have before us.

Admiral CARNEY. Yes, sir.

Senator ROBERTSON. I think you have brought up an extremely important point, Admiral, when you point out in this chart that the Joint Chiefs of Staff-that is, the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, and the Chief of Staff of the Commander in Chief, if there be one-have no connection whatsoever with the Secretary of Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of Air, other than through this super-Secretary, or through the President of the United States. I think it is a very important point.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Well, Mr. Chairman, let me ask this: During the war, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported directly to the President, did they not? In the present set-up?

Admiral CARNEY. Yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. So this is no change in that set-up at all. Admiral CARNEY. No, sir. I think that the bill preserves the existing set-up, except in two points. One is that its provides two additional agencies on the top policy level; that is, the National Security Council and he National Security Resources Board. And it does place the Joint Chiefs under the Secretary of National Defense within his organizational structure.

Senator ROBERTSON. But, Admiral, I note that this chart is prepared jointly by the War Department Bureau of Public Relations and the Navy Department Office of Public Information, and it is supposed to be the chart set-up of S. 758. It is absolutely apparent that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which at present comprises General Eisenhower, Admiral Nimitz, General Spaatz, and Admiral Leahy, have absolutely no connection with the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, or the Secretary of the Air Force; except through the super-Secretary.

Admiral CARNEY. And except through their contact with the War Council, sir, of which the Secretaries are members.

Senator ROBERTSON. That is true, but then, that again is through the Secretary of National Defense.

Admiral CARNEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, is it not a fact that each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the military head of his service? Admiral CARNEY. Yes, sir.