General EISENHOWER. I said that there are certain minor economies he could make instantly. But I could expect, as the years go on, 2, 3, or 4 years, real and definite economies that you can see and appreciate and understand. The ones that he could make now, in the absence of long study and examination, I would class as minor compared to what can be done, and compared to the great sums that you are now forced to appropriate for these nonproductive organizations. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Saltonstall?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask just one question of the general.

Do I properly sum up what you feel about a man who would be the proper man for a Secretary of National Defense, by saying that he is a man of intelligence, ability to make judgments, and above all the ability to reach and execute a decision?

General EISENHOWER. That is right, sir; and interested in the United States, and not in the color of my cloth, or the color of Admiral Nimitz' cloth. And I decry this thought that I am looking for a combination of St. Peter and Napoleon. You are not going to find him, but you can find honest, straightforward men that you are concerned with the welfare of this country, and I will take his decisionand I know everybody in the Army feels the same way-just as cheerfully as if the President of the United States walked into my office and told me what to do.

Senator BRIDGES. You feel that it is of advantage to get a decision, even if it is a wrong decision?

General EISENHOWER. The whole history of warfare proves that point. And every man who comes here wearing a uniform will testify identically; I have not talked to one of them, but I know.

In warfare, any decision is better than none.

Senator BRIDGES. Is any decision better than a little delay in getting the right decision?

General EISENHOWER. Oh, do not have the picture of the general or the admiral in war, who suddenly, out of the brilliance of his thinking, says, "We will attack the enemy," or anything of that kind. There are long studies necessary, that run into months. Every possible thing is done; but finally decisions are made, and then the element of strength of character becomes important. Will you stick to your plan? You cannot do it unless there is one man who is holding the reins, who tells you where you have to go.

Senator BRIDGES. If we had had this one man in the war just past, would we have won the war in a much shorter period and with much less loss?

General EISENHOWER. I am not going to give you any guesses as to what could have happened in Washington. Personally, I think Washington, by and large, did a good job. But I should think this: that a critical analysis of every single thing that was done in the war, both in the field and in Washington, will uncover many delays that occurred because of the necessity of waiting and waiting for decisions after all the evidence was in.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any more questions?

Thank you very much, General.

The committee intended to have the testimony of Admiral Nimitz follow that of General Eisenhower, but the committee was informed

that Admiral Nimitz would not arrive in Washington until this evening.

Now, we had scheduled General Spaatz to follow General Eisenhower, and we will follow that procedure, unless Admiral Nimitz wants to testify now. That is at your pleasure, Admiral.

Admiral NIMITZ. I am at your service, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, if it would be all right with you, I think we would have more time at the next meeting, so that you could have the full hour and a half, or whatever is necessary. I think that General Spaatz can accommodate himself to the remainder of the time that we have this morning. So if it is all right with you, we will hear from General Spaatz next.

STATEMENT OF GEN. CARL SPAATZ, COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES, WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

General SPAATZ. Mr. Chairman, I have a prepared statement. The CHAIRMAN. That is fine. You may proceed in your own way with the prepared statement, and then we will undoubtedly have some questions afterward.

General SPAATZ. The Air Force supports this bill.

The bill proposes that our country make timely use of the lessons learned in the last war. A most important lesson is that we must think about national security now, and not wait for another Pearl Harbor.

It proposes that we be strong where we have been organizationally weak, or where we have become strong only after war had started, and then only at great cost in time, lives, and resources.

It proposes more efficient employment of our country's talent, in the interest of security for all.

It proposes certain new functions which are absolute requirements for the existence of a great nation in the technical era of air power and atomic energy.

National security is a larger concept than military defense. For security we must have the proper state of mind-a feeling of confidence that we have the capacity to defend ourselves against any enemies, whoever, whatever, wherever they might be, and at any moment they might choose to attack,

No physical Maginot line can give that sense of security. Confidence comes from belief in our ability to use our resources, our arsenals of production, our manpower, at the decisive moment.

Confidence in our national security can be assured by an organization which provides for strategic planning and unified action; for development of our capabilities and knowledge of our possible enemies; and for military readiness.

The bill provides for unified action. The National Security Council permits the integration of our military and foreign policies.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, under the direction of the President and the Secretary for National Defense, will insure long-range strategic planning and unified action of our military forces when necessary.

It was not so necessary to anticipate events in the preair age. But in the era of air power and atomic bombs, we do need long-range strategy and unified action.

The bill provides for the fullest development of our capabilities in economics and science.

This will be the responsibility of the three boards to be established by the bill: The Research and Development Board, the National Security Resources Board, and the Munitions Board.

The knowledge produced by this combined effort will be available to all services. Full freedom of inquiry and full exploitation of the results can only come by organized pooling of scientific knowledge.

During World War II our production astonished. American citizens as well as our enemies. Our allies made us a gift of 2 years' time, however, in which to make this production ready for battle. In the future that productive capacity can have a greater diplomatic usefulness for the prevention of war, provided it is organized for action, instead of being a potential requiring years to develop.

The bill provides for enlargement of our capacity to know the capabilities of our possible enemies-how they can attack us, and with what. The Central Intelligence Agency will serve all branches of the Defense Establishment.

The bill enhances our capacity for military readiness, the essence of security.

One requirement for readiness is new weapons which are most likely to be decisive. Air weapons, existing and possible, are characterized by a constantly increasing power of destruction, by increasing speed, by lengthening range, and by greater facility for technical and tactical surprise than ever before.

Another requirement for readiness is control of the air wherever our national security might be exposed to attack.

The bill provides the organization for this purpose by giving the Air Force equal status with the Army and Navy under the Secretary of National Defense.

To have the confidence required by national security we must be able to control all approaches to our country.

Our capability for prompt and decisive air retaliation must be instantaneous. Such action must be closely coordinated with the Army and Navy to enable us either to capture, or to destroy by air bombardment, the launching sites on enemy territory from which might come airplanes, or guided missiles, or submarines.

In the last war, the Germans had perfected orthodox methods. They seemed impregnable on the Continent. The only way to break the will of their high command was to destroy its capacity for war. The chief flank the Germans had left exposed was the air. But to carry out the great bomber offensives necessary to destroy German's capacity in key industries, we had first to gain control of the air. That required 212 years of build-up of force after Pearl Harbor. We won this control by destroying the enemy's air power in the air, on the ground, and in the factories.

Thereafter, the destruction by bombardment of the enemy's warmaking potential made possible the invasion without prohibitive losses, insured our surface advance, and gave freedom of action to all forces-land, sea, and air.

In modern warfare, there is the land battle, the sea battle, and the air battle. For victory all must be closely integrated.

Our battle experience of nearly 4 years proved that control of the air is gained most economically by the employment of air forces

operating under a single command. A single command also insures flexibility, which gives, among other things, a capacity to concentrate overwhelming force where it is needed.

This conclusion is accepted by all other major nations of the world. They have established their air forces on a basis of parity with their armies and their navies.

We believe this bill meets the requirements of national security. It provides for integrated strategic planning and for unified action. It gives us an organization which will insure national security with increased efficiency and greater economy.

It is a positive step toward the prevention of war.

As representative of the Army Air Forces, and personally, I wholeheartedly support this bill for unification of the armed services as recommended by the President.

I would like to make an informal statement. In the opinion of the Air Forces, in setting up this bill, there will be no duplicating services necessary provided there is a single Secretary with power to insure that the proper servicing is given to the Air Forces.

Without such a single Secretary there can be no such assurance and the natural evolution would be the establishment by the Air Forces of their own services.

The CHAIRMAN. What you are thinking about is undoubtedly your own hospitals, procurement system, quartermaster corps?

General SPAATZ. Yes, sir; for instance, the Quartermaster Corps of the Army will buy our quartermaster supplies for us.

The CHAIRMAN. By that you mean if you were not getting the supplies you needed, then you could come to the Secretary of National Defense and tell him your troubles and problems and he could have a combined meeting that they were forthcoming in the future?

General SPAATZ. Yes, sir; and we have full confidence that under a single Secretary the services will be forthcoming from the Army or Navy-whichever one provides the service that is required.

The CHAIRMAN. I have one more question which I have in mind: A carrier is no good without airplanes. Do you feel that the Navy should have an air unit under their command, a balanced fighting force, and they should have complete control of the carrier, together with the carrier airplanes?

General SPAATZ. Yes, sir; I believe that the carrier planes and the carrier are a naval function.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the answer I was looking for, General Spaatz.

Senator SALTONSTALL. One of the great issues, as I understand it, is the question of the Navy with land-based airplanes, and the guarding of our shores.

Has that been worked out satisfactorily?

General SPAATZ. It has been in the proposed Executive order on roles and missions. It has been worked out satisfactorily from the Air Force's point of view provided there is a Secretary with sufficient power in his hands to insure carrying out of paragraph e on page 2, which I might read into the record:

Naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, and protection of shipping.
That is a Navy responsibility.

The air aspects of those functions shall be coordinated with the Air Force, including the development and procurement of aircraft and air installations

located on shore, and use shall be made of Air Force personnel, equipment, and facilities in all cases where economy and effectiveness will thereby be increased. Subject to the above provision, the Navy will not be restricted as to types of aircraft maintained and operated for these purposes.

With that written into the roles and missions, there can be no possibility of unwarranted duplication of the large land-based airplanes, which are the most expensive. It will insure the equipment needed by the Navy for the antisubmarine protection. As for any augmentation of the force which may be necessary from our strategic bombers, the machinery is set up so that the Air Force in case of emergency can assist the Navy, operating, of course, under their operational control. Our strategic airplanes would have this function, not as a primary role, but as a secondary role. This would meet emergencies too great to be handled by the antisubmarine planes in existence in the Navy.

Senator SALTONSTALL. You mentioned, General, antisubmarine. What I had in mind was the example of a bomber coming over the Atlantic. The Navy would have the duty of scouting that bomber, but if it came over Canada and down to Chicago, the Army would have the duty of scouting that bomber. Is there a line in between there?

General SPAATZ. I do not believe you are going to do much scouting for bombers coming across large areas of water. There might be shipping out there on the alert which would report the progress of the bomber; but to meet the bomber out in midocean, I believe, would be a rather expensive method of defense.

Senator SALTONSTALL. That is a rather poor example, but for an enemy that comes over the ocean, the Navy has the duty of scouting; for an enemy that comes over Canada, we will say, or the northern part of the Arctic, the Army would have to do the scouting?

General SPAATZ. The Navy has the mission of control of the seas. Senator SALTONSTALL. That is a difficult line in this unification. General SPAATZ. If we had fighter planes on the coast of Massachusetts, and the fighter planes could go out 500 miles to sea and attack a bomber, we would not necessarily hold them until the bomber got close to Boston before attacking it. We will not admit any restriction in operating our Air Forces to the limit of their capability, either offensively or defensively.

It is an Air Force responsibility in the Executive order on roles and missions to provide the means for coordination of air defense among all services.

Senator BRIDGES. General Spaatz, in your testimony you have the same confidence in human nature that our very distinguished Chief of Staff apparently has. You have full faith in the super Secretary and in your ability to get a fair decision out of such a man even though you will be entirely subordinate to him.

General SPAATZ. The Secretary is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of Congress, and, furthermore, the President prescribes the roles and missions for the Army, Navy, and Air Forces. The Secretary cannot change those roles and missions without going to the President. There is a further check on the Secretary when he comes to Congress with his budget. The Congress controls the armed forces through the budget or through any law they may want to write.

Senator BRIDGES. How long do you think the Secretary of Air would last if he came up here and testified contrary to the super Secretary?