NATIONAL DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT-UNIFICATION OF THE ARMED FORCES TUESDAY, APRIL 1, 1947 UNITED STATES SENATE, Washington, D. C. The committee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to adjournment, in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Chan Gurney (chairman) presiding. Present: Senators Gurney (chairman), Bridges, Robertson of Wyoming, Saltonstall, Tydings, Russell, Byrd, and Maybank. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. We are still taking testimony on S. 758. Before the start of the testimony this morning, that of Admiral Sherman and General Norstad, I would like to have entered in the record, a copy of the resolution adopted by the American Legion at its twenty-seventh annual convention at San Francisco last fall, in favor of the bill for unification of the armed forces. (The resolution referred to is as follows:) RESOLUTION No. 816 San Francisco National Convention, September 30-October 1-4, 1946 SINGLE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY Whereas the American Legion at its twenty-seventh annual convention established its policy on unification as follows: "We endorse the principle of a unified command of our armed forces with the Army, Navy, and Air Force on an equal level." Whereas Congress recognizing the need for unification of the armed forces, has voted to reorganize its Committees on Military and Naval Affairs to accomplish unity of action; and Whereas closer coordination between branches of the armed services is essential to adequate preparedness and economy of supply; Now, therefore, be it Resolved, That the Congress is requested to enact appropriate legislation to establish a single department for national security with provision for the Army, Navy, and Air Forces on an equal level therein. The CHAIRMAN. The two officers assigned by the Army and Navy to work out the bill that is presently before us are here with us this morning. They are Vice Adm. Forrest Sherman, and Maj. Gen. Lauris Norstad. Admiral Sherman, do you have a prepared statement this morning? STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. FORREST SHERMAN, U. S. N., NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C. Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. After that, the committee will undoubtedly want to ask you some questions. You may proceed. Admiral SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I believe it would be helpful if, before proceeding with a detailed discussion of the proposed National Security Act of 1947, I review briefly the background of its drafting. On May 31, 1946, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy submitted to the President a letter in which agreement was reached on various matters including a Council of Common Defense, a National Security Resources Board, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a Central Intelligence Agency. It was agreed that there should be no single military Chief of Staff. At that time full agreement was not reached on the coordination of procurement, production, and distribution; with respect to a research agency, or to an agency for the review of military education and training. At that time no agreement was reached on the number of military departments, or on the status of the Army Air Forces and naval aviation and the functions of the United States Marine Corps. The President in his letter of June 15, 1946, to the chairmen of the military committees in Congress and the Secretaries of the military departments reviewed the above points and outlined his position regarding those on which full agreement had not been reached. Senator BYRD. May I interrupt you there? Do you have the President's letter of June 15, 1946? Senator BYRD. At the conclusion of the Admiral's testimony, I would like to have that put in the record. Admiral SHERMAN. There is a complete file here, sir. The CHAIRMAN. At the conclusion of your testimony this morning, we will follow with the President's letter of June 15, 1946. Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, I do not wish to delay things, but if you put in the President's letter, will it not be necessary to put in the May 31 letter to which the President replied? The CHAIRMAN. We will put them both in. All right, Admiral; you may proceed. Admiral SHERMAN. On November 7, 1946, Mr. Forrestal invited Mr. Symington, General Norstad, Admiral Radford, and me to a meeting at his home at which it was agreed to draft a plan for unification acceptable to both the War and Navy Departments, and within the scope and spirit of the President's letter of June 15, 1946. It was apparent that the issues which would have to be resolved in order for the Army and Navy to work better together were as follows: First. The form of administrative organization of the departments in Washington; Second. The military command arrangements in Washington; Fifth. The status and future of the Marine Corps. After considerable discussion, it was agreed that General Norstad and I would attempt to work up an agreement. The program discussed on that occasion contemplated the following: First. Three separate administrative departments; Second. A single Secretary of National Defense to coordinate the three military departments and to direct policy; Third. A very small executive force for the single Secretary to consist of 15 to 25 "$10,000-a-year men" and officers. This description of salary was repeated and it was understood that the figure "15 to 25" included both civilians and officers in that force; Fourth. The Joint Chiefs of Staff as at present; Fifth. A joint staff, under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of approximately the same size as at present but to be better organized for getting work done and in such a manner as to provide for the requirements for future warfare; Sixth. A definition of functions of the services which would provide for the continuance of the Marine Corps and the safeguarding of naval aviation including the antisubmarine warfare and naval reconnaissance components; Seventh. Resolution of the overseas command problem by considering it on an over-all or global basis. General Norstad and I were directed to pursue the problem of resolving these various matters and we subsequently held many long conferences for that purpose. It soon became apparent that our problems fell into three categories, each requiring a separate agreement. One of those agreements had to cover the question of the Government organization for national security. Another one had to delineate the functions of the services. The third had to embrace the organization for unified command in the field. Senator TYDINGS. May I interrupt you there for a question? When you have a combination of Army, Navy, and Air, under the proposed set-up, we will say at Guam, or any place, do you have a combined list which shows who ranks automatically, or will it be necessary to designate specially who ranks? Admiral SHERMAN. It will be necessary, sir, to designate the officers to exercise unified command. For example, during the war, and under the current arrangement, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the approval of the President where appropriate, appoint the officers to exercise unified command on the echelon which is responsible directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Then those commanders, in turn, first create their own subordinate organzation, and then they appoint the officers from those available to them, to exercise the principal commands in the next echelon, and so on down. Senator TYDINGS. Is it feasible, Admiral, to have, for the purpose of command, what you might call "automatic command"; a list made up, so that if General B and Admiral A were to find themselves jointly at a certain place, automatically Admiral A or General B would know who was senior and who would be in command of the operation, in the absence of special designation of the commander? Admiral SHERMAN. I think that that system, sir, would have limited application. Senator TYDINGS. That is what I meant. For example, something might happen quickly, to pursue my own thought, where the order placing Admiral A or General B in command had not been issued, but the two would arrive on the spot, and it might be an emergency spot, and I was wondering if it would be possible to have an automatic set-up in the absence of an order from the proper authority designating one or the other to be the commanding officer at that spot. Admiral SHERMAN. Well, sir, I think it would have limited application. First, as to seniority; it is a matter of long-established custom that officers of the equivalent rank take precedence with each other as beween the services in accordance with their date of commission, so that we already have that yardstick. Senator TYDINGS. Then, the answer, it seems to me, would be that if a member of the Army, Air Force, and Navy, high officers, were to find themselves assigned to a certain operation or spot, in the absence of any order designating who was to command, it would be automatic, under your plan, that in the absence of the special designation, those people would know automatically who was the senior officer at the spot. Now, would that senior officer automatically have authority to issue orders for all three of them governing that particular spot or operation, or would he have to have special designation from the higher-ups here in Washington? Admiral SHERMAN. Other things being equal, it would be advantageous to have the senior officer take charge; but there normally would be factors in a situation which would cause the officer of one service to be more appropriate. For instance, in an area which was subject to air attack, I think it would be better to have the air officer take command. If, on the other hand, in that same area, the principal enemy threat were submarines, I think it would be better for the naval officer to take command. Senator TYDINGS. But that would be in connection with designations. I am talking about the automatic period, before designation takes place. I am thinking really of a similar situation to that of Pearl Harbor, where we would have three branches of the services involved. The Navy would have a considerable contingency there. The Army would also have one, and the Air Force would also have one. Now, let us assume that due to some circumstance the three heads of those three services arrived in Hawaii, and there would not be for 3 days any designation as to who would be the chief man there. I am wondering whether, in your present set-up, that situation would be automatic, pending the designation of the commanding officer for that place from among the three services, in the future. And do you not think it would be advisable if we could construct such a situation, either by an order or by law, if such an emergency, pending the designation of the commanding officer? Admiral SHERMAN. It is my hope, sir, that within the next few months the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be able to get out instructions covering that sort of a situation, which in most cases will provide a principle as to who will have the major responsibility. Senator TYDINGS. Who will be on top for the time being? Admiral SHERMAN. Yes. But as I said, if every other factor balances evenly, then seniority is the only thing. Senator TYDINGS. But it is your thought that if this unification goes through, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or some competent authority high up in the strategy of the Nation will promulgate certain rules that will automatically provide for a commanding officer where more than one branch of the service is present, pending the appointment specially of a commanding officer. Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir. Senator TYDINGS. So, do you think it is reasonable to assume that hereafter we will not be caught in a situation where the blame can be shifted, if something happens, from one to the other; but that automatically the blame will be fixed, if blame attaches, upon the commanding officer for a dereliction of duty or a mistake, or whatever the circumstance might be? And you feel it is not necessary to do that by law? In fact, it would be difficult to do that by law? Admiral SHERMAN. I think it would be extremely inadvisable to do it by law. I think that this particular legislation imposes on the Joint Chiefs of Staff the responsibility for creating the command organization that is required. Senator TYDINGS. Well, as a layman, I certainly would like to see them have some yardstick that could automatically apply, pending the designation of an officer who had command. Because, in future wars on a global scale, with weapons that we may not now know fully about, it seems to me advisable that something along that line be done; and particularly in reference to the Medical Corps, which might, under conceivable attack, have to have an authority which would have to be superior in some cases, even to that of the fighting services. Admiral SHERMAN. I quite agree that it would be well to have a completely clarified section in that regard. Senator ROBERTSON. In regard to what the Senator has been asking, particularly in regard to Pearl Harbor, there was a distinct impression with regard to the harbor that when the fleet is in harbor the responsibility for protecting the fleet falls upon the Army command at the particular point where the harbor is located. Is that true? Admiral SHERMAN. Well, sir, it is my impression that at that timeand I have not refreshed my memory of that particular situation recently-that responsibility lay between the local Army commander and the district commandant, and that it was largely with the Army commander. At the present time the directive which was sent out in December, which was, in turn, similar to the directives in force all during the war, provides unified command and unified responsibility in all areas outside the United States. And we are working, as a matter of priority on resolving the problem of unified command within the continental United States. For instance, upon receipt of that directive in December Admiral Towers designated officers to exercise unified command in every group of islands, every island, every atoll within the area for which he was responsible. General MacArthur has done likewise. Senator ROBERTSON. Admiral Towers, to make the record clear, was the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet? Admiral SHERMAN. He is under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Now, Admiral Denfeld is in command of that Pacific command, which in 60266-47-pt. 1- 11 |