Now, Dr. Bush has been given power of decision as between the services in that field. It has been delegated to him by the two Secretaries.

Since they could not settle these matters themselves, he is given the power of decision, as long as he holds that office.

A similar arrangement exists with respect to Mr. Deupree, who heads the Army and Navy Munitions Board.

So, in those two instances there was recognized the fact that there had to be some civilian who was neutral in order to make decisions and get on with business.

Senator BRIDGES. As to Senator Tydings' question here, he says to use the word "umpire."

Now, if we had an umpire at the top over these three services, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, I would have no quarrel. But, instead of that, we have a czar.

Senator TYDINGS. An umpire is a czar.

Senator BRIDGES. Well, an umpire may be that, but he does not have over-all supervision to run the departments.

Senator TYDINGS. I do not think he has here. Certainly I would not want to give him over-all supervision over these three departments. As I visualize the operation of this bill, Admiral, the Secretary of the Navy would go ahead and run the Navy pretty much as he does now, and the Air Force the same, and the Army the same.

After a while, it might be found that one of the three branches is pursuing a policy that is contrary to the policy pursued by the other two.

Now, your resort, under present law, would be to go to the President, take his time, explain the dispute, and ask him to give you a decision.

Under the new set-up, you would all run these departments just as you are doing now, but you would go first to the Secretary of National Defense, or he would anticipate it, and say, "Cut out this, Navy," or "Cut out this, Army," or "Do it this way, Navy," or "Do it this way, Army."

Now, if you felt that the Secretary of National Defense, in cutting out any one of the procedures that had been followed by a department, was acting inimically to the welfare of the service, over all, and particularly the branch that was discriminated against, let us say, then the Secretary of the Navy would go to the President. And he would say, "Look here; we have been doing so-and-so. The Army and the Air Force have been doing the opposite. We have just got the order not to do that any more. Well, if we do not do that, such-and-such a thing will happen. And we would like to appeal this matter from the Secretary of National Defense to you, because we believe we are right. But, of course, whatever you decide will be final."

So you have really got two umpires. You have got a preliminary umpire, whose decision stands provided that the big umpire does not overrule him. But you have always got, as you have now, the same access to the big umpire.

Is that a fair statement?

Admiral SHERMAN. That is a fair statement, added to which-and - very important to me, because I have taken part in the presentation of some of these matters to the President-a Secretary of National

Defense on an important matter might be able to give you two or three consecutive days to really go over it.

The President of the United States has a great many other problems. That is the difficulty.

Senator BRIDGES. The other main trouble with Senator Tydings' argument is that when the first umpire acted, if you disputed the first umpire's decision two or three times, you would be out of the game before you got up to the top.

Senator TYDINGS. I do not know about that. I might put the umpire out of the game, if I found him wrong. I would say, "Mr. President, you had better get another umpire. He will ruin the situation. I think such-and-such a situation should be viewed with tremendous gravity."

And the President might say, "I am sorry, Bill. I think you had better go back to Keokuk, Iowa, or wherever it was, and rest a while, and let me put another man in there."

Senator BRIDGES. There is no sense in predicting, but I would venture to say that if you adopt such a bill as this one here, and you go into any serious situation, the identity of the Secretary of the Air Force, the Secretary of the Army, or the Secretary of the Navy will be tremendously subordinated to this top man. He will be the whole show, and if they buck him, they will be out on their ears. That is what I am afraid of. And the chairman, and every member of this committee, I know, want to do the right thing.

We may approach it a little differently. But I want to safeguard these services, and I do not want someone to ruin them. You have to trust somebody and I will trust, as far as possible, the President of the United States, because he is Commander in Chief in time of emergency.

The CHAIRMAN. We have gotten far afield from the Munitions Board, and I would like to get back to that.

If we can conclude the teestimony of the Admiral this morning, it will be quite a step in getting along with the bill.

Senator HILL. As for the Munitions Board, the Eberstadt Report recommended that this chairman be given the power of decision. I think that is true.

Admiral SHERMAN. Although the percentage and dollar savings on some items may be small in time of peace, in time of great spending during war, these small percentage savings will add up to important dollar savings.

Important savings are made now by procurement procedures such as the purchase of nearly all food by the Army, nearly all small arms, field guns, and their ammunition by the Army, and almost all of the oil by the Navy.

You will notice the provisions for the pay of the Chairman of the Munitions Board is to be $50 a day, and not to exceed a top figure of $14,000 a year. We wanted that arrangement so that it would be possible for the Chairman to be a business executive and with outside interests, who might not be able to give full time to this duty in time of peace.

Section 114 continues the existing Joint Research and Development Board, formerly called the Office of Scientific Research and Development, with one major difference. The Secretaries of War and Navy

have given powers of decision to the present chairman since neither Secretary could make decisions between the services. Those powers of decision would now pass to the Secretary of National Defense.

Section 201 provides for a National Security Council, an agency long felt necessary, and one which was proposed in the Secretary's letter of May 31, 1946, under the name "Council of Common Defense." This is an agency which has existed in an informal and embryo form for a considerable period. During the period before the war and extending into the early part of the war, there was a so-called Liaison Committee which included the Under Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Chief of Naval Operations.

For over 2 years now the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy have been meeting informally each week as the so-called Committee of Three to coordinate action in matters of mutual concern. Recently the Secretary of State has assigned a permanent secretary to that committee.

Current events indicate clearly the necessity for an organization on at least the Cabinet level to make decisions based on sound estimates as to the most effective manner in which our military and financial resources can be applied. In the future we may anticipate that, as during the past week, it will be necessary to consider the optimum use of the power, prestige, money, and other resources available to us for implementation of national policy.

The best results will be achieved only by continuous and exhaustive consideration of the problems involved, such consideration to be participated in by the heads of the State Department, the military departments, and one or more representatives of the branches of the Government concerned with our national resources.

The Central Intelligence Group provided for by section 202 exists now. This section assigns to the National Security Council the supervisory authority and responsibility now given by Executive order to a National Intelligence Authority which includes the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy. It includes language which is permissive, but not mandatory, covering the possible assignment of a serving officer to the post of Director of Central Intelligence. It does not, however, bar the appointment of a civilian as Director.

I consider the Central Intelligence Agency to be a vital necessity under present world conditions. Its necessity will increase with our greater international responsibilities and as the power of sudden attack is amplified by further developments in long-range weapons and in weapons of mass destruction.

Section 203 provides for the National Resources Board, an agency intended to coordinate military, industrial, and civilian mobilization and to maintain and stabilize the civilian economy in time of war.

It should be distinctly noted that while the Munitions Board, dealing with essentially military requirements, is responsible to the Secretary of National Defense, the Resources Board is responsible to the President in its broader field embracing the entire civilian economy.

There must be both a Resources Board and a Munitions Board because two separate functions must be carried out in the field of national mobilization and logistics, which although interrelated, are on different levels-one on the political and national level, and the other on the strictly military level.

The Munitions Board functions within the Military Establishment. Experience has shown that national mobilization plans, which of necessity must affect the civilian life of the Nation, are distasteful to the people of the country if prepared by the military departments.

Politically, any plans of national scope prepared by the Army and Navy Munitions Board are bound to be still-born. Such was the fate of the mobilization plans prepared by the Army and Navy Munitions Board in 1938-39.

Plans for mobilization of the national economy should be drawn up in consultation with the agencies which will have to execute them, and who should therefore have a voice in their preparation. Specifically, the Departments of Treasury, Labor, and Agriculture, the Petroleum Administration, and the agencies having cognizance. over the various systems of transportation are all concerned.

Mobilization plans of national scope and administration should be tied at their inception into the regular departments of the Government. A National Security Resources Board functioning at the Cabinet level is necessary for this purpose.

The experience of every war has been early confusion remedied only by intense effort. Experience indicates clearly the objectives to be sought in national mobilization, and the processes for achieving them. The character of these objectives will be little affected by developments in weapons and techniques. Their full appreciation and early accomplishment, on the other hand, is made urgent by the increased tempo of modern war.

The objectives in mobilizing the resources of the Nation for war include the following:

(1) Coordination of our foreign and military policies and determination of the broad objectives which flow therefrom. This is a function of the National Security Council.

(2) Translation of strategic plans to attain those broad objectives in military requirements in terms of men, weapons, equipment, and supplies. This is a function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(3) Translation of military requirements into schedules of procurement of end items and components, and programs of military requirements for material, facilities, and labor. This is a function of the Munitions Board.

(4) Formulation of civilian requirements, that is requirements for the maintenance and expansion of the industrial system, and for the minimum needs of the civilian consumer consistent with the war effort. This should be done by various civil agencies coordinated by the National Security Resources Board.

(5) Formulation of the necessary minimum requirements of Allied Nations to whom we have commitments. This should be done by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and special agencies under the National Security Resources Board.

(6) Translation of civilian and foreign requirements into schedules of procurement and programs of requirements for material, facilities, and labor. This should be done by the National Security Resources Board.

(7) Coordination of the military, civilian, and foreign requirements programs. This should be done by the National Security Resources Board.

(8) Determination of current and potential total production capacity. This should be done by the National Security Resources Board.

(9) Development of balanced and realistic over-all production programs by allocation between the military and the civil of the total material, production facilities, and manpower. This should be done by the National Security Resources Board.

The greater the degree of integrated balance which can be obtained in realizing these objectives, the greater will be the power of our mobilized economy and the greater the savings in lives and dollars in the event of war.

It is the mission of national mobilization planning to insure this integration by maintaining in being plans for directing all civilian, military, and industrial mobilization in the instance of necessity.

The agency-the Army-Navy Munitions Board-charged with this vital function prior to World War II was inadequate in power and scope to formulate plans of a truly national character.

Functioning on a level well below the Cabinet, without civilian political guidance, without first-hand knowledge of our foreign policies and commitments, and of insufficient stature to demand and obtain the necessary statistics and assistance from industry and business, the plans it produced were considered to have a military bias and were discarded at the outbreak of war. This rejection contributed to the confused and hasty efforts of the first war years.

Adequate and realistic mobilization plans, which will be accepted by the powerful industrial and business elements of the Nation when war is imminent, cannot be prepared by a subordinate agency of the national defense establishment such as a military Munitions Board. National mobilization plans must be prepared by the joint participation of the highest political, economic, and military agencies of the Government.

The National Security Council should therefore be directed by law to consider our international commitments and risks, upon the basis of which the Joint Chiefs of Staff should prepare strategic plans and evaluate their requirements in terms of weapons, supplies, and manpower. This, in turn, would provide criteria for the Munitions Board to plan the military aspects of industrial mobilization, which would in its turn be coordinated by the National Security Resources Board, together with civilian requirements in the formulation of national plans for total mobilization, thus achieving a complete integration of truly national effort.

Fluctuations in our economy may enforce changes in the commitments and risks we will be willing to accept, which in turn would require alterations in our strategic plans and so on through an integrated and continuing cycle.

As the present Chairman of the Army-Navy Munitions Board has said, it is impossible to write mobilization plans which will be good 25 years from today; but it is both possible and necessary to write, each year, plans which will be good the following year.

The agency to coordinate these plans and programs and maintain a skeleton organization for a prompt and effective translation into military, industrial, and civilian mobilization is the National Security Resources Board.