Mr. GUHIN. Well, again I think it is the question of mandate. I think we have a responsibility to look at these questions, as exemplified in the review and review procedures which have been set forth, and to understand the significant health, safety, and environmental effects that are associated with that export. I am not sure it is our position to be able to mandate, and I think one has to be cautious about making judgments on the particular levels or degrees to which other countries may or may not, in our view, match up to certain standards.

Now as I said, I think our reviews will outline where there are any significant discrepancies and that we should be aware of that. These in themselves may suggest further efforts on our part or more cooperative programs, and may suggest that we approach other countries on this and have discussions. I think that is different, however, again than the mandating question. I think that the mandating question could put us again in a mode of judgment in an area which is really getting beyond our responsibility and possibly beyond our capability without substantially more expenditure.

Mr. GILMAN. Then really we don't have a policy with regard to nuclear exports and requiring that some safety procedures and training be available before a plant is established in a foreign land; is that right?

Mr. GUMIN. I wouldn't go quite that far, sir. I think the very question that these reviews are supposed to address is whether or not the health, safety, and environmental effects are being taken into account in that project and the regulatory agency and body that is dealing with these questions. And if we look at the areas which this review is to address, I think you should come away from that or the reviewer, the person making the decision, should come away with the feeling whether or not the questions are being adequately addressed by the recipient country.

As I said, if he has outstanding questions this may lead to further consultations or programs. If he has not and the questions seem to be taken into account adequately, then it would be taken into account in that light. But it is hard to preindge, again in the abstract. The review should address any basic differences and these would have to be taken into account by the decisionmaker in making his decision.

WHO ARE THE DECISION MAKERS ?

Mr. GILMAN. Who makes that kind of decision?

Mr. GUHIN. The export recommendation on the reactor is usually made in the executive branch, in the Department of State, at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level in the OES Bureau. As you know under the procedures, however, the concise review would be prepared with outside help and with technical input from the various agencies. And this review would then be distributed to the Department of Energy, EPA, and other technical agencies with a view to having them review it and with a view to having input or comment on it. So we hope to get as wide a scope of inputs as possible.

Mr. GILMAN. There are criteria then with regard to the safety management that are taken into consideration when the policymaker makes his decision?

Mr. GUHIN. I would not define them as criteria. One I noted earlier, for example, was how do their standards match up against internationally recognized standards? That is not to say it is a criterion in the sense that if they fall short in some areas there is a criterion that says they cannot fall short.

What it is giving the decisionmaker is a picture of where they do match up and where they don't. It is like a variety of areas: the importance of that difference will be decided by the decisionmaker in taking that document into account. If it is a minor discrepancy, I suspect it would mean very little. If one came up with a very large discrepancy, I suspect it would call for further consultations in working with or, as a minimum, advising and informing another country that we have outstanding questions about certain things.

Mr. GILMAN. It seems to be a very loose process. I hope there is a great deal more regulatory requirement than what you are spelling out. Thank you.

Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you very much, Mr. Guhin. We appreciate your being with us today.

The next two witnesses we will hear are Mr. Jacob Scherr, staff attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, and Mr. Lindsay Mattison, director, Center for Development Policy.

Mr. Scherr, would you begin?

STATEMENT OF S. JACOB SCHERR, STAFF ATTORNEY, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL

Mr. SCHERR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am Jacob Scherr, an attorney with the Natural Resources Defense Council. NRDC is a national public-interest environmental protection organization, with a membership of over 45,000 persons in the United States and some 21 foreign countries. For the last 5 years NRDC has been actively concerned about the threat of weapons proliferation and other environmental risks posed by U.S. nuclear exports. NRDC has been involved in litigation, participated in administrative proceedings, and presented congressional testimony on several occasions concerning U.S. nonproliferation and nuclear export policies. On behalf of NRDC, I would like to thank the subcommittee for this opportunity to present our views regarding health, safety and other environmental risks associated with U.S. sales abroad of nuclear reactors and equipment.

Mr. Chairman, I submitted a written statement for which I would request your permission to include in the record.

Mr. BINGHAM. Without objection, Mr. Scherr's statement will appear in full.

Mr. SCHERR. A few days after the Three Mile Island nuclear accident, I was struck by a photograph which appeared in the Washington Post, taken at a large, peaceful demonstration in West Germany against the proposed Corleben reprocessing facility. The picture was of a banner which read, "We all live in Pennsylvania." Indeed, the risks posed by nuclear power are shared by the people of Germany, the United States, and all other nations.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION THREAT

The great threat is that the expanding use of peaceful atomic energy will lead to the spread of nuclear weapons and with it a highly increased risk of nuclear war. The explosion of a nuclear device by India in 1974 shattered the dream of the exclusively peaceful atom. The nonproliferation initiatives of the United States during the last few years have focused upon the proliferation dangers posed by sensitive reprocessing and enrichment facilities and the presence of weapons-grade materials, such as plutonium and highly enriched uranium, in the civilian fuel cycle.

This is a difficult, complex problem of our own making. With the sales abroad of nuclear reactors comes the inevitable drive in other countries for energy independence, whether or not it is economically feasible. India, Pakistan, and Brazil have all used this as a justification for their own efforts to acquire sensitive reprocessing or enrichment facilities and technology, which also can be used to produce nuclear weapons.

Second, there is the dilemma of radioactive waste disposal. This is a common problem for 40 nations which have already embarked upon atomic energy programs. It also has a broader transnational dimension. A number of nations will have no choice but to ship their nuclear wastes elsewhere due to high population densities or the lack of suitable geological formations. At present, the only option for some of these countries is reprocessing services offered by France or Great Britain, which provide at least temporary relief from the problem. Yet the problem of radioactive waste disposal has not been solved anywhere in the world and remains a major factor in public resistance to nuclear energy. It contributed to the rejection of nuclear power by Austrian voters in 1978 and to the recent decision of President Marcos to order an indefinite suspension in the construction of the Westinghouse reactor there. It may be imposisble to locate any suitable sites on land, and there will be greater pressures to dump radioactive wastes into the oceans or to implant them in the deep seabeds. Both of these options pose significant environmental risks for the global environ

ment.

NUCLEAR HEALTH AND SAFETY RISKS

Third, the sales of U.S. reactors abroad also carry with them health and safety risks. In some cases, such as in the Philippines, the population living close to a U.S.-supplied nuclear powerplant might include a substantial number of American citizens. In any event, a major accident would have severe implications for U.S. interests.

PAST U.S. POSITIONS

Today I would like to focus primarily on the health, safety, and environmental aspects of U.S. nuclear exports, other than those related to proliferation. Until recently, the position of the United States Government was that the importing country had sole responsibility for the health and safety of its people and the protection of its own environment. Sales abroad of U.S. reactors were characterized as commercial

transactions involving only a U.S. reactor manufacturer and a foreign utility. It was thus up to the foreign regulatory agency to perform the necessary health, safety, and environmental reviews. Any protective control by the U.S. Government was labeled as an unwelcome intrusion upon national sovereignty.

This line of reasoning is based upon a number of false assumptions. First, the U.S. Government is, in fact, deeply involved in every stage of the nuclear powerplant export process, which begins with the negotiation of a government-to-government agreement for cooperation, which establishes the framework for the sale of nuclear powerplants and fuel. The U.S. State Department in the past has actively promoted the sales abroad of nuclear reactors. Since 1954, the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency persuaded a number of nations that they need nuclear power in order to meet their energy needs.

The United States continues to provide enrichment services for foreign reactors through the Department of Energy and financing for reactor and fuel exports through the U.S. Export-Import Bank. Finally, all reactor exports must be licensed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

The second assumption is that foreign governments have the capability to assure the safe construction and operation of reactors. While this may be true in the case of other industrialized nations with large nuclear programs, sinaller and developing countries are ill equipped to assure effective regulation of nuclear power.

As pointed out at a March 1978 IAEA international symposium on problems associated with the export of nuclear powerplants, developing country governments typically lack an appreciation of the hazards posed by nuclear energy. They have a tendency to hold regulatory agency budgets at very low levels in spite of ambitious plans for nuclear power expansion. As a result, there is an inadequate number of skilled regulatory personnel. Finally, regulatory agencies are often placed within other government departments and thus lack the independence necessary for assuring the health and safety of the public. Dr. Morris Rosen of the nuclear safety section of the IAEA has stated that:

At the present time, with little exception, the regulatory organizations of developing countries with active nuclear programmes can be classified as subminimal. In many cases they consist of less than 15 fulltime staff members associated with nuclear power activities. This minimal staff may not be familiar with disciplines of nuclear safety and may be in need of extensive training.

According to a survey taken by the U.S. Export-Import Bank, the prospects for U.S. nuclear sales in the 1980's include Korea, Taiwan, Mexico, and Yugoslavia. All of these countries, with the addition of the Philippines, have very weak regulatory units. In Korea, the government has failed to fund the recommended organization of a regulatory agency. In Mexico, the nuclear regulatory body, the INEN, has been forced by construction schedules to make licensing decisions without evaluating all relevant safety considerations. In Yugoslavia, the regulatory body has been described as "practically nonexistent." In the Philippines, both the regulator and the utility are under the control of the same ministry.

IAEA HAS POOR RECORD

A third assumption is that the U.S. nuclear suppliers can be relied upon to provide importing countries with adequate data and assistance in making regulatory and other decisions about nuclear powerplants. In 1972, an official of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission wrote that:

U.S. manufacturers have extremely poor records of information disclosure to foreign purchasers; they term many items as proprietary which are readily made available to [us]. Designs at times do not reflect all the regulatory items required in the U.S.; at times, design innovations are first tried by U.S. manufacturers in overseas reactors.

U.S. manufacturers normally deal with foreign utility companies, and short cut their assistance to foreign governmental control groups, which are sometimes in weak governmental positions

There does not appear to have been any appreciable change in the situation. In 1978, Dr. Morris Rosen of the IAEA urged reactor exporters to be more candid during the initial project contract stage about safety and regulatory aspects of nuclear powerplants. He emphasized that exporters should not imply that the proposed plant could be licensed in the country of origin, stating that "removal of this myth of licensability would add emphasis to the need for technical competence and an adequate and well-trained regulatory body in the importer country."

As noted earlier, the U.S. Government has in the past professed a rigid legal posture that no health, safety or environmental reviews are required of nuclear reactor exports. Yet in practice, there has been an inevitable, albeit ad hoc, U.S. Government involvement in foreign nuclear health and safety matters. Lacking the capability to develop their own standards, smaller and less industrialized countries have no choice but to rely upon the standards and practices of the exporting country. A number of countries have actively sought U.S. regulatory assistance.

FOREIGN COMPLAINTS ABOUT U.S. PLANTS

In the early 1970's, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission was drawn into a dispute between the Indian AEC and the General Electric Company over problems at the Tarapur Atomic Power Station. Defective fuel bundles supplied by General Electric had led to widespread contamination of the plant and high radioactivity levels. The Indians later complained bitterly to the U.S. AEC about inadequate designs, sketchy training, and poor service from GE.

This incident led to U.S. AEC Commissioner James Ramey to warn GE to be especially careful in setting up a nuclear plant in Mexico, stating that "GE should pay particular attention to assuring there is an adequate operations and maintenance staff, whether or not they have a contractual obligation to do so."

In September 1976, the then head of the Philippine Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), Dr. Ibe, turned not to the IAEA but rather to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a request for a review of the preliminary site investigation report for their first nuclear powerplant. It was noted that PAEC had "neither the depth of technical expertise nor breadth of experience" to evaluate the report. The