4. United States Marine Corps The Navy and the Army differ on the functions of the United States Marine Corps as follows: War Department view: There shall be maintained as a constituent part of the naval service a balanced fleet marine force including its supporting air component for— (1) Service with the fleet in the seizure of enemy positions not involving sustained land fighting and (2) To continue the development of tactics, techniques, and equipment relating to those phases of amphibious warfare which pertain to waterborne aspects of landing operations. Navy Department views: There shall be maintained as a constituent part of the naval service a balanced fleet marine force including its supporting air component for (1) Service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advance naval bases or for the conduct of such limited land operations as are essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign and (2) To continue the development of those aspects of amphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, techniques, and equipment employed by landing forces. There is agreement upon the other primary duties of the Marine Corps, viz: (1) To provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, and (2) To provide security detachments for protection of naval property at naval stations and bases. These matters have been explored by us with a sincere desire to comply with your wishes that the military services reach complete mutual agreement. Our failure to achieve complete unanimity is due to no reason other than that our respective views on the points of difference are as sincere as they are divergent. Faithfully yours, (Signed) ROBERT P. PATTERSON, Secretary of War. (Signed) JAMES FORRESTAL, Secretary of the Navy. (The text of the letter from the President to Secretaries Patterson and Forrestal follows:) The Honorable ROBERT P. PATTERSON, The Secretary of War. The Honorable JAMES FORRESTAL, The Secretary of the Navy. JUNE 15, 1946. GENTLEMEN: I have read with care your joint report of May 31, 1946. It was also helpful to me to have the full oral presentation of the points involved, which you and the members of your Departments made to me on June 4. I am pleased and gratified at the progress you have made. I feel that we have come a long way in narrowing the zone of disagreement which had previously existed between the services. The full understanding reached on eight vital aspects of unification is a significant accomplishment. These eight elements are Council of Common Defense, National Security Resources Board, Joint Chiefs of Staff, omission of single Military Chief of Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, Procurement and Supply, Research Agencies and Military Education and Training. I In addition to these eight points of agreement, I am advised also by representatives of both services that they are in accord in their attitude toward the provision in the Thomas bill (S. 2044), which provides for four assistant secretaries in charge of research, intelligence, procurement, and training, respectively. They believe that such assistant secretaries are unnecessary. agree with their position that the presence of these four assistant secretaries is undesirable because they would greatly complicate the internal administration of the services and that such a plan would deprive the secretaries of the respective services of functions which are properly theirs. Your report of May 31 listed four items upon which you were unable to agree. An analysis of your comments contained in your report, and in the lengthy discussion which we had, discloses that the services are not nearly so far apart in their attitude toward these points as had been reported. It is my firm conviction that the determination of these questions in the manner which I present herein will result in a plan which incorporates the best features offered by the respective services. With reference to the points upon which full agreement was not reached my position is as follows: 1. Single military department There should be one Department of National Defense. It would be under the control of a civilian who would be a member of the Cabinet. Each of the services would be headed by a civilian with the title of "Secretary." These Secretaries would be charged with the internal administration within their own services. They would not be members of the Cabinet. Each service would retain its autonomy, subject of course to the authority and over-all control by the Secretary of National Defense. It is recognized that the services have different functions and different organizations and for these reasons the integrity of each service should be retained. The civilian secretaries of the services would be members of the Council of Common Defense and in this capacity they would have the further opportunity to represent their respective services to the fullest extent. 2. Three coordinated services There should be three coordinated services-the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The three services should be on a parity and should operate in a common purpose toward over-all efficiency of the national defense under the control and supervision of the Secretary of National Defense. The Secretaries of the three services should be known as Secretary for the Army, Secretary for the Navy, and Secretary for the Air Force. 3. Aviation The Air Force shall have the responsibility for the development, procurement, maintenance, and operation of the military air resources of the United States with the following exceptions, in which responsibility must be vested in the Navy: (1) Ship, carrier, and water-based aircraft essential to naval operations, and aircraft of the United States Marine Corps. (2) Land-type aircraft necessary for essential internal administration and for air transport over routes of sole interest to naval forces and where the requirements cannot be met by normal air-transport facilities. (3) Land-type aircraft necessary for the training of personnel for the aforementioned purposes. Land-based planes for naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, and protection of shipping can and should be manned by Air Force personnel. If the three services are to work as a team there must be close cooperation, with interchange of personnel and special training for specific duties. Within its proper sphere of operation, naval aviation must not be restricted but must be given every opportunity to develop its maximum usefulness. 4. United States Marine Corps There shall be maintained as a constituent part of the naval service a balanced fleet marine force including its supporting air component to perform the following functions: (1) Service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases or for the conduct of such limited land operations as are essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. (2) To continue the development of those aspects of amphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment employed by the landing forces. (3) To provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy. (4) To provide security detachments for protection of naval property at naval stations and bases. It is important that the basic elements of the plan of unification be stated clearly. The eight fundamental points agreed upon and the four points which are herewith decided, constitute a total of 12 basic principles that should form the framework of the program for integration. There is no desire or intention to affect adversely the integrity of any of the services. They should perform their separate functions under the unifying direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of National Defense. The internal administration of the three services should be preserved in order that the high morale and esprit de corps of each service can be retained. It was gratifying to have both of you and General Eisenhower and Admiral Nimitz assure me that you would all give your wholehearted support to a plan of unification no matter what the decision would be on those points upon which you did not fully agree. I know that I can count upon all of you for full assistance in obtaining passage in the Congress of a bill containing the 12 basic elements set forth above. Very sincerely yours, The Honorable CHAN GURNEY, (Signed) HARRY S. TRUMAN. THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, • United States Senate, Washington, D. C. MY DEAR SENATOR GURNEY: You have requested me to comment on the advisability of having an Under Secretary of National Defense. As you pointed out, S. 758 provides a Secretary of National Defense, but not an Under Secretary or any Assistant Secretaries. Furthermore, S. 758 does not make any provision for succession to the office of the Secretary of National Defense in the event of separation from office of the incumbent. In the course of our exhaustive studies of the problem involved in the reorganization of the armed services, it has been established that a Secretary of National Defense, to best fulfill his purpose, must be free to concentrate his efforts on the establishment of broad policy. He should rely upon capable secretaries at the head of the individual military departments for efficient administration in support of the established policy. In other words, he must look to the secretaries of the military departments for the information and data upon which his policy is to be based and then look again to them for the execution of those policies. In the resolution of the problem of reorganization of the armed forces to which the War and Navy Departments have agreed, a determined effort was made to achive the benefits of a Secretary of National Defense while minimizing the detriment of lowering the stature of the Secretaries of the military departments. It was thought that this could best be accomplished by closing as much as possible the gap between the Secretary of National Defense and the three departmental Secretaries, and by providing the same rate of pay for the Secretaries of the military departments as was provided for the Secretary of National Defense. It is obvious that the position of an Under Secretary above them in the line of succession would be anomalous, and would directly serve to reduce their stature and authority. This matter was considered in the drafting of S. 758, but for the reasons I have given provision for an Under Secretary was not included in the bill. If the bill is left in its present form it would be my understanding that the Secretary of the individual military department having first official precedence would serve as acting Secretary of National Defense in the absence or indisposition of the Secretary of National Defense. I would have no objection to an amendment to S. 758 to provide expressly for succession to the office of Secretary of National Defense. If the succession which I have mentioned is not satisfactory to your committee, provision might be made for the President to appoint any civilian official in the National Defense Establishment to serve as Acting Secretary of National Defense in the absence or indisposition of that Secretary. This, for example, would permit the appointment of the Chairman of the National Resources Board, or some other civilian in the National Defense Establishment as Acting Secretary if the President so desired. Sincerely yours, JAMES FORRESTAL. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will stand in recess, then, until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. (Whereupon, at 12:05 p. m., an adjournment was taken to reconvene Wednesday, April 2, 1947, at 10 a. m.) NATIONAL DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT-UNIFICATION OF THE ARMED FORCES WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2, 1947 UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, D. C. The committee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to adjournment, in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Chan Gurney (chairman) presiding. Present: Senators Gurney (chairman), Bridges, Robertson of Wyoming, Saltonstall, Tydings, Hill, and Maybank. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Admiral Sherman, I believe we shall continue with your statement at this time. You might have to pick up some threads of what happened yesterday, and then you may proceed in your own way. STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. FORREST SHERMAN, UNITED STATES NAVY, NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.-Resumed Admiral SHERMAN. The agreement of January 16 took an incomparably better form than the German authoritarian organization, and it is on the basis of their functions, their roles and missions that weapons and equipment are assigned to our Army, Navy, and Air Force. It is around these functions that their organizations are shaped. Furthermore, no service has a monopoly on any weapon or type of equipment. Each service has the tools to accomplish its strategic mission, by the use of its own forces if possible, or through its joint employment with other services if this is necessary. The Navy with its naval aviation, its Marine Corps and its own service forces and logistic support is a functionally well-balanced service. Its flexibility, range and striking power on and over the sea and over coastal regions, as well as its adaptability to joint employment during the last war, speak for themselves. Senator ROBERTSON. Admiral, in the German form of organization, did they have any such naval aviation, or marine corps, et cetera, as we have? Admiral SHERMAN. In the German organization they had no marine corps which was comparable to ours. They had another very curious arrangement, from our point of view, whereby what is the equivalent of our coast artillery was under the navy. They had no naval aviation, and the records of the conferences between the Commander in Chief of the Navy and the Fuehrer show that the Commander in Chief of the Navy made repeated representations to |