We are taking our standard, current, highly capable helicopter LAMPS III, the SH-60. We will leave out of the configuration all of the expensive multimission and passive acoustic avionics. We will leave out the radar, the electronic support measures, the passive acoustic processors, the two-way data links, and instead install a standard dipping sonar that is being developed in another development program.

It is a minimal R&D program, simply marrying the dipping sonar to the highly capable LAMPS III helicopter; very low risk. It will result in our having a standard helicopter in the fleet, since by having these helicopters on the carrier-and thus having an intermediate maintenance activity on the carriers-even our LAMPS helicopters on destroyers will work better because they will have the availability of this intermediate maintenance.

With that, if I may, I will leave that subject until we get into closed session and I can get into more detail on the more classified aspects, and go to the question of management of missile defense in ships.

This has, as Mr. Paisley said, been brought into the forefront by the experiences in the Falklands.

Senator COHEN. I notice in Mr. Paisley's statement he indicates on page 7 that "After extensive analysis, we have concluded that the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps team would have been well prepared for a similar challenge."

That does not say very much because I don't view the kind of operation that the Argentines launched against the British to be the kind of magnitude that we are supposed to be prepared for. To say we could have met a similar challenge does not give me very high confidence we have that much greater competence that that statement would indicate.

Mr. PAISLEY. We looked at it from the viewpoint of having to commit a major portion of our forces against an escalated capability of that type-

Senator COHEN. The Argentines had a minimal capability, do you agree?

Mr. PAISLEY. Not necessarily. I think the air threat was a real air threat. It was not minimal. If it had been minimal, they would not have got through like they did.

Senator COHEN. They got through because the British had no air cover to speak of. They also had limited capability on their aircraft carrier.

Mr. PAISLEY. If you are talking about meeting a Soviet threat to be considerably greater than that launched by the ArgentinesSenator COHEN. I am stating that to be well prepared for a similar challenge does not tell me a lot in terms of our capability.

Mr. PAISLEY. What I had in mind when I said that is if the threat would come under a larger air attack, and that is what I mean by similar attack, of much larger magnitude. There wasn't anything in that threat that we saw that we are not prepared to deal with. There were no surprises in the threat. I will say this, that it reminded us of some things that we know, that we ought to be working a little harder on. Two of them in particular I think.

One of them which Bob is going to address in a minute is one associated with adequate testing with target vehicles, particularly

the sea-skimming threat. Fundamental to such a threat coupled with that is having a fuze capability to engage a very low-flying missile. Out of that people ask me what did you get out of all of that review from an R&D viewpoint. I say there are two areas we must get more vigorous in, fuze research and our target vehicle program.

I will have Bob talk a little more on the target program.

ANTISHIP MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM

Admiral MONROE. I would like to start with a general inventory of our antiship missile defense systems. Of course, the ones that get the greater attention are the large systems like Aegis, which do cover the low-flying, close-in missile, but also cover an extremely large envelope reaching far out, handling extensive jamming, and having supersonic, subsonic, and multiple target capability. I will talk more about Aegis in a moment.

Second, we have a program called the New Threat Upgrade, which improves the capability of our existing missile ships, the Terrier and Tartar ships, to enable them to remain effective at the altitude, speed, and jamming levels to which the threat has migrated.

Once you get into closer range systems-and this area of antiair warfare is analogous to the last ditch ASW defense of the dipping sonar helicopter that I was describing-we have the NATO SeaSparrow system which uses Sparrow missiles upgraded to the RIM7M, monopulse Sparrow, with much greater effectiveness in electronic warfare. We are putting the Target Acquisition System, or TAS, in as the front end of this NATO Seasparrow system on the ships that have the system.

We are well along in development and testing of the 5-inch rolling airframe missile, which is a dual-mode missile. Again, I will talk more in closed session, but the testing to date has shown this system to be remarkably effective. Prior to the Falklands we probably were indecisive as to whether to go into production on this missile after we had developed it. We now are quite firm about that.

The close-in weapons system, the Vulcan-Phalanx, a high-rate-offire gun, is not only being put in our ships more rapidly, but it is being upgraded to give it better attack algorithms, better reliability, better maintainability, and better elevation angle of use.

The SLQ-32 electronic countermeasures system, which is going into ships in large numbers, is extremely quick in its detection of an incoming missile threat, allowing us to place Super RBOC Chaff which is very effective in decoying missiles.

Finally, we are developing the NATO Sea Gnat system. So we have an entire spectrum of antiship missile defenses, which have been funded for 10 years and more, and are moving rapidly through the pipeline and into the fleet today in numbers, as well as being improved.

Let us talk a minute about testing. I will use Aegis as an example. How much you test, when you test, and against what you test, are issues requiring a high degree of judgment. You can easily test something to exhaustion in an R&D stage, hold all production until

you finish, and then start in with tooling, long-lead material, and pilot production, and by the time you get the actual production model in the fleet you find you have had to make so many changes to upgrade it to meet the changing threat that what is produced finally is not what was tested at all. So, that is not a good solution.

On the other hand, too little testing is a direct road to disaster. The Government then has to buy every system twice, once when it doesn't work and once again when it does. What you have to do is strike the right balance of testing. Aegis, which has gotten a lot of attention in the press lately, is a good example to use in describing test phases. The balance that was struck in that case was a very reasonable balance in my judgment.

We put the first engineering development model, EDM-1, to sea 8 years ago in the Norton Sound, a test ship that we kept in inventory specifically to test Aegis. We have gotten many tens of thousands of hours of operation of that system at sea.

We have fired over 100 missiles, and again I won't go into the exact number, at targets that range from high supersonic speed to subsonic, from high altitude to low altitude, in jamming environments, against multiple targets, and so on, testing that system and that capability about as well as could be done in that configuration. Senator COHEN. You tested Aegis against a supersonic seaskimming target?

Admiral MONROE. I will say no in this open session. I would like to amplify the answer in closed session because it requires a qualified answer.

Senator COHEN. It was not clear from your statement a moment ago that you had tested against high-flying supersonic, low-flying subsonic, the combination arrived at was seaskimming supersonic. Admiral MONROE. The question of how low is low

Mr. PAISLEY. We will cover that definitely, Mr. Chairman. Admiral MONROE [continuing]. Is important to this issue; and what the profile is and how low is that low altitude.

We then developed another engineering development model, EDM-3, and built an entire shore site at Morristown and we have been testing some 7 years at that site with multiple targets and jamming. We do not fire missiles from that shoresite, but it gives you the capability of doing many kinds of testing better than you can do at sea.

This month we are seeing the first Aegis ship Ticonderoga, at sea undergoing more realistic tests than have been done before. This is the final phase in knowing exactly what this weapon system will do.

I believe if we had gone from the balance in either directionthat of doing more testing before production, or that of earlier production with less testing, it would have been less effective than the course we are following.

TARGETS

I will close with 1 minute on targets. To develop a target that simulates a threat missile, particularly a newer, higher performance threat missile, is an extremely expensive proposition. Essen

tially the target has to be as good as the missile, only it has to have a lot more things.

It has to have instrumentation and miss distance indicators. It has to be controllable; and you have to have mechanisms for insuring that at the end of the engagement it doesn't destroy the ship you are shooting from; and you may wish to make it recoverable. So a target is even more difficult to develop than a threat missile which as you know, is a billion dollar program. We could easily bankrupt ourselves by going overboard with development of targets that exactly simulate every aspect of the threat.

What we try to do is: (1) Have a mix of targets that represents each of the most difficult segments of an enemy missile flight, whether it is low or high altitude, low or high speed, or transition from one regime to the other; (2) test those data points; and (3) use engineering analysis verified by test data for the other limitless possibilities.

We think we have a very good mix of targets. As Mr. Paisley said, we believe the recent changes in the characteristics of Soviet threat missiles are requiring us to develop some new capabilities in targets; and we have some target programs to do this; the Vandal program, and the Supersonic Low Altitude Target program. But the mix we have now is quite capable of allowing us to get an extensive amount of data on the performance of the system.

Mr. PAISLEY. With that, Mr. Chairman, I would like Admiral Nyquist to talk about the DDG-51.

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. J. W. NYQUIST, U.S. NAVY, DIRECTOR (SURFACE COMBAT SYSTEMS)

Admiral NYQUIST. Good morning, Mr. Chairman.

I know you have been briefed many times on the emerging Soviet threat and the emergence of the Soviet Navy as a blue water Navy. In preparing for this emerging threat, of course, the fundamental principles of naval warfare have not changed and that is to go to sea and fight at sea and win.

What has changed over time is the level of sophistication required to operate effectively in today's and tomorrow's environment. In these terms, although defense is necessary it is a credible offense that is decisive.

DDG-51

The Arleigh Burke destroyer, DDG-51, provides us with the opportunity to enhance this dimension of our deterrent and warwinning capability without sacrificing the other basic surface combatant missions. The ship will do so by providing significantly greater fire power volume deliverable at long range in support of both sea control and power projection roles.

This multipurpose combatant capability is required now and will continue to be needed as we enter the 21st century. the Arleigh Burke DDG-51 class is that multimission guided missile destroyer which will replace existing guided missile destroyers which face obsolescence commencing in the late eighties.

She is designed to operate, in addition to operating as a full fledged member of the battle force, with surface action groups or in support of replenishment and amphibious groups.

She is designed with better survivability than her predecessors in vital areas such as combat information center, radio rooms, and magazines located deep within the hull and protected by additional

armor.

The ship will combine the best features of current design and newly developed systems. The prime feature of this destroyer is its state-of-the-art multifunction SPY-1D phased array radar four fixed antenna arrays providing long-range multiple detection in clear and hostile environments and I emphasize here capability in a jamming environment.

In addition to the Aegis combat system, additional defense in depth against antiship cruise missiles will include two Phalanx close-in weapon systems and SLQ-32 electronic warfare systems along with decoy launchers.

She has significant ASW capability. She has the SQR-19 integrated tactical towed array sonar and our newest active sonar, the SQS-53C.

In addition to these organic ASW systems, the ship will be able to land, launch, and control the LAMPS Mark III ASW helicopter. Long-range strike and antisurface warfare capability will be provided by vertically launched Tomahawk and Canister-launched Harpoon missiles.

Semiactive laser guided projectiles will enhance naval gunfire support operations and close-in surface engagement. We strongly believe that the DDG-51 is designed as the multimission surface combatant of the future which best incorporates the balance between required warfighting capability and affordability and represents the most versatile and least costly destroyer option available to us.

Mr. PAISLEY. With that, Mr. Chairman, I would like to turn to Adm. Steve Hostettler to wind up this session, to talk about the Tomahawk program.

Admiral HOSTETTLER. Mr. Chairman, I am well aware that you realize that Tomahawk is not a weapon system, but a mix of several variant weapon systems.

The flexibility of employment of those variant systems from our naval surface and subsurface platforms in surgical strikes, major engagements at sea, or against land forces will add an impressive and much needed offensive capability to our Navy.

All three of the Navy variants are scheduled for deployment on a variety of Navy platforms, attack submarines, cruisers, destroyers, and battleships and in several different modes-armored box launchers and vertical launch systems from surface ships, as well as from torpedo tubes and vertical launch capsules from our submarines.

This extremely versatile and densely packed family of weapons will provide our naval forces with a new dimension in naval warfare a dimension that will allow virtually all Navy combatants, not just the carrier battle groups, to go on the offensive whenever necessary and from any corner of the globe. Over 150 Tomahawkcapable platforms are planned for by the mid-1990's.