1

off that fubterfuge, I will ask why the contemplation of the Son's perfections, which are fuppofed to be fully equal to those of the Father, and whose energy of contemplation must likewife be fuppofed equal to that of the Father, does not produce another intelligent being equal to himself; and why are not perfons in the Godhead in this manner multiplied ad infinitum ?

If, for any incomprehenfible reason, this mysterious power of generation be peculiar to the Father, why does it not ftill operate? Is he not an unchangeable being, the fame now that he was from the beginning, his perfections the fame, and his power of contemplating them the fame? Why then are not more fons produced?. Is he become ayor, incapable of this generation, as the orthodox Fathers used to afk; or does it depend upon his will and pleasure whether he will exert this power of generation? If so, is not the Son as much a' creature, depend ing on the will of the creator,, as any thing elfe produced by him,, though in another and this whether he be of the fame fubftance (opt) with him, or not?

manner;

I should alfo like to know in what many ner the third perfon in the trinity was produced. Was it by the joint.exertion of the two first, in the contemplation of their refpective perfections? If fo, why does not the fame operation in them produce a fourth, &c. &c. &c. .

Admitting, however, this ftrange account of the generation of the trinity (equal in abfurdity to any thing in the Jewish cabala) viz. that the perfonal exiftence of the Son neceffarily flows from the intellect of the Father exerted on itself; it certainly implies a virtual priority, or fuperiority in the Father with refpect to the Son; and no being can be properly God, who has any fuperior. In short, this fcheme effectually overturns the doctrine of the proper equality, as well as the unity of the three perfons in the trinity.

SECTION

SECTION V.

Of the Nature of the Arian Hypothefis, and of the Proof which is necessary to make it credible.

ΤΗ

THE doctrine of the trinity may be reduced, as has been fhewn, to a proper contradiction, or a mathematical impoffibility, which is incapable of proof, even by miracles. This cannot be faid of the Arian hypothefis. Because, for any thing that we certainly know, God might have created one being of fuch extraordinary power, as fhould make it unneceffary for him to exert any more creative power; fo that all that remained of creation might be delegated to that great derived being. But it is highly improbable that this fhould have been the cafe. And the more improbable, a priori, any propofition is, on account of its want of analogy to other propofitions, the truth of which is admitted, the clearer and ftronger evidence we require before we give our affent to it. This improbability

may

may be so great, as to approach very nearly to an impoffibility. At least the impreffion made upon the mind will hardly be diftinguished in the two cafes, and the refiftanceto affent fhall be, in a manner, as great in the one as in the other. Confequently,

though the doctrine be not incapable of proof by miracles, yet it will be necessary that the propofition which contains it, be very clearly expreffed, that the miracles alledged in fupport of it be well authenticated, and that the connexion between the miracles and the propofition be very particularly eftablished. Let us now confider whether this be the case with refpect to the Arian doctrine.

1. There is fomething in the doctrine itfelf, which, if we were not accustomed to it, would appear exceedingly revolting. Such, certainly, is the idea of any being in human form, who was born, grew up, and died like other men ;, requiring the refreshments of food, reft, and fleep, &c. having been the maker, and while he was on earth, and asleep, the supporter and governor of the world. Had fuch an opi

nion been firft propofed in the present ftate of philofophy, it would have been rejected without farther examination.

That Chrift emptied himself of his former glory and power, and did not fuftain the world during his abode on earth, is quite a modern opinion; and, on that ac count only, can never be received as the original and genuine doctrine of chriftianity. Besides, this hypothefis is of itself as improbable as the other. For it may reasonably be asked, Who fupplied the place of Chrift in the government of the world, when his office was fufpended? If the fupreme Being himself undertook it, what reason can there be imagined why he should not himself have always done it? And yet, if there was a reason, in the nature of things, why this work fhould be done by another, and not by the fupreme Being himself, that reafon must have fubfifted while Chrift was on earth as well as before. But the Arian hypothefis provides no other created being, of rank and power equal to that of Chrift, to undertake his office when he should be disabled from